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The life and letters of
James Martineau

THE
LIFE AND LETTERS
OF
JAMES MARTINEAU



James Madison

1751-1836

Portrait by Gilbert Stuart, 1800

THE
LIFE AND LETTERS
OF
JAMES MARTINEAU

LL.D., S.T.D., Etc.

BY
JAMES DRUMMOND, M.A., LL.D., HON. LITT.D.

Principal of Manchester College, Oxford

AUTHOR OF THE HIBBERT LECTURES, "VIA, VERITAS, VITA" AND
OTHER WORKS

AND A SURVEY OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL WORK

BY
C. B. UPTON, B.A., B.Sc.

Professor of Philosophy in Manchester College, Oxford

AUTHOR OF THE HIBBERT LECTURES ON "THE BASES OF
RELIGIOUS BELIEF"

WITH PORTRAITS.

IN TWO VOLUMES

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LIFE OF DR. MARTINEAU

Chapter VIII

PRINCIPALSHIP OF MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE, 1869-1885

ON the decease of Mr. Tayler, Mr. Martineau was, as a matter of course, appointed Principal of Manchester New College; and if any jealousy of his influence still lingered here and there, it remained silent, and he was able to enter on his new duties without protest. He was now in his sixty-fifth year; but his mental powers were still at the height of their efficiency, and his mass of dark hair, his beardless face, his erect figure, and his quick, elastic step, gave the impression of a much younger man. The new Professor, who had been one of his own pupils, and afterwards for ten years the colleague of the Rev. William Gaskell in Cross Street Chapel, Manchester, was the youngest son of his old friend Dr. Drummond, of Dublin, and was received and invariably treated by him with a kindness and consideration never to be forgotten. It was thought by some of the students that at this time he became more accessible, and that henceforward a warmer feeling of affection was added to the more distant admiration which was formerly felt towards him, and at least one student who was then at the College thought the change so marked as to indicate a spiritual crisis in his life. It may be, however, that, as Principal, he felt it to be incumbent upon him to throw off, as far as possible,

his natural reserve, and open his mind more freely to the young men who were placed under his charge.

In his home the first faint shadows of approaching trouble already began to be perceptible. Mrs. Martineau had felt acutely the separation from her old Liverpool friends, and it was remarked that her warm-hearted and sympathetic nature experienced some depression in passing into the new world of London. Her husband's work and responsibility were now necessarily increased, and she wrote to a friend, on June 16, 1869, as though in presentiment of a coming illness: "Our life becomes more and more complicated and intense, till I feel the thread *must* snap or tangle soon. My husband's wonderful calm and arrangement and grasp and power of work carry him through all, while *I* quiver and gasp, and suffer the more the less I really do."

About this time he became acquainted with the Tennysons, who had been reading the "Endeavours after the Christian Life." Mrs. Tennyson wrote in her Journal on November 1: "Dr. Martineau came. He struck us as having a subtle and wonderful mind; he is mournful and tender-looking, 'a noble gentleman.'" ¹

In the earlier part of 1870 he was deeply interested in the visit of Keshub Chunder Sen to England, and was particularly anxious that the general public influence of this able leader of the Brahmo Somaj, of India, should not be injured by his too close association with Unitarians. Some of his impressions are given in letters to the Rev. Charles Wicksteed:—

(April 11.) "His preaching (quite extempore) is simple and affectionate; highly interesting from its religious tone, but not marked by any striking intellectual force." Again (May 5): "I hardly know whether our social formality, or our religious hardness and divisions, offend him most. It

¹ "Alfred Lord Tennyson. A Memoir by his Son," Vol. II. p. 83.

is easy to perceive that he is profoundly disappointed by the aspect of our religious life. And the truth is—in spite of ——’s objection to his heathenism—that he is a truer Christian than is often to be found here; and his preaching and whole tone of feeling are too devotional for full response here. I tell him that in the North he will find a better spirit than in this wicked Babylon of ours. . . . You will find him a most interesting man; not perhaps strikingly intellectual, but of singular strength and sweetness of character,—simple, pure, and high-minded. . . . I believe I have something in me which responds to the Indian temperament.” (August 26.) “Chunder Sen’s Society¹ is an experiment too innocent and interesting to excuse the shameful tone of “The Inquirer” towards it. But it does not excite my hopes. As every religious person in England is a ‘Theist’ or ‘Monotheist’ (I do not appreciate the distinction), and usually belongs to some Church already, the principle expressed in the name provides for nobody, except the outlaws banished from existing Churches by what they add to Theism. Such persons may, by joining, secure Theism and nothing else. But these Theists, pure and simple, are in our times extremely rare. Those who, from long orthodox confinement, escape into the free air of thought, seldom, I observe, settle into the devout Natural Religion of our Indian friend. They become Positivists, Pantheists, Atheists, Agnostics; or if they adhere to Theism, they take it in a materialistic form, and object to prayer, and to the whole system of the spiritual life. Or else they float about in lifelong doubt, and are in no condition of mind to surrender themselves to the obligations of a religious fraternity. I do not believe, therefore, that the materials exist for the proposed organisation. It will encounter all the difficulties which the Free Christian Union has met, and others besides. I have come to the conclusion that to serve any good purpose, organisations must now invert their old order of origin; instead of beginning with common principles, with a view to work them out to their results, they must be formed of persons intent on some one practical end, however different the principles by which they reach it; and when the end is gained, disband. To agree at the fountain-head is no security against divergence at the next stage,—which may be the

¹ This refers to a “Theistic Society,” which Mr. Sen had started, with the view of uniting men of different creeds in a common effort to attain and diffuse purity of spiritual life.

first point of necessary action. Sen, for instance, considers it an immediate corollary from his Theism that opium culture should be prohibited, or, at least, should yield no tax; that the Permissive Bill should become law; that women should have votes, etc. But on all these points his English brethren would be instantly divided. Those on the other hand who are intent on a common practical end will work for it together, though in the opinion of one some questionable reasons for it may be given by another."

A painful subject, which must not be entirely passed over, was, in the course of this year, brought prominently before his attention. It is introduced in a letter to Mr. Wicksteed, written on the 26th of August, from the neighbourhood of Crieff, where he spent the summer:—

"I want to learn something from you on one of those points of ethical and social judgment on which I look to you with especial confidence. Have you any definite and well-considered opinion on the principle and operation of the Contagious Diseases Acts? You have probably read the leading statements on both sides, including F. W. Newman's powerful though somewhat passionate pamphlets, and the counter-statements in the 'Pall Mall Gazette.' I have all along perceived that the new legislation was a matter of intense moral importance; and after considerable hesitation, I so far made up my mind against it as to join the protest against its extension to the civil population. It now seems likely that I shall be put on the Royal Commission for investigating the whole subject,—an odious task, but one from which I think it would be wrong to shrink. And I am anxious to carry to the work whatever light I can get from a comparison of other ideas with my own. On no subject involving moral considerations so grave have I ever found such difference of opinion among good and reasonable men."

In course of time he formed the strongest adverse opinion, which has all the more weight because it was no hasty intuitive judgment, but one founded on full knowledge and deliberation. He was pressed by Mr. Bruce, the Home Secretary, to accept a place on the Royal

Commission, and he consented to do so; but afterwards, finding that the most important sittings were not to be held in London, he felt constrained to withdraw.

A portion of the summer was spent, in compliance with the request of a number of friends, in looking over his materials with a view to the publication of a volume of sermons. The result was communicated in a letter to Mr. William Shaen:—

10 GORDON STREET, W. C., Nov. 20, 1870.

MY DEAR MR. SHAEN,—In answering the requisition, so largely and impressively signed, which you sent to me in the summer, urging the publication of a volume of Discourses on the true and false elements in the faith of Christendom, I promised to look over my materials during the vacation, and decide whether I could fitly offer them as a contribution to the literature of religion; and I owe to you an account of the fulfilment of this promise.

I found, as I had expected, that what I had written in the interstices of a life without leisure, although adequate for the expression of personal conviction and the exigencies of oral address, fell so far short of the thorough treatment due to the gravest subjects of human thought, that to publish it as it is would be just neither to them nor to myself, so long as I retained any hope of throwing it into better form. I have reached a time of life when perhaps it is hardly reasonable to cling to this hope. Yet, while the powers of thought and action are continued to me, I cannot, without a sense of unfaithfulness, acquiesce in work which is less than my best; and if I cannot improve it, I would rather that my death than my will were the cause. You will naturally ask, why not devote the summer months to the revision of your materials? I can only answer that the leisure of that time has hitherto been imperatively preoccupied by Academic work; this year to such an extent that even the reading over of my MSS. sufficiently to form the judgment I have expressed has not been effected without difficulty.

Glad, therefore, as I should be to defer to the wishes of the friends whom you represent, I must at present refrain from doing so; consoled by the reflection that if they could judge from the interior, as I must, they would approve of the decision which seems against their present desire.

In 1871 there is little over which our narrative need linger, except the address, entitled "Why Dissent?" delivered at the opening of the College Session in October.¹ This was called forth by Mr. Matthew Arnold's strictures on dissent. While admitting that "nothing short of a supreme obligation, directly imposed from the Source of all duty, could release from the secondary authority of society and the Commonwealth, and warrant retreat into exceptional modes of religious life," it contends that this supreme obligation, though not discernible by one to whom religion was only a popular form of culture, rests upon those who have real belief which is opposed to the Anglican teaching, and who acknowledge the laws of veracity in the highest exercise of the mind. It also vindicates historically a place for Nonconformity among the higher influences which have moulded English character and life; and shows that, in spite of the efforts of the dominant party to deprive it of all provision for culture, it has made considerable contributions to philosophy, science, and literature. The following letter to Mr. Matthew Arnold relates to this subject:—

OCT. 28, 1871.

I am sorry that you have learned from anyone but myself that I have been so presumptuous as to criticise your estimate of us poor unfortunate Dissenters. I meant of course to send you the Address, when out of the printer's hands, and hope to do so to-day; and I did not suppose that the newspaper report would fall in your way. In spite of my stiff-necked Nonconformity, I go with you very far in your Nationalism. And the more completely *Authority* in Religion is displaced from supernatural ground, the better pleased should I be to see it sustained by the natural force of public, and especially of educated, consent. But the moral weight of such consent to a common worship depends on its inward reality; and it is fatal to demand for its sake sacrifices which carry with them a consciousness of radical insincerity. The Broad

¹ Reprinted in *Essays*, IV.

Churchmen would be glad to comprehend everybody, but they never propose to recast the Church services and dogmatic system for this end; their whole receipt for bringing us to conformity is to be themselves models of graciousness, and examples of the most flexible interpretation of the symbols of faith. Till they have courage to say "Nothing must come into the public worship but what is true to the conscience of all," no approach can be made to unity. Specialties of doctrine — once removed to the realm of personal opinion — might then continue to have place, and would be borne with equanimity. But without a clean sweep of the questionable theology now pervading the Church system, the Anglican body must pass into a mere upper-class sect, rendered rotten by the unbelief of all its intellectual people. The whole history of its religion is to most of us a mere mythology, impossible to profess. You may not unnaturally reply, "So is your Theism to me; yet I am prepared to acquiesce in its expression." But there is surely this difference: the Theism is at least the impersonation of the *real law of Righteousness* in the world, and enforces only what wants to be enforced. The Church mythology presents (to me) the universe and human life under utterly false aspects, and holds up misleading ideals; so as to distort, rather than rightly educate, the spiritual nature of man. It may be narrow in me, — a remnant of Puritan and Huguenot inheritance, — but I cannot help shrinking from the faintest shadow of insincerity in the offices of religion, and holding that all reforms must proceed from this feeling.

In the autumn his old friend Mr. Alger had a serious cerebral attack, while he was on a visit in Paris. However, though not without illusions, he was able to write coherently; and he had set his heart on bringing about a mutual understanding between Mr. Martineau and Mr. Herbert Spencer, the latter having taken some criticism amiss. So Mr. Martineau called on Mr. Spencer, and was able to report that his friend's wish was accomplished, and a complete clearing-up had taken place.¹ This reconciliation did not, of course, remove the differences in their phil-

¹ From a letter to Wicksteed, Oct. 27, 1871.

osophical opinions. In 1872 Mr. Martineau published a philosophical lecture on "The Place of Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man," which, being intended for delivery in the pulpit, was provided with a text: "Behold, there went forth a Sower to sow."¹ This was elaborately criticised by Mr. Spencer; and Mr. Martineau intended to employ his first leisure in preparing a reply. This intention, as we shall see, he was unable to carry out. In a letter to the Rev. J. E. Carpenter² he says: "I could not see how it [the criticism] touched the main argument at all; and that so able a man should say so much that has no relevance to my intended line of thought I take as a humiliating proof of my unskilfulness in bringing out my meaning."

Religious tests having been recently abolished in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which thus became open to Dissenters, some of the younger supporters of Manchester New College were already anxious to remove it to Oxford; and in March, 1872, some correspondence on the subject took place. But Mr. Kenrick, Mr. Martineau, and others, thought the proposal so inopportune that no public action was taken at that time. Mr. Martineau was to the last opposed to this step, and it was understood that the subject should remain in abeyance so long as he continued to be the head of the College.

On the 26th of June the University of Harvard carried out a purpose to which allusion has been made in an earlier part of our narrative, and conferred on him the honorary degree of LL.D.; and thus he was indebted to a foreign country for the first recognition of his academic rank. His friend, Dr. Dewey, wrote to him with generous enthusiasm, on November 9, that he ought to have a place in Westminster Abbey, and that "but for the abominable intolerance of English religion and society," he would take

¹ Reprinted in *Essays*, IV.

² Oct. 12, 1873.

his place among the foremost men of England. These words were written with special reference to articles which he was contributing to an American journal called "Old and New," of which more will be said hereafter. But if the Universities of his native land were blind to his merits, a number of his friends determined to show their appreciation by presenting him with two pieces of silver plate, accompanied by a sum of £5800. At the close of the College Examination, his honoured friend, William Lamport, drew him aside in the Library, and in a few feeling words, as simple as they were delicate, told him that, in conjunction with Mr. Ainsworth of the Floss, he had been commissioned to convey to him an expression of affectionate regard from a large number of persons who found their deeper thoughts reflected in his, and that he had selected this private method of procedure, knowing Mr. Martineau's aversion to scenes of public compliment and parade.¹ In this way his friends desired "that the shortcomings of the past might be repaired, however inadequately, in the case of one distinguished example of the material injustice usually sustained in England by the instructors of intellect, and especially by the men who become pioneers and leaders of thought and opinion." This munificent act was prompted, not only by the desire thus expressed, but by the more personal feelings of "gratitude, affection, respect, and admiration." The silver plate bore the following inscription:—

"Presented, with five thousand guineas, to the Rev. James Martineau, by a large number of his English friends, as a memorial of personal affection, and in grateful acknowledgment of his services in the maintenance of spiritual freedom, in the promotion of Christian truth, and in the inculcation of that pure morality which is the foundation of private and public virtue and the safeguard of national liberty. June, 1872."

¹ Bi. Mem.

To the address accompanying this splendid gift Mr. Martineau replied:—

“The munificent act which your letter announces and completes overwhelms me with surprise, and both by its delicate form and its great scale renders any adequate expression of my gratitude simply impossible. During a term of more than forty years, changes of conviction cannot fail to affect the mind of every reflecting religious teacher, and of the later generation into which he lives. In their course these changes bring their critical and painful moments, often involving alienated looks and the severance of precious ties. In remembering such crises, I thank God that my lot has been cast among a generous people, heartily reverent of freedom and trustful of truth, so that the inevitable struggles of opinion have occasioned me no broken friendship and left me no bitter thought; and as I prepare for my last march of duty, I find myself moving step by step with those who are just entering the field. I well know that this is due, not to anything in my own work, but simply to the courses of the world, which have given a conservative aspect to teaching which had once a revolutionary look, and have turned into acceptable allies many who were regarded as the free lances of an earlier time. I can take no credit to myself for having outlived the fears and prejudices of the last generation. But it is a rare privilege and happiness, at a time of life when it is least easy to dispense with sympathy, to be assured of the approval of such a troop of friends as your list of signatures enrolls; of one revered instructor, to whose wisdom and learning I have ever looked up as to something unapproachable, and who must remember me chiefly as an impulsive enthusiast; of honourable and high-minded contemporaries, who have been my companions on the same level, and carried the same principles into the rising problems of the time; of pupils of my own, who, on various lines of independent conviction, can still remember or imagine, in what they once heard from me, some stimulus to their intellectual life, if not some help to their younger thought. From my heart I thank them all. The ease and tranquillity which they have aimed to provide for my remaining days will, I trust, only brighten and not relax such industry as it may be yet in my power to exercise; adding new hope to the aspiration which unites us, of a Christianity purified of superstitions, a Church intent only on righteousness, and a social habit of justice and charity to all men.”

He was spending the summer in North Wales, and was at this time rather seriously unwell. On the 17th of July he wrote, from Beddgelert, to Mr. Wicksteed:—

“Many surprises, of good and ill, have befallen me in life; but nothing has so astonished me as this wonderful presentation just made me by so choice a set of friends. Such expressions of feeling, touching as they are, rather humble than exalt me; and my first answering desire is for some opportunity yet of better deserving the appreciation which I cannot help, yet cannot appropriate. Till the last two or three days, however, I have been so much out of health—with giddiness of head—that I began to think my work near its end. I could hardly write or read without a consciousness of danger. I shut my desk, and threw aside my books, and went up Snowdon and other mountains, and took to my boat, and lived half out of doors; and for the last three days I have been much better. But I have been obliged to give up a half-written reply to Herbert Spencer for the ‘Contemporary.’ I never was so idle or so rustic.”

Before the end of the year the giddiness in his head became much more distressing. He went to visit some friends in Leeds before resuming his work in London, and on arriving at the station he had an attack which seriously alarmed him. He stooped to drag some luggage from under the seat of the carriage, and for an instant his head drooped upon the cushion, while the carriage seemed upset and rotating. He did not, however, lose consciousness, but, reasoning on the assumption of the illusion, considered how he could best protect his wife and daughters in their fall. In a few seconds he recovered sufficiently to walk to a carriage in the street, and no further traces of the attack remained than a certain weakness, and a tendency, on any excitement or fatigue, to slight giddiness or faintness. Dr. Andrew Clark gave, on the whole, a favourable opinion, finding no structural disease, but a disturbed local circulation in an organ which itself was sound. However, it was thought necessary for him to curtail his

work, and he resigned his pulpit.¹ A letter to Mr. Thom, who had suggested a different course, clearly states his reasons:—

10 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Oct. 18, 1872.

MY DEAR FRIEND,—Your counsels have always such weight with me that I can never act against them without feeling bound to state my plea of justification. And apart from this, I would not have you learn from anyone but myself that I have resigned my pulpit and closed my ministerial life. In all respects save one there was much to recommend the middle course which had occurred alike to your thoughts and to my own.

A colleague every way congenial, who would probably take a pulpit in partnership but not by himself,—an easy settlement of the congregational future, else most precarious, the continuance of a kind of Academic Church, as a centre of interest and labour for our students;—all these advantages seemed to plead with me not to break the tie. But Dr. Clark warns me against the risks of pulpit *excitement* as the one thing against which no precaution can avail; and several times during the past year I have been impelled, by a sort of instinctive sense of danger, to impose a sudden voluntary check upon my eagerness in the pulpit, as if else it would burn me up. My own feeling, therefore, supports Dr. Clark's urgent recommendation to give up the Chapel, and limit myself to the academic work which, though involving more continuous occupation, is tranquil and comparatively flexible. If he is right in his belief, which to-day he reaffirms after renewed examination,—that there is nothing amiss in either heart or brain,—there may yet be a term of service in reserve for me, not less efficient than the first years which I spent in London; and the kindly warning I have received may give a wiser direction to such industry as I can exercise. So I am content and grateful.

In his letter of resignation, dated Oct. 16, 1872, after referring to the circumstances which had rendered his retirement obligatory, he says:—

“It is not so much the burdensome amount as the exciting nature of the preacher's duties which has become an over-

¹ From a letter to Professor Knight, Oct. 17, 1872.

match for me; and in reducing my work I have to select for the sacrifice precisely that in which I feel too keen an interest. Nothing, therefore, remains for me but to accept unreservedly the sentence of public silence, and to withdraw once more into the quieter field of academic duty, in which to serve a little longer the same claims of truth and piety. . . . I will not dwell with idle lament on unrealised projects and unfinished tasks. Life is never finished in its purpose and idea; and its work, at the best, is but a fragment. To the congregation which I have tried to serve I bid farewell, with deep gratitude for much earnest help and co-operation,—for patience under my shortcomings and encouragement under my despondencies,—for many precious friendships with the living and the dead,—and for catholic sympathy, often in spite of intellectual divergence, with a ministry chiefly devoted to the building up of the Christian life. May a higher inspiration and a more effective wisdom take possession of the place which I resign!”

This letter was read to the congregation on the 3d of November. The more important parts of the Resolution, accepting his resignation, may be quoted:—

“During the past fourteen years they [the members of the congregation] have enjoyed the privilege of sharing in the religious teaching of Mr. Martineau with ever-deepening feelings of respectful admiration and grateful affection.

“They believe there is no other living man who is so capable of guiding earnest and devout inquirers through the doubts and difficulties which arise from the claims, often conflicting, of traditional piety on the one hand and of scientific and historical truth on the other.

“They are, therefore, only deterred by the terms of Mr. Martineau’s letter, which they feel leave them no alternative, from urging him to reconsider the necessity of a step which will not only be, to everyone of themselves, a personal loss they cannot hope to replace, but also a grave and serious public calamity.

“They are thankful at the same time to believe that what is thus so great a loss to them, will, by diminishing the demands upon Mr. Martineau’s physical strength, afford him greater opportunities for speaking through the press to a still larger public, and that there may be, thus, rather a change in, than a cessation of, his relation to them as teacher, guide, and friend,

and they rejoice to think that in the important and honourable task of training the future teachers and preachers of Christian faith and duty, his powers and sympathies will still find congenial occupation, and still largely influence the course of religious thought, and quicken the force of religious aspiration in this country."

In the course of his reply Mr. Martineau says:—

"Though unwilling to prolong the sad echoes of 'last words,' I cannot silently receive the resolutions of the congregational meeting held in Little Portland Street Chapel on Sunday last.

"Their words of sympathy and affectionate regret will linger in my thoughts so long as memory remains, and as the earthly future has less to say to me, will lend a brighter tone to the voices of the past. Even their exceeding overestimate of my work shall pass without a protest; for it is but the generous illusion which so truly appreciates my aspirations, as not only to forgive but even to forget their poor fulfilment.

"It will be a less indulgent audience which I must expect, should I follow the exhortation to exchange the spoken for the printed word. But my interest in the problems which agitate our time is deep and ever deepening; and should I seem to have any contribution to offer towards their solution, it shall take its chance of rejection or response.

"I am profoundly sensible of the extreme consideration shown me by the congregation in their mode of accepting my resignation. To the nominal continuation of my ministry to the end of the year, without power of service, I reconcile myself with some difficulty; yet I cannot ungraciously resist a last overflow of unmerited kindness."

The congregation expressed their high appreciation of the services they had lost, and their deep affection for Dr. Martineau himself, by presenting him with £3500, together with a piece of plate, which recorded the event in a touching inscription. Referring to this and the earlier presentation, Dr. Martineau wrote:—

"On these great gifts I can make no comment. I know not what has drawn them upon me. In the several offices of life, so far have I been from consciously exceeding their claims upon me, so as to deserve anything special at the hands of others,

that I have never satisfied my own sense of obligation. But towards true and hearty service, I have always observed, the expectations of men are more apt to be too indulgent than too exigent; and the minister who, instead of waiting to be moulded by the pressures of his lot, honestly though imperfectly follows his own ideal and will not part with it, easily overpasses their demands, however short he falls of his own.”¹

His resignation of the superintendence of the Sunday School necessarily followed, and in reply to a letter from the teachers, he wrote an affectionate farewell:—

TO THE TEACHERS OF THE PORTLAND SUNDAY SCHOOL.

10 GORDON STREET, Oct. 29, 1872.

DEAR FRIENDS AND FELLOW-WORKERS, — Under the inevitable pain of parting from you as partners in a common duty, your cordial words, at once of regret and of hope, soothe me with the happiest relief. At the date of your recent meeting I had not the courage to send you my written resignation; and still lingered in feeling near my superintendent's desk, unable to forego entirely the dream of returning to it again. You will pardon this shrinking of affection which kept me silent; and will even accept it as an additional evidence of the sorrow with which I acquiesce in an indispensable separation from you.

The years of my Superintendentship have been rich in satisfactions from the hearty co-operation of the faithful and united band of teachers and a succession of devoted partners in my office; every one of whom will live in my affectionate remembrance as long as I have memory at all. The only shadows which have crossed this experience have been cast by the imperfections of my own work; but even these leave me so grateful to you for your willingness to accept the little I could do, that they have served to strengthen the tie which I have now to sever. Be assured, my retirement will in no way lessen the interest with which I shall watch the course of your labours and the welfare of the Sunday School. And in a short time I hope to be able, at least now and then, to visit the scene so long endeared to me and renew the old associations. I wish I could promise to take one of the classes; but this, I fear, is just the

¹ Bi. Mem.

kind of exertion from which, at present, it is incumbent on me to abstain.

Believe me always, with heartfelt gratitude and affection,
Yours very faithfully,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

Though he was now able to pursue his College work, he was in a low state of health, and in the Christmas vacation had a severe and disabling attack of lumbago and sciatica. This probably is accountable for an unusual tone of despondency in a letter to Mr. Wicksteed, of December 28. He says:—

“It is perhaps a natural illusion of elderly people to fancy that their little world still needs them, and cannot well spare them to their retirement. But I cannot look round without anxiety on the reduced strength of our older ministerial staff. . . . With few exceptions, the future of our leading congregations is far from bright. . . . I cannot but see everything under shades of deep discouragement. Our little College seems to me the one bright spot of hope; whence the springs of better life have issued and will issue to fertilise the future years.”

Before the spring, however, he was able to report to Mr. Knight that he got through his “College and study employments” with ease and interest, and, as long as he was thus engaged, was about as well as ever. He attended the meetings of the “Ministers’ Conference,” and sometimes the Metaphysical Society, without suffering for it. But the excitement of evening society, and of any really public occasions, reminded him, by severe headache, that he had been ill, and might easily be so again. It may be mentioned here that his brother ministers deeply valued his regular attendance at their periodical meetings, where he always illuminated the subject of discussion, and was listened to with the profoundest interest.

In 1872 some members of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association determined to make an effort to secure

or erect a building in one of the best localities in London. In a circular inviting subscriptions it was quietly assumed that the Association was identical with the "Unitarians of the United Kingdom," who ought to have "a building worthy of their position and their cause," although the vast majority of Unitarians had no connection with it, and the representative function which it had once endeavoured to secure had been formally abolished by its own act. This assumption at once threw the whole subject open to public discussion, and entitled those who were not members of the Association to make their voices heard. The objection was immediately raised that the erection of a building to be owned by the Unitarian Association would be tantamount to the endowment of a particular theological doctrine, and would thus violate a fundamental principle of the denomination, which held its property on what were called "open trusts," that is, trusts free from dogmatic restrictions. Dr. Martineau, himself a member of the Association, took the lead in pressing this objection. The opponents, however, were not moved by any hostility to the Association, or any unwillingness to meet its legitimate requirements; and one of the first to raise the alarm suggested the possibility of taking a wider view, and providing for other interests along with those of the Association. A hall, it was said, might be dedicated, like the Memorial Hall in Manchester, on a perfectly open trust, to religious, educational, and philanthropic purposes, a portion of the building being used for the Association's offices, while at the same time provision was made for other existing societies, and the building would also be available for any new agencies which might be formed in future years to meet the changing exigencies of the time. Such friendly proposals, however, which would have met every practical want, found no favour with the promoters of the scheme. Unless the building was held in trust for

the Association, they would have nothing to do with it; but, with that proviso, they were willing to have a trust as wide and flexible as this essential limitation would permit. The advocates of open trusts not only were unable to accept this as an adequate concession to their principle, but, on general grounds, were in favour of the more inclusive scheme. Accordingly a "Declaration," advising the Association to decline the ownership of any building required for its service, was circulated and extensively signed; and among those who signed were several who were devotedly attached to Unitarian doctrine, but nevertheless thought it wrong to bind their successors. A vast majority, however, were not members of the Association;¹ and they could not but regard with apprehension the result of a movement in which they felt themselves vitally concerned, and which, nevertheless, would be decided by the votes of others. It was felt that much depended on Dr. Martineau's powerful influence. On Wednesday, the 4th of June, 1873, the Annual Meeting of the Association was held in Essex Street Chapel. After the usual service, and the transaction of the regular business, Mr. James Hopgood, who, always courteous and munificent, had been the foremost promoter of the scheme, moved the following resolutions:—

"That the Draft of the Deed of Trust in relation to the new Buildings for the Association intended to be erected or acquired by means of funds raised by subscription, having been laid before the Meeting, this Meeting recognises the principle that the permanent endowment of any form of theological doctrine injuriously interferes with the natural changes of religious thought and life, and is at variance with the principles recognised in our institutions since the Act of Toleration; but seeing that the proposed Trust-deed provides for the absolute sale of the property affected thereby whenever the Association shall so direct, and that thereupon the proceeds of sale will form part

¹ The total number was given as 539, of whom only 128 were members.

of the ordinary funds of the Association subject to immediate and absolute disposition; and seeing also that care has been taken to guard against any narrow construction as to what may from time to time be deemed the principles of Unitarian Christianity, this Meeting considers that the proposed arrangements will not constitute an endowment of the class before referred to; it therefore accepts the gift of the donors, it approves of the proposed Draft Deed of Trust, and authorises the Committee to carry the same into effect, with such verbal or formal variations as to the Committee shall seem advisable."

When this had been duly seconded, Dr. Martineau moved, as an amendment:—

"That the permanent endowment of any form of theological doctrine injuriously interferes with the natural changes of religious thought and life, and is at variance with the principles recognised in our institutions since the Act of Toleration; and that the British and Foreign Unitarian Association, being founded expressly for the promotion of the principles of Unitarian Christianity, would accordingly do well to decline the ownership of any building required for its service, and to recommend the munificent contributors of the funds to place their building, when erected, in the hands of independent trustees of their own selection, open to such uses, religious, philanthropic, or educational, as may, by the trustees for the time being, be judged best from time to time; the first being the free occupation of the building by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association."


He defended this amendment in a long and effective speech, passing from light and genial humour to close argument, in the course of which he showed that the proposed trust involved a permanent endowment of Unitarianism, and that Unitarianism was a form of doctrinal theology. He also protested once more against the assumption of a representative character by the Association, and concluded in these pathetic words:—

"I have a deep attachment to the old, large, catholic principle; and I believe that, if we are faithful to it, the history of our churches is not closed, that it has a future before it—a

future that will carry us far beyond the limits of our definitions of Unitarian Christianity. It has grown to that point in the past; I believe it will grow to yet nobler and better positions in the future. I do not, at all events, expect to see it. I know that my hour is drawing nigh, and, if it be needful, I am ready to retire from the sectarian contentions that are becoming in our country the scorn of intellectual men, and the lifelong affliction of the earnest and pious, to dream, for the rest of my time, of that Kingdom of God for which I have ever prayed, but which has ever seemed to recede from behind, and to lie only within the folds of the dark future."

The amendment, when put, was negatived, fifty-five votes being given in its favour, and sixty-one against. It was then proposed that the two resolutions should be referred, under certain conditions, to the Committee; but, as the mover and seconder of the amendment declined to act under this suggestion, the motion was withdrawn. Finally, Mr. Alfred Preston moved the Previous Question, and this was carried by a large majority. At a future time provision was made for the Association and for other purposes in Essex Hall, which was placed upon the broad trust advocated by Dr. Martineau.

In 1873 was exhibited a portrait of Dr. Martineau, by Mr. G. F. Watts, R.A. This portrait was subscribed for by his old pupils, thirty-seven of whom dined together on the 24th of June, 1874, and formally presented it to Manchester College, where it may now be seen at the far end of the Library. The great artist had for a long time abandoned portraiture as an ordinary branch of his profession, and practised it only when peculiar conditions afforded sufficient reasons for breaking through his rule; but he expressed the pleasure which he would feel in painting "so good and distinguished a man as Mr. Martineau." He was unwilling to paint more than the head, as modern costume was "not only so uninteresting, but so ignoble." The high artistic merits of the painting are obvious, and there is no other portrait with such depth



JAMES MARTINEAU

1873

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY ELLIOT & FRY

of expression, or which so speaks, as from an inner soul, to the spectator. Its supreme excellence remains, and seems to grow with the lapse of years. Nevertheless, some of his friends were greatly disappointed with it when it first appeared, and lamented that its very greatness as a work of art would perpetuate a wrong idea of its subject. Mr. Martineau was ill at the time, and had not been previously known to Mr. Watts; and the artist may have formed a somewhat erroneous idea of the man before him. The pose of the head is rather stiff; and there is a grave and pathetic melancholy in the expression which, if it might be occasionally seen when he was lost in thought, does no justice to his natural vivacity and cheerfulness, or to the radiant look of his face when his thoughts were flying forth in golden speech to enrich the minds and cheer the hearts of others. We see before us the philosopher and the mystic, with his dreams of diviner worlds, but not the man of action and the prophet, strong through a present communion, and rejoicing in the divineness of the present scene.

Dr. Martineau was at this time engaged in the preparation of a new hymn book, and employed himself, in his summer retreat, in completing it for the press. His long vacation in 1873 was spent at South Kinrara, near Aviemore, "amid the most delightful scenery and in the most invigorating air of Scotland." In some letters he gives an amusing account of his surroundings and his life:—

"We have been fortunate in finding a capital newly built and furnished farmhouse, standing on a pretty high knoll commanding a fine view of Strathspey on the one side, and the mountains on the other. Nor are we without pleasant acquaintances. . . . But as everyone here is called *Grant*,—and the nearest *town* itself follows the example (*Granttown*),—it is difficult to 'distinguish the persons,' . . . and to prevent conversation running into a 'Comedy of Errors.' You have to charge your memory with a host of Christian names; and in

picking them hastily up, you are in imminent danger of laying hold of the wrong one, and sticking on the great proprietor the label that belongs to his factor Tom. I hope we shall escape without positive treason against the honour of the clan."—"We are in delightful quarters here, in the very heart of the Grampians. Yet no retreat, of forest or mountain, carries one in these days into shades of solitude and forgetfulness. The lights of civilisation have become wandering stars, and you cannot get out of their way. Here is Jowett at Grantown already; and Herbert Spencer is soon to follow; and one is in danger of encountering Hegel in a fishing excursion and being pursued by Evolution to the top of Cairn Gorm. Happily, however, the sleep-bringing breezes here blow away all subtleties and irritations, and reduce men to a level low enough for the sense and harmonies of common life."

The new hymn book, the preface of which is dated Dec. 1, 1873, was published at the beginning of 1874, with the title "Hymns of Praise and Prayer." This rich collection of sacred poetry contains seven hundred and ninety-seven hymns, including many of recent composition, some of which, with their inward and spiritual tone, are perhaps better fitted for private reading than for public singing. It was not, however, only the "gradual enrichment of our religious literature by new hymns" that seemed to the editor to call for a new book, for this might have been adequately represented in a supplement to the old one; but Christian piety itself had insensibly modified its complexion, and rendered it necessary, not only to add what was absent, but to withdraw something that was present, in the manuals of an earlier date. His own conception of what a hymn-book should be was in strong contrast with that which had determined the character of recent Anglican hymnals. In the latter, exaggerated prominence was given "to the objective and mythological elements which have found their way into the faith of Christendom; simple and natural piety" found there "no shelter and no voice." The new hymn

book endeavoured to find adequate expression for that spiritual devotion which identified "its Christianity with the religion of Christ in its pure and personal essence." Still, it would be a fatal error to fling religion out of history altogether. "For myself," says Dr. Martineau, "both conviction and feeling keep me close to the poetry and piety of Christendom. It is my native air, and in no other can I breathe; and wherever it passes, it so mellows the soil and feeds the roots of character, and nurtures such grace and balance of affection, that for any climate similarly rich in elements of perfect life I look in vain elsewhere." He once more defends the practice of altering hymns, so as to retain the permanent beauty and truth of their sentiments, while discarding modes of statement that had become incredible. "In the absence of this liberty, there could be no literature of devotion common to Christendom. . . . A fresh library of piety, a separate school of spiritual culture, would be set up for every little community; and for the grave and lofty speech of a universal devotion, we should have a grotesque assemblage of provincial eccentricities." If even a word is altered, however, the fact is indicated, and "deviations from the original texts have been kept down to the lowest possible amount; and, unless occasionally imposed by metrical necessity, admitted only for grave reasons of religious veracity."¹

The state of Dr. Martineau's health was still unsatisfactory, and compelled him to husband carefully his remaining stores of strength. One of his pupils, the Rev. H. Shaen Solly, was settling at Padiham, and wished him to consecrate the occasion by his presence and his speech. He replied as follows:—

¹ It may be mentioned that three "anonymous" hymns, 133, 390, and 446, are by Dr. Martineau himself.

JAN. 9, 1874.

DEAR MR. SOLLY, — Like an old cavalry horse turned out to grass, that pricks up his ears and makes for the hedge when he hears the troop trot up the lane, I am stirred by the sound of the Padiham Easter celebrations, and drawn to their very edge to take a wistful look at them. But alas! the hedge is high; and, if I try to leap it, it will only bring me to grief. I must be content to peer through it, — see what I can, — and go back to my field with a new meditation on the generations as they pass.

The simple truth is, I dare not make engagements beyond my daily routine of life, for though, *unpledged* and suiting my work to my possibilities, I accomplish about as much as in earlier years, I am liable to such sudden and disabling headaches that I cannot depend on being true to fixed engagements. Nor is anything so likely to bring them on as the expectation of a journey, and the anxiety of a public occasion. Though therefore I should be delighted to have a share in your settlement services, I must deny myself that satisfaction, and acquiesce in my position on the retired list.

I am truly glad to hear that the congregation are manifesting so vigorous a spirit for the completion of their good work. As a pledge of future zeal there is nothing like a good store of labour and sacrifice wrought into an enterprise. I trust all things augur well for you.

Owing to this uncertain condition of his health, he found it desirable still further to reduce the pressure of his engagements; for he felt that the work of his life would not be complete till he had thrown his lectures into their final form and given them to the public. He therefore resigned his duties at the College, with the full intention of immediate and complete retirement. When, however, it was urged upon him that time would be required to mature new arrangements, and enable his successor to undertake his whole work, he consented to postpone for a time the fulfilment of his purpose. It was arranged that he should have an extension of his long vacation, retain the Principalship, and deliver some of the Philosophical lectures till his successor was able to undertake the entire duty. This greatly relieved the tax upon

his energies, and, together with the long residence in Scotland every summer, renewed his strength for the fruitful years which were still before him. About the same time his son Russell was ill, and compelled to take six months' rest, and ultimately to resign the Chair of Professor of Hebrew at the College, while retaining his position at the British Museum.

This year it once more devolved upon Dr. Martineau to deliver the Address at the opening of the College Session in October. He chose for his subject "Religion as affected by Modern Materialism,"¹ and treated it in connection with Professor Tyndall's Address before the British Association. This, together with a subsequent Essay in the "Contemporary Review,"² written in reply to a critique by Professor Tyndall, brought him perhaps more prominently than any of his previous efforts before the attention of religious thinkers, and people began to acknowledge that the mischievous heretic was after all the ablest living defender of a spiritual conception of the universe. The line of argument, which is purely philosophical, must be noticed elsewhere.

His own partial, and his son's complete, retirement from College duties left two vacancies to be filled. Before any arrangements had been completed, he was informed by his remaining colleague, on the 23d of December, that Bishop Colenso, who was then in London, was said to be disposed to resign his office in Africa, provided he could find in England some professional position suited to his tastes and attainments; and he was impressed by the importance of the suggestion that he should see the Bishop and sound him as to his willingness to accept an appointment at the College. Accordingly, he called

¹ Reprinted in Essays, IV.

² "Modern Materialism: Its Attitude towards Theology," February and March, 1876.

on the Bishop, who was about to leave the country; and he learned that Dr. Colenso regarded all Church Colleges and similar institutions as closed against him, and yet felt drawn to the duties of an Academic position, provided it were free; that his membership of the Church would cease if it were disestablished; that the history and principle of the College surprised and interested him; that the financial side of the question did not repel him; and that the idea was sufficiently attractive to him to secure a careful consideration, if it should be presented to him in any definite form. Dr. Martineau believed that the Bishop's acceptance of the Chair of Old Testament and Hebrew would have important results, reaching far beyond the limited interests of the College itself, and was most anxious that an invitation should be sent to him. The objection, however, was raised that it would be inconsistent for a College which rested on the principle of perfect intellectual freedom to appoint as one of its Professors a clergyman who was bound by his subscription to the creeds and articles. Dr. Martineau maintained that this objection was theoretical rather than practical, and that in the case of Dr. Colenso it had no real validity, since his teaching was as free, and his love of truth as pure, as the College could desire. Some of his own most ardent supporters could not follow him in this view; the objection prevailed in the Committee, and an invitation was never sent. A letter to his friend, Mr. Thom, sets forth fully his view of the question:—

JAN. 17, 1875.

MY DEAR FRIEND, — It must always deepen my self-distrust to find myself, in any important judgment, unsupported by your concurrence; and your exceedingly able argument has so much force in it that, had I talked this Colenso case over with you when it was new to me, I am not sure that you could not have carried me to your conclusion. But after turning the matter round so as to give effect to its many aspects, I do not

find it possible to decide it on the single issue which you raise; nor can I quite accept the terms of the dilemma into which you so neatly compress this issue.

You say Colenso is either dogmatically bound, or he is not. If he is, he is not free enough for us. If he is not, he is not honest enough, for he disregards his obligations. The affirmative side of this alternative is faultless; but the negative side simply assumes the whole matter in question, viz., whether a past confession of faith constitutes a permanent engagement, which can be voided only by voluntarily quitting the body imposing it. I concur with you in saying, "If the case were mine, I should answer *Yes*." But I know beyond all doubt that, in like case, others, eminent for clearness of mind and sensitiveness of conscience, answer *No*. Colenso's own course has been this: on entering the Church, he made of course the usual declaration:—this is, in its form, not a pledge for the future, but an avowal of present belief. In contenting itself with this immediate test as an adequate security, the Church abstains from burthening the clergyman with the future by promises on his part, and itself undertakes to look after it; he is left to his natural moral obligations, to seek for truth and teach and speak nothing else; only, he has incurred and must accept the liability to forfeit his position, if the exercise of his conscientious liberty carries him beyond the law of his Church. For determining this there are courts provided to which all individual officers are amenable, and which take off their hands the onus of privately settling their own legal position. Colenso accordingly gives free course to his own conscience and convictions in what he reads and abstains from reading of the Services of the Church, as well as in his own preaching; and has brought all his professions and habitual life into the sincerest accordance with his inward thought. In a National Church, the conditions of which are defined by Act of Parliament, he thinks that the *legal* obligation measures the moral. Were this to cease, and give place to private voluntary contract, guarded only by honourable understanding, the personal conscience would then become charged with the judicial responsibilities for which at present there is a separate provision; and he would then at once accept the duty which you regard as his already. Meanwhile, being attached to the theory and influence of a National Church, he would prefer to win for her the freedom within, which we exercise without, and works towards it from the interior, as all her members have a right to do, so long as he has a footing there.

I do not adopt this mode of thinking. But neither can I treat it as a "disregard of personal engagements," or an attitude which cannot be assumed "without dishonour." It characterises men like —, who, with an extreme — his best friends thought a superfluous — delicacy of conscience, resigned his Fellowship rather than run a remote risk of violating (in mere tutorial teaching, wholly untheological) a condition not to inculcate what was inconsistent with the Word of God; and who is, intellectually as well as morally, better fitted perhaps than any living Englishman to give on such questions a verdict entitled to respect.

The important point for us, however, is this: whether our College is committed by its fundamental principle to disown all people who give this answer, rather than yours and mine, to the problem of conformity. What is that principle? To require from the Professor the free exercise of a competent mind and the conscientious communication of its best light; and, in furtherance of this end, to abstain from prescribing beforehand, to him or his pupils, any results which they must reach. This principle certainly shows our conviction that tests are apt to hinder free learning and ought not to stand in its way; and makes it imperative on us to elect no Professor without adequate guarantees for the free and conscientious action of his mind. But it does *not* say, that *no* evidence of this conscientious freedom can avail in the event of a past confession of faith having once been made, without a formal abandonment of the Church which exacted it. Surely there may be proof enough that the restraining force of that confession is utterly worn out, as in the whole career and open declarations of Colenso for the last fifteen years; and ample indications of elevation and disinterestedness of character, as in his heroic encounter, for the sake of truth and sincerity, of contumely and sacrifices the most galling, and his unpopular and lonely demand of justice to a people helpless and oppressed. Add to this the surrender of a bishopric, and the withdrawal to the private station of an unbeneficed clergyman, in the service of a religious body unhonoured and insignificant, and surely it is unreasonable to say, that all this shall go for nothing for want of the one thing more, that he shall cease to go to church, or at least to preach there. And to describe a man who takes up such a position as attempting to combine the "distinctions of conformity" with the "liberty of nonconformity" appears to me a highly ideal representation of the life which he adopts. Sure to be hooted at by the Church to which he clings, and liable to

be only half-trusted by that to which he makes approach, he is likely to concentrate in his own person rather the disadvantages than the advantages of both; and, in incurring this liability, gives a pledge of devotion to unfettered truth and right far more emphatic, in my judgment, than is implied in the mere act of renouncing his original communion. Such a pledge seems to me fully to satisfy the requirements of our "fundamental principle"; and I do not see that our own rule of abstinence from tests obliges us to set up a test against tests.

To put such a strain upon our principle would carry us far beyond our historical usage and habitual feeling. It would forbid us ever to avail ourselves of the instructions of any *Confessional Protestant Minister*. Yet, of our older divines, the freest and most eminent resorted to Leyden and other universities, in which the theological chairs were filled by men of this class; and of our own more recent ministers some of the highest type have been trained in Dublin, Glasgow, Edinburgh, under similar conditions. Nay, your last letter suggested that we should advertise our Hebrew vacancy, in the hope of drawing to us some scholar not of our own connection, like —, or, . . . — of Oxford, — both of them clergymen. . . . And we have always approved of our young ministers resorting to the Lecture-rooms of such teachers as Schleiermacher, Rothe, Schenkel, Volkmar, Kuenen, etc., — all of them scholars holding office in Confessional Churches. . . .

If every minister in a Confessional Church is *ipso facto* disqualified for our service, it is plain that only a Unitarian is eligible; unless some exceptional layman could be found, devoted to the special studies of the theologian.

Mr. —'s type of nonconformist zeal strikes me as affording a curious study. That he should shrink from letting in Colenso, yet want to carry the whole College to Oxford, is surely a singular case of straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.

. . . I had indulged the hope that this opportunity would change the currents that are sweeping us along the weary courses of all sects, and clear the air for us of a new region in the future. The check which this hope, like every other having our churches for its object, receives from various causes and now especially from your disapproval, is profoundly disheartening. But the regret is only personal. The "Kingdom will come" in good time, if along other paths than I had watched, and through other agencies than those which I had loved.

Believe me ever, dear friend,

Very affectionately yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

It is known that Dr. Colenso would have seriously considered the proposal if it had been made to him, and did not believe that his position in the Church would have prevented him from throwing himself heart and soul into the work, as contemplated in the fundamental principles of the College. Finally, two of Dr. Martineau's own pupils — the Rev. C. B. Upton, and the Rev. J. E. Carpenter — were appointed to fill the vacant Chairs.

On the 8th of February, 1875, the University of Leyden, on occasion of its tercentenary celebration, conferred on him the degree of S.T.D. This distinction surprised as well as gratified him, for he thought he had not the slightest ground for supposing that anyone in Leyden knew of his existence.¹ Nearly at the same time he received an invitation from the Council of the Liverpool Literary and Philosophical Society to deliver the Roscoe Lecture for the current year. While "deeply sensible of the honour" thus conferred upon him, and owning "the attraction of an engagement so interesting and so congenial," he was obliged to decline on account of his health, which, "though equal to all the demands of quiet pursuits, academical and literary," forbade him "to venture on the excitement of public engagements."²

His summer vacation was spent in Yorkshire, where, among other labours, he wrote an introductory chapter for a new edition of Mr. Tayler's "Retrospect of Religious Life in England." This chapter became virtually a supplement, bringing down the historical survey to the time of writing. By prefixing this additional material as a kind of preface, he retained for the original volume "its integrity, and its literary beauty of proportion and manner." This interesting sketch occupied him for three weeks, and, as he was at a distance from his books, had

¹ From a letter to Rev. C. Beard.

² From his answer, addressed to Mr. A. J. Mott.

to be written from memory.¹ The closing section, on "Christian Theism," explains what are obviously his own relations to Christianity, and states the reasons why he refused "to quit the line and disown the obligations of the Christian succession." The power of religious truths "is not logical and abstract, but comes through human life," and "a religion that declines to be united with the past will hardly avail to combine men in the present; in ceasing to be historical, it loses its best hope of becoming social."

In 1876 he sought once more the bracing air of the Highlands, and found a house in the neighbourhood of Kingussie. For some time his friends had been urging him to bring out a new volume of sermons; but hitherto he had not been able to secure the necessary time. In a letter to a friend, written on Feb. 18, 1875, he says:—

"I can assure you the wish is always present with me to prepare a set for publication; but from the hourly pressure of work which cannot be postponed, it remains thus far ineffectual. . . . It seems a simple matter to copy out and send to press what is already in manuscript. But the writer knows too well that what it may be permissible to preach is not on that account in a condition to be published; and the needed revision is just what I cannot command time to effect. I trust, however, that, with the abatement, after this session, of my College work, I may be able to do something towards the execution of my purpose. The times, however, are hurrying men's minds so fast away from the old trusts and affections that I fear to find myself already antiquated, and no longer able to speak to the heart of the present generation."

The hoped-for leisure had now come, and on the 6th of October, 1876, he was able to write the preface for the volume known as "Hours of Thought on Sacred Things." By the beginning of November it was in the hands of his friends; and notwithstanding his fears, there were many

¹ From contemporary letters.

left for whom the thought had not become obsolete or the old spirit lost its charm. He himself was aware that the volume represented a considerably later stage of feeling and experience than the "Endeavours after the Christian Life," and bore traces of the more recent aspects of religious speculation; but it retained essentially the same view of life, the same conception of the order of the world, and the same interpretation of the Christian mind. The new lights of historical criticism had certainly changed, in no slight degree, our picture of the origin and growth of the Christian religion; but every larger comprehension of the universe only invested the principles of that religion with sublimer truth; and every added refinement of conscience the more attested their spiritual worth.¹

But the appreciation, if not loudly expressed, yet deeply felt, with which his volume was received, did not allay the sorrowful forebodings with which he contemplated the prevailing tone of thought among the body of Christians with whom he was connected. He wrote to the Rev. C. Wicksteed, on November 20:—


"F. W. Newman writes to me in warm appreciation of the two 'most slighted versions of Christianity,' the *Quaker* and the *Unitarian*, and sees in the latter the hope of the future, just when I have nearly come to the conclusion that we are far on the downward path and near the last stage of our *religious* history. Religion, once drifting away from the Personality of God and resolved into a Moral Idealism (and this is the growing tendency with our young men), loses all that is distinctive and melts into general culture. From this fate the Churches are protected which, finding their centre of gravity in the Incarnation, unite the Divine and the Human in the representative of our nature, and construe our own moral phenomena into personal relations with the All-holy Mind. I see in this a germ of fruitfulness; in the other, only a spreading barrenness. In short, we are falling, I fear, into far more serious errors than those which other Churches still retain."

¹ From the preface.

There were, doubtless, some grounds for this despondent view, though it was perhaps exaggerated, and the drift in question was of a temporary character. Dr. Martineau himself had been largely instrumental in bringing about a profound change in Unitarian theology, and his own thought combined with the scientific influences of the age to destroy the old reliance on miraculous intervention and dogmatic revelation. Now the older Unitarianism rested on the security of miracle; and when this support was withdrawn, it required time before it could find a new spiritual basis laid in the very constitution of the soul. It was only natural, therefore, that the force of destructive agencies should be felt, and painfully faced, before the conservative and constructive labours, in which Dr. Martineau had so large a share, could produce their restorative effect. His own experience was different. His spiritual grasp of divine realities always preceded the loosening of external ties; and the dropping away of ancient views was but as the rending of a veil which had hidden the beauty of eternal truth. It is therefore intelligible that one to whom negation was invariably the rejection of the lower in favour of the higher thought may not always have estimated at its proper value the effect of negation upon minds less prepared, or made sufficient allowance for a necessary period of doubt in the passage to a more refined and elevated faith.

In the forest of Rothiemurchus, about two miles from Aviemore, and at an elevation of seven hundred and forty-four feet above the sea, is situated a cottage, standing within about seven acres of land, and known as the Polchar, which is said to mean "The Pool of Rushes." The rushes have given way to cultivated ground, and at the present time a wood, fields, and a large and fruitful garden make up the little estate. Not far off the river Spey flows through the valley, and mountains of various heights and

distances rise on almost every side. Dr. Martineau, having obtained a lease, established here a summer residence, and, almost to the close of his life, spent several months every year in this lovely and sequestered spot, where the dry and bracing air, and his remoteness from all the distractions of city life, soon restored his health, and must have contributed not a little to the vigour of his old age. The cottage was enlarged to suit the requirements of his family. A room, sufficiently commodious, was selected for the study. Its window commands a view nearly south-east. On the left, across a field, is a wood, chiefly of fir-trees, and on the right the ridge of Inchriach, which rises beyond the beautiful waters of Loch an Eilein (the lake of the island); and still further on the right may be seen the neighbouring hill, called Ord Bain, which commands from its summit an extensive prospect, and on its lower slopes is so densely clothed with trees that a stranger may easily lose himself. The wood on the left now hides from view the mighty mass of Cairn Gorm, which may, however, be seen from the shady avenue of sycamore and wych-elm, by which the cottage is approached. Close under the window pretty chaffinches pick their morning meal; and white gulls may be constantly seen wheeling their graceful flight. In all directions there are beautiful drives and walks through the valleys or the forest, or over the wooded hills; and on great occasions Dr. Martineau would climb, with some chosen friend, the higher mountains, and from an eminence of over four thousand feet survey, as he said, the half of Scotland. The summers are generally fine, and the severity of the heat is tempered both by the northern latitude and by the general elevation of the country. The effect of the climate upon his health may be described in Dr. Martineau's words:—



THE POLCHAR, AYEMORE
FROM A SKETCH BY GERTRUDE MARTINEAU

TO DR. BARCLAY.

Nov. 5, 1892.

"The Rothiemurchus air, such is my experience, blows away at once all care for health, and gives the *thing* without the *thought* of it. Under its influence, we find ourselves soon enabled to bear and do what we should decline to venture on at home. I have more than once gone to the west coast of Scotland in good health, and brought away from it a fit of the gout. I went to Aviemore this year under the most tedious attack I ever had, and it vanished, as you know, with scarcely any treatment, and I have returned without a trace of any ailment. So I have every reason to accept Sir A. Clark's report of Strathspey, 'It is the sanatorium of the British Islands.'"

In this quiet retreat Dr. Martineau retained his studious habits. He rose in the mornings a little before seven. After breakfast he walked about the grounds, and arranged with his man the work of the day; and then a little before ten he shut himself up in the study till the post came, about two. In the early times the family dined at three; but as it was difficult to draw him from the house after dinner, the hour was changed to five, and then he went for a walk or a drive after lunch. After tea, about seven, he again retreated to the study, and remained among his books till midnight. This routine was occasionally varied by a day on the mountains; and as the hospitable family delighted to welcome friends tired with their season's work, he had sometimes to exchange his books for living converse with men of culture and distinction, such as the late Master of Balliol, and many others. His colleague, Professor Upton, paid an annual visit, and amid mountain rambles held high discourse on philosophic themes.

The first summer, 1877, in this delightful home was darkened by a cloud which for many years had been slowly gathering. An illness affecting the brain had been quietly stealing from Mrs. Martineau something of her

old brightness and quick intelligence; and now, on the 2d of August, Dr. Martineau writes that his time is much taken up by his dear wife's state of health, which gives him much anxiety. On the 26th she was again better,¹ but the improvement did not last long. The rest of the story may be told through his letters, some of which seem almost too sacred for publication; but they will be read with reverence by those who have sympathy for human sorrow and human trust.

TO DR. WILLIAM SMITH.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Oct. 11, 1877.

Notwithstanding the unsettled weather, we had much enjoyment and refreshment from our sojourn in Strathspey; and fine days enough for some glorious ascents of Braeriach and Cairn Gorm, the one by Glen Innich, the other from Larig Rue (the pass to Braemar). But our stay at the Polchar was cut short by the serious decline of my dear wife's strength, which gave too plain a warning that we must not linger so far from home. Before the middle of September we brought her hither in an invalid carriage. She did not suffer from the journey; but the illness advances with well-marked steps, and leaves us only the sorrowful duty of soothing the descent by such resources as care and affection can command. Under more favouring conditions, it would have been most acceptable to me to make a pause on my way at Edinburgh, in conformity with your kind proposal.

TO PROFESSOR KNIGHT.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Oct. 18, 1877.

Too true it is that the verge of limiting darkness which every personal union is always approaching is close upon my sight, and no lingering steps can detain me from it long. My dear wife, after many years (nearly twenty) of weakened spirits and declining powers, lapsed this summer into so low and hysterical a state, that, by the advice of our London medical attendant, we at once secured an invalid carriage, and brought her home. She bore the journey well; but, from time to time, serious effusions on the brain recur, and leave an abated vitality.

¹ Letters to Rev. C. Wicksteed.

Each evening we carry her down to our family tea-table, and for two hours or more she enjoys our music and conversation, and is like her old self. But this brighter margin of life is ever contracting; and when it vanishes, lost either in troubled sleep or in the nervous distress and wandering of other hours, we can hardly wish to detain her,—the mere prisoner of our watchful cares. Meanwhile, our simple and sacred duty is to guide her descending steps over whatever grass and flowers we can find, and soothe the last embrace with the inward calm of trust and love. It is but a brief separation; the emigrantship will soon be sent for me too; and higher work—as I firmly hope through all the sadnesses of experience—be found for us together in another country, even a heavenly. In the interval of trial and suspense, no sympathy—and no stimulus to persevere in my appointed tasks—can be more precious to me than yours. My earlier congenial friends have dropped off and left me almost alone; and I need the more the support of comparatively recent friendships, and the help of younger eyes to see the world and human life in the truest and the freshest light. . . .

I am thankful, during this trying time, for the necessity of constant lecture writing. Difficult as it often is, the interest of it is a wholesome engagement to my thoughts, and, by many a sweet breath of truth, dissipates the cloud of gathering sorrow.

TO REV. J. H. THOM.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Oct. 25, 1877.

MY DEAR FRIEND,—Your word of sympathy is very precious to me; and your message of affectionate remembrance lighted up the poor sunken countenance of our sufferer with a sudden smile which it would have touched you to see, as it broke through the previous look of distress struggling with unconsciousness. The nature of the disease (“red softening of the brain”) involves frequent wandering; but with intervals of complete, even startling, collectedness. A few days ago, as she lay with closed eyes and to all appearance insensible to everything around, two of us at her bedside were speaking of Tyndall’s Birmingham address; and when his conversion of moral responsibility into mere animal training or breaking-in was mentioned, she said: “On such terms it is not worth while to be men and women at all; better be a dog or a horse, without illusions”; and this, though distinct speech was almost too much for her weakness. Spent as her strength is, it may yet

perhaps detain her two or three weeks; but though the parting lingers, all of life is gone except the patience of its end. After a companionship in duty and affection for forty-nine years, the habit of loneliness is but sorrowfully and ill acquired. But then, it is not needed for long; and it is better to have, than to give, the grief of survivorship. I try to keep a heart ready for the surrender, as well as trustful for the restoration. And meanwhile, the pressure of immediate duties, in writing my weekly lectures, helps me to maintain a healthier tone of mind than would be possible if I yielded to the pleadings of sorrow. . . .

TO REV. S. A. STEINTHAL.

Nov. 1, 1877.

The words of sympathy which you send me, in your own name and your dear wife's, touch me deeply. They reach me almost in the crisis of our trouble. A few days may yet remain before the parting comes; but hardly more. Nor can we desire it; for our poor sufferer's illness has painful complications which check the natural clinging of affection to the lingering life. It is a comfort to be all together, and afford her such support and peace as the daily sight of all that is dear to her can afford.

The 9th of November brought the closing scene; and the life which had been, "through all its vicissitudes of interest, fused into one long affection,"¹ parted for a time into its separate channels. The funeral on the following Tuesday, when the body was laid in Highgate Cemetery, was conducted by the old friend of the family, the Rev. Charles Wicksteed. The next day Dr. Martineau wrote to him:—

"I could not command myself yesterday sufficiently to thank you as my heart impelled for the true and tender way in which you discharged your great act of friendship. I knew it would be so,—that you would speak just that, and only that, which would be congenial with the memories and the hopes of our sorrow; and now that the realisation of my assurance has been so perfect, I can only tell you of the heartfelt gratitude of all my young people, as well as of myself."

¹ From a letter to Wicksteed.

On the 14th he wrote to Mr. Thom: —

DEAR FRIEND, — Of all that this sorrow brings into my heart I cannot say much, even to Him that sends it. But your words are so true to me, and so gently lead me to my rest in Him, that I must thank you for thus interpreting and clearing my dim griefs. Only a spirit deeply steeped in these experiences could tell their story and find their meaning with such faithfulness. It is not for me to murmur or despond, but only to be grateful that the harder lot is reserved for me; and that it is spared to her, the depth of whose love — known only to myself — was a rare and blessed power through the years of action, but too pathetic for the later season of suffering sympathy. The gathering evening shadows lie more gently upon us; and we may let our dear ones pass first to the new morning. The Everlasting Love keeps us safe for each other, whether there or here.

It was a true comfort that our friend Charles Wicksteed stood by us, and performed the last offices at Highgate yesterday; and I hope he will complete his *act* of friendship by taking the services on Sunday. He knew, better than any survivor here, the earlier, brighter, and more obvious features of my dear wife's character, and can take a truer measure of what is lost. On Monday we shall return to all our quiet duties, consecrated anew.

Ever, dear friend,

Your affectionate and grateful

JAMES MARTINEAU.

TO REV. C. BEARD.

5 GORDON STREET, W. C., Nov. 16, 1877.

DEAR MR. BEARD, — Through silence however long we should have felt assured that, in our sorrow, we were not without the sympathy of yourself and Mrs. Beard. But the form which it takes from your living words renders it doubly welcome; and I must send you our heartfelt thanks. I will not tell you how true is your estimate of the late weeks, indeed months, of suffering. They are over; and memory naturally takes flight to what is brighter, more permanent, and more representative. Even through the periods of prevailing unconsciousness, there broke from time to time singular gleams of clear thought and strong love, which were absolutely startling, even to me, who alone knew what a reserve of light there was behind the later

shadows. Gratefully do I think of the cloud as now lifted and contentedly enter whatever darkness it casts upon my short remaining way.

TO PROFESSOR KNIGHT.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., NOV. 17, 1877.

Of no friend's sympathising thought have we felt more sure, in our time of trial, than of yours and Mrs. Knight's; and its full and comforting expression in your letter only renders a little more explicit what we knew to be there.

There is something in the reality of sorrow which indisposes us to speculate upon it, and throws us upon simpler and deeper supports than even our best-considered theories of life and death. At least, so it is with me. An ever-deepening shadow has long been gathering upon this dear, devoted, dutiful and once bright companion of all my manly years, till her sunny genial nature was almost hid by the overcasting clouds. And for months past the darkness became the shroud of obscure suffering which frustrated most of our efforts at relief. It would seem not unreasonable that an experience so sad should bring with it some troubled doubts, some passionate demand for explanation. Why it is, I cannot tell; but I do not find it so. Behind all this,—nay, *more tranquil* for the wild storm in front,—remains the calm trust which is the soul's last stay; the gloom and terror are in our atmosphere; and are lost in the Everlasting Love whose light is everywhere. The grievous hour of mortal struggle once over, the natural thing is for the memory to look *past it*, and fetch back the dear perfect image as the only real, the sweet *silent* presence of the remaining way, till Death which has sealed the immediate communion shall unseal it again. I do not question that these simple trusts admit of intellectual justification. We both of us indeed devote ourselves to the attempt. But they have somehow a deeper root, and hold on to our Reason though their apparent ground be torn, and bear their fruits though their seeming atmosphere gives them no nutriment.

On Monday, I resume my College work in full. During the last two months, with the exception of a week or two, I have continued the habit of writing a lecture week by week,—often with the difficulties of a depressed spirit, but with benefit from the diversion of thought. To-morrow, the services in Little Portland Street Chapel will be taken by my old friend *Charles Wicksteed* (the father), who will say what is congenial in his

1879] REVISION OF "COMMON PRAYER"

sermon, as he did at the funeral on Tuesday. He was minister at the Park Chapel in Liverpool when we came over from Dublin to settle there in 1832; so that he knows what my home was, and what its directing spirit, in those early days.

More I will not say at present. Believe me truly grateful for your gentle remembrance of us; and ready, with an unrepining heart, to enter on my short solitary way. It seems a kind of ingratitude to my faithful and loving children to speak of "solitude." But you will know how to limit the sense in which I use the word.

The years now flowed tranquilly on, chiefly devoted to quiet literary work, and the delivery of College lectures. In 1878 we need only record the opening of the College Session with the lecture on "Ideal Substitutes for God."¹

In 1879 he was engaged upon a revision of "Common Prayer for Christian Worship." We have already seen that he was dissatisfied with some of the phrases in that work, and had introduced modifications for his own use. He now believed that the desire for change was so widely felt as to overbalance his scruples against having two recensions which might be placed side by side, and thus be brought under critical comparison. Dr. Sadler acceded to his wishes, and the revised edition appeared in the summer. The preface, dated July 8, speaks in the name of the "Editors"; but the hand is the hand of Dr. Martineau, and the alterations introduced into the volume are his.

The following letter to Professor Knight throws some light upon his views, and also introduces us to a new literary enterprise:—

THE POLCHAR, July 9, 1879.

MY DEAR DR. KNIGHT, — You must not attribute my week's delay in replying to your most welcome letter to any retaliation on your long silence, but to the preoccupations which still beset my life, and of which you have an experience large enough to make you boundlessly charitable. First, let me thank you

¹ Reprinted in *Essays*, IV., where 1879 is an error.

heartily for the interesting volume of "Home Prayers"; of which the general tone, the special selections, and the mode of combining and distributing the materials, are, in my judgment, alike admirable. The only point on which I am not quite at one with you is in regard to the Anglican Collects. From some cause, — doubtless a defect in my mental constitution, — I never could enter into the admiration felt for these; neither their spiritual nor their literary character speaks to me with any effect; and the contrast between the thin ecclesiastical prose devotion and the massive energy of the Hebrew poets and prophets, is to me almost painful. I know, however, that I am here in a minority of one. I have been engaged in preparing a revised edition of our (*i. e.*, Dr. Sadler's and my) Ten Services; not to supersede the existing book, but to be offered as an alternative form of it. The first eight Services (which, you may perhaps remember, are all compiled from old materials, taken from religious books) are extensively altered or recast; mainly with the object of placing them on about the same theological level with the two remaining Services. Though there was before no *intentional* doctrinal difference between the several parts of the volume, a want of homogeneity was felt; and Dr. Sadler readily agreed to the revision which I have attempted. The task is just out of my hands to-day. The book will be a poor return for your double gift, — the second half of which I eagerly expect, — but, such as it is, it shall be sent to you.

Now, as to your rash, but gratifying, proposal to entrust me with the Spinoza volume of the Philosophical Classics, my first impression was strong that, at my age, I ought to decline it; partly from the positive uncertainty of life; partly from the need of all my short remaining span for uncompleted projects; partly from the general rule that old men, being rarely conscious of failure in their powers, ought always to presume themselves incompetent for the tasks to which they were equal in their days of vigour. One consideration, however, I have to set against these weighty reasons. In preparing my Ethical lectures for publication I have always intended to work up the recent Spinoza literature, and recast my exposition of the *Ethica*. The study necessary for this purpose would constitute a fair preparation also for the volume you ask at my hands. Whether I should find fair scope for treating the same subject twice over is questionable. But I should desire to make my own lectures more critical and polemical than they now are; whilst your design is expressly limited to exposition; and per-

haps this difference would suffice to mark out independent lines of treatment. Before I finally decide, therefore, I will ask what time you can give me, first, for a definite answer; and, secondly, for the work itself. In order to make up my mind, I must procure, and estimate for reading, several foreign books, which could hardly be got together within three or four weeks. If I was then not frightened by the quantity of preliminary study, I do not think I should be much diverted or delayed in the execution of the work itself. Not that I can ever be rapid; but my slowness I try to compensate by persistency.

One of your requirements I fear I should be incompetent to fulfil. To interpret Spinoza without technical terminology, or resort to anything beyond the English of the present day and of common life, seems to me simply impossible; not less so than to teach arithmetic without figures. A deductive system, the fundamental conceptions of which are no longer current, except in the schools, can have no entrance into the untrained mind which refuses the trouble of acquiring those conceptions and therefore their verbal symbols. Take away the terminology as defined, and the whole nexus and articulation of the system simply disappear; and though some account may be given of *what* Spinoza believed on this and that subject, no insight can be imparted into the reasoning which induced his belief; and the intellectual architecture of his mind must remain out of view.

All things considered, I think you would do better to put this work into the hands of Frederick Pollock, who is probably more ready for it than I am, and has, very justly, a special Spinozistic repute. If my scruples dispose you to the same opinion, do not hesitate to act upon it at once; and think of me as pleased to have been asked, and in no way displeased to be replaced.

The invitation to prepare a volume on Spinoza was due to the fact that Professor Knight was engaged in editing for Messrs. Blackwood and Sons the well-known series of "Philosophical Classics for English Readers." It is needless to relate in detail the negotiations which accompanied the progress of the work. It is sufficient to say that Dr. Martineau, having thrown himself zealously into the task entrusted to him, ultimately found it impossible to compress the results of his labours into the limits, about

two hundred small pages, insisted on by the Messrs. Blackwood; and, the arrangement having consequently fallen through, he brought out the volume independently, with the title, "A Study of Spinoza," in 1882.

On the 30th of October an important Special Meeting of the Trustees of Manchester New College was held in the Memorial Hall, Manchester, to take into consideration a Report of the Committee on an inquiry ordered more than four years previously. An account of the proceedings belongs rather to a history of the College than to the present work. It is sufficient to say that the main point of the discussion turned on the question whether the College should be kept in London or removed to Oxford. As it was known that Dr. Martineau would not remove to Oxford, this discussion was necessarily painful to him, and if a resolution to transplant the College had been carried, it must have been regarded as a vote of want of confidence, and led to his resignation. Happily he was spared so ungracious a termination of his long period of devoted service; for, though the debate was not apparently influenced by any regard for his wishes and opinions, it was decided by thirty-one votes to fifteen to retain the College in London. The views with which Dr. Martineau looked forward to the meeting are expressed in letters to the Rev. A. W. Worthington:—

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, Oct. 19, 1879.

With regard to the College question I naturally feel a deep interest, not to say anxiety; the more so from being precluded by my official position from attending the Manchester meeting. If the Special Report had taken any notice of the Professors' opinion which had been twice invited and expressed in careful Reports, the meeting would, I am aware, advantageously dispense with our personal presence; but as these Reports are passed *sub silentio*, no influence can flow into the discussion from those who have the closest *interior* view of the problem, and who, in considering it, have been led to make a special study, during repeated personal visits, of the related conditions

of life at Oxford or Cambridge. If I thought, with Mr. —, that our business, as a College, was rather to hang out a flag than to do a work, to proclaim to all passers-by "Free Theology," regardless whether anyone followed the standard or not, rather than to carry out this true principle practically in what is really our proper object, — the right training of a body of scholarly ministers, — I should perhaps plant the flagstaff in Oxford rather than in London. But the *dominant end* being Education for the liberal nonconformist ministry, I can imagine no more unfortunate set of conditions than would surround the institution on the proposed Oxford plan. The students are none of them to be Undergraduates, therefore none of them resident in any College but our own. Our own would have no connection with the University, and would be simply a Theological Seminary in the town. Its students may have graduated *anywhere*, and, even if at Oxford, would have outlived the personal relations of their undergraduate years. Such a set of young divines would be far more completely insulated, by their destination and the contrast of their life to everything upon the spot, than they are now; and no professions could prevent the denominational stamp being fixed on the College ineffaceably. Then, there is no congenial religious life to feed the fires of zeal and hope, — no congregation, no schools, no opening for popular Christian action; nothing but a family chapel, occasionally brightened by an address from some free-thinking lay Fellow or Tutor from the outside. And on either side of this loneliness would be the enormous pressure of a High ecclesiastical devotion and a fashionable Agnosticism, equally contemptuous towards all that lies between. I am convinced that the evils from which we have suffered have nothing whatever to do with the locality of the College or its Academical system. They lie in the *Ministry beyond*, and in the unsettled state of Theological belief. The pastorate in our churches has greatly lost its attractions not only to the reasonable interests and social desires of men, but to their nobler and devouter enthusiasm. The response to it is increasingly feeble. And other walks of life have opened out, more secure and more animating.

OCT. 21, 1879.

I have no plea for objecting to your using my letter in any way that may be opportune. I found all my previous impressions confirmed by my conversations with Professor Jowett. It is said that our laymen and our divines ought to be educated

together. But if the laymen are scattered, as undergraduates, through the various existing Colleges related to the University, while the divines, already graduates, are either living in town lodgings or gathered within the walls of a town College unrelated to the University, they are *not* educated together. They are not parallel in time; they are not united in place; they are not pupils of the same teachers. I doubt whether there would in general be much disposition, in the sons of Unitarian gentlemen at Christ Church, at the age of eighteen or nineteen, to seek out for friendship the young preacher of twenty-four who was studying Theology in the frugal Nonconformist college of which the University Calendar knows nothing.

Towards the close of the year a second volume of "Hours of Thought on Sacred Things" was published. The book was sent forth at first, and was sent forth again, "in the midst of an intellectual conflict involving no less than the continued existence of any Christendom at all. Wearied with the clang of opposing pleas, and noticing that disputes are seldom settled till their arguments are forgotten," he thought his best offering to the needs of the time "would be a volume in aid of personal religion, and admitting no polemic tone to break the harmony of simple trusts and natural piety." But in a few instances in the present volume a place was allowed to indispensable theoretical reasonings and expositions. He also inserted a Confirmation Address, and two Communion Addresses, to show what meaning was attached to the Communion Service by persons who, like himself, disowned the Sacramental theory.¹ These volumes take their place beside the "Endeavours," presenting the same great spiritual faith in the forms of his maturer thought. He thus refers to the volume in a letter to Mr. Thom:—

JAN. 13, 1880.

I found it impossible to write to you at the time when Longmans forwarded my volume; but I must send you my heartfelt thanks for your kind reception of it. It is the last word of my

¹ From the preface.

Preacher's function; and I do not think I should have put it forth but for my desire to save from heedless slight some sides of Christian truth and sanctities of usage which our younger men, through mere infection from the temper of the times, are allowing to be treated with irreverence. I suppose that the conservatism of age is in itself as little reasonable as the haste of "advanced thought" in younger men. But few things astonish me more than the small amount of reason which seems sufficient, with the new generation, for the most radical changes of conviction. The greater haste of life and the mass of fugitive literature, as they have distributed thought widely among the half-competent, have also, I fear, greatly weakened the intellectual solidity of those who, as guides to others, are bound to make their competency thorough. I have a strong attachment to our historical churches; but, from their present aspect and tendency, I cannot hope that they have any large inheritance in the future of English religion.

The 7th of April, 1880, was the centenary of the birth of Dr. Channing, and it was decided by the Council of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association to hold a public meeting on that day, in order to call attention to the various aspects of his work and influence. The meeting was held in St. James' Hall, and was attended by ministers and laymen of various denominations. Dr. Martineau was asked to give the principal address of the evening; and notwithstanding his reluctance to undertake public and exciting engagements, he felt that he could not decline. The address was an admirable review of Channing's life and influence. He finds the animating principle which constituted the unity and harmony "of this pure and powerful soul" in the immovable faith "that moral perfection is the essence of God and the supreme end for man; in the one, an eternal reality; in the other, a continuous possibility; in both, the ground of perpetual spiritual communion"; and he shows how this dominating thought affected Channing's theology, his ethics, and his action.¹

¹ The address is printed in the volume of "Reports of the Centenary Meetings," issued by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association.

Mr. Thom fulfilled a similar duty in Liverpool; and Dr. Martineau wrote to him:—

“No words can express the delight with which I read your incomparable Channing Address, and the pride I feel that such a representation of our English feeling should go over to America. It is to me the one illuminated feature of all the celebrations, here and there; and, except for local impression, it would be as well if all else could drop away and leave this alone. On the whole, these Centenaries are unmanageable affairs, with too large a proportion of unreality to exercise a satisfactory influence.”

In the summer Dr. Martineau gave up his house in Gordon Street, sleeping there for the last time on the 24th of June, and, on his return in the autumn from his country residence, removed into a more commodious house, 35 Gordon Square, where he gained a quiet situation, a studio for his youngest daughter, and a better study, upstairs, for himself.

The Rev. Stopford A. Brooke having seceded from the Established Church, Dr. Martineau became a member of his congregation, and continued to attend his services till the congregation was dissolved, on the retirement of Mr. Brooke.

In 1881 an earnest appeal from forty-five of his old pupils, who were engaged in the work of the ministry, became the occasion of one of his grandest and most solemn utterances. It happened in that year that no student was leaving the College, and consequently that the Valedictory Service, which was usually held in Little Portland Street Chapel at the close of the session in June, would not be required. He was asked, therefore, in a letter dated the 2d of March, to fill the hour, thus left vacant, by an Address to his old pupils, to whom it would be a source of great delight and refreshment to meet together once more, and listen to the voice from which they had learned so

much. Deeply moved, he could not wait for a second thought before saying how joyfully he consented. If they were not tired of the old voice, speaking in the old spirit, he would not shrink from offering what might be his last word, though it should be only to say how the world looked to one who must shortly leave it.¹ The devotional service on the occasion was conducted by his old fellow-student, the Rev. William Gaskell. The subject of the Address was "Loss and Gain in Recent Theology." It was spoken from such a lofty spiritual height that it required clear vision to apprehend its real drift, and minds in a lower stage might be excused for misconceiving it, especially as it was impossible in the time to answer all the questions that might arise in the mind of a reader not familiar with his thought. After some introductory remarks, he proceeded to measure some of the admitted changes of religious conception since the time when he and his hearers had first studied together. He noticed, first, "the total disappearance, from our branch of the Reformed Churches, of all *External Authority* in matters of Religion." This, instead of requiring the preacher to despair of his office, conferred upon him the "noble though severe advantage" that he was "driven from words to realities, and must sink right home to the inward springs of religion in our nature and experience." "The Spirit of God, which in the old time wrought their elements of sanctity into the pages of the Bible, lives and operates for ever in the human soul, renewing the light of Divine truth, and kindling eternal aspirations; so that the day of Pentecost is never past, and there is still a tongue of fire for every evangelist." Next, he referred to "the disappearance from our faith of the entire *Messianic mythology*." From the person of Jesus everything *official* has fallen away; and

¹ The letters are printed in full in Essays, IV. p. 317 *sqq.* On p. 326, line 1, for "statute" read "statue."

“He is simply the Divine flower of humanity, blossoming after ages of spiritual growth, — the realised possibility of life in God.” But we are not thus abandoned to a desolate negation; for “it is only in the rudimentary stages of piety that men crave tangible objects or feigned pictures on which to fasten their wonder and veneration,” and “when we are called of God to plunge and float in His illimitable sea, what can be more miserable than forthwith to escape and land on some broken spar of mythology or dogma?” The sum of these changes of thought is “that they discharge the ingenuities of schoolmen and dreamers and re-deliver us to the intuitions and pieties of our nature; by his identification with which it is that Christ wins us as his disciples and makes us one with himself and God.”

This Address attracted the attention of the Rev. Dr. Allon, at that time the President of the Congregational Union; and at the meeting of that body in Manchester, on the 4th of October, he embraced the opportunity of animadverting on some of Dr. Martineau's supposed positions. In doing so, he certainly displayed a remarkable talent for misapprehension. His character places him above the suspicion of misrepresentation; and not only so, but he had real regard for the object of his criticism, and expressed this in “gracious words of personal appreciation.” Dr. Martineau, though reluctant to engage in any controversy, thought it necessary to bring his meaning down to Dr. Allon's level, and published an “Appendix” to the Address, in which he endeavoured to make his position unmistakably plain.¹ The following letters relate to this subject:—

¹ As this misunderstanding was of a temporary character, the Appendix has not been printed in the collected Essays.

TO MR. R. C. HALL.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, N. B., July 16, 1881.

I ought to have thanked you sooner for your friendly words in recognition of my "Address." But old age does not abate my laziness as a correspondent; but rather finds new excuses for it in the lengthening shadows and the shortening time for unaccomplished work. It is pleasant to me to know that a reader so long familiar as you have been with my spoken thoughts sees in the Address just what it was meant to be; not any assumption of a new and revolutionary position, but a simple summing up of the scattered record of admitted results, and a planting of the residuary truths in the focus of a purer light. The memory of such "*negative*" sermons as you refer to deprives me of all right to find fault with the aggressive "radicalism" of some of my younger brethren. But I own that it is distasteful to me; not merely, I think, from the conservatism of advancing years; but also because the conditions of the conflict are changed; the batteries of the attack have done their work, and the defences are toppling down in such swift confusion that much that was never meant to fall is now difficult to save. The errors we have assailed are smitten and may be left to crumble away; the immediate service needed is to snatch away from their vicinity the divine truths and sacred elements of life which have long had no better shelter. This, at least, is the feeling which will direct whatever little work I may yet be permitted to complete, though it should be rather under the category of philosophy than of theology.

TO MR. HARRY RAWSON.

OCT. 10, 1881.

Mr. — was so good as to send me a copy of the "Examiner's" report some days ago. But, having my hands full of work, I had not read it till your letter to-day called my attention to it. I therefore owe you my thanks, which I very sincerely tender, for opening my eyes to what may perhaps be a necessary, though certainly a disagreeable duty, of reply to Dr. Allon. I say "disagreeable" because if, instead of picking out just the words of mine that suited him, he had quoted the sentence or two in which they occur, he could not have written any of the allegations contained in his criticism.

I am not likely to notice this attack in the College Address;¹

¹ At the opening of the Session.

simply because it is already written, and is on a subject quite distinct. It is possible, however, that Dr. Allon's criticism may bring my previous Address to a new Edition. And, in that case, it might be proper for me to add a few pages of self-defence as a Preface or an Appendix. The pamphlet copy which you so kindly promise of Dr. Allon's address will be very acceptable.

TO REV. R. C. JONES.

OCT. 21, 1881.

I have been reluctantly withdrawn for a time from my Spinoza work by the necessity of answering Dr. Allon's criticisms in his "Church of the Future." I have just sent the MS. to the printer; and it will appear in a few days. I abhor these polemics; but one must now and then acquiesce in their miserable waste of time.

In October, 1881, he delivered the last of his Addresses at the opening of the College Session, choosing for his subject "The Relation between Ethics and Religion."¹ This is a philosophical treatise which must be noticed elsewhere; but here attention may be called to an impressive passage near the end, contrasting the practical effects of belief in "blind necessity" and belief in "righteousness on the throne of the Universe." Are we now witnessing the results of the former?

The first meeting of the National Conference of Unitarian and other Non-subscribing Congregations was held in Liverpool, from the 18th to the 20th of April, 1882. Dr. Martineau felt unable to be present, although his old connection with Liverpool, as well as his deep interest in the churches, would naturally have drawn him thither. He, however, in response to a request, sent a letter of "greeting and sympathy." In this he avowed his "unabated confidence in the *Christian Congregation* as the most beneficent of human institutions, — the best guardian of the sanctities of life, and the asylum of its sweetest affections." He found the springs of its power in three

¹ Reprinted in Essays, IV.

conditions: “(1) That its members unite purely for Fellowship and Growth in the Christian life and mind. (2) That, in its external action, it bears down with Missionary zeal on the paganism and irreligion and neglected suffering which it sees around. (3) That on other Churches it looks as on confederates, moving upon different lines in the same sacred warfare.” The letter enlarges upon these three themes with the usual earnestness and felicity of language.¹

In 1883 a strong desire was felt in Lancashire and Cheshire that Dr. Martineau’s voice should once more be heard. An invitation from the “Provincial Assembly of Presbyterian and Unitarian Ministers and Congregations” was signed by ninety-eight ministers and one hundred and forty-eight lay-members. It was then handsomely engrossed in a quarto volume, and bound in crimson morocco. The Rev. H. E. Dowson and Mr. Harry Rawson were deputed to convey this to Dr. Martineau, and on the 17th of September proceeded to Aviemore. The mission proved fruitless, though Dr. Martineau deeply felt “the touching and wonderfully signed Address.” “Seldom,” he says, “have I been in a severer ‘strait between two,’ than between my gratitude for its request and my shrinking from compliance with it. But the more I reflected on it, the clearer it became to me that I am bound by an indivisible allegiance to the one remaining life-work for which as yet old age has not disqualified me,—the revision and completion for publication of what I have written on Ethics and on the Grounds of Religion. Having at length plunged into the midst of this task, I see that I have no right to hope for its accomplishment, if I do not give myself unreservedly to it. I have therefore wrung from myself, with much sorrow, a negative reply.”² This

¹ The letter appears in full in the Report of the Conference, p. 81 *sqq.*

² Letter to J. H. Thom, September 25.

characteristic reply has sufficient interest to be given in full: —

To the Members of the Provincial Assembly of Presbyterian and Unitarian Ministers and Congregations of Lancashire and Cheshire.

DEAR FRIENDS, — If my will were of rock, your letter would melt it down. Never were more persuasive influences brought into one appeal than it sets before my thoughts: surviving friendships, that must be severed soon; tender memories of lost associates and past toils; the inspiring sight of a young generation, freshening the old scenes and outstripping the aims and labours of their fathers; an audience predisposed to listen once again to a long-silenced voice; what more can I need to win my assent to your earnest request that I would revisit you in Manchester?

Alas! it is not *more* that I need, rather is it *less*, to make it possible. The cup is already too full. Did your expressions of confidence and affection not so deeply move me, did I not know that the occasion would overwhelm me by intensity of interest, I should perhaps have courage to stand before you and say my parting word. But, believe me, it is impossible. Though old age deals very gently with me, neither visiting me with bodily infirmity, nor sensibly affecting my quiet work in the study and the lecture-room, it has relaxed the once steadfast nerve of self-command, and leaves me helpless on the waves of any deep excitement. Hence, I have no longer a right to accept a post of exceptional exposure and honourable trust, but must be content, like many a veteran before me, to perform some garrison duty among the unseen defenders of the citadel of God. Moreover, through my eager interest in the studies assigned to me and my desire to keep pace with their continual growth, I have too long shrunk from gathering up the fruits of past years, and throwing into final form such parts of my life-work as may be allowed to survive me. Now that I am at length deeply engaged in this task, it becomes evident that, without absolute concentration upon it I cannot hope to save it from dying with me. Whether, in that case, it would be missed, no one can feel more doubt than I. But, as it is my only apology for having lived, you will not wonder that I feel bound to consecrate to it the eventide of my years, and to guard it from even the most winning of diverting appeals.

Such an appeal, most assuredly, is yours. And were my appointed days' work done, and a few unpledged hours and an

adequate remnant of strength at my disposal, it would be a true privilege and joy to spend a portion of them among you, in the stirring scenes and amid the dear associations of my earlier ministry; and it would take more prudence than I have learned to hold me back.

As it is, the considerate kindness and sympathy with which your excellent representatives Messrs. Dowson and Rawson listened to my plea for declining your affecting invitation encourage me to hope that my reasons will meet a like appreciative reception from the general body of their constituents, and will be mistaken by no one for the excuses of indolence or indifference. Though I cannot personally rejoin the goodly company of the venerable Provincial Assembly, the precious volume (itself a marvel of the Illuminator's and Copyist's art), which preserves the story of their invitation, will remain for my children, as for myself awhile, among the most sacred memorials of my life.

I remain always, with grateful affection,

Yours faithfully,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, Sept. 22, 1883.

Early in 1884 the University of Edinburgh invited him to attend its approaching tercentenary, and receive the honorary degree of D.D. Writing on this subject to Dr. William Smith on March 11, he says: "It certainly is a marked example of the altered theological spirit of our time that such a person as I am should be placed on the list for receipt of a Divinity degree. Though these public occasions are far from congenial to me, and I love the shade rather than the brilliancy of life, I felt it at once a duty to evince my sincere and grateful appreciation of an act so liberal."¹ The degree was conferred on the 17th of April.

In the course of this year appeared a Preface which he had written for Professor Bonet-Maury's "Early Sources of English Unitarian Christianity, revised by the Author

¹ Perhaps it is allowable to mention, for the honour of the Scotch Universities, that at a much earlier time his old friend, Dr. Drummond of Dublin, had received the honorary degree of D.D. from the University of Aberdeen.

and translated by E. P. Hall.”¹ This Preface, which gives high commendation to the Professor’s “rich and instructive pages,” is full of thoughtful suggestion, and traces the appearance of Unitarianism in many different places to the same ultimate source, the use of the “vernacular Bible.”

Before the end of February, 1885, his first great systematic work on philosophy, the “Types of Ethical Theory,” issued from the Clarendon Press. This will be further noticed in its proper place.

On his eightieth birthday an affectionate Address was sent to him from friends in Liverpool, some of them members of Paradise Street Chapel, some of them of Hope Street Church while he still occupied the pulpit there, others remembering his annual visits after his removal to London, and still others who knew him only from the conversation of their elders or from his writings. To this he sent the following reply:—

DEAR FRIENDS, OLD AND YOUNG, — Though I do not find it quite true that old age is compelled to live chiefly on the Past, yet thither it is that, so far as the treasures of memory make up its life, its tenderest looks must always turn. And so, your affecting Address, on the completion of my fourscore years, sinks very deep into my heart; coming as it does from the very circle which brightened the best part of those years, and in which almost every name is associated with some unforgotten labour, some sorrowful experience, or some noble and gentle image of human goodness.

The forms that rise before me as I think of the Hope Street Sunday worship have, with a few precious exceptions, vanished from sight, and the place which once knew them will know them no more. But to me it is a true joy, and I doubt not it is to them, that their children and successors are still there, owning the same sanctities, and carrying on the genealogy of faith and work and love.

You say most truly that the changes of thought and feeling have created around us a more congenial medium for the recep-

¹ Published by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association.

tion of such spiritual Religion and the influence of such moral agencies as are in harmony with the convictions of our conscience. All the more is the glorious obligation laid on us, to tamper with no truth, and be slack in no good work, and turn to account the better light, while it is yet with us.

But, dear friends, let us not fancy that the larger thought and more liberal spirit of the time are witnesses to anything but the progressive Providence of God. That Providence works, no doubt, through human instruments,—instruments, however, so various, and so indissolubly united by reciprocal action in every field, that each receives infinitely more than it can give, and all must own the whole advance Divine.

Your earnest expression of hope for my continuance a little longer here, I gratefully receive as a fresh incentive to diligent devotion to some yet unfinished tasks. When *your* word of zeal and affection becomes insufficient to provoke me to industry, I shall judge myself lost in decrepitude indeed.

If I touch upon the personal memories that crowd upon me, as my eye passes down the many columns of your names, I shall not know whither I am going or at what point I am to end. I dare not venture on a line of reflection, which in itself is too pathetic, and can have its full meaning only for a few among you. Rather let me close with a word of heartfelt thanks for your generous recognition of my past work in your midst, and of sincere joy that whatever I tried to do then is better done now, under the guidance of more vigorous ministers, wielding the enlarged resources of a new age.

To the end of life,

I remain, dear friends,

Your grateful and affectionate

JAMES MARTINEAU.

LONDON, April 23, 1885.

He thus refers to the Address in a letter to Mr. R. C. Hall:—

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., May 1, 1885.

I am much obliged by your kindness in sending me a few printed copies of the Address. One I file as a record, with other memorials of the day; the rest pass into the hands of my children; and more I do not need. I felt sure of your hand in it, all along, and had told my daughters so. There are some perceptions, you see, which are slow to vanish even from the heart of old age. The special names which you point out to me ar-

rested my eye at once, as it passed down the columns, especially that of the good Mr. Cox, of whom I had not heard tidings for many a year. Mr. Unwin I well remember. . . . Of my York fellow-students three Pagets and my neighbour, Mr. Busk, all my juniors, alone survive, . . . and of the intimate companions of my settled life only Mr. Thom and Mr. Newman still cheer me with the blessing of their friendship. It is the inevitable lot of us lingerers to live with a heart of divided allegiance between the visible and the invisible worlds. Happily, neither need impair the love and reverence due to the other.

On the 12th of May he once more presided over the Annual Meeting of the London Domestic Mission, which was held in the Portland British Schools. This was the Jubilee meeting of the Society; and he embraced the opportunity of relating the history of its foundation, of reaffirming its principles, and reviewing the progress which had been made in combating the evils of destitution, ignorance, and intemperance. The Society, like that in Liverpool and other towns, had its origin in the impulse given to work among the poor by Dr. Tuckerman. The humane enthusiasm of the Rev. W. J. Fox had thus been stirred to its depths, and he urged, in the Committee of the British and Foreign Unitarian Association, an immediate appeal to its members for the establishment of a City Mission; and at a meeting of the Association in Manchester, on the 17th of June, 1830, the establishment of City Missions was earnestly recommended. Dr. Martineau had been present and voted for this resolution. The recommendation was accepted by the next Annual Meeting, which was dignified by the presence of Dr. Kirkland, President of Harvard College, and of Rammohun Roy. It was afterwards thought, however, that the Association being "a product of the very conflict of theologies which the Mission was to ignore," was not the most suitable agency for carrying out the conception, and an indepen-

dent society was constituted for the purpose. Turning to the evils of society, he showed that there had been a vast improvement, except in regard to intemperance, in which there was no decline, though in quite recent years there had been some slight reduction in the "frightful prodigy of ruinous waste." Finally, he protested against the despair of that "dismal personage," the Pessimist, and defended the moral and spiritual methods of reformation which the Society had always followed. Reconstructive institutions could effect only an economy of operations, and all the agents in a moral enterprise must be stirred with spiritual enthusiasm. He looked with no little distrust on the amount of *Officialism* which was thrusting itself into life, and saving our time by putting our conscience into commission. If the time should ever come when private and personal initiative was reduced to a minimum, and Society became an aggregate of Clubs, the very soul would have been drained away from human life and the sources cut off of whatever in it was strenuous, tender, and noble.

The time had now come when he was to complete his retirement from his College duties. On the 30th of December, 1884, he sent the Secretaries a letter announcing his resignation, which was to take effect the following Michaelmas. This was communicated to the Trustees at their Annual Meeting, on the 15th of January, 1885; and after speeches had been delivered expressive of the highest appreciation and of the deepest personal regard, a fitting resolution was passed. This was acknowledged by him in the following letter:—

JAN. 21, 1885.

To the Secretaries of Manchester New College.

MY DEAR SIRS,—The Resolution of the College Trustees which you have kindly communicated to me, as passed at their Annual Meeting on the 15th inst., I can only acknowledge with respectful gratitude for their favourable interpretation of my

imperfect services, and with deep-felt reciprocation of their regret at the severance of so long and congenial a relation. The memory of it will remain with me as an after-glow for the short remainder of my time.

Of the terms in which the Resolution was commended to the Meeting I cannot trust myself to speak. I can account for them only by the fact that they proceeded from lifelong friends and sons of friends, to whom, at the parting hour, old affection rendered nothing possible but the most generous appreciation. Such approval is not flattery, and does not spoil like flattery. It is at once more humbling than disparagement, and more awakening than any heartless praise. One only of the good features assigned to my term of work can I appropriate — that of honest and serious purpose to carry out the high trust committed to me. And it would indeed have involved great culpability in the Principal, if, under a watchful administration and with colleagues absolutely one in heart and will, his period had not earned some improved repute for the College, and closed with hopes of larger influence in time to come. The sooner that future eclipses the past, the more will my wish and prayer be fulfilled.

I remain, always,

Yours most sincerely,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

At the Annual Meeting in the summer, when, in accordance with custom, the work of the Session was brought publicly to a close, many friends assembled in London to bid him farewell. A number of the past and present students dined together at Freemasons' Tavern on the 24th of June. The Rev. S. A. Steinthal occupied the chair, and, in proposing the toast of Manchester New College, connected with it the name of Dr. Martineau, and read him an Address from his old pupils. The Rev. Henry Ierson also presented an Address, which he had been requested to deliver, from the Consistory and Bishop of the Hungarian Unitarians. This Address was appropriate to the occasion, because for many years the College had had a succession of Hungarian students. Dr. Martineau began his reply in a light vein, professing himself embarrassed

by receiving "an expression of thanks and regard from a Bishop and an ecclesiastical body," and reminding his hearers that he had "been content to slink into the shade" to teach philosophy to "a few youths in a corner." And, he added, "unless you have forgotten your Gorgias you know what happens to a man who does this;—how, by growing old in philosophy, instead of taking a sip of it in youth, he so loses all gentlemanly self-composure as to deserve a whipping for his helpless gaucherie; and when fetched out of his seclusion, and having to face a public assembly, stands agape and dizzy, without a word to say, were it even to save his life. Such is the poor old creature before you." But they would bear with him as he was a creation of Manchester New College, formed throughout from its homely material. He then proceeded to speak more seriously of the changes in teaching; and having given a bantering description of the student who, if he knows nothing else, is sure to know what he wants, which means "what he likes," he solemnly warned him "that this enervating mood is the canker of manly thought and action, of godly life and character." Turning to the teachers, he thought the multiplication of professorships, with its division of labour, involved some loss of moral power, and did not conduce to real breadth of mind in the pupil, who became "a compendium of specialisms, all sitting apart, and not being on speaking terms with each other." In this connection he spoke of the mixed character and varying wants of the congregations to which the students, for the most part, were called to minister. Finally, he adverted to the special occasion which had brought them together. It had been said that a man who resigned his life-work was signing his death warrant; and he had been warned of the consequences if he carried out his purpose. If it were so, it would make no difference. He knew that he was stepping into the shadows; but

when he counted the group which he trusted to rejoin, death met him with a mild countenance of welcome. Nevertheless he had not quite done with this world, or lost one jot of his interest in its persons and affairs. He did not mean that that week should sever him from those whom he addressed. "I quit my post of teacher," he said, "to take my place among you as an old student, — so old that, as one of the milestones in the College history of which I spoke, it must appear to you quite away from the now frequented track, moss-grown and dim in the far perspective, mingled already with the hedgerow and the grassy road. There, however, let me stand and be counted with you."

To the Address of the Consistory in Hungary he sent a reply, couched in words characteristically gracious and modest. The last few sentences may be quoted:—

"It is without anxiety, therefore, that I quit the stress of life, and turn to the few possibilities that yet await my finishing hand. That they are small and final brings me no sadness; the merest remnants of 'the great Taskmaster's' service are sacred, like the rest, and may still be wrought out in love and prayer. The thought that you, dear distant friends, follow my last steps with sympathy and affection will brighten the shades as they close around me.

"Here, in this preliminary life, we see each other, as we see all things spiritual and divine, only dimly mirrored; but ere long, face to face. Meanwhile, may the truth of God which we know in part, and the work of Christ which we aspire to serve, prosper in your hands, till that which is perfect is come, and we know even as we are known.

"Believe me, dear and honoured brethren in Christ,

"Your grateful and affectionate

"JAMES MARTINEAU.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, SCOTLAND,

July 12, 1885.

He received another Address from Hungary, signed by seven gentlemen, professors and ministers, who had been students at the College. Its somewhat broken English

does not impair its Oriental warmth. It concludes with these words:—

“Surely you were, you are, and will be a Master to us.

“We bring our homage, our gratitude, our thanks to you. Accept, we pray you, dear Sir, from your late Hungarian pupils what they offer from their hearts. May God grant you still many years that you may finish, in the quietness of private life into which you now retire, the work you wish to do, that you may still benefit your older and younger pupils, and the community you belong to, and to which you are a glory.”

The answer is too full of wise counsel, and of self-revealing, to be omitted:—

DEAR FRIENDS AND FORMER PUPILS, — I should indeed be unworthy, through self-ignorance, of your generous affection, if I could appropriate all the noble things which it prompts you to believe and say of me. Yet, while they humble rather than elate me, they are a true joy to me as an outpouring of enthusiasm from pure and tender hearts; and fervently do I thank you for thus freshening my loving remembrance of each and all of you. Through the grace of God and the sobering temper of old age, your touching praises shall not spoil me. You look at me across an interval of some years and many lands; and as time and distance are the great idealisers of life, you see an image of what I ought to be rather than of what I am; while I, being ever close to myself, both here and now, am too familiar with the poor reality to find the glorifying colours there.

I may well be grateful, however, if, on any terms, I have contributed to awaken or foster in you an interest in the aims and methods of philosophy, and a faith that its main problems are not a mere mocking spectrum of the human mind, vainly pursuing its own light. Towards all other doctrines of the schools I have honestly tried to maintain the expositor's attitude of impartial suspense, till a position had been gained for final critical judgment. But one thing I have deemed it imperative to assume and hold exempt from doubt, viz., that *Truth is to be found*, and that the instinctive prayer of the human soul for vision is not itself the only dream in an eternal darkness. Intellect itself would be an illusion, unless the faculty to seek were the pledge and measure of the faculty to learn, and in the catechism of Reason no question stood without its answer.

The theorist who despairs of truth is no less in contradiction with himself than the patriot who despairs of the Republic.

This faith, which, as prior to all reasoning, no reasoning can impair, is the condition of all intellectual and moral enthusiasm; and the systems which have sprung from it, however various, we have found it possible to review, often with deep sympathy, and never without some glorious enlargement of the horizon of our thought; some contents of our own nature, some interaction of human relations, some aspects of the beauty of the world they have thrown open to us, which have enriched for us the meaning of the universe, and rendered more adorable the perfection of God. Not only do I remember the delightful wonder with which, at your studious age, I fell under the fascination of speculative philosophy; but so little am I proof against it still, that I share it with you to the uttermost, and accept our fellow-feeling in it, as a bond of imperishable friendship, devoting us as comrades to the untiring search of whatever things are true and pure and good.

I say "as comrades"; for let me, dear friends, repeat here the sacred words, "Call no man Master upon earth"; and be assured that he who accepts such a title, unless in the charge of childhood, bears witness against his own gifts as a teacher. For the true teacher's function is not fulfilled, until he has wakened up the energies of independent thought and the fervours of individual aspiration, in those whom it has been his duty to instruct; and he will have less satisfaction in their response to his personal convictions than in the quickening of their several creative powers, giving various developments to whatever germs of truth he may have delivered to them. Being yourselves, for the most part, instructors of others, you are well aware how much greater an achievement it is to elicit faculty than to infuse knowledge and store up ideas. There is no life but in perpetual growth; and, as the old leaves drop from the tree of humanity, each successive season, with its new shoots, should enrich it with a fuller foliage and more copious fruits.

What can I add but an old man's blessing? My sympathy is with you all; your callings are, without exception, worthy and noble; though of deepest interest to me, from personal experience, is the mission of those who bear the message of Christ to men. His faith, his love, his self-sacrifice, his life eternal, are to me the sanctifying crown of all philosophy, the secret of union with God for the individual soul, and the hope of redemption for the sins and sorrows of mankind. My race is nearly run; the fire given me to bear flickers between dark

and light; but if, ere its last live spark drops into the stream, it should have sufficed to kindle any torch of yours and send it aglow through its appointed stage, the prayer of my heart will be fulfilled, though my name should but touch the water with that momentary trace, to be seen no more.

With heartfelt gratitude for the affectionate regard which I so warmly reciprocate

I remain,

Your faithful friend,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, SCOTLAND,

July 14, 1885.

The Trustees of the College met in University Hall on Thursday, the 25th of June. After the ordinary business had been transacted, Dr. Sadler rose to move the following Resolution:—

“The Trustees of Manchester New College on this, the last occasion on which they can renew to the Rev. Dr. Martineau, as Professor and Principal, their respectful and most grateful acknowledgment of the distinguished services which, for forty-five years and sixteen years respectively, he has, in these capacities, rendered to the College, desire to convey to him their earnest appreciation of the faithfulness and dignity with which he has maintained its fundamental principle of free teaching and free learning, while, with surpassing ability, vindicating for a devout spiritual philosophy its high place among theological studies.

“His students of forty-five successive years have already borne grateful testimony to the love and reverence which they entertain for Dr. Martineau’s personal character, and to the guidance, encouragement, and inspiration they have received from him in their labours for the ministry, and other walks of life.

“The Trustees, speaking for their own larger community, and for many classes of hearers and readers within and beyond it, would add their conviction that, invaluable as has been the work of Dr. Martineau for the College, this is only part of his great services to ‘the Spirit and the Truth,’ in which alone man may live his highest life on earth.

“In taking official leave of their venerated friend this day, with the warmest assurances of esteem and affection, the Trus-

tees would express their earnest hope that he may long enjoy in health and honour the rest which he has so nobly earned; and that, set free from his College duties, he may, without encroaching too much upon this rest, have opportunity and strength to complete the publication of the fruits of his lifelong dedication to the loftiest of all studies, and to Religion, and the furtherance of the greater glory of God."

Dr. Sadler spoke with affectionate reverence, not unmixed with genial humour, of his own recollections of Dr. Martineau, which went back to the year 1838. Two sentences may convey the tone of his speech: "He has been to us one of those rare men of whom it has been said that, as we stand afar off in the plains below, we see them going up the Mount, and drawing near to the great Source of life and light, and coming back to be our instructors and guides. And while we recognise his marvellous grasp of the profoundest questions, and his power of making them clearer to others, we cannot be insensible to the unequalled charms of those words by which, with a touch peculiar to himself, he has made the abstrusest subjects rhythmic with what Plato called 'the enchantment of speech.'" The Resolution was seconded by Mr. R. H. Hutton, who had long since, under the influence of Maurice, become a member of the Established Church, but had never lost his profound reverence for his old friend and teacher. "Such," he said, "has been the influence of Dr. Martineau on me, that if you could imagine such a miracle as my going with that part abstracted from my nature which he has woven into it, people would not know me." He then referred at some length to the influence which Dr. Martineau's writings and character had exercised upon him; and winding up with an allusion to their divergent views, he declared that nevertheless it was he who first taught him the full power of Christianity. After others had spoken, Dr. Martineau replied. A much younger man might have been wearied by the labour and

excitement of the previous days, and by the duration of the meeting which he rose to address; and when to physical fatigue was added the deep emotion which the circumstances awakened, it was not surprising that he was unequal to one of his great speeches. His opening words were: "I am sure the sturdiest and stoutest heart in this room will not wonder if I am totally overpowered, and quite unable to gather together any thoughts which can be worthy to present to you in reply to this Resolution." He contrasted the present tributes of regard with the utter distrust of his teaching, and the protest against its enlarged recognition in the College, which, when he entered on his office, had the sanction of a host of men whom he held in the sincerest respect. Now that was all past and the danger was of too much approval. He then referred with generous confidence to his colleagues, and spoke of the union with which they had worked together, and which had never suffered a moment's interruption; and finally he acknowledged "the invariable courtesy and friendliness — the more than courtesy and friendliness — which he had experienced from the officers of the College. He closed with these words: "I shall always regard the Resolution which you have now passed as the final diploma of my career, — a diploma, indeed, which adds no fresh letters to be appended to one's name, but which proceeds from a source, and expresses a sentiment, more precious to me than any honours received from more conspicuous but more distant witnesses of my life."

LETTERS, 1869-1885

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TO MR. E. S. ANTHONY.

(A student about to enter the College.)

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., May 16, 1881.

I was delighted to hear, from my friend Prof. W. Knight, who has been recently in London, a very pleasant and appreciative report of the completion of your St. Andrews career; and I look forward with much satisfaction to welcoming you to your maturer studies with us here. In connection with these it has always been my earnest desire that the student for the ministry should from the first weave into his plan of life some willing labour of love, which should relieve the dryness of mere intellectual work and exercise the affections and habits on which his future value to others will mainly depend. For this end I know of no discipline so effective or in the end so interesting as the experience of a well-ordered Sunday School; and I venture to express the hope that, like so many of your worthiest forerunners, you will consent to undertake a class in our Portland Sunday Schools. From Mr. J. J. Tayler's and my own relation to these schools they have naturally been regarded, as, in some sort, a charge for which our College fraternity has a special responsibility; and I am very anxious that we should be faithful to it.

TO REV. CHARLES BEARD.

5 GORDON STREET, W. C., Feb. 22, 1877.

I am obliged by your kindness in opening to me the pages of the "Theological Review" for any personal explanations which may seem to be called for by my late sister's Autobiography. I cannot conceive, however, that anything of the sort will be required. I never had any serious difference with her except on two matters. I refused to destroy her old letters, accepting rather the alternative of receiving no new ones. And I reviewed the Atkinson Letters in the "Prospective." Nothing that I can say can alter these acts; and others will doubtless judge them differently, just as she and I did. They occasioned alienation on her side; they expressed none whatever on mine. If her memoirs merely give utterance to her disapprobation,

TO REV. J. E. CARPENTER

I shall have nothing to complain of, and must leave her readers to form their own opinion. It is only in case of some mistake about facts — which is hardly possible in matters so simple — that I should feel it incumbent on me to make any correcting comments. It is unlikely, I think, that remarks of that nature would assume a form or scope suitable for the “Theological Review.” A short letter in a daily or weekly paper is all that at present I can imagine to be contingently needed. But I must reserve all judgment till the occasion arises.

TO REV. J. E. CARPENTER.

OCT. 5, 1883.

It is no great comfort to think that we are losing only a student¹ of failing promise; nor can I lightly dismiss these cases as a desirable sifting out of ineligible material. I strongly feel that it is a most serious responsibility to renounce all influence, of sympathy and guidance, over young minds, still helpless and fluid in all the greater matters of thought and character, and throw them upon a foreign field, where every attraction and appeal will play upon them except such as will turn their enthusiasm and devotion upon the life to which they are dedicated. I cannot admit that no mind is worth saving from desertion of its first love, which is capable of being drawn into such desertion.

OCT. 13, 1883.

I rather distrust the effect of pressure and persuasion, when once the impulse towards the ministry has given way. It is a life which cannot be worked upon wavering thought and half-hearted love; but which needs, above all, deep convictions and strong enthusiasm. When these are once shaken, I have little faith in their restored stability. If sufficiently re-instated for the needs of the personal life, they will hardly become an adequate base for an aggressive religious devotedness.

TO THE REV. ———.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, May 27, 1884.

I would gladly respond to your inquiries if I had the means of doing so in any adequate way. But they are far more definite than any answer to them can be; because they assume what is not the fact, that the “Unitarians” are — like Independents

¹ One who had changed his purpose of entering the ministry.

LETTERS, 1869-1885

or Baptists or Churchmen — a body of people ecclesiastically combined on the basis of a common creed. If this were so, it would be easy to state what the creed pronounced upon the several theological doctrines to which you refer. In reality, however, there are not, I suppose, as many as twenty congregations in Great Britain which have any Unitarian constitution. And though there are hundreds of others, composed chiefly or wholly at the present time of members whose individual opinions are Unitarian, they have passed into this phase of prevalent belief from a prior Trinitarian theology, and may pass out of it again, either by retrogression or by movement in some ulterior and unforeseen direction. The uniting principle, in virtue of which this has been possible without prejudice to the continuous identity of the congregation, is a profound faith in Christian communion unconditioned by concurrence in the articles of a distinctive theology; and a consequent conviction that it is the duty of churches to close no question on which Christians are divided, but to leave open to the future the progressive thought which they themselves have, emerged[?] as they are from the past. The historical result has been, that Religious Sympathy — that united worship and culture of the Spiritual Life — has proved compatible with a wide range of divergence in opinion, not only successive, but contemporaneous. When I was a Minister in Liverpool, there were Trinitarians among the regular members of the congregation; and though I always called *myself* a "Unitarian" when I had occasion to define my theological position, I would never, without protest, allow the *congregation or the Chapel* to be called so. "Unitarians" are, in fact, like "Necessarians" or "Molinists," or "Republicans," — a scattered set of individual thinkers, who may be found in many ecclesiastical connections, and not an organised sect, for which there is any medium of authoritative speech. These scattered and unorganised people have, no doubt, one point of belief in common, viz., in the Unipersonality of God; and on all other points, as well as on the interpretation of this, they have a various literature, — all of it unorthodox, but in different degrees and directions.

TO REV. JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, July 5, 1883.

I thank you heartily for your latest contribution . . . of your "Comparison of All Religions." I received and placed it, an hour or two before my departure from London at the Session's

TO REV. V. D. DAVIS

close. I look with admiration and gratitude on your productive intellectual activity. There are no books which, in their several kinds, I value more highly, or more frequently commend to others in their mental and spiritual needs, than yours; indeed my sympathy with them is so great, that they have long been my text-books of reference for the guidance of doubting and bewildered minds.

My weaker will finds it easier to own than to follow your true interpretation of the old man's duty, to "do quickly" what remains to be done. I try in vain to stop the preliminary process of learning and re-thinking before I venture to teach my final lesson; and so I render it more and more doubtful whether it will ever come. Some unfinished designs, however, have been brought pretty near to completion by the labour of the last two years; and, if my working power continues for another such term, may bring me some relief from the humiliating consciousness of an almost barren life.

TO MRS. W. C. COUPLAND.

LONDON, April 24, 1885.

In the absence of conscious change, I can hardly believe myself to have reached an age which I have always looked upon as something to be feared. Yet here it is; and neither the zest of life, nor the interest in its pursuits and concerns, has perceptibly abated; nor do I crave as yet the discharge from claims upon my diligence, which is regarded as the privilege of old age. Doubtless, this is largely due to habitual life among young people, with whom it has been my happiness to be always in contact, and who have saved me from most of the temptations to stupidity and gloom.

I am thankful to the Divine Disposer for my eighty years, — not less for their sorrows than for their joys. The scanty band that yet remains of my early friends is thinning fast, and giving ever a milder look to the face of approaching Death, — as if preparing to break into a smile at last. My heart has its treasures above and its treasures below, and hardly knows to which it would fain be nearer. The choice will be made by the Best Will, rightly and soon.

TO REV. V. D. DAVIS.

MARCH 31, 1878.

In our communion with God, how is it possible for us to establish any real difference between experience of his mani-

LETTERS, 1869-1885

festations and consciousness of himself? Even in our intercourse with a friend, nothing reaches us but the acts and effects of his life; it is by an inward operation of natural faith on our part that his words and looks become representative expressions of a personality like our own. The passage of our thought from the perceived phenomena to their believed cause is so instantaneous that you may call it *immediate knowledge*, especially as there is no other step between which makes it *mediate*; but it no less involves a reference of changes experienced to a source whence they come, than does that recognition of our highest affections as Divine which, by way of contrast with immediate knowledge, you designate as *only* "trust" or "faith." It appears to me, therefore, that we know the presence of God with us and his agency upon us on precisely the same evidence that assures us of our life with one another; in neither case are we cognisant only of manifestations; in both, the manifestations are given to our feeling that we may know the realities behind. Knowledge other than this act of Reason—Vision other than that of Faith—appear to me quite inconceivable,—at variance with the very constitution of Mind as alone we are acquainted with it. No doubt, in different stages of spiritual culture, even in different moods of the same,—nay, in different types of natural faculty,—the power of vividly realising the Divine Presence in personal communion will greatly vary; and so long as it is not dimmed by unfaithfulness and negligence, no one should despond under its imperfection. There is, in some of the best people I have known, a "slowness of heart" in spiritual things, which is their cross and not their reproach; and which would first become a sin, if they set up their defect as a standard for the world, and derided the experience on which they could not enter. But how accessible and real, to pure and simple minds, may become the direct life with God, seems evident from the private history of innumerable persons belonging to the better times and more fervent sects of Christendom.

The absorption in the living God which Wordsworth describes is a more exceptional state because the agency of God in Nature is, in effect upon us though not in reality, less immediate than his action on the human soul; and is therefore more difficult to realise. The realm of Nature he administers by fore-announced and pledged methods, the perseverance of which have [*sic*] all the effect of mechanism on us, till we check the impression by an effort of thought. But, in the human soul, he has reserved a *free* space, with which his own Free

TO REV. V. D. DAVIS

Spirit may enter into relations, and where nothing hinders his acting *pro re natâ* with gifts of light and comfort and inspiration. Whatever we recognise as Divine in this personal sphere affects us as flowing from immediate affection and as part of our biographical account with the Father of our spirits. It comes home to us therefore with intimate conviction, and draws us closer to him. But his agency in Nature is in relation to the whole, as the Sustainer of a universal Order, which takes no separate heed of any individual creature subjected to it; and therefore, although the beauty and grandeur of the spectacle glorify the conception of him, yet the moral attributes are absent or in the background. And hence, this nature-worship is apt to become an ineffectual Pantheism, productive, it may be, of poetry, but feeble and barren in life.

I can only say that the true part of a man, in relation to God, seems to me to be, to give all that is claimed, and claim nothing that is not given. And I profoundly believe that whoever will cheerfully surrender himself to the daily duty and the prayer of faith, will not long be left in the shadows, but will emerge into a light which he knows to be divine.

MARCH 4, 1881.

It is a true joy to me if any fruit of my own experience has ever turned to good account in the mind and character of another. Yet to me, whose whole inner life has been one long self-distrust and conscious need of a power beyond my own, it is strange and hardly credible that, having no spiritual strength, I can ever have imparted it. It can only be by simply telling through what resources I have found escape from natural weakness and despondency.

AUGUST 20, 1882.

I know not whether it be a defect of realising faith in me; but there is one of the experiences of her old age¹ into which I cannot fully enter, — the longing to depart. It is not that the better life is ever doubtful to me; but that it is dim, — with few determinable points and many shifting lights that change with one's brighter and sadder moods; so that the definite duties and unresting interests and affections of this immediate life absorb me still, and leave me simply content but not eager to change the scene, whenever the Divine messenger is sent.

¹ Alluding to Mrs. Davis, the grandmother of his correspondent.

LETTERS, 1869-1885

TO THE REV. ORVILLE DEWEY.

10 GORDON STREET, W. C., Jan. 19, 1871.

Are we not forbidden to return evil for good? How, then, can I possibly answer your letters as they come? Write me something, if you can, that is not genial and charming, send me something shrill and spiteful, and see what a good Christian I can be. As it is, your pretty little spice of Jewish vindictiveness flings me, you see, into instant good-will; and overcharges my heart with blessings on you and your dear wife for remembering us in the crisis of your "golden age." It seems superfluous and untrustful to "*wish* you joy"; for you have it, and are rich in all the true springs of it, come what may in the stage that yet remains; but affectionately do we congratulate you on a retrospect so long and bright, and present surroundings so full of peace and hope. One gladness of life you have which has not been granted to us. There are grandchildren round you to snatch you back, and carry you over the green tracks again. Though we have a son and a daughter married, our history seems thus far likely to end with the next generation.

Your life of delightful retirement would fill me with longing, did not your freshness and vigour — at eleven years in advance of me — tell me that I have not yet earned my repose, and give me hope of some good time still, when the stress is over, and the fruits of toil may be quietly gathered. For the present, sixteen College Lectures per week, in addition to my Sunday work and a week-day congregational Lecture, and numerous public engagements, forbid me to think of rest or leisure; and, while strength and power of endurance remain, I do not complain that my old age is harder plied than any of the former years. It is a relief and surprise to me to find no tendency creep over me to shut up my mind from new lights of thought, or my will from new methods of action. I remember how in my youth Priestley's dictum distressed me, that no man ever changed his ideas after forty, and made me say, "In that case I hope I shall not live to be forty-one." I never was much of a "radical," notwithstanding some superficial heresies; but I had no notion of surrendering to sheer stupidity and drowsiness halfway; and I have found no abatement in the rate of natural change; and certainly the most important modifications of opinion have come to me since the date when I ought to have ceased to think. Even in politics, where chiefly what is conservative in me seems to tell, I find that, on the whole, I move

TO REV. ORVILLE DEWEY

with the times ; now and then fearing lest the pace be too fast ; often offended that the leaders *do not lead*, but are only *pushed* ; yet never desiring to go back, or dreaming that to perpetuate the past is better than to open up the future. Do I “ distrust the democratic principle ” ? you ask. I am content to let it work itself out against all relics of injustice and social negligence, and as a necessary process on the way to something better. But as for believing in it as an ultimate ideal, I could as soon accept the Pope’s infallibility.

Majorities are in no way sacred to me ; and I look upon their period of sway as only an experiment needful to find the minorities that have the native right to govern them. This fearful war, which forces the experiment in France, will delay it in Germany ; and its probable unmanageableness among a population so little homogeneous as the French is not unlikely, I think, to produce a Catholic and military reaction, unfavourable to the spread of revolution. The new place which Germany takes in Europe seems to me full of hope for the world. Only, I wish she would spare France the sacrifice of Alsace ; it would be, I believe, a wise magnanimity. The least satisfactory feature of European republicanism is its close connection with a total break-up of religious belief ; not merely of the established forms of faith, but of all reverence whatsoever beyond a scientific homage to physical laws. The fashionable doctrine is that between Atheism and Catholicism there is nothing worth listening to for a moment. The priesthood will not be long in discovering the advantage which this gives them.

BALNESPICK HOUSE, NEAR KINGUSSIE, N. B., Sept. 10, 1876.

We both of us, dear Dewey, stand near the verge of life ; you a step in advance of me, yet, if not hand in hand, at least within speaking distance. And if asked what is to be seen from so solemn a station, I do but echo your report, — enough for perfect trust and serene hope. Many things have changed in my modes of belief on sacred things ; but, with you, I fold myself in the Infinite Love without a demand ; yet continue to look on Death as the approaching emigrant-ship that shall bear me to brighter life beyond the seas. So far as the future gives me an anxiety, it is more for the world which we shall soon quit, than for any destination to which we may go. The prospects of society in the next generation seem to me seriously overclouded. The hollowness of the Christianity still recognised, the accelerated break-up of all devout conviction

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in cultivated minds, the evident set-in already of a consequent tide of private and public demoralisation, and the non-appearance as yet of any hopeful counteracting power, alarm me as auguries of the early future, and throw me forward upon the ultimate faith, which never wavers within me, that, through sunshine or through storm, our nature is being trained to a perfection, of insight and character, beyond our present power to conceive.

TO MR. FREESTON AND THE OTHER STUDENTS OF
MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE.

APRIL 21, 1885.

MY DEAR YOUNG FRIENDS, — Of all the greetings and good wishes which I have received this day, none have more deeply touched me than yours; and to you first must I render thanks for your generous and affectionate words. For more years than I need count, my relation to you and your predecessors has been unspeakably close to my conscience and my heart; and to sustain it faithfully has been the chief desire and prayer of my life. To meet all its possibilities as I would fain see them met has been denied to me by imperfections of nature or limits of circumstances. But nothing can so alleviate the consciousness of this as the readiness of my pupils to estimate my work for them by its governing spirit and intent, rather than by a performance of it which can never disappoint them so much as it does myself. I can honestly say that, if I have loved my work much, I have loved my pupils more; and in retiring from the field, not without a touch of evening sadness, no such heartfelt consolation can be given me as the assurance that that love is reciprocated.

I pray you to accept my affectionate thanks for giving me this consolation, and to

Believe me to the last

Your attached and faithful friend,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

TO REV. DR. FURNESS.

DEC. 23, 1878.

In venturing to send you my recent Address,¹ I did not mean to impose upon you even the task of reading it, — which I know is not a light one, — much less that of sending

¹ "Ideal Substitutes for God."

TO REV. J. HARWOOD

me so charming an answer to the presentation. I often lament the metaphysical habit which—as my friend W. R. Greg tells me—spoils my style, and makes all that I write very stiff reading; but it is too late to mend. My own faith by no means requires me to sink deep in the scrutiny of ultimate principles; I rest contentedly in the common trusts of the human soul, and seek no recondite verification of them. But when I encounter the doubts of others, a fear of not getting to the bottom of them drives me too far from the surface,—in which, after all, they may probably have their only roots.

I wish I could look with your genial and hopeful eye on the negative tendencies of our recent culture in regard to religion, or could detect any better affirmation lurking behind their denial. Without for a moment doubting that, when the darkness and the storm are past, the air will be brighter and sweeter, and the clear heaven embrace us again, I cannot but apprehend great desolation of heart and no little moral shipwreck meanwhile. Indeed, they are already abundantly visible; and when a generation has grown up without the idea of *Duty*, or with no sacred feeling connected with it,—and that is certainly what is coming upon us *here*,—the social result is one which I shrink from contemplating. My German and Dutch friends are affected by similar anxieties.

You introduce me to a personage quite strange to me in your mention of Omar Khayyâm; and as it is a part of my business to make acquaintance with all oddities and extremes of thought, I shall look him up,—probably with the help of Mr. Channing, who lives very much with these queer Orientals. I suspect I shall share Emerson's feeling,—as Mr. Channing will be found to share yours. I am obliged to own that I have never found any light I care for in either Indian or Persian literature, so far as accessible in English; and the study of it is mere task-work to me.

TO REV. J. HARWOOD.

TYLAS, OLD BYLAND, HELMSLEY, YORK, Aug. 3, 1875.

I hope now to resume the American papers which have been suspended by the breakdown of Mr. Hale's Journal "Old and New"; but there is so much new literature to master, and the Dutch portion of it takes me so long to read, that I despair of any rapid progress. The whole subject of Paul's Conversion and its value as evidence in relation to the

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resurrection of Jesus involves problems most interesting and difficult; and from time to time such new lights seem to me to open within them, that I can never recur to that critical stage of the early Christian history without feeling the necessity of a restudy of all its elements. This is what chiefly engages me at present. It is humiliating to find even one's recent thought and writing no longer satisfactory; but it would be more so to shirk the labour which this discovery brings.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Jan. 19, 1876.

It was very pleasant to me that you so kindly remembered my longing to picture you to myself in your Leipzig experiences. . . . Though in most respects I should have deemed Berlin the more eligible place, it is not a bad discipline to be thrown for a while into the very midst of uncongenial modes of thought which one ought to understand in their inner working as well as in their outer form. I must say I cannot but look on the orthodox Lutheranism as utterly dead and no longer a spiritual or intellectual power. Yet *something* in it there must still be, enabling a certain residue of sincere and not stupid men to keep life a-going upon it, and it is worth while to see what that may be. I judge from ——'s books that no good is to be got from him. But Kahn is certainly a highly capable and I should think fair-minded representative of the conservative school of theology.

I have noticed, in the German literature of recent years, the strong *party* tendency which you describe to a complete split between all theology and the studies proper to the Philosophical Faculty, — a tendency which evidently extends beyond the Universities and divides society into two camps, organised around the Church on the one side and the "Naturforscher" on the other. And I fear that in this, as in so many other respects, Germany only exhibits in advance a condition which is rapidly becoming European. The coolness with which the philosophical German resigns himself to an inevitable "Streit der Facultäten" in human nature — as if we were constructed to be the sport of contradictions and condemned to disbelieve our own beliefs — not only astonishes but repels me; all the more when I ask myself whether this is the outcome of Luther's victory by *Faith*. However, I have thus far a trust in Hegel, that in this drawing off of forces towards extreme points I see an assured promise of a "higher unity" to which the tension of so miserable an opposition will drive the minds of men.

TO REV. J. H. HUTTON

We go on in our usual quiet way at College; and notwithstanding the overweight of Professors, our students live on, as under the pressure of the atmosphere, without apparent danger of being crushed. It is wonderful what we can bear when there is no help for it.

TO REV. J. H. HUTTON.¹

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., June 27, 1885.

The overpowering pressure of this week² has made it impossible for me to be as prompt as I could wish in acknowledging your kind letter of the 17th inst., with its well-balanced interest for me. You will not wonder if its poetical beauty fails to divest it, to my feeling, of excessive colouring in both its appreciation and its censure. . . .

I believe the main difference between your mode of determining theological questions and mine is, that I cannot feel satisfied to measure doctrinal or historical truth by presumed religious consequences of gain or loss; but feel compelled to estimate questions of fact and reality by their proper objective evidence. The kind of argument implied in the constant statement "Christianity must be something more, or something less, than you retain," seems to me wholly illegitimate, — an *a priori* dictation of a standard to which the Infinite Disposer is bound to conform. On the contrary, I think we are bound to accept, and trust as adequate, whatever, in point of fact, he has seen fit to give us. So great a sympathy have I with many, if not most, of the judgments which separate from me, that if I had thought it right to allow a preponderant voice to that sympathy, I should have clung to much that I have been forced to relinquish. But, having thus relinquished it, I find in later spiritual experience my regrets transfigured into a higher peace. If this is a delusion, I have not long to wait ere the scales will fall from my eyes.

The events of this week have touched me too deeply to permit of my speaking of them; and none of the incidents has so affected me as Richard's speech at the Trustee meeting.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, July 12, 1885.

If I spoke of your "censuring" me, I attributed to you nothing but what was quite within your right, as friend convers-

¹ Mr. Hutton, like his brother Richard, had become a member of the Established Church.

² The week referred to at the end of the chapter.

ing with friend; nor did I mean to give to the word the slightest tone of complaint. And in simple truth, is there no censure implied in calling a man "a destructive critic," — "a sceptic disowning truth"? Surely something more than divergence of judgment, some considerable moral colouring, is involved in this language. Though I am sorry that you should have so to think of me, I am neither surprised nor hurt at it; it cannot be otherwise, consistently with the point of view from which your conscience obliges you to estimate my position. I perceive, however, that, from some cause, you entirely misconceive that position, and describe it in language which I can in no wise accept. Your representation would be correct if I held by the old Unitarian or, as I should call it, *Deistical* conception of God, as present in the world and man only in the form of necessary Laws, constituting the sphere of *Nature*, while reserving in Himself all that is supernatural, unless when He sees fit to interpolate within the Natural order certain exceptional acts of Will for special and supplementary ends. These acts, in virtue of their exceptional character, would be *Miracles*, and would be the only samples given us from the Supernatural sphere; so that on their reality would be staked all that we can learn of Divine things beyond the inferences from Law.

Thus it is that "Revelation" is identified with what may be gathered from the historical miracles, or attested by them, and is limited to this; so that anyone who comes to think the alleged miracles to be *unhistorical* thereby incurs the character of a denier of Revelation.

This resolution of Christianity into Deism *plus* Miraculous history — the former being what Man finds of God by inference; the latter what God tells Man by immediate communication — I cannot accept. The Divine Life in relation to us presents itself to me as twofold, like our humanity; *Natural*, so far as we are creatures subjected to necessary laws and part of a determinate order; *Supernatural*, so far as He has endowed us with spiritual capacities and affections, open to His free appeal, and to our own responsive insight and direction under it. From this immediate communion of Spirit with spirit, in which the initiative is with Him and the answer with us, no soul is shut out; in the struggles of conscience, in the silent dawning of higher ideals, and in countless experiences of faithful and saintly lives, as well as in the awful warnings of shame and remorse, the pleading of the Divine Love is felt directly addressed to the

TO MR. W. JANEWAY

individual's need, and following all the windings of his will. As it is on this side of our divine relations that all Religion lies, all Religion is Supernatural, and there is a Revealing Presence of God in every Soul that is not sunk in slavery to the mere "Natural man." But the closeness and intensity of this union between the human spirit and the Divine may vary in indefinite degrees; and the saints and prophets in whom its higher measures appear are the great instruments for clearing and opening the darkened windows of unawakened natures. Supreme in the hierarchy of inspiration, standing unique at its culminating point, identical in filial will with the Infinite Father's Perfection, is Jesus Christ, the moral incarnation of the Love of God. This affirmation of Supernaturalism in Christianity would gain nothing by birth "of a virgin"; and loses nothing, to my feeling, by an immortality that dispenses with a bodily ascension. Instead of stripping the Supernatural elements away from the life of Christ, I make it inward instead of outward, and by extending it in minor measures to his brethren of humanity, render them homogeneous with him, and through this harmony at one with God.

I do not wish to plead for this faith further than to render intelligible my inability to accept your description of it.

TO MR. W. JANEWAY.

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., April 25, 1885.

It is wonderful to me, and a source of heartfelt gratitude, to find the fourscore years completed with as yet so little touch of the "trouble and sorrow" which alone they are said to leave for our experience; and not less so, to see, in the world around me, an atmosphere of thought and feeling, on matters of Morals and Religion, far more congenial to my deepest convictions than, half a century ago, I could have supposed possible. I am considerably less disheartened than I once was by the wave of Scientific and Positivist negation of Religion (in the proper sense) which is passing over society. Already, I think, it gives evidence of its [?] and the human soul has a wonderful way, if not of recovering its perfect equilibrium, at least of so oscillating out of one direction of overbalance as to verge towards a different one. And perhaps at each change it tends a little more towards its true centre.

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TO THE REV. WILLIAM KNIGHT.

10 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., March 23, 1872.

I was deeply interested in your sermon before the University of Glasgow, and did not feel in it the lacuna which the spectator steps in to fill. To expect a Revelation of applied morals—proportioning the duties to home, to country, to friendship, to the world—seems to me to involve a misapprehension of the essence of Religion as the conscious communion between the human spirit and God. Other causes surely provide for the growth, and regulate the relative intensity, of the secondary human affections; and the function of Christian piety is complete if it lifts them into its elevation and touches them with its glory. The sermon seems to me to mark the Christian characteristics with a most delicate and skilful hand; and as I read, I marvel more than ever at the indifference, and even repugnance, shown by our “pure Theists” towards that unique personality, at once ideal and historical.

In your Public Education program I fear I must confess—as perhaps a veteran may—that you are a stadium in advance of me; unless, indeed, the difference of our position is due simply to the dissimilar conditions of the problem in England and in Scotland. But *here* my feeling and judgment go entirely against the aims of the Birmingham League, and the Dissenters; and I desire nothing better at present than that Mr. Forster’s Act should be carried into operation. What we want is (1) to get hold of the children not reached by our existing machinery; and for this purpose the main instrument must be Board Schools, and Board compulsion over all of school age; (2) to put the pressure of Inspection and adequate requirement on all existing schools; (3) to impose on all assisted schools a conscience clause for protection of the religious minority. But I do not desire the discontinuance of the existing schools in favour of Board Schools; having no faith whatever in ratepayers’ management, and strong faith in the administration of the devoted volunteers who have created all the primary education which we have. All that they want is the stimulus and guidance of Inspection. I also dislike the total severance of secular instruction from Religion, and the surrender of the latter to professional volunteers in hours which will be regarded as due to play. In our schools here we have five hundred scholars of all denominations and no denomination, with one Principal Teacher

TO REV. WILLIAM KNIGHT

an Independent, another, Church of England, a third, Unitarian; and never once has our little religious opening and close—the hymn and prayer, and short Scripture lesson—been the occasion of a scruple. It is congenial to all; and I should be sorry to part with its sweetening influence. The jealousy of the clergy manifested by the League people seems to me to be utterly absurd. Take them all in all, they exercise not only an indispensable influence, but one that is moderating and sensible, and far superior to any which a ratepayers' election is likely to send to the front. You would probably tell me that it is very different in Scotland; and of this I am no judge.

GRETA BRIDGE INN, BARNARD CASTLE,
Aug. 14, 1875.

My young people seized upon the little Book of Services before I could read them; and it has been on its travels, so that I could not get hold of it till I met it here, where we are just established for the remaining time of our absence from town. This morning I have read through the Services with much interest. I find them excellent in their simplicity and cheerful devoutness, and rejoice in so valuable an addition to the very scanty store of wise and elevating Sunday School literature. I fully concur in your opinion that the children should bear a responsive part in the School worship. But I am sorry to say that in our Schools the Teachers have come to the opposite conclusion, and are disposed to revert to the former practice of "Free Prayer" on the part of the presiding person. I attribute this mainly to the want of a proper training of the scholars for the Service by their Teachers. Mr. J. J. Tayler drew up for us some excellent services which have been in use for some years. They used—when I was Superintendent—to be made the basis, along with the Scriptures, of the direct religious teaching given in Class. They were thus filled with meaning for the children, and the tendency to run into routine was checked. But with disuse of this method, the liturgical form seems to have lost its power. I admit, however, that our services were too long. You have much better hit upon the right limits. I dare say that, for Scottish Church Schools, the Creed, the Trinitarian Doxology, and the Prayers to Jesus, may be indispensable. But their immediate juxtaposition with the simple conceptions of a child's religion sets their artificiality—I will use no stronger word—in the intensest light; and I really think that if I

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had never before had a doubt on these matters, the incongruity alone would have provoked it into existence.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Nov. 18, 1878.

I have a lover's quarrel to settle with you; for I have been upbraiding you for running away with me to the "English Lake District," when I ought to have screwed myself down to my desk, and listened only to the "Stern Daughter of the voice of God." However, she would only have squeezed out of me some stifling metaphysics; while you have poured through me the very breath of the mountains, and "the light that never was on land or sea"; so that, in spite of the formal reproaches of my Time-list, I shall thank you from my heart for my stolen holiday. Your charming volume will be an inseparable companion of the poet's works, as well as a literary guide-book to his district. The exactitude and completeness with which you have both tracked his steps and exhibited the relation between the real and the ideal in his local allusions fill me with admiration. The only thing I regret in regard to the book is that anything has been omitted from the Lecture at the end. I have read no estimate of Wordsworth that reproduces so entirely my own feeling respecting him as your concluding pages.

Your Publisher ought to have given you a better binding.

Your approval of my Lecture¹ is very comforting to me. I know well that, in the present temper of men's minds, its protest is uttered in vain. But behind the clouds the sun remains and shines; and though the great world may forget it, it is worth while to keep the hope alive, in some poor shivering souls, that ere long it will burst forth again in all its glory.

TO MISS GERTRUDE MARTINEAU.

TYLAS, OLD BYLAND, HELMSLEY, YORK, July 21, 1875.

Your account of the little island of Sark is most winning, and makes me dream of possible summer weeks upon it, if other years are given, and if, in the meanwhile, its charms are not discovered by the flies and midges. It would be something worth living for to find a place where one could really read out of doors, an early romantic hope of mine, which has been *buzzed* and *bitten out* of me half a life ago.

¹ "Ideal Substitutes for God."

TO MRS. T. SMITH OSLER

THE COKEHURST, E. FARLEIGH, April 21, 1881.

As it is impossible to call in question the almanac and the chronicles, I suppose I must believe myself six years beyond the Psalmist's reckoning of human life. But, so long as it rests upon testimony, like any outside fact, and not upon other experience than that departure of dear ones, which more or less extends through all one's years, it is difficult to realise one's position so near the verge. I fancy that I have a little more to do while here; but I shall not repine if my hand is stayed, and I am sent for to the great colony of fore-runners. You may suppose that *this week* I have not added much to my life-work, though I shall carry home a few pages of Spinoza more than I brought. . . . Did you see Miss Cobbe's letter on vivisection in the "Times," in answer to C. Darwin's? It is very good; whilst C. Darwin's is, in my judgment, weak and simply authoritative.

TO MR. A. J. MOTT.

5 GORDON STREET, W. C., Feb. 25, 1875.

While I write, I receive from Dean Stanley the sad call to attend the funeral of Sir Charles Lyell in Westminster Abbey on Saturday. It is but a few weeks ago that, with his sister, he called upon me, and, though showing increased signs of failing sight and hearing, conversed with unabated interest and vivacity. But since the shock of Lady Lyell's death in the summer of 1873, he has sensibly declined; and of late has had attacks of vertigo, the effects of which were manifest in his loss of words. At last, the death of his attached younger brother Lieut.-Col. Lyell seems to have shaken him down. He was in many ways a very interesting man. His scientific confrères were probably little aware of the vein of deeper sentiment in him which kept him in sympathy with moral and religious trusts too often disowned by them. Few men have found a more distinct work to do in science and in life; or have done it with more complete effect.

TO MRS. T. SMITH OSLER.¹

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., May 9, 1885.

I am sorry that you have been troubling your dear heart about your silence as to my octogenarian dignities. Early

¹ Daughter of Rev. J. J. Tayler.

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or late, your affectionate good wishes are ever welcome, and do not depend for their value on any niceties of punctuality. After all, I hardly know why such a host of eager benevolences should throng around the close of fourscore years; for with so short a stage of the journey yet in front, there is little room for further desires, and the most loving will can seek no more for one than a peaceful arrival. Were it not that I have carelessly let some tasks linger which I ought to have completed, I should myself be well content to go, whenever the call might come. But while there is work on hand, and unabated interest in it, and in those whom it may concern, it is impossible not to be thankful that my daylight holds out.

With all that is most precious in my long retrospect, your beloved father's image mingles; and gives it an indescribable charm. To his sweet and calming influence, more than to anything else, I owe the reduction of my natural impetuosity within any tolerable limits; and had I not been disciplined by love of him, I should never have been at all fit to take his place. No one now remains to me, on the same line, except Mr. Thom, — I should add F. W. Newman, were it not that, though attached to him as much as ever, I am quite unable to go with him in the social and political judgments which have become his dominant enthusiasms; so that the ground of our sympathy has been seriously narrowed. With Mr. Thom, on the other hand, I find, every time we meet, the approximation closer.

TO MISS ELIZABETH P. PEABODY.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Dec. 9, 1876.

As one of those who are never tired of gazing up again in Channing's face, I heartily rejoice that you are about to add some new lineaments, or at least some fresh lights, to a picture which, with all its charm, has been left thus far a little dim and hazy. The image of his personality which I early derived from his writings remains more vivid than any modification of it which has been received since from what has been published about him. I attribute this very much to the scanty amount of minute biographical detail in my friend W. H. Channing's conscientious and elaborate Memoir. With all the more interest shall I look for your supplement. . . . Beyond the circle of this "Review" [the Theological], the rest of our English world has moved on quite past the period

TO MR. C. E. RAWLINS

of personal interest in Channing, and is surrendered to newer, alas! not higher loves.

I had no plea for publishing the sermon to which you allude; though I believe that the personal sketch of Maurice which it contained found its way, through some reporter, into the newspapers at the time. Certainly the intensest element of his influence was in the persuasiveness of his living presence. But he has been the chief cause of a radical and permanent change in the "orthodox" theology, — viz., a shifting of its centre of gravity from the *Atonement* to the Incarnation, — a change which prepares it, as soon as it can drop the mythology and discern the philosophy of its own doctrine, to encounter from a vastly improved position the spreading doubts respecting a Living and Loving God.

TO MR. C. E. RAWLINS.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, N. B., June 9, 1880.

MY DEAR FRIEND, — So to you also the heaviest blow of human sorrow has come, and the discovery has to be made of what loneliness really means. My heart bleeds for you. I well know the strong affections of your nature, and how deep beneath your vigorous and manly will lay an inward dependence on the gentler persuasions of life. No one that has known her can ever lose the image — so stately and so winning — of your great-hearted wife; and the longer the memory of her, the deeper must be the admiration of her constancy and devotedness of love. The hold she had upon my dear wife — who had great insight into the essence of character — was something marvellous; due, no doubt, in large degree, to the absorbing *motherly* feeling which characterised them both. It is an alleviating feature of advancing years, which so impoverish our *present*, that they intensify the light of memory and give its resources a larger and more sufficing place in life; especially where its rays pass by natural reflection into the other focus and shine again in the form of hope. Under the discipline of time, I have found it possible, with this help, even to make friends with my solitude, and to love rather to increase it, by flight to the silence of the forest and the hills, than to dispel it by the voices of society and the stir of life. Not indeed that we are permitted, on the plea of sorrow, to desert the duties and sympathies of

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the time which is opening to others, though closing to us. But it is possible to live on with the young towards the future, while hiding in the heart the secret treasures of the past. Surrounded by your children and grandchildren, you will see in them what they cannot see, and find the romance of their life doubled by the reality of your own. God bless you and strengthen your heart!

DEC. 30, 1880.

No Christmas greeting comes closer to my heart than yours. Separate as our paths of work have been, there is a near resemblance both in the memories which consecrate the past to us, and in the experience which makes up our inward life in the present. It is often said that to the old all anniversaries are sad and dreary, — a mere reckoning of loss on the verge of final bankruptcy. I do not admit it in the least. The retrospect of blessings is rather their prolongation than their extinction, and constitutes all the historical interest of life, which replaces, in our latter days, the no less ideal romance of the earlier. How it might be, if I thought the partings *final* which leave the years more lonely, I cannot say. But the silent pressure of a brighter trust takes away the shadows on the future which else would make the lights of the past too pathetic for endurance.

. . . I sometimes wish that old age would give me a little apathy about public affairs. They fill me not only with interest, but with anxiety, which is rendered the more keen, because, in relation to most foreign affairs and to some home questions, I find it impossible to approve the attitude and tendencies of the Gladstone Liberals; and have, therefore, to stand out in the cold, without the supporting sympathy of any party. I am not conscious of any change of opinion, and were I put back, should vote over again for Parliamentary Reform, Free Trade, and all that the Liberal party has won in the past. But their present aims seem to me, in many respects, not only without logical connection with their fundamental principles, but at real variance with them. I cannot learn the modern contempt for Political Economy, or the modern reliance on Government regulation in preference to freedom of contract in matters of temporary service and exchange. But I know you would not approve of me on these things. So, having made my confession, I quit them. I am sorry that you suffer still from deafness. In a slight degree, but only in one ear, I am similarly affected. At dinner parties, it is inconvenient

TO REV. H. SHAEN SOLLY

to me; but else, I hardly feel it. It would be a great privation to me, were I kept from church; especially now that we have joined Stopford Brooke's congregation. His preaching is intensely interesting, and is doing a great work on people whom we could not reach.

TO MR. J. HUNTON SMITH.

5 GORDON STREET, W. C., Oct. 18, 1876.

What you say about the want of social cohesion in our congregations is perfectly true; and we are, for many purposes, weakened, no doubt, by the looseness of our union. But it arises, nevertheless, from some of the best features in our modes of thought and feeling; from the breadth and variety of sympathy which dwarf mere theological agreement as a bond of union, and throw people together in more natural and liberal groups. I confess I have never been able to admire the "denominational" arrangement of society or felt the least wish to push it into general life, further than its special and limited purposes require. A world composed of religious clubs may hang well together around its small centres, but it produces men of narrow minds and disproportioned affections, who judge persons without candour, and affairs fanatically. I have more faith in the culture of the world than in the ties of the churches. I regard it as an honour far beyond my due to be associated in anyone's mind with Thomas Carlyle, a man who above all others stands amidst this age as its prophet and interpreter. He has shamed the folly and braced the nerves and touched the conscience of not a few; including some of the noblest spirits of our time. But he will leave no successor, I fear, that can bend his bow; and when he is gone, there will be no such voice to be a terror to pretenders and an inspiration to veracious men. At present the younger generation is surrendering itself to far inferior guidance.

TO REV. H. SHAEN SOLLY.

MANOR HOUSE, EASTBOURNE, March 29, 1877.

I quite agree with you that translator's work is an excellent discipline, and a useful variation upon a minister's regular duty, if it is not carried too far and run on too long, so as to take the place of independent study and production. After a while, anyone who knows what true scholarship is gets

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to feel, I think, the need of concentration upon some one definite line of research, in which he may hope to see with his own eyes, and perhaps help others to a little light. Towards this, translating is scarcely a help, encouraging, as it does, a somewhat dependent form of culture.

TO REV. R. RODOLPH SUFFIELD.

10 GORDON STREET, W. C., Jan. 30, 1874.

The legislation and official correspondence of the Catholic Church give one a wonderful insight into the moral interior of European Society through a long series of generations. They impress me profoundly with both the corruption of private life, and the evident latent presence of redeeming ideas and possibilities sure at last to make their protest and their struggle felt. All through the abominations of the Roman Court, and the dissolute period of Clerical life in Europe, signs are not wanting of a silent religious power present in the background of the scene; like the unnoticed influence of a saintly and suffering and patient wife on a passionate and abandoned husband,—an influence that works shame and recovery at last. There is *one* grace, however, which the Church seems never to reach,—*veracity*; committed once for all to an untenable system, it lives, and ever must live, on evasions. In this lies its doom.

5 GORDON STREET, W. C., Dec. 30, 1874.

My thanks have been so long delayed for the kind and welcome present of your pamphlet, that they must now cover also the interesting sequel to that gift,—Mr. Gladstone's gracious and characteristic letter. I hope you will avail yourself of his proposal, and seek an interview with him during his visit to town. As for his own pamphlet, I rejoiced at its publication, on the purely personal ground that it removed all ambiguity from *his* position, and rendered it certain that the leaders of neither political party would truckle to the Ultramontane power in the Irish Education problem. Otherwise I am not sure that it is desirable for an Anglican statesman to present a challenge to his Roman Catholic countrymen to define publicly their relation to the Vatican Decrees. It is a case, I think, in which an indefinite smouldering discontent and aversion would be more efficacious allies of a just and liberal policy than a scanty though impressive avowal like Lord Acton's.

TO REV. J. H. THOM

Manning's courageous declaration that the Decree makes *no difference* in the limits of a Civil obedience is highly characteristic and amusing; the sense of it being: "We meant *no less* before," not, "We mean *no more* now than previously."

FEB. 10, 1876.

There is great truth in what you say about the too great prevalence of the "*minor key*" in the tones of the prevalent Christianity, and the need there is for a more thankful and joyous chorus of praise. I own this in my judgment; yet am so often saddened by the evils of the world, and longing for more light, as to fall into too pathetic a mood, in spite of an unabated and absolute faith that we live under the rule of an Infinite Perfection.

TO MISS A. SWANWICK.

THE POLCHAR, Oct. 18, 1879.

Our loneliness has been relieved by the continued kindness of our friends, who have never left us without a guest. Among them Professor Jowett gave us a few days, which were most enjoyable. His friends complain of his reticence on subjects of deep religious interest. I find but little ground for this, and there is no one whose intercourse is to me more suggestive of thoughts both new and true than his. He doubtless feels the difficulty — which cannot be unknown to any deep thinker — of exactly formulating doctrinal truth respecting infinite things, and, in treating of existing controversies, directly says that "neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem," is the Religion of the Future. But in speaking of what he holds and of what he relinquishes, I meet with nothing but the purest simplicity. And his charity is so large and genial that, if it wants anything, it is a little more shadow.

TO REV. J. H. THOM.

DEC. 14, 1878.

My Friday lecture over, which absorbs me pretty much till it is delivered, I may indulge myself with a word of thanks for your precious note. That your sympathy is with me in the pleadings of my Address¹ is worth everything to me, and I can bear up without discouragement against Max Müller's

¹ "Ideal Substitutes for God."

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friendly dissent. I could not indeed expect approval from those who have lost their faith in any Personal God,—a class which, I fear, includes an immense majority of the educated people in Germany and Holland, if not in England. The curiosity felt about foreign and ancient religions, with the apparent hope of getting some truth out of them, seems to be one of the many features of resemblance between our time and the period of the Roman Empire,—a resemblance which would affect me with less uneasiness if I could anywhere see a nascent influence comparable with the young Christianity. But while the decay is plain enough, no such regenerating power is as yet apparent; and though with full faith in its return, I expect “we shall die without the sight.”

THE POLCHAR, Aug. 7, 1881.

The remarks on my late Address¹ to which your letter refers, I did not see. But certainly nothing could be further from my thought than to take up any new theological position or break away from any conception of Christianity that had not been long relinquished by us. Your interpretation of my meaning is perfectly accurate. But I must have expressed myself ill for the “Spectator” also to understand me as reverting to “mere natural religion,” to the exclusion of all “Supernaturalism.” It has not been usual to call the Quaker doctrine of the inward witness of the Spirit by the name of “Natural Religion,” or to limit the word “Supernatural” to the case of Physical Miracle. Without these misnomers, the “Spectator’s” description is inapplicable. No doubt, a serious question recurs, at every large surrender of mistaken conceptions, whether in what remains firm standing-ground still exists for the maintenance of Divine relations; and at such crises there are always fallings away from faith sufficient to render plausible the prophecy of lapse into sheer negation. But it is only the old Romanist threat, “Catholic or Atheist,” over again, a threat which always affects me as in itself simply atheistic, founded on an estimate of mere logical humanity, and impossible to one who has a living trust in the “Father of Spirits.”

Have you seen, I wonder, a curious book in two volumes: “John Inglesant, a Romance,” published anonymously, but known to be by a Birmingham manufacturer named Short-

¹ “Loss and Gain in Recent Theology.”

TO REV. J. H. THOM

house? It is an historical reproduction of the Civil War and Commonwealth times in England and in Italy, with special reference to the religious movements and conflicts of the period; and, though deficient in *dramatic* power, is remarkable as a descriptive book. The author has evidently read himself thoroughly into the interior and exterior life of a most interesting age; and presents it with an ease and general purity of style, which oddly contrasts with occasional fragments of bad grammar. I am not a good judge of such things, for as I never read tales, they are apt to run away with me if ever I fall into their hands. But certainly this book has interested me much. Anna Swanwick writes to me in warm praise of Dean Stanley's last book,¹ which I have not yet seen. Anything of his, read now, cannot but have a solemn and tender light upon it. With him the greatest *personal* power I have ever known has passed from us. The loss to London in particular is something quite unique.

THE POLCHAR, Aug. 26, 1881.

I have been reading Robertson Smith's "Old Testament in the Jewish Church," and have been most agreeably surprised by the honest thoroughness of his whole treatment of the subject. I expected much from his ability and learning, and from his skilful selection and exposition; but was not prepared for the unflinching courage with which he indicates the inevitable way to far-reaching results. I cannot help thinking that the book — which is pleasant reading for a people so biblical as the Scotch — will make a great impression here.

The last time I saw Dean Stanley he spoke a good deal of the Revised New Testament, and I asked him whether he thought the translation "Evil One" in the Lord's Prayer was irrevocable. He said, No, he hoped it might yet be altered. I fear that the silencing of his voice may make all the difference. I dread to hear the name of his successor!

THE POLCHAR, July 21, 1882. ¹

It is a relief to me that you have not to go further afield than Pitlochry in quest of a suitable Bath-house, and I trust that the ample comforts of the good establishment there will soon dissipate the unsanatory effects of our Spartan cottage and rough mode of life. From my heart I thank you for ven-

¹ "Christian Institutions."

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turing into such conditions, and giving us the great delight of your presence once more. I own, with you, the limiting imperfections of even near and intimate intercourse; under present human conditions, I suppose, there will ever be an unspanned interval between the inner and the outer life. Yet is it silently lessened by the habit of trust and love, in understanding more than comes to speech or open view. To me this week will be an additional light of joy among my last memories.

THE POLCHAR, Aug. 28, 1882.

I strongly feel with you the need of meeting the objection on which you touch in the enclosed excerpt; and also, the great difficulty of meeting it. For my own part, I am accustomed to throw the ideas in relation to the Resurrection of Christ into an order somewhat different from that which your MS. gives them. The *belief* in the event I take to be, not the cause, but the effect, of the Apostles' faith (whether in the form of new conversion, as with Paul, or of personal ties, as with the eleven) in Jesus from other sources;—a faith, stunned for a while or prevented by the crucifixion, but bursting into fresh life under the influence of irrepressible veneration, and finding excuse for itself in prophecies that God would "not suffer his Holy One to see corruption," etc. Thus there is an immediate and close connection between the impression of Christ's personality and the belief in his immortal existence. When once the conviction became fixed, and had been refound in the prophets that it *must be so*, it would not wait long for confirmatory visions and rumours of personal appearances, such as those enumerated by Paul in 1 Cor. xv. in the form which tradition had given them more than twenty years after date. The additional accounts, in Matthew and Luke, in Acts, in John, carrying us down from ten to twenty, thirty-five and seventy years later, give no further light except, in their succession, on the growth of the tradition.

The belief in the immortality of Christ was thus really, though unconsciously, the fruit of his spiritual influence, just as our own faith in the diviner life of our departed is inseparable from the insight of love and reverence which looks through the cloud of death. But, in conscious afterthought, and by way both of self-vindication and of expression to others, it sought refuge and support from the authority of prophets and the testimony of believers' experience. This was not to rise into a spiritual from a Messianic conception,

TO MR. HENRY WALKER

but rather to sink back from the spiritual into the Messianic, and accommodate their new birth to their old thoughts. While therefore I admit that it was indispensable to the embodiment and diffusion of the Christian idea, I cannot but feel that it involved a *lowering* of the idea, and clothed in a mythological form for the imagination a divine truth which else would have no welcome from the minds that need it and are to pass it on.

In the case of Paul, the belief must have been wholly of the official or Messianic sort, founded on prophetic interpretations with a Pharisaic faith in another life for man; except that he had doubtless received at second hand the impress of Christ's soul through the heroic and saintly enthusiasm of the disciples whom he hunted down.

You will see readily why I cannot, so completely as you, *detach* the Resurrection story from the "soul of Christ."

TO MR. HENRY WALKER.

10 GORDON STREET, W. C., Feb. 26, 1872.

"Call no man Master upon earth," — least of all one who can never quit the learner's attitude, and who professes, in Divine things, to know little and to trust much. If you find, however, some sympathetic strength in a personal acknowledgment of faith from me, I gladly tell you that for my part I keep fast to my early belief of "life in death"; nor have I the least apprehension that the individuality of any soul is either suspended or lost in the transition to a higher stage of being. I can conceive of an ulterior life only as the promotion of the same personalities to a more advanced term of spiritual education; nor do I doubt that they who have left us are simply on their way before us, and wait to help us on ours when the moment shall strike for us to join them.

As for the question of Baptism, it has doubtless some hereditary interest for you. Early in life I came to a conclusion against the applicability of the rite, except to persons voluntarily *changing over* from some other religion to Christianity, and I have therefore never administered it; but have substituted a simple *Dedication Service*, addressed to the Parents shortly after the birth of the Child, without any use of water or other ceremonial form. It does not appear to me, therefore, that there is any room for the proper resort to Baptism in the case of adult Christians who have never been

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anything else. But if I took the usual view of Baptism, as the door of entrance into the Christian fold, I should perhaps think otherwise. Still, though I should regret that it had been neglected at the right time, I could never attach any serious importance to the omission, or suppose that there was any spiritual necessity for attempting to repair it "out of season."

My leanings also are strongly towards a "Broad Church" and I lament that the narrow-minded political fanaticism of the Dissenters is so successfully abating the hope of such a thing, and so mischievously embarrassing the only reasonable scheme of Public Education.

TO REV. CHARLES WICKSTEED.

10 GORDON STREET, LONDON, Oct. 27, 1871.

The position of a Baptist minister, ceasing to hold orthodox opinions, is totally different, I think, from that of a clergyman, week by week obliged to make himself the organ of a religion inwardly rejected. I agree with you entirely that mere denunciation of such conformity is unfeeling and repellent. But I cannot look on it neutrally as a simple psychological curiosity, and must think that it calls for grave moral criticism, and that it behooves us to speak on it plainly enough to save the public conscience from its desolating influence. I am persuaded that honourable laymen, themselves of Broad Church sympathies, are more awake than is commonly supposed to the essential immorality of the liberal clerical position. An eminent man among them said to me to-day, with a shrug of the shoulders, "I could not for a week do what they (the Broad clergy) do through life." I never meet with a layman who does not say the same. What must be the effect of having in the clergy a standard of veracity which is thus too low for the conscience of their laity, so that they could not change places without the latter forfeiting their self-respect? The fact is, their intellectual and sceptical laymen look upon the outspoken liberal clergymen as serviceable instruments for breaking down the church superstitions, and patronise them, just as they would patronise a Publisher that defied religious prejudice; but this use which is made of them, though it necessitates silence about their moral position, is compatible with strong disapproval of it.

TO MR. R. WILSON

TO MR. R. WILSON.

10 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., April 28, 1872.

It is very pleasant to receive from you so prevailingly bright an account of your course of life,—of the improved health and better finance and more established position which, I trust, will in the end reconcile you to the world, and make you content to rest your too aspiring wings and stay upon terra firma like the rest of us, poor groundlings that we are. You will be shocked at my barbarism when I tell you that I heartily love to see a poet turned into a drudge,—regularly put into harness and yoked to the mill-staff, to grind his full measure of the world's corn. It is in truth the test of his genius, for if he cannot find his ideal in the real, but only beyond it, the fire within him is no glow of heaven, but the hectic fever of romance. An orderly, well-taught, sweet-tempered school, where every lout is getting a light into his eye, and every ill-conditioned urchin a touch of shame into his soul, is a better creation than any poem you could substitute for it; and will leave you, after all, fitter than before to think worthy thoughts and sing sweet songs. So I cannot at all condole with you on your stiff battle of life; for, while it gains ground, it is the very work for which a responsible man is made. Now you must indeed be pushing on, if already you can set up your country cottage,—a thing which I have never been able to accomplish, whatever the inducement, and which I look upon as the crown of all prosperity.

5 GORDON STREET, LONDON, W. C., Nov. 20, 1877.

The memorial notice to which you respond with so true a sympathy would explain the sad cares which had prevented me from answering your previous kind letter. And now, though those cares are exchanged for a strange and solemn calm, you will readily believe that it brings with it a mood of sorrow which is little given to speech. I thank you from my heart for your kind and tranquillising words; but with this at present I must be content. The long and painful watching through the summer and autumn has ended as the poor sufferer herself could not but wish; and we surrender that dear life with thankfulness and perfect trust, till the Infinite Love in which we live and die shall resume the interrupted communion. How can I repine at a few lonely steps, when for forty-nine years I have been granted the

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most perfect companionship in every duty and affection! I grieve to hear that you too are a mourner, though I know not the nature of the sorrow; accept my fellowship in it.

35 GORDON SQUARE, LONDON, W. C., ? 1883.

I hear with no regret, indeed with hearty pleasure, of your well-filled hours and constant work. There is no better discipline for any of us, especially for those who, like you and myself, would else be in danger of turning life into a dream of thought and feeling.

It is partly this conviction which induces me not to lay aside the yoke of my pledged duties on the plea of years while my power of fulfilling them remains unabated. At present, *i. e.* since September of '82 and till near midsummer '83, I have more on hand than I ever had, except in my hardest years; having to write weekly two lectures of an hour each, on subjects requiring close study and reflection, besides disposing of a mass of College business and endless correspondence. To manage this, I am obliged to give up all evening engagements, except official ones, and to minimise my hours of sleep. And lest I carry this too far, I must close my letter in obedience to my daughters' peremptory order.

TO MISS CATHERINE WINKWORTH.

INCHREE HOUSE BY FORTWILLIAM, INVERNESS-SHIRE,
Sept. 24, 1869.

I received your last precious volume¹ at a time when unusual pressure of anxiety and work compelled me to accept the dispensation which you considerately offered me from immediate acknowledgment. But I did not think that, in waiting till I could read the book, I should condemn myself to so long a silence. Only within the last few days, however, have I been able to indulge myself with your delightful echoes of the "Christian Singers of Germany." And most heartily do I thank you for the book. It constitutes a most interesting chapter of religious history, and gives, in a way eminently attractive, an insight into the inner life of Europe during times which would seem to have nothing in common with our own, were it not for the undying trusts and aspirations which make us one spiritual family, and which have

¹ "Christian Singers of Germany."

TO MISS CATHERINE WINKWORTH

nowhere such pure utterance as in the Christian Hymn. Congenial as such reading has always been to me, I am indebted to you for an introduction to several poems, which I had not met with in the original form, and for the appropriation of one or two known pieces to their right authors. The biographical element of the volume immensely enhances the interest of the poems. Indeed, so *insular* is my taste in regard to religious lyrics, that the *personal* history of the German hymnology is almost essential to my thorough enjoyment of it; and notwithstanding some few grand exceptions, its general type seems to me considerably below the standard of our English hymns. After the Scriptures, the Wesley Hymn-book appears to me the grandest instrument of popular religious culture that Christendom has ever produced. But for the German antecedents, however, it would never have come into existence.

This year has brought to you, as to me, some testing vicissitudes, — the sorrow of your venerable father's death, the joy of your dear sister's return to life, and the departure of our beloved, and almost perfect, friend, Mr. Tayler. Natural as it is for the old to pass away and for the young to tarry with us, all three events bring their pathetic surprises, and their appeals for higher trust and better faithfulness. The image of your father's cheerful patience under one of the most trying of human infirmities will always remain with me. And from the guiding influence of my venerated colleague, Death can never divide me; his pure, bright, and tender spirit, his large and *living* knowledge, his absolute devotion to truth and goodness as the way of communion with God, not only remain ineffaceable in memory, but blend inseparably with every diviner hope.

DALGUISE HOUSE, NEAR DUNKELD, July 19, 1871.

You would indeed have greatly mistaken me and withheld from me one of the rarer interests of my life, if you had resisted the kind prompting which brings me "Bunsen's Prayers." The volume belongs to a kind of literature which has always attracted me, and for which the advance of life deepens my affection; and I can imagine, with reverent sympathy, the satisfaction with which Madame de Bunsen, on the extreme verge of her time here, turns the pages which so faithfully reflect the purest and noblest aspect of her husband's mind. The translation appears to me about perfect, as usual. I have

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read the first week, and with such consent of heart, that I wonder why you can expect me to find it to any large extent uncongenial. Tersteegen speaks to me, I think, more than any other of the writers; and the Greek Collects—though not without a certain dignity—are perhaps the least rich in the substance of their thought. Further on in the volume there are materials, I perceive, of which I must lose the benefit, from the ecclesiastical and doctrinal distance which makes their language foreign to me. Never do I feel my exile from the common heritage of Christendom as in reading a book like this, which, after making me sure of the profoundest communion, reminds me but too plainly that I am and must remain a spiritual outlaw. However, alone, or in the great company, we must live by the light we have.

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., Feb. 2, 1883.

What precisely was the thought in my mind when writing the words which you quote I cannot venture to say; for there are two or three characteristic aspects of Schleiermacher's theology; and which of these it was that provoked my rather harsh sentence it is impossible for me to remember. But in his construction of a theology he started from a principle—the consciousness of *dependence*—and worked upon a method—of analysis of feeling—from which he could gain, and did gain, no faith in either a Personal God or the Immortality of the individual soul; and to me a religion which is destitute of these beliefs has no moral or spiritual worth. So far, therefore, as Schleiermacher led the generation which he influenced to be content with an intellectual and æsthetic mysticism and mistake it for a religion,—nay, to identify it with the essence of Christianity,—I cannot but regard his teaching as unsound, and leading inevitably to the later disintegration which had its chief representative in Strauss; or, I should rather say, failing inevitably to arrest it; for Strauss was the product of Hegel rather than of Schleiermacher. But I have always thought that the school of Schleiermacher was embittered against Hegel from the same feeling that made the demoniacs savage against the Messiah; the instinct that told them it was all over with them. Unfortunately, Hegel was no saviour, but rather the sevenfold substitute of the same spirit which, in weaker form, he had cast out. Yet, in spite of my own judgment, I have always had a strong affection towards Schleiermacher's personality, and an admiration

FROM LETTERS ON "OPEN TRUSTS"

for his leading disciples, — De Wette, Lücke, Rothe, Dorner, — all of whom have had distinguished merits little affected by the philosophy of their master. I hope you have seen Mr. Thom's volume of Sermons. If not, you really have in reserve a privilege of the highest and rarest value. I know of no book of this century that is to be compared with it for wealth of spiritual wisdom and beauty.

From Letters on "Open Trusts," July, 1882.

Dr. Martineau would define congregations coming under the principle of open trusts as "congregations that statedly (or regularly) assemble for the worship of God and the furtherance of the Christian life, without subjecting either members or minister to any more particular creed or confession of faith than is expressed in such fellowship."

He would thus obviate all occasion for defining Christianity "by accepting as sufficient *the congregation's own avowal of a Christian purpose*; on the plain principle that whoever claims the Christian name can be cast out from it by no other disciple. The phrase which I employ, viz. 'to assemble for the worship of God and promotion of the Christian life,' simply designates the *intention of the persons assembling*; and therefore presents . . . no object of inquiry, except *that intention*. . . . It applies the word 'Christian,' not to doctrinal or critical belief, but to 'life,' — a certain type of spiritual affection, conscience, and character, which has its source and centre in the person of Jesus Christ. In this application the word does not come near any question of mere historical judgment, or interfere with differing opinions about miracles and the narratives of the Resurrection. The necessary latitude on all such matters of intellectual research is secured by forbidding any further test than the *practical one* of fellowship in the same worship and the quest of the same perfection.

"*Wider* latitude than this — liberty, for instance, to abandon the worship of God and to relapse from the Christian to the Pagan ethics — I do not desire to favour by special endowment. Let those who want it have their hands free to exercise it and win a way for it, if they can. But they must pay the costs, not I; so long as I have any energy left, it shall be spent in resisting their advance. . . .

"In contending for open trusts and the resolute refusal by congregations of all theological names, I have never dreamed

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of dispensing with limiting definitions and tests, but only of rendering those tests *practical* and not *doctrinal*,— *i. e.* founded on sympathies of affection, purpose, and character, such as express themselves in worship and action, instead of on agreement in matters of theoretical judgment. Men who naturally unite, and remain united, in a common enthusiasm of reverence and active faith, will instantly begin to divide, as soon as you insist on their selecting a formula of belief which shall have assent from all. Try to *name* the logical essence or ground of their union, and the union is gone; for it is a *diffused* attraction, spread, with varying intensity, over a multitude of parts; and its centre of gravity is different in different minds. This is the reason why, in defining the natural and permanent type of religious society, I should always resort to terms expressive of worship and spiritual aspiration, and avoid all language of specific opinion. Any opinion that can live within these terms shall have my sympathy; but no opinion, no state of mind, that is at variance with them."

Chapter IX

STUDIOUS RETIREMENT, 1885-1900

DR. MARTINEAU had now retired, and laid down the burden of his public engagements. The veteran of eighty years, however, was not going to put aside his arms and indulge in well-earned repose, but to complete the labours in which he had so long been interested, and to exert himself in various ways to promote movements which he thought conducive to the general welfare. The amount of work which he accomplished is truly astonishing; and though in his letters he frequently pleaded his inability to address a public audience without unfitting himself for the quiet pursuits of his study, he did not shrink, when the occasion appeared sufficiently important, from coming forward and defending in fervent speech the principles which were dear to his heart.

In order that his connection with Manchester New College might not be altogether severed, he was appointed its President by the Annual Meeting of Trustees in January, 1886. This office was not very exacting, and his constituents were satisfied if he presided over a general meeting once or twice a year; but as he did not like holding an appointment without a strenuous fulfilment of its duties, he resigned it, after two years' tenure, into younger hands.

In February he enriched the pages of a new periodical, "The Christian Reformer," with a paper on "A Way Out of the Trinitarian Controversy."¹ A text at the begin-

¹ Reprinted in Essays, II.

ning indicates that this was one of the exceptional sermons in which he discussed some doctrinal difficulty; and a note in which he calls attention to the changed aspects of the subject suggests that it was not of very recent composition. At all events, it was now for the first time given to the public. The object of the article is to show that the central religion, which is expressed by the contrasted forms of faith, is identical in each, and that Unitarians are "at one with all Christendom in the very focus and fervour of its religious life." He explains the functions of the three Persons of the Trinity as unfolded in the Creeds, and then points out that the Being whom Unitarians worship as the Father corresponds with the second Person in Trinitarian theology, and that the Father, in the sense of the infinite primeval Essence, without finite manifestation, "is really absent from the Unitarian creed." Trinitarian and Unitarian, then, alike worship Him whose attributes are "creative thought, guiding Providence, redeeming grace," and who was "manifested through all ages by nature and history; but concentrated with unique brilliancy in the character and existence, the holy life and redeeming work of Jesus, in whom the Spirit so dwelt without measure that he was the very 'Word made flesh'; the divine perfection on the scale, and united with the incidents, of humanity." Thus "the two are agreed, not indeed by any means *throughout*, but in that which constitutes the pith and kernel of both faiths." In sending a copy of this paper to Professor Knight some years afterwards, Dr. Martineau said that it was not favourably received by his Unitarian friends, but brought him some sympathetic letters from clergymen.

The centenary of Manchester New College, which was founded in 1786, was celebrated in Manchester on Monday, the 22d of February. The most honoured member of the College, however, was not present, and it was

thought well to have a celebration in London, which should be distinguished by an address from Dr. Martineau. Accordingly, a Soirée was held in Willis's Rooms, on Wednesday, the 23d of June, when a large company assembled, many of them old friends, who had come from far and near to listen once more to the well-known voice, others comparative strangers, who had been induced by the fame of the speaker to accept the invitation of the Committee. The address consisted mainly of an historical sketch of the origin of the College, and a defence of its principle of free teaching and free learning in theology. The College had given up its once ample provision for instruction in Arts, since the national Universities were open to its students. But its theological function still remained, because in the older Universities the theological faculty was bound by the doctrines of the Church of England, and those of recent foundation made no provision for guiding the students in the highest subjects of human thought. He concluded with these words: "Until our old Universities at last listen to the call to open their last schools to us, — until the new Universities also feel that without the theological faculty they are but a truncated and headless organism; until they feel that it is possible to work a theological school, taught by instructors and attended by pupils who are free to follow the convictions of their own understanding and conscience, — until then our College is a necessity; but when that hour comes, then I say that we shall be well aware that the knell of our College has tolled. We shall be prepared to lay down our arms, and to say our work is done; we shall be willing that Manchester New College should die, for its death will be in that case its transfiguration, and its exaltation to a larger and a higher life."

In the course of this address, when speaking of the Warrington Academy, of which Manchester New College

was the immediate successor, he mentioned the interesting fact that he had in his possession Dr. John Taylor's own copy of the well-known Hebrew "Concordance," and also an electrical machine, by the use of which Dr. Priestley had made several of his electrical discoveries. These had come to him through the Rev. Philip Taylor, as whose junior colleague he had begun his ministry in Dublin. Mr. Philip Taylor was grandson of Dr. John Taylor, the first Principal of Warrington Academy, where Priestley also was for some time a tutor.

The excitement and fatigue of receiving, and then addressing, a large assembly did not exhaust Dr. Martineau's energies. The next day he appeared at the meeting of the College Trustees, and was ready with another speech. He moved the following Resolution:—

"That as Trustees of this College, meeting for the first time since the completion of its hundredth year, we record our serious judgment that its fundamental principle of free teaching and free learning has been amply vindicated by a century's experience; our gratitude for the release, at the older Universities, of all departments of study save one from the pressure of exclusive tests; and our conviction that, while this exception continues, the duty is still imposed of our securing to theology—embracing the supreme subjects of human thought—an unrestricted application of enlarging knowledge, the perennial freshness of unbidden faith, and the varying inspirations of personal devotion."

He pointed out that, in consequence of its principle of doctrinal freedom, the College had passed through a century of theological change "with more quietude, with more steadiness, with less convulsive interruption of the course of its working" than some other institutions, where the teacher felt himself under a constant espionage as to his doctrines. This fear of dogmatic offence was ruinous to the spirit of effective and complete teaching. He then illustrated the importance of the principle by supposing

that when the College was founded the teachers and students had been bound only by some large and liberal type of doctrine, which, as being universally held, was regarded as absolutely axiomatic. Yet the whole basis of theology had changed, and he himself would have been disqualified by the very rule which a few years before he would have been ready to accept. "It is utterly impossible to foresee the changes in the human mind." Opinions are outgrown, and simply drop away; and these constant changes are in the order of Providence, and are a part of the appointed growth of the human mind. After referring with approval to the changes in the older Universities, which were due in part to the efforts of one of the most esteemed of their own Trustees, Mr. James Heywood, he said: "Human history is a beam of God's will, the human mind the shrine in which his moral government and his infinite purpose are revealed. His science lays new provinces open, and ethical experience new depths in our human life; and as the story of humanity is enlarged by the courses of history, so must there accrue to us vast enlargements of our apprehensions of God and the range and relations of his character to ourselves. . . . The inward intuitions of human agency are always being born again in fresh and unexpected forms, and each of these new births is a new source of spiritual life to those that come within its influence, and it must not and cannot be tied down to any definite measures of past standards. And so with regard to the varieties of individual character that co-exist. The spiritual proportions, so to speak, of individual natures are perfectly different, and where they are different they require to have different forms of intellectual conception; and I am quite persuaded, therefore, that the forces of the human mind, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, can never be developed and never be consecrated to the purposes of religion unless we recognise what are natural

laws fearlessly, and make no bargains and stipulations for the opinions of our own generation."

The principles thus enunciated were now to be brought before a wider public and applied to the subject of reform in the Established Church. The question of reform or of disestablishment was at this time a prominent topic of discussion both in the press and at various meetings convened for the purpose of conference on the subject. Some earnest members of the Church were anxious to widen its borders, so that it should include all, within the nation, who professed and called themselves Christians. With this end in view they proposed the establishment, in every Parish, of Councils which should be representative of the whole body of Parishioners, and which should be empowered by law to exercise a real control over the appointment of ministers, the disbursement of the funds, and the arrangement of the services of the National Church. In order to secure these objects they instituted a "National Church Reform Union," and prepared a Bill which should give the sanction of law to their proposals. Dr. Martineau was deeply interested in the discussion which was thus raised; and Mr. R. Bosworth Smith, one of the Masters of Harrow School, having drawn attention to the subject by some letters in the "Times," he embraced the opportunity of publicly stating his views in the following letter addressed to that gentleman:—

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., Dec. 23, 1885.

MY DEAR SIR,—Your letter of November 16th on Disestablishment I had read in the "Times" with delighted admiration and sympathy; and I thank you most sincerely for completing my knowledge of the series. For nearly fifty years I have been a most unwilling Nonconformist; compelled to be so by inability to accept the Theology of the Anglican formularies; but believing in a fundamental unity of religious sentiment in the English people, attaching great importance to its National expression, and longing for the time when the ban of exile may

be removed which excludes so large a multitude at present shut out from Church Communion. Mere personal banishment, however, has no effect in diminishing my historical reverence and social affection for the most venerable and beneficent of all English institutions; the gates of which I would still defend from assault, even though her fellowship were to be denied for ever to such as I am. At the same time, the more profound my homage to the Church, the more eager is my desire to see her wake up to the full range and grandeur of her mission to this nation of ours. And I am painfully struck by what I cannot help calling the pettiness and poverty of such schemes of Reform as are set forth from time to time by her own members. It is well and needful, no doubt, to amend her internal ecclesiastical constitution in many ways; and her own work, *within its present bounds*, will be more effective when this is done. But it is not from this side that her chief danger threatens. There is an irreconcilable variance between her assumed theory of Christianity and the living inward Christian pieties which stir the hearts of religious people in our time, and which alone will stir them in the future. Among Nonconformists, who have no stereotyped forms of worship, obsolete elements can drop silently away, and the whole tone and character of their services have accordingly changed and are in harmony with the catholic spirit of their preaching; while in the Church the contrast is often painful between the sincere and earnest *breadth* of the pulpit and the unreal phrases which can no longer be appropriated in the creeds and prayers. One of the best of the London clergymen, lamenting to me the consequence of this, said, "The only man I have ever known who really *prayed the Prayers* was F. D. Maurice." So long as this is even tending to become true, surely a fatal canker is at the root of the Church whose clergy it concerns. Mr. Gladstone's attitude does not surprise me. I well remember a conversation with him in either 1863 or 1867, which led me to say to a friend next day that, if in his time the Liberationist agitation came to a head, *he* would be the man to Disestablish the Church. He laid down two positions: (1) The Anglican Church is Divine and (except in ecclesiastical machinery) unalterable; and (2) the State must bear itself impartially towards all the religions of its subjects. The inference is inevitable; the Church is unsusceptible of enlargement; the State must choose between the establishment of all religions and the establishment of none. The responsibility in this great matter rests primarily, it seems to me, with the serious-minded *laity* of the Church, especially the *M. P.'s*.

They have *bound the clergy by subscription* and it is shameful to throw the burden upon men thus placed.

Pardon an old man's garrulity, and

Believe me

Yours most truly,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

In the following January a Memorial was circulated, protesting against the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church, and favouring measures whereby the laity should have a voice in the management of Church affairs, and the basis of the Church should be "so widened as to include, as far as possible, the entire Christian life and thought of the nation"; and a Conference was then convened of those who had signed this Memorial, and of others interested in Church reform. This Conference met at St. Jude's Vicarage, Whitechapel, on the 14th of January, and appointed a Committee to secure public attention and support, and urge the government of the day to appoint a Royal Commission. The Committee decided to summon a public meeting, to be held in the Governors' Room, Charterhouse, on the 24th of February, for the purpose of promoting the object in view. On the motion of Dr. Martineau, who was in favour of larger schemes, this meeting was adjourned. When the Conference was resumed on the 24th of March, the Rev. Sir George W. Cox moved the following Resolution:—

"That the only means by which the Church of England can vindicate her comprehensive name is by so widening her conditions of communion as to embrace 'the whole Christian thought and life of the nation'; and that for this end the abolition of Subscription and the repeal of the Acts of Uniformity (provision being made at the same time for the adequate share of the laity in the work of Church administration) are measures of primary, immediate, and indispensable importance."

After the Resolution had been seconded by Dr. Martineau, the Rev. S. A. Barnett moved, as an Amendment,

to substitute, after the words "Christian thought and life of the nation," the following words:—

"But that it would be premature for Parliament to consider any proposal for the abolition of Subscription and the repeal of the Act of Uniformity until the people are empowered by law to exercise a real control over the appointment of the ministers, the disbursement of the funds, and the arrangement of the services of the National Church in every parish."

The Amendment having been seconded by the Rev. G. S. Reaney, a division resulted in the loss of the Resolution by two votes; but the Amendment, on becoming a substantive motion, was carried only by the casting vote of the Chairman, Mr. Albert Grey, M.P. (now Earl Grey).

The dubious result of this meeting seemed to justify some further action, and a requisition, signed by Dr. Martineau, Sir G. W. Cox, and others, was sent to the Committee, calling upon them to convene another public meeting, at which the rejected Resolution might be again discussed. A meeting was accordingly held at St. Jude's on Friday, the 25th of June, when a Resolution of similar purport was carried, with only three dissentients,—the Rev. S. E. Barnett, the Rev. Brooke Lambert, and the Rev. G. S. Reaney. These gentlemen consequently resigned their positions on the Committee, and the Revs. Dr. Martineau, Sir G. W. Cox, R. E. Bartlett, and A. W. Oxford were appointed to take their places. Sir G. W. Cox had prepared the way for this Resolution by an article in the "Contemporary Review" for June, 1886, on "The Expansion of the Church of England," in which he advocated much more sweeping reforms than were contemplated by the National Church Reform Union. This was followed, in the next number, by an article on the same subject, from the pen of Dr. Martineau. He begins by defining the Church as "the fraternity of disciples devoted to a Universal Religion," and united through reverence

for an ideal Head. The offence of the Church of England is that, by imposing other than divine conditions, it has, for more than two centuries, shut out from her communion multitudes of faithful citizens, including "not a few who have borne the very 'seal of God upon their foreheads.'" The end and essence of a Christian Church is "the sanctification of human life by conscious communion with the infinitely Perfect Spirit, and the consequent enthusiasm of pure and uniting affections." This end has been in a good measure attained by every Church within the compass of Christendom; but when religion was transmuted into theology through the working of secondary minds, it was supposed that the secret of religion's consecrating power was wrapped up in some distinctive form of theology, and each organic constituent of Christendom set up its own *modes of thinking* as conditions of harmony with God, and hence a Christian type of mind in all sects is combined with a refusal of fellowship on the ground of intellectual variety. The attempt in England to secure unity by doctrinal uniformity has utterly failed, and has been productive of some grave moral evils. "It is precisely the men intellectually and spiritually incorruptible whom the ordeal of subscription and creeds picks out for rejection." A real *bonâ fide* assent to the vast range of doctrinal obligation, involved in accepting the contents of the Book of Common Prayer, is absolutely impossible, and hence there is necessarily an indefinite amount of unreality and officialism in worship. The habit of mind that is trained under these conditions is not favourable to popular influence. And lastly, unorthodox men are found in Holy Orders at various stages of deviation from the standards prescribed and accepted; and this leads to a false moral position, which is sometimes defended by "shameless pleas." The conclusion is irresistible, "that doctrinal uniformity is absolutely unattainable, and that the attempt to

secure it . . . entails, in the process of inevitable failure, a train of frightful evils, darkening to the understanding, embittering to the affections, and corrupting to the conscience, of both its agents and its victims." It does not follow that religion and theology can exist apart; but the ideal objects of religion must accept the limits of our finite thought, and, as these are various in different minds, each step of change should be allowed its place and season, and "it is fatal and blighting to embalm the obsolete and set up as sacred its ghastly mimicry of life." It follows from these principles that the fundamental rule for reform is "that theological doctrine is no proper subject of legislation at all." The great Nonconformist bodies should be adopted as constituent elements of the Church of England. In regard to financial reform two things are clear on grounds of general principle: "(1) That to alienate the vast property accumulated through past ages for the spiritual culture of our people and their training in all righteousness, and to throw it into the lottery of possible appropriations, whereof even the best would be inferior, and the indefinite remainder either wrongful private gain or wasteful public loss, would be an irredeemable folly; and (2) that a distinction should be drawn between such portion of the ecclesiastical revenues as may be presumably referred in its origin to private benefactions, and such vested right, immemorial and universal, like that to the tithe, as may be attached to the whole spiritual corporation." Finally, if the Act of Uniformity were repealed, clerical license in the use of the Liturgy should be controlled by vesting the new liberty, not in the incumbent alone, but in a local Church Council. If the Church of England would change her voice, with which her heart is already out of tune, and, instead of repelling her children from her by a host of unspiritual conditions, would revert to Christ's simple claim of devout and humane love, the

exiles long expelled — nay, the enemies that threatened her with downfall — would rally to her and ask enrolment as her National Guard.

This article was adversely criticised in "The Guardian" of the 21st of July. The criticism, while clearly pointing out some of the difficulties inherent in the scheme, was partly founded on such grave misconceptions that Dr. Martineau thought it necessary to correct them, and this he accordingly did in a letter dated August 2. It is needless now to follow the arguments in detail; but we may notice the reply to the question "What about the Roman Catholics?" Dr. Martineau says:—

"I have no wish to exclude them, if they could be satisfied with the unmolested exercise of their own worship, and with the enjoyment by others of equal rights of faith and thought and conscience. But by failure of this condition they put themselves out of question, as every sacerdotal body must, by the very nature of its pretensions. The exclusive commissioners of supernatural grace want obedience, not fellowship; and can enter into no federal sympathy with disciples too clear-minded to admit the claim in others and too humble to appropriate it to themselves. Did I suppose the Anglican Church delivered over to this theory, I could not appeal to her to open her relenting arms and make peace with those whom in a season of passion and of pride she drove forth from her. Believing better things of her I have thought that she would now own as fellow-workers the numerous bodies, partly, like the Wesleyans, springing from herself, partly of Puritan descent, which have long directed half the religious life of the nation, especially if, as I should wish, she were trusted with an autonomy similar to that exercised by every voluntary body."

Some of the thoughts and feelings which pressed upon him are indicated in the following letters addressed to Mr. Bosworth Smith:—

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., Dec. 11, 1886.

Since I had the great pleasure of seeing you and exchanging ideas on matters of common interest, the course of events has more and more turned my thoughts to ecclesiastical affairs;

and though I hardly venture to reckon much on your approval of my dreams, I feel an eager desire to confer with you about them. If they are really visionary, I shall not be convinced of it by critics whose Church or Nonconformist prepossessions prevent their clear apprehension of what I mean; but must be undeceived by some one as earnest about the end and as free from prejudice about the means as I know you to be. The subject is on my conscience, and though very disturbing to my work, refuses to be shaken off. Could you indulge me with an hour's interview?

DEC. 26, 1886.

I return with many thanks the Report of the Harrow Meeting. Mr. Welldon's speech quite bears out your characterisation of him as a man of large grasp of thought and generous sympathies. If, from his interior point of view, he magnifies the ascendancy of English Episcopalianism in the future union of Christian denominations, this is just as natural as that I, from my outside position, should understate it. When the present Church of England *becomes Catholic* by renouncing the ecclesiastical Catholic tradition, moulded by persistent expulsion of minorities, she will earn and deserve her place as *prima inter pares*. But who can suppose that the expelled minorities will be charmed into her embrace by the sound of the word "Catholic" in its current excommunicating sense?

With your speech I am in hearty accord in almost every sentence. It is only when you hint the same expectation of wearing out all dissent, alienation, and indifference by simply working the existing institution faithfully on its own terms that I sorrowfully drop off and despond. My conviction on this point is the more assured because it is without any support from my personal or party feeling. Such as I am would easily be drawn into your Church by a widening that is by no means impossible. But the portion of the nation which represents the Puritan element is as hopelessly irreconcilable with "Prelacy" as ever the Covenanters were.

JAN. 9, 1887.

It will be most agreeable to me to accompany you to Mr. Welldon's on the Sunday evening. I am grateful for his friendly words, and in no way surprised at his disapproval of my Church scheme. I expect no other judgment on it at present, or till the alternatives are well to the front and forced upon the attention of a public at present free from all apprehension

of them. I can quite believe in the possibility of the present Church *liberalising* itself; but in its capability of *nationalising* itself I do not believe. And, in this respect, the liberalising process would rather hinder than help it; for when was it ever known that *popular* religion was "liberal"? I am well aware that in my earnest longing for a *National* Christian Union, I am inviting a state of things least favourable to the type of theological conviction and religious life congenial to my thought and affections.

Dr. Martineau drew up a Memorial, partly based on one prepared by Sir G. W. Cox, and containing suggestions for a vital reform; but this was set aside, on the ground that it was too long, and contained proposals which were likely to excite needless opposition; and the next important measure was the drafting of a Bill, which should throw into precise form the changes which he proposed, and which was ultimately to be issued with the sanction of the Committee. In the preparation of this he was assisted by Sir G. W. Cox, and on points of law by his friend, Mr. Justice Wills. It was naturally exposed to some technical objection on the ground that the phraseology was not that of an expert, and he always wished that it had professed what alone it was designed to be, — "an outline of instructions to a draftsman." A few extracts from his letters will show how earnestly he was bent on making the Bill as complete as possible: —

TO MR. JUSTICE WILLS.

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., Nov. 27, 1886.

DEAR MR. JUSTICE WILLS, — I hope you will find that your valuable criticisms have not been forgotten or disregarded by me; though doubtless there are endless blemishes still uncorrected. Many matters I have left undefined, lest my ignorance of Law should settle them the wrong way. It was enough for my immediate object to perceive that they *could* be settled by a competent draftsman. I learn this morning that the Committee before which I have to lay the Draft meets at 10 or 11 A. M. on Friday next, December 3d.

DEC. 3, 1886.

My thanks for your very valuable criticisms are most concisely conveyed by sending you some of their immediate results on the left-hand pages and in the interlinear corrections of the enclosed MS. If they do not cover quite all of your comments, it is because I feel the need of a little further light on some points before the way is quite clear before me; and also because, in Committee to-day, some new cross-lights were thrown upon the matters in question. You will readily judge, therefore, how precious to me is your generous offer of another interview, before the paper receives any further distribution. [Having mentioned some engagements, he proceeds:] Of these engagements, the latter is one to meet some twenty clergymen and others interested in Church Reform to discuss this matter at the house of a London Vicar. Your work, however, is work that cannot wait, and must not be hindered by mine; which as yet has no substance in it. So throw me over without scruple, if I burden you. I shall not wonder at it, however weak I may find myself, when left alone to my own foolishness.

JAN. 10, 1887.

This time my few words may be only of thanks, imposing upon you no further correspondence respecting what, I am told, is but a visionary scheme. I retain, however, a certain faith that it will be otherwise judged, when the alternatives come to the front and force upon public attention their less eligible changes. . . .

The Broad Churchmen, I find, are bent on nothing but "*liberalising*" the Church. The object of the Bill is to *nationalise* it, — a totally different thing; for when was it ever known that a *popular* religion was "*liberal*"? Unless Theology is allowed to go its own way, and shape itself to the wants and possibilities of the various grades of culture and character, in presence of a *State* neutral towards their differences while recognising their moral power, Religion can never play its part as a main element in the National Unity.

23 ROE LANE, SOUTHPORT, Jan. 18, 1887.

For greater convenience' sake I enclose by way of Postscript to my last letter, a copy of the Draft Bill as amended. To my great satisfaction, Sir George Cox, in a letter received this morning from Cannes, says: "The corrections and additions for the Draft Bill meet all my suggestions and objections. I

am prepared to act entirely with you, and give my vote in favour of every clause."

On the 8th of December, 1886, Dr. Martineau addressed a meeting of the Bedford Debating Society, which was held at University Hall, and presided over by the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke. At this meeting the question of Church Reform was under discussion, and he embraced the opportunity of setting forth his views at considerable length. These are preserved in a more permanent form in an essay on "The National Church as a Federal Union," which was published in the March number of the "Contemporary Review," 1887, and issued as a separate pamphlet about the beginning of the following September.¹ He begins by showing that the practical width of the Church of England is inconsistent with its theoretical narrowness; and hence "the necessity is urgent of relieving the facts and feeling of the actual Church of England from condemnation by her own law; for while the Acts of Uniformity remain, the work of the Church will be honeycombed by the canker of unverity and self-sophistication." When it includes such variety within its own borders, there is no reason for the exclusion of Nonconformists; but the attempt is quite hopeless to tire out their "grave and reasoned convictions," and bring them back into the Episcopal Church. Latitude for variety is a prime essential of religious unity; for a divine communication "enters finite conditions, and incurs all the liabilities of a fallible nature; shrinking with the contraction, finding room with the expansion, of the capacities it occupies." Hence, unless there is an "infallible interpreter," there is no foundation for any exclusive claim of divine authority, and the temper which this assumption betrays "has its root in intellectual illusion, and its fruit in moral arrogance." The "multi-

¹ Reprinted in *Essays*, II.

form fallibility" of a crowd does not remove the subjective character of theological judgment, and is indeed more dangerous than individual idiosyncrasy. The time was come for a truer catholicity which would find its unity, not in an exclusive uniformity, but in an inclusive variety. In explaining the legislative measure which he advocated for carrying out these principles, he refers first to certain ends, often in favour with Church reformers, at which the scheme did not aim. It did not seek to liberalise the Church of England, or widen the entrance to its ministry. It did not propose to throw preferment to benefices open to non-Episcopalians, or to confer a legal right to exchange pulpits. It did not seek to disendow the Church. It did not propose to place the Church, while still subject to the Acts of Uniformity, at the disposal of popularly elected parochial boards. But it would begin with the "disestablishment" of the Church. "A Church is not established so long as the rules of its constitution and procedure are voluntary, framed, accepted, and administered by its members under stipulated sanctions." "A Church becomes established whenever the rules of its constitution and procedure — in other words, its ecclesiastical laws — are taken up into the civil law of a State; before the judicature of which alleged violations of them are brought as *public offences*, punishable by enacted penalties." The repeal of the Act of Uniformity, therefore, would be disestablishment. The ecclesiastical courts would drop of themselves, and there would no longer be any reason for vesting presentations in the Crown or giving the Bishops a place in the House of Lords. In thus setting the Church free to develop its own life, disestablishment would be an emergence into fresher inspirations and more fruitful labour. The removal of control by a lay legislature, however, would render it necessary to have lay representation. And now comes the most remarkable part

of the scheme. "It is proposed that any Christian denomination at present counted as Dissenting shall be co-ordinated with the Episcopalian as another branch of the Church of England, on showing its hold on the English religious life by a history of one hundred years, and a magnitude of two hundred congregations, and also its adequate provision for education and character in its ministers. And it is to the bodies fulfilling these conditions that a proportionate participation is extended in the benefits of the Church endowment prior to 1662, and is left applicable to any religious purpose approved by the recipients." The confederated group of communions thus constituted would be the "Church of England" in its enlarged sense, and would have their collective representation in a "National Church Assembly." The paper concludes with an earnest plea for this new experiment, founded on the assurance that among Christian men "the blending affections are higher and more sacred than the dissevering thoughts."

A meeting was summoned to consider the Draft Bill, on Wednesday, Feb. 9, 1887. The Right Hon. Lord Justice Fry was asked to preside, the purpose of the meeting being explained in the following letter:—

TO LORD JUSTICE FRY.

35 GORDON SQUARE, LONDON, W. C., Feb. 1, 1887.

MY LORD JUSTICE, — I hardly know what it is that gives me courage, in the absence of any presentable plea for so unusual a step, to bring under your notice the enclosed Draft of a scheme for justly and peaceably solving the impending Ecclesiastical Problem. Since the evening when, under your Presidency at the Christian Conference, I was called up to say a few words about it, its two leading principles, of Disestablishment without Disendowment, and Federal Union of the several branches of our English Christendom, have been worked out into definite form, and followed into all their more testing

applications; and this paper is a summary of the results. Drawn by my inexpert hand, it has no pretension to the precision of a Parliamentary Draftsman's work, but aims only at intelligibility for the ordinary reader. It is sent as a necessary preliminary to an inquiry which the Committee responsible for it urge me to make; viz., whether it would be consistent with your Lordship's personal sympathies to preside over a small meeting (not public or reported) of their constituents, convened for its consideration on Wednesday, the 9th inst., 3 P. M. (the hour could doubtless be changed), at Willis's Rooms (one of the lesser rooms). The meeting will consist only of Memorialists who signed a paper on the subject of Church enlargement issued by Mr. Barnett and others at the beginning of last year; and as the signatures were not widely sought (chiefly among liberal clergymen and Dissenting ministers) and did not exceed one hundred and thirty, and came in from all parts of the country, the attendance cannot be large; and the occasion is so little impressive from its scale, that we are very conscious of our presumption in hoping for your acceptance of the Chair. Yet with an intense conviction of the importance of the interests at stake, and of the value of our proposals as a *via media* between disastrous extremes, we are unspeakably anxious for the supporting influence of the highest character, and the most grave and balanced judgment, to preside over us and keep us right. If any further information would be serviceable for the removal of doubts, I should be happy to place myself at disposal by a personal call wherever and whenever an interview would be most conveniently appointed.

I am, my Lord Justice,
Yours with the highest respect,
JAMES MARTINEAU.

The Lord Justice was unable, owing to other engagements, to occupy the chair, and did not, on a cursory survey, regard the scheme as one likely to succeed. In expressing his regret, Dr. Martineau wrote: "I shall be most thankful for your criticisms, when we meet, and anxious to avail myself of the suggestions which you may supply. I have no real expectation of any favourable reception to proposals on so large a scale as ours, until the still more sweeping alternative of the Liberationists is im-

mediately in view." At the meeting, which was held at Willis's Rooms, a "National Church Association" was formed for the publication of its principles and the realisation of its objects. The objects were defined as follows: "(1) To confer self-government by its own members, lay and clerical, on the present Episcopal Church, in place of statutory definition and control; (2) to retain the Ecclesiastical Endowments for spiritual uses, and remove from bodies of Puritan descent or character the long forfeiture of their share in the inheritance; (3) to create the National Church of England, by the Federal Union for common Christian ends of the several Christian bodies already organised, and thus to lead the way to a truer moral unity in the nation; (4) to promote a Bill in Parliament for carrying out the objects of the Association." A General Committee, with power to add to their number, was appointed; and subsequently a circular, signed by Mr. J. M. Macdonald as Honorary Secretary, was issued, inviting the recipients to allow their names to be added to the list of members.

In the later part of the year Sir G. W. Cox found himself constrained to withdraw from the Association. He had failed to perceive that the repeal of the Acts of Uniformity would put an end to the jurisdiction of the existing ecclesiastical courts and deprive a clergyman of the power of appeal, on points of doctrine, to the Sovereign in Council. With this change he believed that the latitude of the Church of England would disappear, and that the Broad Church party would be crushed out. Comprehension, guaranteed by the power of the State, was his ideal; and he appears somehow to have fancied that the abolition of tests would simply relieve Nonconformists, and leave Episcopalians untouched. Accordingly, if the decisions of the courts upon points of doctrine could not have their validity secured, and if provision could not be

made for appealing to the civil authority, he saw no alternative but retirement. Not only, however, was it impossible to meet his views, which would have required a new Act of Uniformity, but Dr. Martineau at least had no sympathy with his aim. In a letter to Mr. Macdonald, of Aug. 28, 1886, Dr. Martineau wrote:—

“I confess, however, that, instead of wishing to compress incompatible elements into a struggling semblance of cohesion, I most of all desire to set free the natural religious affinities to determine their own centres of spiritual crystallisation; and the use of the same creeds and Prayer-book by” High, Low, and Broad Churchmen “is to me a painful spectacle. With their real differences I can deeply sympathise; their professed agreement fills me with dismay. Till it is broken up, the day of redemption will not draw nigh. I am therefore for guaranteeing to English Episcopalians a self-government which is successfully exercised by their brethren in Ireland and in Scotland. Should it lead to secession, it will only be to throw the members into more living relations. One thing is certain: that any retention of *exceptional* relations of the Episcopalian body with the State will make *all Nonconformists* turn a deaf ear to proposals for Church Reform, and finally settle their preference for Disestablishment. The Federal scheme is the last chance; and *that*, I fear, is but a slight one.”

A report of their work, issued by the Committee on the 8th of May, 1888, states that it “has consisted mainly in preparing and distributing literature in explanation of their proposals.” They had received much “tacit approval”; but to act with due effect on the public mind they required an increase in the number of members, and an enlargement of their resources.

On Sunday evening, the 18th of November, 1888, Dr. Martineau attended a meeting at New College, Oxford, which had been promoted by Mr. P. E. Matheson, in order to explain the objects of the Association. About thirty men well known in Oxford life, including several of high distinction, were present. Referring to this afterwards, Dr. Martineau wrote to Mr. Macdonald:—

"Finding my MS. unavailing from defect of light, I betook myself to *talking* instead, and know little more of what fell from me than that it included little or nothing of what I meant to say. In taking a different line, I was influenced chiefly by your remark, that our scheme was by no means understood by the persons likely to be present.

"I was unable to hear the Master of Balliol's remarks, after the first sentence or two, and could not trust myself to comment on them. I the less regret this because the objection to which Canon Bradby attaches importance does not, however true it may be, affect me as an objection at all. If, under fair play and independent action, the Episcopal Church should become more powerful, it is entitled to do so; and I have no wish to strip it by law of its natural relative rank among religious agencies in the country. In judging of a *national* question, I do not think it right to consult my own theological preferences. This seems to me the weak side of the Broad Church liberality.

"I wish I had left more time for discussion of the hearers' criticisms. It was my hope that the evening would be chiefly devoted to the consideration of them. Yet I myself am responsible for their finding no adequate room for expression."

The Committee continued for some time to hold meetings and discuss plans; but, as the needed support was not forthcoming, the Association, though never dissolved, became inoperative, and was compelled to wait for a time, not yet arrived, when it could act with more effect upon public sentiment.

The following letters to Lady Victoria Welby relate to Dr. Martineau's proposals for reform:—

JULY 9, 1886.

It is as supporting to me as it is rare to find one who can look deeper than any defined system of doctrinal theology for the living essence of religion, and reverently own the quickening Spirit of God in the varieties of thought and new openings of affection through which men "feel after Him to find Him." Hence you will readily believe that your leaflet touches me deeply. To the very natural question which you suggest as a difficulty in applying "The Living Test" instead of the Creed test, I can offer no *complete* answer; but only one or two con-

siderations which seem to me to reduce the difficulty to insignificant dimensions. (1) In limiting the Church of England to "Christians" I do not mean to claim for them any necessary spiritual superiority to one who cannot take the disciples' place. Among my dearest friends are some who in spite of this alienation from what is very sacred to me are so near to the very type of Christian perfection that no saint, I feel assured, was ever closer to the Heart of God.

If it were a question of *personal* religious fellowship—friend with friend—I should find it, I do find it, larger and deeper with Miss Cobbe and F. W. Newman than with most of those who "profess and call themselves Christians." But a religious fellowship which is to unite a *nation* cannot break with historical conditions in order to start anew from philosophical theism. It must take up the *actual* forms of visible social religion, and while letting them continue their history, render them conscious of their common elements of Divine history, truth, and holiness. All these actual forms are Christian; and to carry the embracing circle further afield would dissolve the inner cohesion for the sake of a few individuals who, as solitary thinkers, do not greatly miss the ecclesiastical relation. To the Agnostic that relation is even *repulsive*; so that the impossibility of including him is not felt as a hardship or a wrong, but is in conformity with his own will. There remain to him the *ethical sympathies*, which can never be denied to what is noble in himself, and which he will not withhold from the faithfulness and pieties of others. (2) The word Christian has for me a *religious* meaning apart from Creed. Whoever finds his highest in the Mind and Spirit of Jesus Christ and lives in his felt relation of Sonship to God, I should call a Christian; he has the very essence of discipleship, even though he should be brought to this temper of soul indirectly without knowing its Source; just as the Christian Fathers sometimes say that certain of the Pious Heathens were "Christians before Christ." The "Living Test," therefore, of love, of trust, of holiness, is in this view that Christian test; and whenever its conditions are complied with, *there* is a "Christian" indeed, whether he knows it or not. . . .

Beyond this *minimum* of demand on belief we pass out of the limits of Religion; and those who stand outside would be the last to complain of not being provided for in the interior. Their exceptional position is a *fact*; and whether they be above or below their fellows, the social constructive institutions must address themselves to the general and enduring wants.

In leaving the impression that I would "antedate the time when Creed-tests die" I must have explained myself ill. The only tests which I propose at once to abolish are those which are prescribed by Act of Parliament. All the religious bodies which would be adopted into the National Church, as well as the Episcopalian nucleus round which they would be clustered, would be left to perfect freedom of self-government as Voluntary societies within the Church.

And it would be open to each one of them to retain or remit any existing test, or to impose any that might be held needful for their interior religious life. They are asked to co-exist with each other, no longer as rivals competing for the sole or "greatest place in the kingdom of heaven," but in fraternal partnership, dividing among themselves the evangelisation of the land. That under these conditions their lines of separation would be softened and the Creed differences lose their contrasts I cannot doubt; but the process would be wholly natural, and no characteristic would die before its time.

JULY 24, 1886.

You cannot look with more aversion than I should on any breach of historical continuity in reforming the Church, or any dilution of the Christian life in England with un-Christly elements.

My whole object in the proposals suggested has been to restore a broken historical continuity, and to intensify the real Christian vitality of the country by concentration, and penetrate with it the multitudes that never pass beyond the outer courts.

The Episcopalian body of Christians I cannot admit to be "the historical Church of England," any more than the Independents or the Baptists or the Presbyterians are, who no less legitimately arose out of the development of Catholic Christendom in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than the Anglican type of the Reformed Religion.

They belonged to English history, and have to this day continued to make English history, just as much as the worshippers in the Parish Churches. And the Episcopalians, by excommunicating them, broke with "historical conditions," and forfeited all claim to be themselves anything more than one ascendant sect among several.

The "Act of Uniformity" was an act of schism; and ever since, we have been forced to live as two nations on one territory; slowly indeed acquiring considerable community of civil

rights, but so alienated in religious life that neither knows anything of the traditions, the heroes, the saints, the literature, or the inner social characteristics of the other. The "Puritans" have had quite as important a share as the "Prelatists" in making England what it is; and as truly belonged to the *Church of Christ in England*; and the Episcopalians owe their exclusive title to the name "Church of England" to nothing better than an arbitrary appropriation of temporalities and privilege secured at a crisis of party triumph.

It is this breach of "historical conditions" that I would fain see repaired, by replacing within the recognised limits of our national Christendom the excommunicated half of the worshipping population. The expectation that the Anglican community should ever, by leaving it alone, "expand from within," is precluded by the fact that it is stereotyped in its present form by law, and has no power of self-government or self-modification. And, on the other hand, the hope that it may, while remaining essentially what it is, draw and absorb into itself the bodies of English Christians which it has forced into separate organisation is too chimerical for the most sanguine optimist. The only way of avoiding checkmate by these alternative impossibilities is, (1) to release the Anglicans from their legal restrictions, and set them free for self-development and self-regulation, like the several voluntary bodies; (2) to recognise the legitimacy of those voluntary bodies, as having each its own *raison d'être*, and its own congenial portion of the population under its charge; (3) to gather all these co-equal self-governing bodies into a *Federal union*, empowered to confer and act together in the numerous matters of common Christian duty and enterprise, — social, moral, missionary, charitable, — which gain so much both in spirit and in range, by a wise economy of energy.

I cannot see why this "inclusion of the Denominations should accrete a vast body of fresh un-Christliness." Is the proportion of "nominal Christianity" greater among Non-conformists than among Conformists? My impression by no means confirms this fear; and I have lived much among both. Each class has its distinctive religious characteristics, deserving of all love and veneration, yet much needing, for their perfecting, to be brought within reach of each other. The constitutive idea of most Nonconformist bodies, viz., that a Church must consist only of the inwardly converted, tends to bring together the more spiritual types of character, and to keep the insincere and secular-minded at a distance.

And that "Love of God with all the *mind*" as well as "heart and soul" — on which you lay so just a stress — is certainly not less emphasised by Nonconformists than by Anglicans, and leads to a scrupulous anxiety to think only what is true and say only what is sincere before God; which can rarely, I fear, survive the ordeal of constant repetition of liturgical prayers and creeds involving, for reflective worshippers, very mixed degrees of assent and dissent.

So that I do not apprehend any prejudice to the "intellectual love of God" or the "Conscience without guile" in devotion, from the nearer approach of our Puritan England to the Anglican.

At the same time, I am far from expecting an advent of new and ideal life from any Ecclesiastical reconstruction, any severing of the tares from the wheat on the Divine field of our world.

It is beyond the power of human arrangements to pick out and import into the sanctuary only the sincere and Christlike. All that can be done is to remove hindrances to the natural affinities of wise and pious Christians, while reverencing the independence of their separate convictions. This is simply to leave the intellectual and spiritual laws of God within us to their free play, instead of preventing their operation through the circuitous artifices of our erring will. I do not forget that by drawing the line at those "who profess and call themselves Christians" we fail to include some — in this age *many* — whose purity and elevation of soul would place them among the saints of any *perfectly constituted Church*. But it is only a much humbler structure — a mere *National Church* — which we are proposing to raise; and *this* cannot be set up on any base other than the history of its own genesis and the contents of its own faith. Theism may serve the spiritual needs of the individual soul; but, to become an organic centre of social and national union, it must quit its philosophic form, and enter the human conditions and the life of time and place and personality.

The limit is a practical necessity.

We must now retrace our steps for a short distance. In 1887 an incident occurred which, though of no public importance, sheds an interesting light upon Dr. Martineau's character, and his power of adapting himself to

different audiences. The School Board of Kincardine in Strathspey gave a holiday on the 1st of July, in honour of the Queen's Jubilee. The children were hospitably entertained at a neighbouring farm. Dr. Martineau and two of his daughters were among the guests; and the veteran thinker, whose utterances sometimes taxed the powers of very clever people, spoke to the children for about twenty minutes about the Queen in such a simple and pathetic way that, in the words of one who was present, the address could "never be forgotten by old or young who listened to it"; and "as he went on, the youngest children got more and more interested, until they fixed their eyes upon him with an eager attention we have scarcely ever seen."¹

In the later part of the year he was engaged in passing through the press the second of his great philosophical works, "A Study of Religion, its Sources and Contents." In letters written on the 14th of June, when the work had been just finished, a different title is given, — "Converging Lines of Religious Truth: a Treatise on the Correlation of Reason, Conscience, and Faith." The present title was chosen before the end of September. The preface is dated Oct. 24, 1887; and the two goodly volumes, issued from the Clarendon Press about the beginning of the following year, bear the date 1888. The contents of this important work must be noticed in another connection; but a few lines, indicating the spirit in which he wrote, may be cited here from a letter to his cousin, Miss Rankin: —

He speaks of it as "a product, alas! far too Academic (like its predecessor) for my wish; yet not, I hope, inaccessible

¹ From an account printed at the time. The extract which I have followed does not contain the name of the newspaper. — J. D.

to the multitude of modern readers who have become familiar with the border-lands of thought between philosophical and religious problems. Among the host of Manuals that smooth the way for learners, there is perhaps a little room still for books that enter rather into the difficulties which weaken and disturb the teacher. Ere long, dear Isabella, you and I will 'know even as we are known'; and if then we could but speak to those we have left behind, we might spare our poor testimony now. But, as it is, even the faint touch of Divine light which reaches us in our penumbra here appeals to us to forecast and interpret, as best we may, the full orb as seen where 'there is no darkness at all.'"

On the 12th of February, 1888, he wrote a short letter to the "Modern Church," explaining his denominational position. This was called forth by the misrepresentations of someone, who was moved by that curious disregard of truth or inability to understand others, which affects some people who think themselves religious, and bridle not their tongue. He says it is not true that he has in any respect changed his religious affinities or withdrawn from any denomination to which he once belonged. The word "Unitarian" is not an ecclesiastical, but a theological term, like Monophysite or Monothelite. He concludes in these words: "It is therefore no new thing for me to say that I know nothing here in England of any 'Unitarian Church'; and that, if there were such a thing, I could not belong to it. Orthodoxy, as a condition of fellowship in the Christian life and worship, is equally repulsive to me, whether it be *my doxy* or *your doxy*."

On his eighty-third birthday he received an Address expressive of reverence and affection, followed by a series of signatures which is probably quite unique. The Address was at first prepared by Professor Knight, and subsequently revised by the late Master of Balliol. This tribute of respect came "from the most opposite quarters

in the literary, scientific, political, and religious world,"¹ and could not fail to be as gratifying as it was unexpected. Only the first few names are here appended, with some references to the remainder, the whole list having recently been given to the public by Professor Knight, in his little volume called "Inter Amicos."

TO JAMES MARTINEAU, D.D., LL.D.

We desire to express to you on your eighty-third birthday the feelings of reverence and affection which are entertained towards you, not only by your own Communion, but by members of other Christian Churches who are acquainted with your character and writings.

We thank you for the help which you have given to those who seek to combine the love of truth with the Christian life; we recognise the great services which you have rendered to the study of Philosophy and Religion; and we congratulate you on having completed recently two great and important works, at an age when most men, if their days are prolonged, find it necessary to rest from their labours.

You have taught your generation that, both in politics and religion, there are truths above party, independent of contemporary opinion, and which cannot be overthrown, for their foundations are in the heart of man; you have shown that there may be an inward unity transcending the divisions of the Christian world, and that the charity and sympathy of Christians are not to be limited to those who bear the name of Christ; you have sought to harmonise the laws of the spiritual with those of the natural world, and to give to each their due place in human life; you have preached a Christianity of the spirit, and not of the letter, which is inseparable from morality; you have spoken to us of a hope beyond this world; you have given rest to the minds of many.

We admire the simple record of a long life passed in the strenuous fulfilment of duty, in preaching, in teaching the young of both sexes, in writing books of permanent value, a life which has never been distracted by controversy, and in which personal interest and ambitions have never been allowed to have a place.

In addressing you we are reminded of the words of Scripture, "His eye was not dim, nor his natural force abated,"

¹ From Professor Knight's "Prefatory Note."

and we wish you yet a few more years both of energetic thought and work, and of honoured rest.

TENNYSON.

ROBERT BROWNING.

B. JOWETT, Balliol College, Oxford.

G. G. BRADLEY, Dean of Westminster.

DR. E. ZELLER, Prof. Phil., Berlin.

F. MAX MÜLLER.

J. R. LOWELL.

J. R. SEELEY.

W. E. H. LECKY.

EDWIN ARNOLD.

FRANCIS WILLIAM NEWMAN.

THEODORE MARTIN.

LADY MARTIN.

ANNA SWANWICK.

ELGIN.

J. H. STIRLING.

LEWIS MORRIS.

ANDREW CLARK, Bart.

E. RENAN.

STOPFORD A. BROOKE.

LEONARD COURTNEY, M.P.

RODEN NOEL.

JOHN LUBBOCK, Bart., M.P.

These are followed by the names of Professors and other eminent men in the Universities of St. Andrews, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen, Jena, Berlin, Leipzig, Groningen, Heidelberg, Amsterdam, Leiden, Dublin, Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Johns Hopkins; in several colleges and schools, both British and foreign; and numbers of others, both men and women, belonging to various denominations and of more or less distinction in various walks of life. There are altogether six hundred and fifty names.

DR. MARTINEAU'S REPLY.

35 GORDON SQUARE, LONDON, W. C.

MY DEAR PROFESSOR KNIGHT, — You will not wonder that the Address which you sent to me on the 21st ult. has over-

whelmed me and put me to silence for some days, rendering as it does my eighty-third birthday the most memorable of my life. But I must not longer wait for what can never come,—the power of fitly expressing the wondering gratitude with which I read, in its paragraphs and signatures, assurances of respect and affection impressive from their number and priceless from their source. To be held of any account by the *élite* of those to whom I have habitually looked up, including representatives from the foremost ranks of literature, science, philosophy, religion, and personal character, is an honour simply mysterious to me. “Ea est profecto jucunda laus, quæ ab iis proficiscitur, qui ipsi in laude vixerunt.” To such an escort down the declining path of life, what can an old man do but throw out a few faltering words of thanks, and love, and reverence?

The studies and duties of my life have centred upon subjects which at once draw men into closest union, and part them in widest severance, and so render the due combination of intensity with catholicity of affection one of the rarest of human excellencies. All the more striking is the abounding evidence of its presence in the list of names attached to your Address,—names not only supplied from variously contrasted schools of thought and faith, but even sent in by the very authors whom I have had occasion to criticise and controvert. Deeply as I am touched by this as a trait of personal generosity, I honour it no less as an insight into the philosopher’s secret,—that, often, differing conceptions, if in one direction opening into divergencies of opinion, converge in the other and close upon the truth.

To those who, though unable to subscribe to every clause in the Address, have yet signified their wish to be associated with its general purport of sympathy and congratulation, I cannot refrain from tendering my cordial acknowledgments, not only for what they express, but for the solid guarantee for its serious meaning and sincerity in what they withheld. Such residue of approval as, in hearts thus scrupulously honourable, can still be spared to me, is all the more precious from its fidelity to truth.

Among the signatures from foreign lands are some names dear to me as those of former pupils, now occupying posts of honourable service, whether for Church or University, in the East of Europe. But I also see the autographs of many distinguished scholars and philosophers whom I have long regarded with the homage due to intellectual benefactors. In

several instances the appearance of their names is the more grateful to me because, as I know it does not imply philosophical agreement, it can only mean that, in what they have seen of my writings, they find something to approve in the matter or the spirit of the discussions. To no ampler encouragement do I aspire than such witness from such men.

As I cast my eye on this Address and place myself in presence of those who bring it, I feel how strangely it inverts my real relation to them. "Who are these," I ask myself, "that speak to me of 'services rendered to the study of philosophy and religion'?" Why, here are the very men in whom is centred the genius of their time and who have educated us all,—poets, artists, great thinkers, and prophetic spirits,—without whom what I admire and think and believe and love would never have found its present life in me. If ever words of mine have struck upon the hearts of others, they are but the reverberated tones of these master-voices that now generously render to me what they should rather reclaim as their own.

I am happy, dear friend, to intrust to you this inadequate message and grateful homage; and only wish that I could worthily supplement it by the separate acknowledgments due to your personal direction of this memorable presentation.

I remain, always,

Faithfully and affectionately yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

MAY 8, 1883.

He was at this time busily occupied with an endeavour to organise the old English Presbyterian congregations, in such a way as at once to emphasise their catholic principle and to secure for them that corporate strength which was needed for the maintenance of the weaker societies. He was deeply impressed by the inefficiency of the congregational system, which tended to foster in the large towns a selfish indifference to wider than local interests, and allowed rural congregations to languish in the discouragement and feebleness of isolation and poverty. On the 8th of June, 1887, he wrote a letter on this subject to the Rev. Lawrence Scott, which was read at the Annual

Meeting of the Provincial Assembly, held this year at Denton, near Manchester. He pointed out the fact that "no branch of the Christian Church ecclesiastically unorganised has ever turned to account the scattered resources of character or met the inconspicuous needs of thirsting souls that are no less present in sparse than in concentrated populations. Whether its financial system is legally instituted or voluntary, it is indispensable to provide for diverting the overflow of wealth at the great centres to the nurture of village religion." This had been done among the Presbyterians by recognised methods universally obligatory; and he and Mr. Tayler had endeavoured fruitlessly, some forty years before, to commend this system to their friends in Lancashire. The want was now widely felt; but the British and Foreign Unitarian Association stood in the way; for, being doctrinal in its constitution, it could not be ecclesiastically recognised, and nevertheless it preoccupied the ground required for a fitter organisation. He thought that, if it could be dissolved, as no longer needed, they could organise themselves on simply Christian principles, and have a common fund, and a corporate life; and thus they might raise the smaller livings to something like £250 per annum. "One would like to see village service, among a people simple, poor, and few, as welcome to a Christian pastor as the charge of a large flock in a busy town. And to the best men it might well be so, were it not for the deterring privations involved in country ministerial positions." The letter concludes with these words: "The deeper remedies to which I have referred are probably beyond hope; though if I were beginning active life instead of ending it, I am not sure that my conscience would let me refrain from an attempt to realise them." This letter excited so much interest that he was invited to contribute a paper on organisation to the next meeting of the "National Conference

of Free Christian Churches.”¹ On the 11th of September he accepted the invitation, stating at the same time that he would hardly be satisfied without being present in person to secure, by reply to questions, a clear understanding of any proposals which he might make. If, however, he should be unable to attend, he would gladly do his best to make his meaning clear in a written communication. The feelings and intentions with which he looked forward to the public exposition of his scheme are indicated in the following letters to the Rev. J. H. Thom and the Rev. S. A. Steinthal:—

TO REV. J. H. THOM.

DEC. 23, 1887.

It was a rash act in me to accept the proposal of the Conference Committee. The only way to minimise its mischief is to avoid reading any anticipatory criticisms, so as to work out—when the time comes—such ideas as I bring into distinct form, with a fresh and wholly unpolemical mind. I am not blind to the necessity, which you rightly point out, of some mode of determining both the Ministers and the Congregations qualified for inclusion in the plan; and this necessity will be the rock on which we shall split. The binding religious fellowship which keeps personal wishes within bounds has died out amongst us. Congregational isolation in the collective body, and individual isolation in each particular church, has become so habitual that I have little hope of any effective response to the appeal for corporate action, however guarded against encroachment on the rights of private thought and will. I shall not attempt to give definiteness to the few floating preconceptions I have on this matter till the time comes near; else they will altogether preoccupy me, and keep me from better work.

FEB. 27, 1888.

In looking forward to our meeting at Leeds, I am continually wishing that you were within reach, to counsel me and comfort me in my misgivings about the paper which I have

¹ The Conference was referred to in these words at the time; but it has, officially, a very cumbrous name.

promised. The task, I fear, requires more faith in our religious future than I can honestly profess to feel. The doubt will force itself upon me *whether we are worth organising*. The only *practical* issue of the discussion can be the appointment of a Committee to deliberate on such proposals as the meeting may elicit, and report. But the prior question is still difficult, — what *range* the suggestions of the paper should take; whether it should be measured by the apparently practicable under actual prepossessions and tendencies, or by the ideally desirable, if the prerequisite state of mind could be induced in our people. I dare not go into the subject till the time draws near; for when once it has got hold of me, I can attend to nothing else. I am such a poor creature that each interest wants the whole of me.

TO REV. S. A. STEINTHAL.

FEB. 13, 1888.

Agreeing in haste to the proposal of the Conference Committee, I have repented at leisure; and the consternation with which I look at my undertaking as the time approaches is greatly increased by your request. Hoping to be personally present at Leeds, I had by no means made up my mind to *write* beforehand what I had decided it best to say. Supposing the Conference to be an assembly, not for the advocacy of stereotyped proposals, but for *bonâ fide* consultation on open questions largely depending for their true answer on what is possible in the actual temper of men, I had not intended to determine the precise range of my suggestions till the spirit of the meeting gave me some measure of their practicability. Under these conditions my duty would resolve itself into the moving of a Resolution, referring certain subjects involving fresh organisation to the consideration of a special Committee for future report. My wish to be present was mainly due to the need I felt of such freedom of judgment according to the aspect of facts as I found them. Even if obliged, from any cause, to commit my ideas to writing, I should feel seriously hampered by a pledge to set them up in type before the meeting. I have yet to think out the whole subject, and cannot throw myself into it till pretty far into next month. And under the grievous and depressing doubts which haunt me, whether we are worth organising and have any religious future to provide for, I cannot foresee whether I shall have anything to say, unless in favour of some orderly

provision of financial help to needy and meritorious congregations. I will not lose sight, however, of your request; and if, as the time approaches, I can see my way to some form of compliance with it, I will do my best to minimise your difficulty.

MARCH 28, 1888.

The only thing made clear to me by the lapse of time since our last correspondence is, that I certainly cannot place a MS. paper in a printer's hand before the Leeds meeting. If I throw what I have to say at all into written composition (which is not my practice on such occasions), it will be in shorthand, for I cannot compose in longhand; and there will not be time for the copying process in addition to the writing. But I cannot think that the few days necessary for the transcription after the meeting, and the printer's work on the "copy," can be of the slightest consequence. If I do not read a written paper the correction of a reported speech into a readable form will no doubt be—in the case of so awkward a speaker—a task too troublesome to be very rapidly accomplished. But even this would not, I think, hold you back from publication as prompt as even impatient people could expect. I am, in truth, almost buried alive in correspondence consequent on my recent book, and in proof-sheets of a crown 8vo edition of it for the American market; and by irreducible preoccupations am driven, flat and weary, into a small corner left for my preparation.

In substance, however, I know pretty much what I would be at, and I have little doubt that I shall be able to give Mr. Rawson in good time a summary of the principal positions which I propose to maintain, and of the chief reasons which induce me to value them.

The essential features of his plan may be given, with sufficient fulness for the present purpose, in his own words. Mr. Harry Rawson, of Manchester, had been invited to open the discussion; and in order that he might not have to speak without adequate deliberation, Dr. Martineau sent him, on the 6th of April, a summary of his intended speech:—

TO MR. HARRY RAWSON.

APRIL 6, 1888.

I was delighted to hear that you had undertaken to open the discussion on the subject of my promised suggestions at the approaching Conference; for, if you should approve of them, your support will be invaluable; and if you dissent from them, your criticisms are sure to be helpful and point out what needs to be reconsidered. In compliance with Mr. Steinthal's request, I will give you, as far as I can in brief, some preconception of what I propose to say.

The whole exposition turns on the point raised in my letter to Mr. Lawrence Scott, viz., whether our *Congregational* principle — of treating each congregation as a self-sufficing whole — works well. In maintaining the negative, I begin with the *Financial inequalities* involved in it, with the palliatives devised for mitigating them. In answer to the supposed question how I would remedy them, I sketch a plan, taken, with necessary modifications, from the Sustentation Fund of the Free Kirk of Scotland, and work out the statistics in detail; the result being to secure to every minister alike a *Church stipend*, from Headquarters, of £150 a year. This may be more, or less, than the members of his congregation have contributed to the Fund. In the latter case, the minister will receive, no doubt, a *Congregational Supplement* from the same sources as at present. The mode in which the present Augmentation Trusts may be brought into concurrent action with the Fund, without prejudice to their perfect independence, will be shown. Provision is made for a considerable surplus, after paying the equal dividend, out of which the stations too small for a settled minister may be opened and helped into larger life.

In vesting a *right* in a class of men to a certain status with a stipend of £150, it becomes necessary to define *the conditions of the claim* and guard against the entry of the wrong persons. By some easy modifications of our present methods, I point out how this may be done, so far as regards the men whose training passes under our cognisance. The more difficult task of *sifting* the men who come to us as professed converts, or otherwise from the outside, it is not possible to accomplish except by recourse to a responsible body, of ministers and laymen mixed, capable of *testing* applicants, precisely as the examining bodies test candidates for the exercise of the medical and legal professions. I describe the consti-

tution of such a body, and estimate the number required, for this and other functions, for our needs in Great Britain. These bodies are essentially *Presbyteries*, only consisting of twice as many laymen as ministers, the members being elected, with the minister *ex officio*, by the congregations in the area. Most of our present Ministers' Meetings, in different parts of the country, are, in fact, the wrecks of old Presbyteries that had to perish and disappear during the twenty-seven years between the Act of Uniformity and that of Toleration. Out of that chasm they could not be fetched up and reconstructed. A congregation here and there was all that could be got together; and so our fathers were driven, without choice, upon the congregational system, which was never congenial to them.

Though I admire the Presbyterian order as the true extension to the Church of the modern Representative system of free States, I do not wish to see its *Synods* or local combinations of Presbyteries reproduced. But the Central Body, whose Treasurer and Standing Committee keep the accounts of the collective Fund, must be composed of Representatives from the several Presbyteries direct, and annually meet as a General Assembly; to which shall be presented Reports, and Statistics on all the important elements of religious life and action, and at which proposals for new methods shall be discussed.

This is but a crude outline; but may supply perhaps some suggestions for giving right direction to the deliberations of the Conference.

The "National Conference" met at Leeds; and on Wednesday, the 25th of April, "our great leader," as he was fondly called by men who seldom followed him, addressed a vast audience in the Town Hall for an hour and fifty minutes, explaining every point with the utmost lucidity and completeness. He followed the line of exposition laid down in the foregoing letter; and only a few additions need be made. The qualifications for the admission of a man on the ministerial roll and the receipt by him of income from the pastorate fund should be, in addition to satisfactory evidence of character and gifts, fitting him for the life of the ministry, a Degree in Arts

taken at some University of the United Kingdom, and a theological training, certified as complete by the signature of the Philosophical and Theological Faculty. The question of a name for the united body of congregations had often been a matter of controversy, and the Conference had tried to solve the difficulty by adopting a poly-nomous description. "What common feeling, then," asked the speaker, "impels us to *unify ourselves*, not only with each other to-day, but with the founders of our history,—the Heywoods, the Calamys, the Howes, the Oldfields, the Henrys, the Fairfaxes, the Taylors, the Worthingtons, of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? To look at the circular convening us to this meeting, we might well despair of striking any unison from the chords of so many instruments,—Unitarian, Liberal Christian, Free Christian, Presbyterian, Non-subscribing (and *nondescript*), and kindred congregations. Entering this hall, therefore, under *six banners*, can we hope to march out under *one*?" The name which he proposed was "English Presbyterian,"—"Presbyterian," as expressing the resumption of their ancient constitution; "English," as marking that branch of the Presbyterian Church which adopted, after the restoration of the monarchy, the principle of doctrinal freedom and development. The distinction thus indicated was, he said, "*unique* in its magnitude. No particular varieties of rite or doctrine emerging from development can be in such absolute contrast as the two propositions, 'All differentiating development is the road to ruin,' and 'All the Christian theologies may be found on the paths of salvation.'" But then what of the name "Unitarian"? It remained, like Arminian or Arian, as the expression of a personal belief, which could not be allowed to touch the catholic basis of religious association. "If anyone, being a Unitarian, shrinks, on fitting occasion, from plainly

calling himself so, he is a sneak and a coward. If, being of our catholic communion, he calls his chapel or its congregation Unitarian, he is a traitor to his spiritual ancestry, and a deserter to the camp of its persecutors." The older and larger principle had been lost sight of and overpowered, because the leaders of the Unitarian movement had all been trained in communions of dogmatic basis, and taught to classify churches by their creeds and confessions of faith; and ever since there had been a perpetual influx of seceders from orthodox churches, who brought with them only corrected opinions without more catholic habits of thought. These "foreign influences availed to introduce at last the inconsistent practice of attaching doctrinal names to societies which had hitherto rigorously avoided them."

It was impossible for a scheme involving so many details to receive adequate discussion in a large and miscellaneous assembly. Mr. Harry Rawson followed Dr. Martineau with a speech which, while sympathetic towards the end in view, was mainly critical of the suggested means, and pointed out the many agencies already existing which secured, at least partially, the desired results. The discussion was then adjourned to the next day, when, after further criticisms and discussions had been offered from different points of view, a resolution was adopted "that a Committee be appointed to take into consideration the subject of the Organisation of our Churches and, after submitting the proposals made in such ways as they may think expedient to our Churches and various religious Associations, be instructed to call a Special Meeting of Representatives of all our bodies throughout the country to receive their Report." The further history of the movement thus initiated hardly belongs to Dr. Martineau's biography; for though his great speech gave an impulse towards closer union and greater mutual helpful-

ness among the congregations in which he was interested, they rejected the essential features of his scheme, — the pastorate fund, the requirement of a highly educated ministry, and the adoption of a corporate name which should express their permanent catholic principle rather than the present phase of their theology. His views, however, on some points may be presented a little more fully in extracts from his letters: —

TO REV. E. S. ANTHONY.

MAY 11, 1888.

The pressure of correspondence induced by the Leeds Conference has delayed my word of thanks for your very acceptable letter of the 3d inst. It is particularly gratifying to me to know that you can give approval to the proposals which I have ventured to offer for consideration; because I am aware that your prepossessions were (as my own had once been) rather the other way. The more I have studied our Nonconformist history, the more clearly I have seen that the shifting of the centre of gravity, during the last hundred years, from the *Catholic* principle to the *Unitarian* has been a *reactionary movement*, simply substituting a *new Orthodoxy* for an old one; and we owe this relapse to the ascendant influence of able and excellent leaders, such as Lindsey, Priestley, Wakefield, Belsham, *imported from Orthodox Churches* and bringing with them their habit of regarding every new theology as a Church schism, requiring a new sect. Obligated as they were to leave their *creedal* Church when they no longer believed its creed, they naturally supposed, on joining their fellow-believers, that they transferred themselves to a different *creedal* Church, and went to work to define its better moulds of doctrine and say: "See here, this is what we unite upon." They did not observe that the very people they joined had insensibly passed through the whole distance between their old and their present theology, without any breach of the communion of worship or disturbance to the continuity of their history. There is no doubt some difficulty in resuming the name "English Presbyterian" after having allowed it to fall into disuse. But every suggested alternative is attended, I think, with more serious difficulty. And it would be absurd to take up the *Presbyterian Organisation*, and yet decline to call it

by its name. I am not afraid of occasional mistakes between ourselves and the "Presbyterian Church in England." They will do no harm either to us or to the people who make them, beyond a hearing of the wrong sermon now and then;—an experience through which the thing will soon right itself. In Scotland I count up eight Church Bodies, all calling themselves "Presbyterian"; with unintelligible epithets of distinction; and they manage to co-exist comfortably enough. Moreover, we are in prior possession of the name "English Presbyterian"; we have never relinquished its rights, but have, in virtue of it, exercised the privilege of access to the Throne on every occasion of public or Royal interest through the last two centuries. There was an attempt last year, on the part of the "Presbyterian Church in England," to oust us from it and to get into our place; but it was defeated through Dr. Sadler's explanation of the historical facts to the Lord Chamberlain and production of Minutes of the Body of "English Presbyterian Ministers of London and Westminster and the Neighbourhood." The links, therefore, have never been broken, and we are entitled and, as I think, bound to take them up and secure them. I have had letters or messages from Orthodox Congregationalists and Baptists since the Leeds meeting, thanking me for exposing the weakness and failure of the Congregational system, and saying that it is high time to relinquish it for a modified Presbyterianism. This is a striking fact, for which I was not prepared.

TO REV. J. H. THOM.

JUNE 23, 1888.

The difficulty which you fear (and to which I was by no means blind) in the Organisation Scheme, viz., of bringing under one category (however designated) the Unitarian and the Catholic-minded congregations, has already arisen; the Secretaries . . . being bent on receiving into our catholic communion all congregations indiscriminately which may be willing to enter, even those whose own fellowship and constitution are exclusively Unitarian. If this were proposed as a provisional indulgence to societies approving of a broader basis and hoping to find a way of escape from their restrictions, I should be quite inclined to put up with the transitional inconsistency. But the intention avowedly is to incorporate those who *prefer* the exclusive fellowship in the Church Union which *condemns* it. Because I cannot thus play fast and loose

with a catholic principle, I am charged with being myself "exclusive." Dr. Aspland indeed evidently feels and admits the theoretical inconsistency, and urges acquiescence in it only on the ground of practical necessity. I am in correspondence with him on the subject; and it remains to be seen whether we can hit upon any *via media* before our next Committee meeting on Friday. On the matter of *Name*, I am quite ready to acquiesce in *any* which (like "Free Christian") is compatible with the catholic principle; though preferring, not only historically but ecclesiastically, one which carries the Presbyterian idea. I have letters, from the Secretary of the "Presbyterian Church in England," heartily approving of the proposals contained in the Leeds Address, and expressing an earnest hope that they may be carried into effect; at the same time distinctly admitting that Presbyterianism is equally applicable to an open Church and to a Church with a doctrinal code. The Secretary who writes thus is a *Minister*; and he furnishes me with valuable papers, including the Minutes of his Church. I have had also a letter from an influential Congregationalist Minister, saying that the working of the congregational system has been so disastrous to the smaller societies among both Independents and Baptists, that a substitution of a Presbyterian organisation has become imperatively necessary.

JULY 17, 1888.

Two days ago I received from Professor Bonet-Maury a letter full of delight at a proposal which, he says, is precisely what the Liberal Protestants need in France, more urgently than we do here.

SEPT. 17, 1888.

I will not identify myself with any *schism*, in order to carry the scheme into operation. But neither, on the other hand, can I have anything to do with an organisation stripped of its catholicity in order to secure for it the energies of dogmatic narrowness. I prefer our present weakness and inevitable decay to any change which shall consolidate and strengthen precisely the wrong elements in us. On the question of *Name*, I am quite flexible, provided there be no theological particularism in its meaning. I do not regard the word *Presbyterian* as failing in this condition. . . . If my preference is set aside, "Free Christian" seems the only tolerable substitute. The *swagger* implied in the epithet *Free* is, however, distasteful to me. And I dislike *new phrases* except

for *new things*; and the catholicity we require is but a return to what we have lost.¹

Amid these exciting engagements some of his time "was idly spent in sitting to Mr. Emsley."² The portrait by this artist has been much admired, and photographic and other reproductions of it are well known.

The 20th of June was a memorable day. He was at last to obtain academical recognition from his own countrymen, and to receive the degree of D.C.L. *Honoris Causa*. It was the day of the Encœnia or Commemoration in the University of Oxford. The great assembly in the Sheldonian Theatre was presided over by Dr. Belamy, the Vice-Chancellor. Along with Dr. Martineau, the Marquis of Lansdowne, Lord Brassey, Sir James Hannen, Ruggiero Bonghi, and W. E. H. Lecky were recipients of degrees. Professor Bryce, who presented them, and described their several merits in Latin speeches, referred to Dr. Martineau as one whom Oxford would gladly have had as an *alumnus*, and who had spent a long

¹ Reference may be made here to a very clear statement of Dr. Martineau's views contained in a letter, of Jan. 13, 1894, addressed to Dr. Joseph Henry Allen, of Harvard University, and printed at the end of that writer's "Historical Sketch of the Unitarian Movement since the Reformation." A few sentences may be quoted: "This relegation of systematic theology to the *Schools*, and concentration of the *Church* on the Christian graces and life of holiness possible under all theories alike, was the characteristic principle of fellowship in our churches here for more than a century before your opening date [1778]; during the whole of which Unitarians and Trinitarians found it possible to worship together." Farther on he speaks of his "lifelong refusal ever to join, as member or minister, a *Unitarian Church*. A *Unitarian Society*, of individuals interested in vindicating the theological opinions held by them in common, I approve and gladly support, so long as it limits itself to the exposition of opinion, and refrains from all ecclesiastical function or pretension to represent churches. Harmony in the moral and effectual relations of the human spirit and the Divine (and *this* it is the object of a *church* to secure) is possible to all degrees of intelligence and all stages of culture, and ought never to be represented as conditional on finally true opinion. But this is no hindrance to an educational zeal for helping forward, by other agencies, the growth of larger thought and clearer insight."

² From a letter of May 1, 1888.

life, full of dignity, sweetness, and distinguished literary activity. The venerable thinker, whose theology was so strongly opposed to the established creed, was enthusiastically received, — a sign, not that Oxford was adopting his particular views, but that it was learning to recognise a deeper worth than conformity to current modes of thought. It is also true that some, perhaps many, felt that they owed him a spiritual debt, and, in a time of doubt, had found in his writings a fresh basis for religious faith. He thus refers to the event in a letter to Mr. Thom: —

“My visit . . . to Balliol was highly interesting; the other guests in the house being the Marquess of Lansdowne and wife, Browning, and Professor and Mrs. Sellar of Edinburgh. I was sorry to miss both Max Müller and Sir H. Acland, who were away; but we saw and talked to all sorts of interesting people, besides our little group of D.C.L.s. The celebration was most gracious and splendid, with no drawback but the rain-clouds and the sodden grass. . . . A very kindly congratulation reached me yesterday from a son of our old antagonist Dr. Byrth.”

During his visit to Oxford Dr. Martineau embraced the opportunity of making inquiries respecting a subject in which he was deeply interested, and had many conversations about it with trustworthy resident graduates, with Heads of Houses, and with Dr. Fairbairn, the Principal of Mansfield College. The proposal, so long cherished by some of the best friends of Manchester New College, to remove it to Oxford, had by this time obtained the sanction of the Committee, and a decisive vote of the Trustees was to be taken before the end of June. The events which led up to this crisis may be briefly related. The opening of the ancient Universities to Dissenters naturally drew away many young laymen from London; and owing to this and other causes, the number of residents in University Hall declined, and the position

became so serious that in 1882 it was handed over to the College, which had hitherto had only a tenancy in some of its rooms. The College, having accepted the responsibility, spent a large sum of money in adapting, renovating, and furnishing the Hall, and invited Professor Henry Morley, of University College, to be its Principal. Under his popular management the Hall was soon filled, and entered on a short period of renewed prosperity. A change, however, was impending. By the beginning of 1888 Professor Morley had intimated to the Committee that he would retire from the Principalship in June, 1889; and from this time there were several vacant rooms, and the finances began to show an annual loss. Moreover, the classes in University College no longer met satisfactorily the requirements of the undergraduate students, and some of the warmest supporters of Manchester New College thought that the time had arrived when it should finally abandon its undergraduate teaching, and confine itself to post-graduate theological instruction. In this grave condition of affairs the Trustees, at their Annual Meeting in Manchester, on the 19th of January, 1888, passed the following resolution: "That the Trustees instruct the General Committee to consider the question of the future of the College, taking into their special consideration the expediency of remaining in London or otherwise, and of continuing the Internal Undergraduate Course, and to report specially to the Trustees." On the 10th of February a Sub-Committee was appointed to prepare a Report; and this Report, which recommended the removal of the College to Oxford, was adopted by the General Committee on the 31st of May. The question had now to be settled by the Trustees, among whom some of the old supporters of the College, especially in London, were strongly opposed to the recommendation of the Committee. Dr. Martineau was one of these, and his judgment

had been very carefully formed. He had refrained from finally making up his mind and thoroughly weighing the Sub-Committee's recommendations till he could gain some personal insight into the conditions of the Oxford case, and into the merits of the alternative possibilities. Only a few days before the meeting of the Trustees he wrote: "I have yet to gain some clearer idea than I now have of what may be possible in London after Morley's retirement." But he adds: "With all my veneration for the University life of Oxford, I think the London influences are far more favourable to the right growth of character in our Theological Students. For *Oxford itself*, what is wanted is, not to surround its Divinity Schools with rivals of different complexion, but to *open* them and *let them deserve their ascendancy*." ¹

The decisive meeting was held in University Hall on Thursday, the 28th of June, and lasted from eleven in the morning till a quarter past five in the afternoon. In order that the debate might be limited to the central point of interest, the Committee submitted a very brief resolution, — "That the College be removed from London and established at Oxford." This was moved by the Rev. J. E. Odgers and seconded by the Rev. P. H. Wicksteed. We are immediately concerned only with Dr. Martineau's speech, and cannot follow here the many pleas which were raised in the course of the discussion.² He began by reading a letter from Mr. William Rathbone, in which the writer lamented "the decay of the Puritan spirit and Puritan vigour," and declared that Oxford was the last place he would go to to guard against that danger. Dr. Martineau then pointed out that the only question they had to consider was whether for the post-graduate years of theological study their Divinity School would be more

¹ From a letter to Mr. Thom, June 23, 1888.

² There is a full report in a supplement to "The Inquirer," July 14, 1888.

happily placed in the city of Oxford than in London or elsewhere. With the University and its Colleges it would have no relation; and as laymen usually left Oxford when they had taken their degree, the expected association between young laymen and the post-graduate Divinity men would not be formed. These impressions had been confirmed by inquiries at Oxford. In regard to the relations of the students to the University, he pointed out the difference between the Arts and Science and the Divinity studies. "In Arts and Science," he said, "Oxford is a genuine University, catholic as the scope of Reason; in Theology it is a seminary, narrow as the articles of the Church. In the former it leads the way whithersoever the needle points to the invisible pole of truth; in the latter, moves only on the road predetermined by the spire and belfry at its end. In your joy that the University has opened her gates, you go to her and settle down at precisely the one door which is shut, and therefore have to construct outside all, and more than all, you could find in the forbidden interior." But then it was urged that the College would present a perfect model of Free Learning and Free Teaching in Theology. He would yield to no one in intense desire to free studies in Divinity from all pre-engagements for results, but was far from believing that this happy consummation could be hastened by displaying a self-conscious pattern of it. Having alluded to the presence of Mansfield College, and the probable establishment of others by different denominations, he said: "The practical question, therefore, is whether the right way of redressing the remaining exclusiveness of the University is to fasten on her this necklace of many-coloured faiths, representing only the multiformity of religious thought; or whether it were not better to wait till she sets her own School of Divinity free, and turns her sympathies towards the unity of truth, instead of her an-

tipathies to the schisms of opinion. To resort to the first method is to stereotype the fragments of a disintegrated theology and treat the hope of its unification as relinquished. To trust to the second is to concede to Oxford the lead which it is hers to take, and which will be sooner assumed the less she is made the show-place of dissentient modes of belief and worship." When the degrees in Divinity were opened to intellectual qualification and appropriate scholarship alone, they might disband their separate staff, and spare their costly halls, and trust their students for their whole culture, from the schoolroom to the pulpit, to the directing centres of national thought and life. Turning to another subject, he spoke some very solemn words about the decline in veracity of devotion, which allowed men to join daily in religious services which were not in harmony with their convictions. Finally, he alluded to the want of schools and missions in Oxford. No training would ever turn out a manly and quickening body of ministers unless it placed them within reach of such agencies, and engaged them in duties taxing to their faithfulness and kindling to their love and pity. "What prophetic strength," he asked, "what manly simplicity of faith, what hopeful enthusiasm, do you expect to gain by this exchange? For natures and types of thought cast in a different mould from ours Oxford may furnish all that can be desired. But not yet is it the true nursery for the children of the Puritans; the mountain flower transplanted to the hothouse or the southern garden-bed is not more sure to fade than would be the simple veracities and hardy vitality of devotion which it is ours to transmit, were they exposed to the enervating spiritual climate which is proposed for their development."

On a division the resolution was carried, forty-two votes being given for it, and thirty-six against. Owing to the smallness of the majority, it was suggested that a

poll of the Trustees should be taken; but no attention was paid at the time to this proposal, and the Committee was forthwith instructed to consider the best mode of carrying out the wishes of the meeting. A Special Report was accordingly prepared, containing a scheme for giving effect to the resolution; and this was circulated among the Trustees a week before their Annual Meeting in Manchester, which was held on Thursday, the 24th of January, 1889. At this meeting the President, Mr. Henry Russell Greg, proposed, on behalf of the Committee, that the scheme set forth in the Special Report should be approved, and remitted to the Committee for necessary elaboration. This was seconded by the Rev. C. C. Coe. Notice of the following amendment had been given by Dr. Martineau and eight other Trustees: "Whereas in the opinion of this meeting the Report now presented by the Committee on the subject of the removal to Oxford opens very large and serious questions both of finance and of policy, and has been in the hands of Trustees for a week only: *Resolved* — That the Resolution passed at the meeting in June last be reconsidered in conjunction with the Report of the Committee now presented at a special meeting of Trustees to be summoned at an early date at Birmingham, or some other central town." The President ruled that this amendment, as it stood, was inadmissible; and it was accordingly proposed in this altered form: "That the Special Report be referred to a special meeting of the Trustees to be held in not less than three weeks at Birmingham, or some other central place." This was moved by Mr. Frederick Nettlefold and seconded by Mr. David Martineau. Dr. Martineau supported it in a speech in which he laid stress on the unusual course of giving only a week's notice of so important a meeting, and pleaded for delay, both that the scheme might be more maturely considered, and also that the danger of embittered party feel-

ing might be avoided. He rebuked the policy of treating the June minority as a defeated enemy and the assumption that all the zeal and enthusiasm was on the Oxford side. That such a remonstrance should have been required may well excite surprise and regret, and the veteran who had spent the greater part of his long life in the service of the College, and in his eighty-fourth year had travelled nearly two hundred miles in mid-winter in order to attend the meeting, should not have been laid under the necessity of making it. His plea was answered simply by the assurance that an immediate settlement was imperative; and the amendment, on being put, was lost, twenty-six voting for it, and forty-one against. The original resolution was then carried by thirty-four to ten.

Soon after the meeting some influential Trustees sent a memorial to the Committee, requesting a poll of the entire body; and the Committee, having ascertained that precedent admitted of such a course, decided, at a meeting in London early in February, to grant the petition. Accordingly, papers were issued to three hundred and eighty Trustees. Of these, one hundred and thirty-eight voted for carrying out the resolution of the previous June; one hundred and nine voted against it; nine declared themselves neutral; and apparently one hundred and twenty-four did not vote, and so may be considered neutral. The Committee were satisfied with a majority composed of considerably less than half the Trustees; and the result was loyally accepted by those who were unable to share their views. A letter, signed by Dr. Martineau and eleven other Trustees, was sent to the Secretary, stating that they did not care to inquire whether the Committee had obtained a legal majority of the Trustees, but hastened to assure him that none of those who signed the letter had any intention of taking legal objection to the

sufficiency of such a majority to determine the locality of the College.

As Dr. Martineau took no further part in the proceedings connected with the removal to Oxford, this account may be closed by the simple statement that University Hall was sold to Dr. Williams's Trustees, and the next College Session was opened in Oxford, in temporary rooms, at 90 High Street, on Friday, the 25th of October.

At this time Mrs. Humphry Ward was desirous of founding a University Settlement on lines generally similar to those of Toynbee Hall, but distinguished from it by affording popular instruction in recent biblical criticism, and in the resulting modifications of Christian doctrine. The transference of University Hall to its new owners gave her the opportunity of carrying the plan into effect; for the north wing, not being needed for Dr. Williams's Library, was available, with a few alterations, as a residence. A lease was obtained for a sufficient number of years to test the usefulness of the enterprise. The institution afterwards acquired premises of its own, and is now known as the Passmore Edwards Settlement. Dr. Martineau took a deep interest in this foundation, and was freely consulted by Mrs. Ward, to whom he addressed several long and careful letters on the course of instruction to be followed, and on other details. Important as are the suggestions in these letters, they are probably too private and too ephemeral to interest the public at the present time.

Bereavement is a necessary accompaniment of long life, and one by one the friends of his youth were passing away. On the 20th of December, 1889, he wrote to Professor Knight: "This black-edged paper is due to our recent loss (13th inst.) of my beloved youngest sister (seven years my junior), Mrs. Alfred Higginson, at Southport. I was persuaded by a remonstrance from the younger gen-

eration not to go down to the funeral at Liverpool; and, reluctantly, I sent my son Basil instead. My sister had long been in failing health, though retaining all her thoughtful and kindly interests in life till the last reduction of vital power by weakening of the heart action." Through this death he became the last survivor of the eight brothers and sisters.

Early in 1890 his last great systematic work was published.¹ This work, entitled "The Seat of Authority in Religion," contains the fullest statement of his theological position, and is the fruit of sixty years' study of the Scriptures, of the cognate literature affecting the early Christian Church, and of modern writers holding various views on the several questions which come under discussion. It was begun as long ago as 1872, when he undertook to write a series of papers for a monthly periodical, published in America by the Rev. E. E. Hale, and called "Old and New." Fourteen of these papers had appeared, and a considerable mass of material had been collected for the remainder of the series, when in 1875 the periodical came to an end. No sooner had he got clear of his two volumes on the "Philosophy of Religion," towards the close of 1887, than, with characteristic ardour, he rushed into the studies necessary for the revision and completion of these papers. He perceived at the time that the recent New Testament literature had brought so much new light on the early growth of Christianity that a restudy of the whole subject was required;² and to this task, accordingly, the next two years were mainly devoted. It is necessary to dwell upon this point, because some of his critics assumed that he only reproduced the obsolete opinions of an earlier period, and had not made himself acquainted with the more sober estimates of a later time.

¹ A presentation copy is dated March 27. The preface is without a date.

² Stated in a letter to Mr. Thom, Dec. 23, 1887.

It is not surprising that a man of eighty-two should follow the line of progression on which he had been advancing through so protracted a period, and if that subjective element which enters inevitably into all human judgments had assumed some fixity of form; but it is surprising that a man at that age should lay himself freely open to new lights of truth, read up the most recent literature, and carefully reconsider his former conclusions before giving them in their final shape to the public. Many of his conclusions may or may not be erroneous, — he made no claim to infallibility; but this grand lesson on the sacredness of study and self-renouncing devotion to truth ought not to be forgotten. An unfortunate statement in his preface misled even so kindly and judicious a critic as Dr. Sanday. He there refers to the “striking improvement, in condensation, critical fairness, and literary form, of modern theological authorship; so that under such guidance as that of Scholten, Hatch, Pfleiderer, Holtzmann, Harnack, and Weizsäcker, even a veteran student may find it possible, with no very wide reading, to re-adjust his judgments to the altered conditions of the time.” It was assumed that these writers represented his whole stock of reading, and that he had neglected works written from a more conservative point of view. As he points out in the preface to the third edition, this was a complete misapprehension. We may perhaps assume that the writers whom he mentions were among those in whom he felt the most confidence; but he had read writers from whose conclusions he dissented, “with much warm appreciation, but without altered conviction.” Perhaps another remark should be made. In a work of this compass it was simply impossible to present, and subject to judicial estimate, the whole of the evidence affecting each controverted point; and he accordingly exhibits, with great condensation, the reasoning which determined his

own judgment; and he does this with such splendour of diction, and such apparent conclusiveness, that an undue confidence of conviction may be awakened in the mind of those who are not familiar with such discussions. One unhappy result of this method was that it was easy for captious critics to ignore the main argument of the book, and try to overthrow it by an assault on details, about which different judgments might be formed without invalidating the central thesis; and even a man of such standing as Dr. Dale could speak of his "naturally" omitting all reference to evidence which might have disturbed his conclusions. The instances selected by Dr. Dale were unfortunate because they were not omitted; and the concealment of evidence, though it may be "natural" to the vulgar controversialist, would have been most unnatural in Dr. Martineau. But the average English mind, trained in sectarianism, seems quite incapable of understanding the simple love of truth in religion. It must be mentioned, however, that Dr. Dale sent to the October number of the "Contemporary Review" a handsome apology for his oversight.

The work is divided into five books. The first, entitled "Authority Implied in Religion," is purely philosophical, and presents in succinct form convictions which are more elaborately discussed in his previous volumes. The sacred authority which alone can be called religious, in contradistinction from the authority which persons of superior information exercise upon the understanding, has its seat in the conscience, and is "necessarily objective and supernatural." Some of his critics, however, represented him as teaching that it was purely subjective and natural; and in the preface to the third edition he says: "I own that this style of criticism deeply humbles me, not by its efficiency, but by its inappositeness, showing, as it does, how absolutely I have failed to put even the best class of

readers in possession of my meaning." But the misunderstanding must surely be due, not to the obscurity of the exposition, which is perfectly lucid and explicit, but to the critic's slowness of heart to believe that anything supernatural can mingle with the ordinary life of men, and his inclination to look for God only in the miraculous and exceptional. In meditative self-knowledge "we meet, spirit to spirit, the almighty Holiness that lifts us to himself."¹ "Whether within us or without us, in the distant stellar spaces or in the self-conscious life of the tempted or aspiring mind, we are in one divine embrace, — 'God over all, blessed for ever.'"²

But while the supreme authority is revealed only to the direct intuition of conscience, the influence of others in the training of conscience is fully recognised: "This is the discipline, this the divine school, for the unfolding of our moral nature, — the appeal of character without to character within."³ "The moment we see a nobleness which is above us, we recognise it and own its claim, and are fired with possibilities we never guessed before. What does this bespeak, — this flashing of conscience from mind to mind, this consent of each to the moral life of all, this answering look of the outward and the inward, — but that the authority which claims us, whatever it be, is something far beyond the personal nature, wide as the compass of humanity, embracing us all in one moral organism, — a universal righteousness which reaches through time, and suffers no individual to escape?"⁴ But while "the affiliated multitude of *consciences*" brings the moral authority which we acknowledge to an intense focus in our minds, "their function in this matter is, not to fill the post of authority, but to join us on the steps of submission below it; to confess their fellow-feeling with us, and accept their

¹ P. 48.

² P. 75.

³ P. 54.

⁴ P. 64 *sq.*

partnership under the same law. Instead of being our masters, they are but bondsmen, with us, of a higher righteousness, which opens its oracles and seeks its organs in us all." ¹

The first book closes with a chapter on "God in History," the object of which is to distinguish two factors, the divine and the human, in all historical developments. It is shown that "our modern religion is a triple cord into which are twined, as strands once separate, the Greek, the Jewish, the German elements of thought and feeling, and which, where it is perfectly woven, combines the strength of all." But none "of the tributary fountains of civilisation can come down to us untainted, — the limpid vehicles of perfect truth. All bring with them elements both pure and impure; and it must still be the problem of our wisdom to precipitate the latter, and lead the former to nourish the roots of whatever is fair and fruit-bearing. It yet remains, therefore, for us to consider how to fling down the evil and reserve the good, and recognise whatever has divine claims upon us in our historical inheritance of religion." ²

Thus far it has been necessary to trespass on the field of philosophy, in order to make clear the object of the treatise. The passage last quoted at once suggests the subject of the following book, — "Authority Artificially Misplaced." The close intertexture "of the human and the divine in our historical inheritance of religion is by no means admitted by its chief trustees. They are possessed with the idea that they have actually got divine truth enclosed within a ring-fence, still pure and integral after all these ages, — a paradise of God, where his voice is heard, and his presence is felt, planted amid the profane wilds around." ³ Hence it is necessary to examine the claims made by Catholics on behalf of the Church, by Prot-

¹ P. 67 sq.

² P. 124 sq.

³ P. 129.

estants on behalf of the Bible. The object of this book, then, is to show that there is a large human and therefore transitory element mingled with both these alleged authorities; and the New Testament especially is brought under a severe examination, to show how much it contains that is untrustworthy, and how defective is the evidence by which the genuineness of several of the books is supported. It is in this part especially that the critic may himself be made subject to criticism; and no doubt Dr. Martineau would have been the last to deny that there were many points in which candid and qualified men might reach different conclusions from his own; and if any tender soul felt painfully that he was not "respectful" to the Bible, it should be remembered that he was not engaged in drawing forth the religious value of its contents, but in proving that it was not exempt from that human factor which mingles with the divinest agencies in our world. It may be, however, that this end could have been reached with greater certainty if he had not entered on the discussion of so many doubtful critical problems.

The next book takes up the other side of the question and speaks of "Divine Authority intermixed with human things." It begins with these words: "If neither the hierarchy nor the canon can make good a claim to dictatorial authority, it by no means follows that the sacred function ascribed to them is gone, and that nothing divine is committed to their keeping." Having alluded to some of the transient questions which agitated the first generation of Christians, and to the "painful sense of shame and mortification, of a sinking intellectual civilisation and a lost spiritual ideal," which is forced upon the mind in studying early Christian history, the writer invites us to look a little deeper. "This is the grand revolution which we find accomplished when we cross from Pagan on to Christian ground, — the transfer of life into the immediate

hand of the living and personal God; and the assumption by each individual soul of man of its own answering personality. . . . So great was the effect of this fresh power, that you had only to step from the forum to the Church to find quite a new edition of human nature, with altered ethical proportions, and a reversal of established sentiments and manners; in the young a reverence and simplicity, in the slave a dignity and quietude, in the woman a modest self-forgetfulness, in the man a frank humility, not ashamed to stoop to the smallest service or lift the voice in highest prayer; — all proclaiming that here an ideal of character and an order of affections prevailed, quite different from the fevered and festering world on which the sunshine glittered without. . . . We are not to charge the residuary corruption of a dissolving society, brought by converts into the Church, upon the community which sought to heal it. . . . I know not how anyone can appreciate these great changes without owning the presence of an intense Divine agency; or, if he owns it, can pretend that it is not everywhere — in priests and people, from the central altar to the outskirts of lay life — mixed up with the natural workings of humanity, and melted down into the indivisible forms of our weakness and our strength.”¹ It follows, then, that both Church and Bible “may provide adequate guidance to the highest truth and goodness. To reach it, however, without use of the discriminative faculties, and be carried blindfold into the eternal light, is impossible. Other than mixed materials, possibilities of true or false, of good or ill, transient or everlasting, are nowhere offered to our acceptance; and we have not simply to *take*, but always to *choose*. And the tests by which we distinguish the fictitious from the real, the wrong from the right, the unlovely from the beautiful, the profane from the sacred, are to be found within, and not without, in the methods of

¹ P. 291 *sqq.*
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just thought, the instincts of pure conscience, and the aspirations of unclouded reason. These are the living powers which constitute our affinity with God." But the discarded elements must not be hastily dismissed, as out of all relation to the Divine will. Even the illusions of men "work out results which cannot be foreign to the scheme of Providence in history"; and "when men, not simply blind to the right goal, but straying towards the wrong, are nevertheless secretly deflected into the curve of truth and beauty, and made involuntary instruments of an issue sublimer than their boldest dreams, it can only be through the controlling presence of a Reason and a Will transcendent and divine. Here, then, in the sphere of ends which, absent from human intention, yet obviously lie within the embrace of an intellectual system of the world, we have a further test, no longer intuitive, but susceptible of outward application, for discriminating the divine and human agencies in history."¹

This discussion is followed by a chapter which seeks to answer the question, "What are 'natural' and 'revealed religion'?" He proposes as a definition, — "Natural religion is that in which man finds God; Revealed religion is that in which God finds man."² The former, therefore, whether as collected by inference from external nature, or as worked out by meditation within our own, is a human elaboration which sets more or fewer steps between ourselves and God, and so is a method of *mediate* knowledge. Revelation, on the other hand, must be *immediate*, "living God with living man, Spirit present with spirit; knowing Him, indeed, but rather 'being known of Him.'" "The disclosure must be *self-disclosure*; the evidence, *self-evidence*; the apprehension, as we say, *intuitive*; something given, and not found."³ Hence flow several inferences

¹ P. 297 *sqq.*

² P. 302.
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³ P. 305.

corrective of prevalent illusions. 1. Revealed religion is strictly personal and individual, and must be born anew in every mind. 2. Nevertheless, the mediation of others is indispensable to turn the implicit feeling into explicit apprehension of the Divine reality. "The divine Seer does not convey over to you *his* revelation, but qualifies you to receive your own." 3. Physical phenomena, even if they be miracles, cannot in any form convey a revelation; "so that the mere inheritance of a reported revelation, dealing with matters which we cannot verify, would but leave us with an organism of natural religion of far more attenuated strength than that which usually goes by the name." 4. "Revelation must always open our eyes to what really *is* or *ought to be*, not to what *has happened*, *is happening*, or *will happen*." 5. We must "invert the accepted order of dependence between natural and revealed religion." Implicit Theism "stands as an initial revelation, out of which is evolved the whole organism of natural religion needed for the ulterior proof of what, under the name of historical revelation, is in fact, as a recent product, a second part, or supplementary development, of natural religion." Revealed religion, accordingly, in its transmission becomes a mixed product of the original grace and the recipient natures, and may develop, under right direction, into higher truth and purer good, or, under wrong direction, sink to lower levels of abject superstition and ignoble aims. The history of Christendom presents examples of both; and we have therefore to determine, by a survey of historical conditions, for how much of what has arisen in its train the religion of Christ himself must be deemed responsible.¹

The question thus started forms the subject of the fourth book, "Severance of Undivine Elements from Christendom." The principal instrument by which this severance is to be effected is found in a distinction, which is explained in

¹ P. 307 *sqq.*

the first chapter, between "revealed religion and apocalyptic religion." The former is due to the inspiration of a higher insight, which communicates its own light to those to whom it is addressed; the latter is a professed disclosure of eternal facts and realities which lie beyond the compass of our faculties or our opportunities, and is therefore accepted simply through confidence in the seer, and is the favourite resort of pretenders and self-deceivers. Genuine revelation, accordingly, is limited to the sphere of intuitive apprehension, *i. e.*, of moral and spiritual truth. The function of the prophet, then, is to carry the minds of men from the earlier to the maturer stage. Himself the subject of a real revelation, he is the occasion of a real revelation to others; and "the moment it is uttered it draws towards him a reverence, and invests him with an authority, due only to one who can interpret the God within us all." Here we must find the root and essence of the power of Jesus: "He established a link of communion between the human soul and God; who never before had the same confidences together, as in the highest religious life of Christendom." But the purity was soon destroyed. "Christendom, from end to end, is one gigantic example" of the substitution of apocalyptic for revealed religion. The disciples of Jesus seized on the small element that was earthly and historical in his teaching and "on this small and mistaken base there has been heaped up an immense and widening mass of Christian mythology." Under the guidance of these principles the rest of the book is devoted to a review of the chief earlier stages of this mythological growth; and theories of the person of Jesus, theories of the work of Jesus, and theories of communion with God, are explained and discussed in successive chapters. In this large section of the work many of the questions belonging to New Testament theology are treated with the author's accustomed force. We cannot here enter into details; but one very interesting view may be mentioned, which he urges

with great confidence, but in which he has hitherto found few followers, that Jesus himself not only never claimed to be the Messiah, but expressly repudiated the claim, and that the Apostles are therefore responsible for corrupting his religion at the fountain-head, in contravention of his own express authority.

One problem still remains for consideration in a fifth book, the discovery of "The Divine in the Human," the clearing away of the refracting media through which the "Light of the world" has passed into our modern Christendom, so that its true form and features may be presented to our thought. The Divine in the origin of our religion will be found in what Jesus himself was, in spiritual character and moral relation to God; the human, in what was thought about his person, functions, and office. The real figure, however, cannot be seen except through the medium of human theories and prepossessions, which have coloured the narrative in the synoptical Gospels, the source of all that can be known of the earthly life of Jesus. There are three critical rules which may help us to draw forth the objective truth:—

"1. Whenever, during or before the ministry of Jesus, any person in the narrative is made to speak in language, or refer to events, which had their origin at a later date, the report is incredible as an anachronism.

"2. Miraculous events cannot be regarded as adequately attested, in presence of natural causes accounting for belief in their occurrence.

"3. Acts and words ascribed to Jesus which plainly transcend the moral level of the narrators authenticate themselves as his; while such as are out of character with his spirit, but congruous with theirs, must be referred to inaccurate tradition."¹

The application of these rules confessedly requires "competent historical feeling," and is therefore not likely to

¹ P. 577.

command universal assent. Some, who acquiesce in the principles of criticism, may think that along with "the veil" more than one genuine element of the history has been taken away. Dr. Martineau, however, believes that by this process he has relieved the narratives "simply of the impossible," and we are left with records which "contain only what *might be true*," so that "we have still to collect the actual, before the historic image issues from the haze."¹ To accomplish this is the object of the concluding chapter, in which he gives no doubtful expression to his profound veneration for Jesus Christ. Through critical methods all that offended his moral intuitions fell away, and he saw a far grander and more heavenly figure when it was stripped of what he regarded as a mythological dress. A few quotations from this chapter may fitly close our notice of a volume which combines the freest, what many would call daring, criticism, with the most heartfelt reverence and penetrating insight.

"Scanty as our knowledge is of what" Jesus "did and said during the great majority of his days, no one can affect ignorance of what he was; enough is saved to plant his personality in a clear space, distinct from all that history, or even fiction, presents."² "It is the singleness of this *life in God* that gave its uniqueness to the personality of Jesus; referring back all his experiences to the infinitely Perfect, all his sorrows to the eternal blessedness, all his disappointments to the living Fountain of hope."³ "Where this pervades the entire consciousness, and the touch is never lost between the human spirit and the Divine, all morals resolve themselves into a personal attitude of affection towards the supremely Holy, a private interchange of secret sympathy, of mutual understanding, of open trust. . . . This one relation, realised as in Jesus, becomes the Supreme good; all other good is but its dependent reflection, whose meaning vanishes in the absence, that is, the oblivion, of its source. Harmony with God is, for the human soul, the only peace, the only right, the only fair: to see things as he sees them is truth: to rank them in

¹ P. 602.

² P. 607.

³ P. 611.

the order of his love, is goodness: to act conformably to his rules, is victory."¹ "The train of the conspicuously righteous in their several degrees are for us the real angels that pass to and fro on the ladder that reaches from earth to heaven. And if Jesus of Nazareth, in virtue of the characteristics of his spirit, holds the place of Prince of Saints, and perfects the conditions of the pure religious life, he thereby reveals the highest possibilities of the human soul and their dependence on habitual communion between man and God."²

A second and a third edition were soon required; and in the preface to the third, dated 1891, Dr, Martineau replied to some of his critics. A fourth edition appeared in 1898.

His view that Jesus never claimed to be the Messiah gave rise to a very natural mistake, which it is desirable to correct; and though it is anticipating a little, this may be the best place to insert a letter which, in reply to a question, he addressed to Mr. H. C. Badger, and which was published in an American journal.³

"Mr. Chadwick's impression that I could not rank myself with the 'disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ,' to whom appeal is made in the preamble to the constitution of your National Conference, if based on the retention of the term 'Christ,' is probably inferred from my contention ('Seat of Authority,' Book IV., Chap. ii.) that the claim to be the 'Messiah' was not made *by* Jesus during his ministry, but only *for* him after his departure from this world. The inference would be correct if I held the word 'Christ,' as now commonly understood, to be strictly equivalent, without subtraction or addition, to the word 'Messiah' on the lips of Peter or of Paul.

"The inference is incorrect, because, from the cluster of ideas which made up the connotation of the word to a contemporary Israelite, the greater part have fallen away; and even disciples who still, in using it, think of a 'Son of David,' foreannounced by Hebrew prophets, no longer invest him with the functions of terrestrial conquest, enthronement, and

¹ P. 609 *sq.*

² P. 652.

³ This letter came into my hands without a proper reference, and I have been unable to verify it. — J. D.

theocracy, around the millennial New Jerusalem, which were crowded into the image and the drama of the Messianic kingdom ere yet it was 'given up,' at 'the end,' 'to God, even the Father.'

"That Jesus was *not* this sort of personage history has made plain; nor can we save the official name by inventing for him, in the present or the future, some imaginary counterparts of these superseded functions, such as are distributed through the eschatology of many popular hymns and some received creeds.

"But when the original Jewish dreams, and the later ecclesiastical mythology which took their place, have been dropped from the connotation of the term 'Christ,' it is not emptied of *all* its meaning and cut down to a mere syllable of a proper name, serving only to distinguish one Jesus from another — *e. g.*, Jesus of Nazareth from Jesus, son of Sirach — though probably, among some nominal Christians, as among all non-Christians, it may play no other part than that of surname in some proper name. To others it is not a mere human mark, discriminating one man from others of his kind, but intimates a relation to *God* — a divine function, not predicable of others, giving him a special place in the history of religious faith and knowledge. It is not necessary for all who use it to have the same conception of the contents which that function carries. Whoever feels them to be exceptional in their truth and authority, and in his response to them is lifted into veneration and love toward the personality revealing them, will be impelled to recognise an unexhausted sacredness in the word 'Christ,' and to cherish it as the symbol of the pure life of man in God.

"Far from being repelled by the word, I could not find any adequate Church fellowship in a religious society which discarded it.

"The word in the preamble which is uncongenial to me, and which I should expect to be a stumbling-block to many, is the term 'Lord.' It has a natural place in the old Messianic theory, which retained a terrestrial seat and a kingly constitution with judicial, civil, and administrative offices in its picture of 'the world to come.' But it bears the indelible stamp of a *temporal* character and cannot enter into any true report of *spiritual relations*. The power exercised over me by the higher character, — the diviner spirit, which I revere and trust, — be it finite or be it Infinite, is not that of 'Lord' over 'servant,' but of the uplooking child to the ascending

brotherhood and the Supreme Parent of the whole family of souls. Surely it is time to lift our language into conformity with this living faith.

"I resist the temptation to say more, and ought perhaps to have refrained from exceeding in these last words the strict limits of your question."

A letter written to Miss Swanwick shortly before the publication of the work will show how the negative process of criticism was valued by him only as contributory to positive spiritual results: —

DEC. 17, 1889.

MY DEAR FRIEND, — You know how I value all impressions and judgments of yours, and will not be surprised that, on beginning your note with the prepossession of some dissent or protest on your part, and ending it with entire agreement with your every word, I drew a deep breath of relief and content. I may have spoken to you in terms too strong of the negative criticism in my book; and you do right to dwell upon the immense importance of bringing the unique personality of Jesus into prominent light. You cannot have an intenser feeling on this head than I have. In fact it overpowers me by the consciousness of my inability to convey into other minds the profound convictions of my own. You will find, however, I fully believe, that what I *mean* on this point is what you think and feel, however inadequate to my conception may be the form in which I present it.

A letter to Miss Nicholas, of Liverpool, will further indicate where the centre of his interest lay: —

DEC. 1, 1891.

I cannot receive without a word of thanks your warm recognition of such parts of my writings as fall within your home latitudes of thought and feeling. It is always with more or less regret that I pass into colder regions, and face the rugged and uninviting paths that lead through them. But in these days of dogmatic sophistry and scientific pessimism the paradise of faith lies, for many seekers, across the stony mountains; and there is work for pioneers who have had to explore them. I can only say: "Do not trouble yourself about the difficulties which you have never felt; to learn what they are and how to answer them will only replace

you where you are in your simpler trusts and vision of the right and true." The intellectual study of religious problems is needful only for defence, and not for the energy or faithfulness of the inward or outward life. To have no such need — and therefore to read only what may best feed the springs of pure and pious affection — is a blessing which many a laborious student would be thankful to enjoy. But to preserve this blessing for the many, a few of us must surrender our freedom and go into bondage of scholastic drudgery. It cannot be more pleasantly relieved than by such thanks as you address to me.

Dr. Martineau's occupation during the summer and autumn is described in his own pleasant way in the following letter to Mr. T. H. Gill, the author of so many beautiful hymns: —

THE POLCHAR, Oct. 16, 1890.

I deem it a privilege to be connected, by even the faintest association, with the delightful outpourings of your devout inspirations, still so pure, and strong, and fresh; and most heartily do I thank you for these new lines, that touch me with the sacred glow of the Eternal Fire from which they come. How inexhaustible are the contents of the ancient analogy of natural and spiritual Light, which has thrown the prayer of every age into an invocation which cries: —

"O Lord of lights! 't is Thou alone
Canst make our darkened hearts thine own!"

And which — however often explained away into "*Solar Myth*" — will never cease to declare itself, beneath the human imagery, a Divine Reality.

I congratulate you on the unabated flow of your Pierian spring as a true Vates. As becomes my greater longevity, I resign myself rather to the humbler tasks with which life naturally approaches its close. Do you ask what they are? I tell my daughter Gertrude that I am taking a lesson from her last employment of every Saturday's evening twilight. In the avenue from the public lane to my cottage her rake and broom can always be heard, gathering up and clearing away the fallen leaves, and smoothing the horse and wheel tracks from the gravel, in preparation for the restful aspect of the following day. My week's work being over, and the Sabbath drawing nigh, I am similarly betaking myself to the

mere sweeping and scraping together of such traces of the working days as I have left littering the path of my feet, and putting them to the test whether perhaps they can be put to further use as *leaf-mould* for the soil of the future. In other words, I am preparing for publication three or four volumes of scattered and inaccessible writings that have appeared in Reviews or other transient media between 1833 and 1887, and that, duly selected and classified, may seem to retain some elements of interest still. The first volume I hope to have ready by Christmas; the others to follow (and be separately procurable at 7s. 6d. each) at intervals of three or four months. They will be uniform with the small-sized edition of the "Types of Ethical Theory." This project has been often pressed upon me; it has supplied me with my chief summer's work.

The volumes alluded to in the foregoing letter were given to the public in this and the following year. The plan of selection is described in the preface to the first volume. The papers were divided into volumes according to subject, and, within each volume, disposed in the order of time; and they thus formed an autobiographical commentary on the larger systematic writings for which they had prepared the way. They were left, therefore, to speak the feeling of their day, without any attempt to correct it to the standard of the present intellectual latitude. The first volume contains Personal Sketches and Political Essays. The second is devoted to subjects ecclesiastical and historical. Though these were, for the most part, called forth by some special occasion, he did not admit anything without first satisfying himself that its mode of reasoning and rules of moral judgment were available for the determination of still pending questions. On one subject, the true principles of religious union, he speaks in the preface with a feeling of sadness and disappointment, which led him perhaps to exaggerate the extent to which his friends had ceased to sympathise with his views. The papers on this subject, he says, "express a lifelong conviction and intense aspiration, which I formerly shared with

many a friend, but which has ceased to meet with any response, beyond a little unmeaning lip-homage from those who practically contradict it. The party-spirit has penetrated even to the seats of worship. The centrifugal dread of theological error overpowers at present the centripetal forces of reverence and love. But it may not always be so. And I cannot withdraw a protest, however hopeless it may seem, against allowing the Christian Church to remain a mere cluster of rival orthodoxies disowning and repelling each other, while, in the inmost heart of all, secret affections live and pray, with eye upturned to the same Infinite Perfection, and tears let fall for the same universal sorrows." The third volume contains theological and philosophical essays. He takes the opportunity of pointing out that, though he is reproached with "destructive criticism," his difference from the authors whom he reviews consists, in every case, in his rejection of their *negative positions*, and his claim for an extension of the sphere of knowledge beyond the limits which they assign. Papers academical and religious are comprised in the fourth and final volume. The ruling purpose of the first half of the volume is to retain theology in its place as an organon of cognisable truth, and to exhibit religion as a conscious relation between the human personality and the Divine; while the second part passes from religion in its intellectual approaches to religion in its personal life and applications.

His impulse to act as teacher was still unexhausted; and he undertook to deliver a course of fourteen lectures on the synoptical Gospels, especially Luke's. These were given on Sunday afternoons in University Hall, as part of the scheme instituted by Mrs. Humphry Ward's Committee. They were intended for the half-educated class of young men and women who came up from the country as clerks and shop-assistants, and who often lost their faith and principles under London influences for want of guidance. Only

a few, however, of this class attended; and the audience consisted mainly of persons who, in Dr. Martineau's words, might well have dispensed with help from him and taught themselves, so that he did not feel conscious of having rendered the help which he designed. The lectures were begun on the 18th of January, and finished on the 3d of May. So far was he from being content, as had been alleged, with reading some obsolete criticism, and drawing from the stores of learning gathered in younger days, that even for this popular treatment he threw himself into fresh studies, and the preparation of the lectures occupied him closely during the week.¹

At the end of July, while he was still passing the Essays through the press, he had "a half-formed purpose of issuing a very small volume of prayers."² This purpose was carried into execution; and by the 17th of December he was able to present copies of "Home Prayers" to his friends. Hitherto he had shrunk from sending prayers to the press; "both as a vicarious intermeddling with the free devotion of souls unknown, and as a gratuitous exposure of a sacred confidence between the personal conscience and the Searcher of hearts." But this scruple had been gradually softened; and he was more aware than formerly "of the need of *fellowship* in the spiritual life, and less disposed to trust to its pure spontaneity."³ Here, even more than in his sermons, we hear "the tender voice" of his spirit; and these humble outpourings of his heart's devotion fitly close, in the case of such a man, the long and splendid series of his publications.

But though this little volume marked the completion of all that had been the object of a fixed purpose, he did not contemplate his withdrawal into an unemployed life. From time to time he addressed the public through the periodical

¹ From contemporary letters.

² Letter to Mr. Thom.

³ From the preface.

press. On the 2d of December a letter of his appeared in the "Daily News," "On the Christian Administration of Poor Districts."¹ This was suggested by a discussion, at the Christian Conference, on the question "How to Unite the Christian Forces of a Locality in the Promotion of its Moral and Social Improvement," which is expressed by Dr. Martineau in the words, "How to Neutralize the Effects of Theological Division by a Common Enthusiasm of Love and Duty." He suggests, as a safe first step to an ultimate answer, that "if a locality already contains an agency, which, taking no notice of Church differences, applies the power of a common Christianity, and the methods of approved experience to the succour of helplessness and the elevation of character among the classes that cannot lift themselves," the citizens who care to redeem the locality should give a hearty support to that agency, and "treat it as a prototype of the Union which is feeling its way into realisation." He then describes the Domestic Mission, which for sixty years had been carried on with an "impartial attitude towards all the types of Christian organisation," and, on the ground of this catholicity, appeals for help to "Londoners who have escaped the exclusiveness of Churches."

The following paragraph on the ethics of gambling is worthy of preservation:—

"Gambling, I suppose, has its inner source in the competitive passion, or love of superiority, with the addition, distinguishing it from chess or cricket, of the love of gain. The former is irreproachable, where both parties wish to settle their relations by a trial of skill. The latter is always mean and base, where the gain to oneself is simply loss to another. The consent of that other, no doubt, distinguishes the act from thieving; but when you remember that he would not have consented, except in the hope of making you the loser, the whole bargain assumes an ignoble character. Then

¹ It is also in "The Inquirer," Dec. 5, 1891.

in the rational estimate of consequences the practice of gambling surely has no less demerit. The moment the simple excitement of competition of skill becomes insufficient without the money stake, the taint of moral character, the contented gain at others' expense, has set in; and that the stake is 2*d.* instead of £20 makes no more moral difference than there is between a theft of 2*d.* and a theft of £20. The mischiefs, of course, increase enormously with high play. But the immorality does not wait to begin with the swollen amount, so as to be a mere question of degree. There are many cases of morals, no doubt, where the division between right and wrong lies somewhere along a line of degree, — *c. g.* in the ethics of appetite. But this is always where the primitive impulse has itself a blameless beginning and defined function, beyond which excess sets in and runs into ever deeper guilt. In gambling the initial principle — gain by another's loss — is vicious and vitiating.”¹

The chief events of 1892 are related by himself in a letter to Miss Rawlins, Jan. 3, 1893: —

As for our retrospect of 1892, about which you ask, it is overshadowed by fewer clouds than yours, though not without its passages of uncertain vision. In the spring I was prisoner to the house for ten weeks from gout, a forgotten old acquaintance of fifteen or twenty years ago. It was not so much painful as disabling, reducing me to such occupation as was compatible with a recumbent position. It released me just in time to pay a promised visit in May to the Master of Balliol at Oxford, as fellow guest in the house with the Bishop of London and wife, and Hallam Tennyson and wife. A most charming three days we had. Mary Ellen [Miss Martineau] accompanied me from Scotland in July to Dublin for the celebration of the Tercentenary of the University there. We had a most interesting week in that city of my first married home. At that time (1828-1832) no Nonconformist heretic could graduate in England, Scotland, or Ireland.²

¹ The printed copy of this letter which has been placed in my hands contains no indication of time or occasion when it was written, except that it seems to belong to the year 1891, and was composed in reply to a question addressed to him.

² This is a curious oversight. An Act of the Irish Parliament in 1793, followed by a Royal Statute of the College in 1794, opened the degrees in Dub-

Now, degrees have been conferred on me unsought, by Oxford, Edinburgh, and Dublin,—a curious illustration of the change in the temper of the times. Mary Ellen and I spent a delightful day by invitation with others from the Chancellor of the University (Lord Rosse) at his residence, Birr Castle (eighty-eight miles from Dublin on the borders of King's County and Tipperary); the chief interest, of course, being centred in the great reflecting telescope, and the workshops subservient to it, and the diagrams and calculations resulting from it. The journey, too, was to me very striking, from the evidences it afforded of Irish improvement since my former residence there. But the absolute disappearance of every individual known to me personally or by name, and the occupancy of the whole front of life there by the *grandchildren* of my contemporaries, was most impressive, and made me feel as if I had been literally transported, as a lonely relic, into a new world. A very genial world, however, it was, else the feeling would have been too pathetic. I have gone on, chattering away, about these recent things, as if I could expect you to care for them. My only excuse is, that you asked me for the story of our life, as it is. We are now all in fair health and not inactive work. For me there is little that I can further expect to do before the evening closes and the tools drop from my hands. It has no darkness from which I shrink.

The tercentenary of Dublin University, referred to in the foregoing letter, was celebrated from the 5th to the 8th of July. Dr. Martineau was the guest of the late Dr. Kidd, a leading physician in Dublin. Notwithstanding his long journey from the Polchar, he took part, with unabated vigour, in the long and fatiguing functions which are inseparable from such public celebrations. On Tuesday morning a great procession was formed, and marched, no inconsiderable distance, to St. Patrick's Cathedral. The centre of the streets was kept clear, while on each side was a vast crowd, which maintained the most perfect order, and struck the visitor as being curiously quiet and undemon-

lin University even to Roman Catholics; but neither Catholics nor Protestant Dissenters were at that time eligible to Fellowships. Dissenters resorted to the Scotch Universities also, on account of a similar openness.

strative. On Wednesday he received, in the crowded Examination-Hall, the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters, and, in the evening, attended a banquet given to more than five hundred guests. On Thursday there was a procession to Leinster Hall, where congratulatory addresses from Universities and other learned bodies were presented and acknowledged. This did not prevent him from attending the Gaiety Theatre in the evening, to see a farce which had been specially prepared for the occasion, and which was followed by "The Rivals." The visit to Birr Castle, notwithstanding the length of the journey, was paid the following day. As though these engagements were not sufficient, Dr. Martineau found time, as related in a previous chapter, to visit the Huguenot cemetery, where the body of his child had been laid more than sixty years before.

On the 24th of February, 1893, he addressed a letter to the Rev. J. L. Jones, alleging his inability to make suggestions for the programme of the International Congress of Unitarians, to be held in Chicago the following September. The following is the most important passage:—

"It may slightly indicate the nature of my disability if I confess that, Unitarian as I am, I have always sympathised with Channing's aloofness from any organisation of Unitarianism as either Church or Philosophical School. Its doctrine of the Divine nature, as opposed to the Trinitarian, appears to me wrongly chosen for the centre and designating term of an articulated system of faith and thought; being compatible and having historically been combined with Materialism and Spiritualism, with Necessity and Free Will, with Pessimism and Optimism, with the finality of death and with Immortality; all of them matters far more near to the human heart and operative in human character and life than the theory of distinctions or no distinctions in the Divine nature."

An extract from a letter on another subject to a citizen of Chicago may be fittingly inserted here:—

"A commissioner for the British Section of your World's Fair in its department of philanthropic work, and more especially women's work, the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, applied to me for information respecting English Unitarian institutions and labour under these heads. The very inquiry is a satire upon our intensely sectarian life; assuming, as it does, that all our charities are done denominationally, and that to survey them all without counting any twice over you must find an enumerator for every kind of Church and add up all the lists delivered in. I could only reply that it was the inherited and the personal habit of our people to look on the social compassions and Christian sympathies which gave birth to hospitals, schools, reformatories, rescue missions, and every form of philanthropic effort as of universal obligation, civic and human; we never thought of going apart and setting up for ourselves, as an exclusive theological party, spheres of action equally open and equally congenial to the conscience and affection of others. On the contrary, we worked with our fellow-citizens, irrespective of creed, wherever we could, and did nothing alone except where we must. The result of this catholicity necessarily is, that while our fellow-worshippers contribute probably their fair proportion of thought, labour, and revenues to the philanthropic totals of English life, we have little to show in the way of sect benevolences, and should be wrongly judged by their statistics. And so of woman's work. With small exception there is no difference between men and women in the incidents of charitable duty; and joint action in it is, in our opinion, essential to its best spirit and efficiency. On these grounds I declined to act as reporter for the Unitarian beneficences."

Dr. Martineau took a deep interest in the controversy which was raised in the London School Board by Mr. Athelstan Riley, and was anxious that some scheme should be adopted which would do justice to both sides. His views were fully expressed in a memorial addressed early in March to the Clerk of the School Board and signed by a considerable number of influential ladies and gentlemen, holding various theological opinions. This was followed by letters to the "Times" in which his suggestions were further explained and defended; and as these documents are not now easily accessible they are here reprinted in full.

To the Clerk of the London School Board.

SIR, — We, the undersigned, constituents of the London School Board, having anxiously considered the Motion¹ and Amendment,² . . . reserved on February 23 for decision after an adjourned debate, and also the Motion³ and Amendment² . . . relating to the Religious Instruction to be given by the teachers in your schools, are of opinion that the proposals contained therein are at variance with the religious liberty guaranteed to the parents, and in their operation would subject the teachers to a dogmatic test, applied by a most uncertain court. In support of our protest against them we respectfully submit the following reasons:—

The School Board education, publicly provided for families and supported by ratepayers, various in their denominations or types of personal conviction, cannot justly take sides with any, but is bound to impartial respect for the conscience of all, whether contributing citizens or parents of scholars.

This obligation was recognised in the original Act of 1870 in two ways:—

(1) By prohibiting the use, in the religious lessons, of either catechism or formula special to a particular denomination.

(2) By exempting from attendance at the religious lesson any scholars whom their parents preferred to withhold from it.

The *First* of these provisions secured the denominations having confessions of faith against the use by the school of any *one* to the disadvantage of the rest. But it was and is defective, inasmuch as (*a*) there are denominations (*e. g.*, the *Friends*) that have no confession of faith; and (*b*) there is a vast number of people, members of no denomination and frequenting no church, yet with at least sufficient faith and reverence to desire some religious training for their children. This outside multitude supplies a very large proportion of the scholars in your Board Schools. These people also have their conscience; and usually it is one on which the formulated doctrines of the churches have lost their hold, yet which still finds a thought of God in the thing that is true, and a will of God in that which is right. Its needs are not *all* met

¹ Requiring the children to be taught the doctrines of the Trinity and the Deity of Christ.

² Referring the Resolution to the School Management Committee.

³ Securing that Religious Instruction should be given only by Teachers who had received some training in the principles of Religion.

by protecting the denominations from each other. Still less are they met by

The *Second* provision, viz., the "*Conscience Clause*," which simply removes the scholar from all but the secular instruction. For the Secularist class alone is this clause an adequate protection.

This defective regard for the needs of the *undogmatic* yet still religious popular conscience has hitherto not been left without available remedy. The "Syllabus of Bible Instruction" drawn up for the guidance of teachers in the several standards makes all its Scripture selections, beyond the simply historical, from its moral and spiritual lessons, needing no doctrinal comment or supplement to carry them home to the mind and heart. The teacher was left free, either to illustrate and reinforce exactly what they said, or to interweave with them any doctrinal additions suggested by his own convictions. But his duty would be perfectly done if he recited the parable simply in the spirit of the parable, expounding the two "great commandments" as the divine conditions of "eternal life," and remained as silent about Church doctrines as are the Beatitudes. We are deeply convinced, from experience neither short nor small, that religious instruction of this latitude, coming from the heart of a teacher penetrated by it, would be in accordance with the prevailing feeling of the classes whose children fill the Board Schools.

There remain, however, the various members of orthodox communities, from the Catholic to the Salvation Army; for whom a belief in the doctrines common to their several "confessions of faith" is an essential condition of Divine acceptance. The conscience of these Christians is entitled to the same deference as that of others; and it cannot possibly consent, in its conduct of education, to have its religious essentials suppressed. Enforced silence in this case would be no less a wrong than indoctrination in the others. They have a right, because a duty, to impart their indispensable beliefs *to the children of their fellow-believers*; but upon *others* they have no right to enforce them. Their religious teaching, therefore, from its exclusive nature, cannot be in common with the other. If the School Board should carry into effect the resolutions now before it, it will be forcing upon the children of many a religious parent a religion which he disapproves, as the alternative of *none at all*.

The ratepayers, we submit, do not, by relieving the parent of the cost of schooling, take over all his parental obligations

and delegate them to the Board which they elect. To this administrative body he surrenders his judgment and control in regard to the selection and order of the subjects taught, the teachers, the books, and educational *plant* which it provides; but *not the choice of the religious faith* under guidance of which the child shall live and grow in wisdom, and in favour with God and men. Of this he cannot divest himself; nor can anyone, without wrong, affect to act as his deputy.

Finally, we cannot but deprecate the inevitable operation of the proposed resolutions, if carried into effect, upon the meritorious and rising class of teachers in the public elementary schools. They also have their rights of conscience co-extensive with those of the parents whose children they teach. Yet it is proposed to subject them to an unspecified doctrinal examination, to make sure of their all belonging to one of the confessional denominations, or holding the equivalent theology. This test, avowedly intended to make the profession of teacher an orthodox monopoly, would eject many a distinguished public elementary Master and Mistress, and while driving away no little honest and deep religion, would encourage an inferior type of technical *examinee's* theology, sufficient to pass muster without any real significance for the spiritual character.

We therefore respectfully urge the Board to decline to adopt any of the retrogressive proposals now under discussion.

LETTER IN THE "TIMES" OF MAY 4, 1893.¹

SIR, — The counter-memorial prepared for the consideration of the School Board on May 11, and published in your columns on the 28th ult., finds its answer to mine on the following statements of its purport and proposals:—

1. That in the Board Schools "the religious instruction, instead of being such as will meet the wants and wishes of those who profess any creed or profession of faith" . . . "shall be determined at the instance and by the wishes" of "members of no denomination, frequenting no church, but who are said to find a thought of God in the thing that is true and a will of God in the thing which is right."

2. That this is a claim to substitute the wishes of a minority for the legal rights of the majority.

¹ Reprinted by kind permission of the "Times."

3. That it is an attempt "to deprive the majority who profess the Christian religion of all definite Christian instruction."

So far are these allegations from being true that, in dealing with the two types of teaching — the more and the less dogmatic — the assailed memorial, instead of making them alternative, has for its object:—

1. To secure the co-existence of both in perfect equality, as applied to the needs of different consciences.

2. To supersede the rude sway of numbers, in matters so close to the individual conscience as religion, by consideration towards all teachable reverence, of the many or the few.

3. To make express provision for the very teaching, by those who hold them, for those who need them, of the doctrines of Christianity on which the counter-memorialists insist.

In short, my intention in memorialising the Board was, not to resist the orthodox demand, but to make room for it without prejudice to the catholicity and impartiality pervading the Act of 1870. Nothing could be more admirable than the spirit in which its framers drew the clauses relative to religious instruction; but that they were inadequate as securities for permanent contentment of the public conscience is proved by the outbreak of the present dissensions. In consequence of certain changes of public sentiment the problem can no longer be worked out on the simple line, the *via media* of one uniform religious teaching for all scholars who receive any. Fix the standard of compromise where you may, it will fall short of the religion of some and overburden and crush that of others.

It is often supposed, especially by Latitudinarian thinkers, that religious unity may be reached by lopping off and disregarding the differentiating elements of sects and churches, treating them as a separable appendix to the mass of common elements which they superfluously vary and deform. Under the influence of this idea reformers intent on healing divisions and promoting union have invariably made light of the distinctive features of each religious party and tried to negotiate for their relinquishment. Let the Baptist no longer insist upon immersion, or the "Friend" on his doctrine of the Spirit, or the Calvinist on his five points, or the Catholic on his sacerdotalism, and let them all take their stand on the Evangelical ground plane whence these specialties have been developed, and plainly say, "Here alone is the essential," and all Christendom will be one. It was under some such conception as this, of "a common Christianity," that Mr. Forster framed

the Act of 1870 and intended it to be administered; nor can it be doubted that his prohibition of the use of any particular creed or catechism had a meaning for him which would equally exclude any oral inculcation by a teacher of the same doctrinal matter as the creed contained. The "Syllabus of Bible Instruction" drawn up for the use of teachers clearly shows that this has been the accepted interpretation of his law.

But this fascinating theory of "a common Christianity" on which the essentials are to settle, after leave of absence has been given to all else, will not work. It is doubtless true that there may be spiritual sympathy underlying great doctrinal differences; but the central concordance thus reached is affectional, not logical, and will baffle all attempts to lift it into expression. And on the other hand every creed-maker or creed-mender, every theological innovator, is apt to become the enamoured victim of his own little discovery till it blinds him to a universe beyond, as a sixpence may hide the sun. He at once enters his favourite doctrine among the "essentials," or in such relation to them that it is against his conscience to suppress it. The doctrines which men have received on authority as indispensable (birth sin, incarnation, vicarious redemption) you cannot persuade them to treat as a mere supplement that may be easily added on to the "common elements." They are not of a piece with the common elements, and you will never end in them if you do not begin with them.

Hence Mr. Riley cannot reasonably be expected to abide by the compromise of 1871. In this, I submit, he and his friends are right, and entitled to relief from a disability. A religious man cannot cut his theology in pieces and deal it out in fragments selected by deference to others' belief. Let him teach it entire and *ab initio* in the school to and through those who are of his own mind. Only let him not for this purpose displace the teaching hitherto approved, which defines no more than the common elements of Christian faith and duty. Hold fast the protection for the undogmatic conscience, add an equal provision for the dogmatic.

The counter-memorialists are careful to deny the Christian name to persons who cannot receive the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity. It is easier to bear the opprobrium than to excuse the anomaly of this misuse of a much-loved word. Surely a Platonist means a disciple of Plato; a Pythagorean a follower of the discipline of Pythagoras; and may not, then, a disciple of Jesus Christ, who owns Him as the

source and impersonation of his religion, designate that religion as "Christian"? If the religion of Christ is not Christian it is hard to see how a religion about Christ, wrought out of centuries of speculation respecting His nature and the composition of His person, can not only become so, but claim exclusive possession of the term. The Church, we know, has inherited and still maintains its office of excommunication. But it will be a noteworthy thing if, at the end of the nineteenth Christian century, the School Board of London should copy the example and pronounce the ban.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., May 1.

LETTER IN THE "TIMES" OF NOV. 14, 1894.

SIR, — In a memorial to the London School Board and certain letters to "The Times," I suggested, in March, 1893, a possible solution of the pending problem of religious instruction in elementary schools. The proposal then made was approved by eminent representatives of both parties in the controversy, the memorial being largely signed by supporters of the Act of 1870, and the provisions for carrying it into effect being accepted as satisfactory by Mr. Athelstan Riley himself. In the absence of any other scheme which has united the suffrages of both the parties in conflict, I am encouraged to work it out under some fresh aspects.

It is fundamental that the determining factor in this whole matter is the parental obligation. The "Conscience Clause" recognises in the parents of a scholar a paramount right and duty to accept or decline the religious teaching accessible to him. This means and assumes that, in offering it, you stand in their place; and, in doing your part, it must be their religion in which you train him, and not any other which may happen to be your own. If he be an Israelite you may teach him the Ten Commandments, but not the Lord's Prayer, still less the Apostles' Creed. If his parents are "Friends," you may refer him to the Holy Spirit, but not to the Sacraments. If they are Independents, you may open to him the Divine voices of Scripture, but not insist on the oracles of the Church.

The so-called "compromise" of 1871 was based on the assumption that, when all the differences of our English

Christendom were struck out, there would be found the beating heart of "a common Christianity" sending a quickening life through all its members. Whither, then, should we turn to reach it? And can it be laid bare and looked at apart from all the organism which it animates? If anywhere the central essence of the religion is to be seen, clear of all extraneous admixtures, it will surely be in the primary utterances of Jesus Christ himself, whether heard in his public teaching or overheard in his solitary prayers. At this fountain head we are in contact with the personal religion of Christ himself, with that conscious relation of his humanity to God which reveals to us our own; and we are not yet entangled in the theories about Christ, whence all later divergences sprang. Rightly, then, did the early School Board, in prescribing the series of Scripture lessons, give prominence to the precepts and parables of Christ himself, when he taught the multitudes on the mountain or the sea-shore. How else could they secure what was essential for each and common to all?

When we want to know what we should teach to little children about Divine things, we can hardly go wrong if we take our answer from the method of Jesus on opening his commission to the poor peasants of Galilee. The religious needs and capacities of the two classes are so similar that the same Gospel may surely be accepted as suitable for both. If you think it too plain and simple to be more than a rudimentary Gospel, short of the mysteries behind, it is at least that with which Jesus began, and which he delivered as if it were his whole message to his hearers. Some listeners there would be whose hearts he pierced with conviction. If thenceforth they thought and felt and lived in conformity with his teaching, would they not realise the "Christian Morality"? And if they consciously sustained the relation to God which is there appealed to as the highest spring of affection and action, would they not be imbued with the essence of the "Christian Religion"?

Glance, then, at a few characteristic contents of this Morality. The "blessed" are the lowly, the meek, the thirsting after righteousness, the merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers, the sufferers for the right. The faithful will sacrifice limb and life rather than do wrong. The generous will open their hearts to even their enemies. The secret of all goodness is in the soul within, where no human eye can penetrate.

And what is the corresponding religion? It is a conscious communion with "your Father who seeth in secret"; a loving

rendering to him of every duty, though it should be of alms in compassion to suffering men; a trust in his forgiveness, if only we fail not in our own; an administration of life in his service and not in our own, aspiring to a perfection akin to his.

This is what Jesus gave forth in his personal ministry to his Galilean neighbours as his morality and his religion, that it might become theirs. It must be presumed that such of them as took their vow to it he would own as his disciples. It has two features very significant in the present connection.

(1) It is perfectly simple, so as to pass easily into minds of limited or immature experience. Among the things more often missed "by the wise and prudent" than by the trustful child is the secret sense of a living God, who sees him in the dark and knows the thoughts he fain would hide.

(2) It is absolutely without any trace of the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement by the blood of Christ, while assuming the forgiveness of sins on simple repentance. If, therefore, these are now among the "essentials" of Christianity, they owe that place to ulterior development of the Church; and the Gospel must have attained to its plenitude by two stages of revelation, — one preparatory, sanctioned by the example of Christ himself and identical with his personal religion; the other, an ecclesiastical sequel, arising when his historic presence was replaced by interpretations of his person as once upon earth and for ever in Heaven.

Whether these two stages of Christian teaching — that of Christ and that about him — have claims on us of equal authority need not here be discussed. Let the affirmative be assumed, and the contents of the Anglican creeds stand on the same footing with the Sermon on the Mount and the conditions of eternal life announced to the rich youth in the Gospel. Still the Divine method of imparting the "essentials" by two stages in succession is surely not without significance for us. It plainly prescribes that we also should separate the elementary teaching of our Christian religion from the supplementary, availing ourselves of the Galilean beatitudes and parables and incidents involving spiritual lessons as our model for the one, and reserving the subtleties of the creeds, with their puzzling abstracts, "substance, person, nature," etc., for exposition to maturer minds, should any such be ready in the higher standards of the Board Schools. If, in the Saviour's own mission, the multitude that thronged his steps, including the Apostles themselves, with

Scribes and Pharisees from the city, had to be approached with so much doctrinal reserve, and yet might be credited with such moral and spiritual susceptibility as the Sermon on the Mount implies, the youth of our teeming cities may well be taken in the same order, and the second stage of their instruction can suffer no wrong, but gain its best security, from the first.

Why not, then, let the elementary religious teaching remain, for all its recipients, purely moral and spiritual, such as might be addressed, like Christ's own, to anyone willing to follow him, and then, for those who felt the need of ulterior essentials, throw open in a separate class-room, under a sympathetic instructor, the scheme of doctrine which has become ascendant in the Church? This scheme is as sacred to the conscience of its believers as any primary moral conviction, and has the same indefeasible right of individual and collective expression. It is entitled to a recognised place, proportioned to its real prevalence, in the religious instruction of mixed public schools. It first exceeds its rights when it claims the monopoly of permissible religion and cuts short all remonstrance by the decree, "Take this or nothing." This, indeed, is the sin of both parties in this controversy, and will remain so till they discover that by no device can you provide for a multifarious religion by a uniform plan.

That the insistence on the Trinitarian theory of the God-head, as a prerequisite for elementary religious teaching, should proceed from a high Anglican is the more surprising because it throws away the chief distinctive advantage over the Low Church orthodoxy which his school has brought over from Rome. The Catholic theology has never treated the ruin of human nature by the Fall as anything so complete as Protestant writers assume. Instead of paralysing the reason of man for all apprehension of Divine things, alienating the heart from all love of them, so as to reduce him to atheistic blindness and ethical depravity, as Evangelical authors suppose, the loss of Paradise entailed, in the Catholic view, mainly a weakening of the will and a disturbance of the impulses that solicit it; while the intellect still remained which made a knowledge of God possible, and the conscience which rendered self-judgment inevitable. This difference gave rise to contrasted modes of treating religious problems. The Evangelical pleader moves altogether within the supernatural; he starts from conversion, he proves by miracle; he saves by grace, and drives you to admit the necessity of revelation by

showing the worthlessness of all your favourite beliefs without it. The Catholic, on the other hand, first enters on the doctrine of Grace when he has completed his volume on nature, in which he investigates what may be known of God, what may be recognised as duty, what may be loved as good, by the faculties still unspoiled in even fallen men. Accordingly the Catholic order of religious instruction commences with precisely the contents of what I have called the elementary stage. A good example of this teaching order may be found in the excellent but unfinished work of the late Dr. W. G. Ward on "Nature and Grace," which incidentally illustrates also the basis of sympathy there may be in this mode of thought between even theological extremes, for during its preparation for the press I was privileged by the author to read the proof-sheets and return them with any marginal notes which they might suggest. With all consistent Catholics, Dr. Ward looked on the natural "feeling after God" as the preluding experience which laid the mind open for the consummating gifts of Grace, and would never have deemed it useless, or denounced it as "nebulous," to teach children committed to him of a heart-searching, prayer-hearing God, who counts their efforts at the [? after] right and will reckon with their sins, though ever ready to forgive if they turn to him with repentant heart, or to warn them of the hatefulness in his sight of falsehood, cruelty, greedy self-indulgence, and unloving temper and angry words.

I should expect, therefore, Mr. Athelstan Riley, as the direct consequence of his Anglican principles, to accept as the elementary stage of religious instruction precisely what was contemplated in the regulations hitherto operative, provided they were honestly carried out, without prejudice to what was reserved for the supplementary lessons. For those whose "essentials" lie within this moral and spiritual teaching, as drawn from the personal ministry of Christ, no ecclesiastical sequel is needed; and the elementary type of instruction, admitting of indefinite extension, will meet the needs of the scholars to the last. Others, to whom these "essentials" are themselves conditional on acceptance of the Trinitarian theology, and inadequate without it, are certainly entitled to have it taught, at a suitable age, to the children for whom they are responsible. By all means let it be given, provided only that it be limited to those who offer themselves for it and imparted by a teacher to whom it is congenial. As a separate room and a modified arrangement would be required

for this purpose, provision for it should be made only in response to application for it from a sufficient number of parents to secure a class. Without this simple evidence of serious feeling hitherto unsatisfied, it is vain to charge a grievance against the system as it works.

The proposal thus to meet any parental demand for doctrinal teaching displeases many teachers on the ground that it subjects them to a test which, in case of a vacancy in the supplementary stage, would often exclude, on the ground of opinion alone, the selection of the most capable candidate. The objection, so far as it is valid, already applies to the present system. The requirement of religious teaching at all closes the profession of public school master or mistress against those who cannot sincerely give it, however complete may be their qualification as instructors in secular knowledge. A person who could not with clear conscience lead a prayer or hymn, or enforce the lesson of Christian parable, would be ineligible, as it is, for any but a secular school. And the alteration suggested in the creation of a supplementary stage would throw open more vacancies than at present arise, in some of which a conscientious orthodoxy would find congenial work. In the large schools of London and the great cities, where the staff of teachers is considerable, the usual course would be for each candidate, when elected, to make his choice between the elementary and the supplementary religious teaching. To describe this option as the imposition of an inquisitorial test appears to me an extravagant misrepresentation. The teachers are in their right when they jealously defend the discretion left to them as interpreters of the lessons prescribed to them. But that discretion is not a liberty to say whatever they please, and wring some favourite doctrine out of irrelevant texts, but a serious trust, which they are in honour bound to exercise in the spiritual service of others. From testimony on both sides it appears that the freedom confided to them has been abused; on the part of Unitarian teachers, to the prejudice of the belief in the Incarnation; on the part of Trinitarians, to the inculcation of the Deity of Christ. The temptation to such violations of the "compromise of 1871" would be diminished by providing legitimate expression for the orthodox "essentials" of saving faith.

Believing it not impossible for "all who profess and call themselves Christians" to reconcile themselves to these two forms, elementary and supplementary, I earnestly commend

them for peaceful co-existence to the conflicting parties of School Board electors and members.

JAMES MARTINEAU.

35 GORDON SQUARE, LONDON, W. C., November 12.

In November, 1892, a considerable fragment of "The Gospel according to Peter" found its way into England, and at once attracted the earnest attention of New Testament critics. It was contained in a little parchment book, which had been dug up some six years before in a cemetery at Akhmim in Upper Egypt, and was subsequently identified and published by the French Archæological Mission at Cairo. Dr. Martineau threw himself with the zeal of a youth into the study of this fragment; and on Sunday afternoon, the 7th of May, 1893, he delivered a lecture upon it to a crowded audience in the Hall of Dr. Williams's Library. He regarded it as a Docetic Gospel, was satisfied that it was quoted by Justin Martyr, and assigned it to about the year 130. An article in the June number of the "Nineteenth Century" contains in full the comments which he was obliged to curtail or omit in the lecture. Mr. J. Rendel Harris published in the "Contemporary Review" for August some strictures on Dr. Martineau's views; and this led to a rejoinder in the October number of the "Nineteenth Century." Dr. Martineau differs from Mr. Harris especially in failing to recognise any dependence of the Petrine fragment on the Fourth Gospel. His general estimate of the results of the critical study of the New Testament must not be passed over:—

"On the whole, the fresh light which the researches of the last half-century have thrown upon the early life and literature of Christendom, during the growth and selection of a body of sacred writings, justifies by new reasons our thankfulness for the New Testament as it is. Clear as it has become that the volume has been made up, not by supernatural dictation or even by critical discovery of authorship and testing of

contents, still clearer is it that what has been let drop can claim no preference over that which has been saved; and that, in consulting and defining, from time to time, the Catholic feeling of the Christian communities, the Church authorities, in the name of the Holy Ghost, have really been prevailingly led by good sense and practical piety."

The building was now drawing towards completion, which was designed for the reception of Manchester New College, or, as it was henceforward to be styled, Manchester College, in deference to the wishes of its great neighbour, New College. It was the longing of all hearts that Dr. Martineau should be present and take some part in the opening ceremonies. The following letter to the Rev. S. A. Steinthal will indicate the feeling with which he looked forward to the occasion:—

JULY 2, 1893.

I am in complete accord with you in both your fears and your aspirations with regard to our fundamental principles of Church Union and of Theological Teaching. But, after hammering at the subject for more than half a century without producing any visible effect or arresting for an hour the descent of our people into the ranks of the dogmatic denominations, I have settled into a silent despair, and contentedly accepted my place as a superannuated old Baxterian.

The College, it is true, is irrevocably pledged to the true Catholic principle, and therefore offers, in its entrance on a new period, a legitimate occasion for the restatement of that principle. But for its support it depends on a people long Unitarianised, and demanding from it a supply of ministers prepared to work as effective champions of their favourite creed. In short, their care for religion is chiefly as a *theological "cause"* to be defended and led to victory against the pretensions of *other-dox* churches. This increasing discrepancy between the Principle of the College and the spirit of its supporters renders it very difficult to secure unity of impression from the several utterances given forth at its special celebrations.

Hence, I should shrink from the responsibility of volunteering to address the President in a letter which would be regarded as an uncalled-for advocacy of a crotchet of mine. If

at the meeting any natural occasion presented itself of saying a few words, founded on the retrospect of my experience, I could hardly fail to repeat my confession of faith in the Catholic principle, and to define more or less the field of its just application. It is true that I cannot depend upon my voice for speaking in public. It sometimes serves me and sometimes fails. But this does not matter, if I am not pledged. I can but hold my peace, if I am disabled.

It was hoped that his friend, the Master of Balliol, would give the welcome to the College. He had been invited to do so, and on June 7 had written: "I shall be happy to accept your kind invitation to be present at the opening of Manchester New College. I am no speaker, but if you wish me to do so, I shall be willing to propose the toast of the College." On Sunday, the 1st of October, that beautiful soul passed to the higher world; and on the following Friday a great throng of silent citizens reverently watched the funeral procession. On the 10th of October Dr. Martineau wrote a few touching words about this event to Mr. Oswald Simon:—

"Accept my warm thanks for the sight of your admirable estimate of the beloved friend we have just lost. Yours are not only true heart-words, but full of just discrimination as well as sympathetic insight. Among the many bereavements which have overshadowed this year, none has so deepened my sense of lonely survivorship as this; and I hardly know how I shall bear up through the visit to Oxford to which I am pledged next week. I must muse upon his calm steadfastness, and take heart. The parting is not for long."

On Wednesday, the 18th of October, he took his place, arrayed in his Oxford robes, among the crowd of friends and visitors who met in the Music Room in Holywell Street, and marched thence to the new building. He had felt unable to pledge himself to any public utterance; and accordingly, on this day, he was a silent spectator of the proceed-

ings, except that at the close of the Dedication Service in the Chapel he pronounced the Benediction. The following morning he was able to attend the Communion service in the Chapel, and he delivered an address which came with all the old charm and uplifting power to those who had so often hung upon his words in former days. In the afternoon he was present at a lunch given by the President of the College, Mr. Henry R. Greg, in the Randolph Hotel, where more than two hundred guests assembled, including several distinguished members of the University. "Prosperity to Manchester College" was proposed by Sir William Markby. Dr. Martineau, having felt uncertain of his ability to speak, left it to the Principal to reply in the first instance; but then he rose, and delivered a long speech, starting from a suggestion which had fallen from "the accomplished Warden of Merton." He pointed out how from the third century onward the ecclesiastical spirit had been straining after fixity of doctrine, and maintained that, whatever liberty was assumed elsewhere, Manchester College stood alone in commending to the teachers and the taught an unconditional quest of sacred truth. Referring to the great progress which had been made, and the substitution of grander ideas of the universe for ancient and obsolete science, he said: "And so it ever is with all our warranted 'negations.' We discard the relatively mean and low to escape into the great and glorious; we leave the rudiments to fall away, that we may press on towards perfection. We exchange a God with a 'throne' and a 'footstool,' and a 'right-hand seat' and a left, for the Living Presence of a Universal Mind, looking into our eyes in all that is beautiful, and communing with us in all that is right." Finally he declared that "if the College is intended to train ministers for a particular denomination, that denomination must hold the same impartial attitude towards doctrine as the College assumes, by neither name nor act committing

itself, in its corporate capacity, to a particular theological school. The noble principle, reasserted in every announcement issued from Manchester College, is exposed to the imputation of insincerity by every word or deed put forth in forgetfulness of this relation between Church and College." It is not surprising if a man of eighty-eight, who had spent a fatiguing morning, spoke with rather less ease and self-command than in former days. The speech was thought by some to be a little too doctrinal for the occasion; and at its close the Warden of Merton whispered to his neighbour, "Very interesting from him, but not very wise." Perhaps Dr. Martineau himself thought so; for in the revised report the speech is a good deal modified.

Still unwearied, he attended a crowded *Conversazione* in the evening, when deputations were received and congratulatory addresses read; and when late at night he reached once more the house of his host, he said with his pleasant smile, "Now we have nothing left to do but to dance," and seemed quite ready to begin.

In spite of such efforts as these it was now inevitable that Dr. Martineau's well-known form should be missed from many a meeting; and as he could not be welcomed in person, resolutions were passed expressive of the honour and affection in which he was held. To these he responded in grateful and gracious words. One example must suffice. In 1894 the National Conference of Unitarian and other Non-subscribing Congregations assembled in Manchester from the 10th to the 13th of April; and at its first meeting its President, Mr. J. R. Beard, was directed to express to him the high respect, the reverence, the love in which he was held by all the members of the Conference, and their hope that the long years of devoted service for God and man, which was the record of his life, might yet be extended to the further enrichment and blessing of humanity. To this Dr. Martineau replied on the 16th of April:—

DEAR MR. BEARD, — The time has so plainly come for me to share only as a distant onlooker in the councils of our public assemblies that I learn with surprise from your kind letter how my absence from the National Conference, instead of escaping notice, drew forth the affectionate message which you convey to me in terms so warming and cheering to my retirement. I receive it with the more gratitude because I am conscious that my life-work has not always coincided with the lines of thought and tendency on which our Churches have prevailingly moved. They have exhibited the rarest of historical phenomena — ecclesiastical forbearance — in generously receiving and not resenting advice they could not approve, and still retaining that dissentient councillor in full fellowship of brotherly love. I need not say (and I cannot say) how I reciprocate their affection, and shall ever pray, as I take leave of them, that they may be more and more faithful witnesses to the power of spiritual religion.

On Tuesday, the 15th of May, Dr. Martineau presided in Essex Hall over the annual meeting of a society which had been formed for the promotion of "Biblical and Theological study classes." In the course of his remarks he said that he regarded it as a necessary duty of the minister of every congregation to gather together the young people belonging to it, and to give catechetical instruction to the children, followed up by more advanced teaching to the older ones. It used to be the pride of the old Presbyterians that this was with them a regular practice. Neglect of this was hurtful to the congregations and to the ministers. "A minister," he said, "knows perfectly well his people are not abreast of the critical and historical knowledge of the time, and having no other opportunity, imports these subjects into the pulpit, which is turned into a mere lecture platform for dealing with critical and controversial questions, so occupying the minds of the congregation with things that are no better than the secular questions with which they have to deal in the world. Thus ministers lose the habit of giving, and the people of expecting, those stimulating, inspiring spiritual instructions, those appeals to the conscience and

heart and affections of mankind that constitute the true functions of the pulpit. For my part, I regard it as really an abuse of the pulpit when those prophetic utterances do not almost entirely occupy and absorb it. The real power of our preachers will never be developed until they have the courage to fling themselves upon those higher inspirations which will strike deep into the hearts and consciences of their people." He also insisted on the advantage of examinations: "It is impossible for any person to know — still more to know whether he knows — until he has accustomed himself to give forth in utterances of his own that which he has taken in from the books which he has read. I believe nothing is more perishable than the impression of books, particularly books dealing with solid knowledge or subtle and difficult questions of opinion. No one can ever discover the depth of his ignorance until he endeavours to reproduce the arguments of a powerful reasoner, or the history of a powerful narrator. Every wise student would insist that he should be examined, in order that he might retain and mature his knowledge."

On the 2d of September his beloved friend, the Rev. J. H. Thom, passed from this world. His feelings are thus expressed in a letter to Dr. Forsyth of Abernethy, Inverness-shire: —

THE POLCHAR, Sept. 14, 1894.

Your words of sympathy touch me deeply, coming as they do from one who evidently had caught the true impression of my beloved fellow-labourer and closest friend through more than sixty years. Mr. Thom was in very truth all, and more than all, that your discerning eye read in him. To be intimate with him was to learn by a perpetual lesson what it is to have mind and heart baptised throughout with the Christian spirit. An affection more than brotherly bound us together,—all the more, I believe, for certain natural differences of temperament and even of thought, which, instead of occasioning friction, enabled us to give and take and so love each other better than before. His departure leaves me the sole

survivor of a group of almost lifelong companions; whose loss, if it darkens the remaining way to the last lingerer in this world, sheds a sweet light on the passage to another. At my age, the mourning for the bereavement and the foregleam of the restoration almost touch one another. I pray only for time enough to leave no pressing duty still undone.

A volume of Mr. Thom's sermons was brought out in the following year, under the editorship of the Rev. V. D. Davis. This volume, entitled "A Spiritual Faith," contains a "Memorial Preface" from the pen of Dr. Martineau, in which he sketches the life and gives a fine appreciation of the character and gifts of his friend.

On Sunday, the 25th of November, he attended service at Rosslyn Hill Chapel, Hampstead, in order to unveil a brass tablet, for which he had written the inscription, in memory of his old friend, Dr. Sadler. He spoke only a few simple words; but as they were among the last of his public utterances, they may be here recorded:—

"Christian Friends, the place assigned to me here to-day falls to me, I am well aware, in virtue of mere length of days. In many of your families your late pastor has been honoured and beloved from an earlier date than the beginning of my friendship with him. But the lips of the elders who could bear witness to this are silent with his own; and, to the present generation, what he was in the freshness of his days has become a tradition,—a tradition, indeed, which hung round him as a sanctity to the last, but was most deeply felt by those who had longest experience of its truth. My sole survivorship of that veteran group is all that fits me to be here; unless, indeed, it be that, for two years between one ministry and another, I had the privilege, with my family, of being among you in fellowship of worship, and of knowing the uplifting influence and sacred repose of his weekly ministrations.

"Simply, then, as one with you in your reverence and affection for him, do I become your agent in here giving them public and permanent expression. It is ever a duty and a joy to commemorate the saintly spirits that leave us; and so, in your name, I herewith unveil the record of your late pastor's gifts and graces, which have already shed a conse-

cration upon your past life, and through which, now seen within the veil of the spiritual world, 'he, being dead, yet speaketh' to our hearts."

Twice again he spoke in public: once, on the 5th of January, 1897, in Holloway Congregational Church, where he gave an address at the wedding of the Rev. A. H. Moncur Sime, whose services Dr. Martineau frequently attended; and once in the schoolroom at Rothiemurchus, in July, 1897, in support of a proposal to found a Young People's Christian Association.

He had not yet, however, retired from the field of literature; for in the April number of the "Nineteenth Century," 1895, appeared an article of his on Mr. Balfour's "Foundations of Belief." From the philosophical this article passes on to the theological field, and reviews especially the character of natural and revealed religion, and the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement. The old brilliance and force seem undiminished; but we need not pause here upon a line of thought which has already become familiar.

His ninetieth birthday brought him a multitude of greetings, and he had to write many letters expressive of his gratitude. One of the most characteristic was written a week before his birthday to Mr. Charles Fenton, in acknowledgment of a resolution passed at a meeting of the London District Unitarian Society:—

DEAR SIR,—The gracious and affectionate terms of the resolution passed at the recent annual meeting of the London District Unitarian Society moved me too profoundly for any adequate reply. In the retrospect of ninety years there is a pathetic mixture of gratitude for ample opportunities and humiliation for insignificant performances. The habitual pressure of the latter is the only cloud that overhangs my declining path. My friends—as if they caught sight of the shadow and understood it—try to assure me, as they gather around me at the close of my last decade, that the labour of so many seasons has not been all in vain. If to some few

souls the meaning of life has indeed become clearer, its possibilities nobler, its sanctities deeper, its immortality surer through the simple report of my own experience, I thank the Father of Lights for thus joining me in love, — be it only to two or three brethren in spirit, and children of his.

With heartfelt gratitude for the words of sympathy and blessing so impressively commended to Wednesday's meeting and conveyed to me,

I remain, dear Sir,

Yours very sincerely,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

An address, beautifully engrossed and bound, and bearing the signature of about eleven hundred and sixty names, was presented to him on Monday, the 22d of April, by a small Committee, which had been appointed on the 5th of February at a private meeting held in Essex Hall. At that meeting it was resolved that an address of congratulation be presented to Dr. Martineau on his ninetieth birthday, and that the ministers and representatives of "our Churches," the Presidents and officers of "our Colleges" and other institutions, and some former students of Manchester College not included in the foregoing, be invited to sign it. The following day he was presented with an address, also beautifully engrossed, from the officers and Committee of Manchester College. In reply to short speeches by the President of the College, Mr. George Holt, and others, he spoke of the "fond recollections that made it exceedingly difficult for him to pour out all that was in his heart," referring to the influences under which he had been trained, and to the great changes which had taken place in his teaching. In conclusion he said that "without attempting any fit reply to the touching personal allusions that had been made, he would only say that they sank very deeply into his heart. They were the brightest and most cheering rays on the declining path of his life, and whether or not he was able to continue longer to work on the old

lines he should always remember with gratitude how his efforts had been appreciated by the younger men.”¹ In a letter to Mr. and Mrs. Leyson Lewis he pleasantly describes the congratulations that poured in upon him:—

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., April 22, 1895.

Happy as your presence would have made us, I really believe you would hardly have enjoyed a visit in such a whirlwind as has swept through the hours of the last two or three days; flinging open the house door from morning to night for the reception of persons, letters by the hundred, telegrams by the score, name-cards uncounted, and bouquets or plants enough for a floral exhibition in every sitting-room. It will take me, with your sisters' help, weeks to conquer the correspondence,—English, German, and American. The tone of it all is only too sympathetic, and from the most opposite points of the theologic compass.

About this time a desire was expressed that the form of the beloved teacher should be preserved in marble. A circular was issued, asking for £1300, and this sum was promised within a month. The result may be seen in the noble statue, by Mr. H. R. Hope-Pinker, which now adorns the Library of Manchester College. This statue was formally unveiled on the 18th of October, 1898, in presence of a large number of friends and admirers, and was generally recognised as not only an impressive work of art, but as an admirable likeness of the great thinker.

Still interested in philosophical questions, he consented to join, early in 1896,² with a few other members of the old Metaphysical Society in founding the Synthetic Society, of which he remained a member for two years. “I cannot hope,” he wrote, “on the last verge of life, to contribute anything but sympathy to the meetings of the Society. But I have not outlived my habit of learning ever more from my

¹ From a report in “The Inquirer.”

² The meeting constituting the Society was held on the 28th of February, and was presided over by the Bishop of Rochester.

fellows; and this privilege offered me has an irresistible attraction." On the 3d of February, 1898, he wrote a letter resigning his membership, "being incapacitated by imperfect hearing for participation in the discussions." "It is with no ordinary emotion," he says, "that I take leave of a society which has enriched me by a multitude of precious and affectionate memories." He continued, however, to be an honorary member till the time of his death.

The year 1896 was marked by a very grave affliction. His son-in-law, Mr. Leyson Lewis, having an asthmatical constitution, had been advised to spend the winter with his wife in Italy. The experiment had seemed to answer, and he was able to resort to the many scenes of historic or artistic interest in Rome. But on the 30th of April a telegram announcing his death after a few days' illness was received from Mrs. Lewis. Her immediate decision to return home with his remains precluded the possibility of sending her help or joining her on the way; and the family could only comply with her request to meet her the following Saturday at East Farleigh, in Kent, where the body was laid in the family grave. Mrs. Lewis continued to reside at Farleigh, where she had ample occupation, and all her neighbours were attached to her.

In the summer of 1897 he was asked by the Rev. T. W. Freckelton, of Northampton, to send a few words of benediction, to be read at the dedication of a new church in the autumn. In the course of his answer, written on the 4th of July, he said: —

"The Christian discipleship which brings us into fellowship of worship sums itself up in one condition, — the yearning after 'the same mind in us that was in Christ'; in the assembly pervaded by this there are the same sanctities to all, and there will be no jarring note in the chorus of reverence. But if you dedicate your place of meeting to a questioned variety of human belief, instead of an unquestioned realisation of filial life unto God, you will supersede the affections which unite

you by the disputations which break up churches and multiply creeds. The more deep and spiritual the personal life of the believer, the more ready will he be to sympathise with the enthusiasm of his neighbour, and to bear tenderly with the doctrinal deviations still hindering complete concurrence."

On the 8th of July he sent an answer to a resolution, expressive of gratitude and esteem, which had been passed by the Trustees of Manchester College at their annual meeting in Oxford, on the 25th of June. He alludes playfully to "an unconscionable seventy years' adhesion to the College — an Institution which surely, as a school of progress, ought not to be burdened with such a tiresome fixture." He then proceeds more seriously:—

"Have I, then, I ask myself, worn out the patience of my *Alma Mater*, like some superannuated pensioner? So, indeed, it might well be, had she not from the first deeply imbued me with her own characteristic lesson, and taught me to be for ever a learner, and never more so than when under the responsibilities of a teacher. For nothing am I more grateful to my beloved College tutors than for the conviction that there is guilt in teaching twice that which you only believed 'once'; even though that conviction should involve the repeated rejection of past work as obsolete, and the reconstruction from the foundations of schemes of thought hitherto accepted. . . . If this plea be allowed as an excuse for lasting so long, I am content to abide with those who only stand and wait."

In the same month the editor of "The Inquirer" forwarded to him a copy of the pamphlet containing an account of the little fragment known as "Logia." In Dr. Martineau's view "it is highly interesting. . . . But it is a gain simply ecclesiastical, not religious. I cannot but wonder at the importance attached to it."

In this year appeared also a little volume of four sermons, called "Faith and Self-Surrender." These sermons had been published in the "Christian World" in 1893-1894, and were now issued in one of Messrs. James Clarke and Co.'s "Small Books on Great Subjects."

And now the evening shadows were plainly lengthening. The erect figure was slightly stooped and shrunk; the mass of dark hair had become silvered, and, though still wonderfully abundant, was thinner than in former days; the step was less elastic, and the movements slower, although up to quite recent years he had been able to climb his favourite mountains. The expression had lost something of its ancient strength, but perhaps, in compensation, the innate sweetness and gentleness of his character were more clearly discernible. The memory began gradually to fail, and he would sometimes repeat the same thoughts in conversation after a short interval. But he still spent the mornings sitting upright at his desk, reading or writing, clad in a long dressing-gown, and scorning during the early hours the luxury of an easy-chair, which he reserved for any casual visitor. Visitors, however, were not always admitted; for sometimes now he fell asleep in his study, and, if suddenly awakened, felt a little confused. But when he was able to see a friend for a short time, he received him with all the old warmth of affection, and conversed freely on congenial topics. The grey heads of much younger men brought home to him the consciousness of his own great age. He would refer with some amusement to the superannuation of his own son Russell, who was compelled to retire on his pension from the British Museum at the age of sixty-five. More sorrowful feelings were not far off; for Mr. Russell Martineau's health gradually declined, and he died at Sidmouth on the 14th of December, 1898.

In the last year of life the failure of power was more obvious, and he was not permitted to make his accustomed journey to Scotland. In the winter of 1899-1900 the family were stricken with influenza. Mrs. Leyson Lewis had come up from East Farleigh to spend Christmas, and insisted on remaining to help in nursing them. She caught the illness, and returned home to die. Her father, who was now con-

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fined to bed, did not know that she had passed behind the veil before him; and on Thursday, the 11th of January, he sank tranquilly to his rest.

The funeral took place on the following Tuesday, when the body was laid with that of his wife in Highgate Cemetery. The morning was wet and gloomy; but just as the grave was reached, a beam of sunlight broke from the weeping clouds, and rested on the coffin, a symbol of the glory to which he had passed, and the nearer vision of God.

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TO MR. HERBERT BARHAM.

APRIL 26, 1887.

The great strength of the orthodox doctrine lies, no doubt, in the appeal it makes to the inward "Sense of Sin," — that sad weight whose burden oppresses every serious soul. And the great weakness of Unitarianism has been its insensibility to this abiding sorrow of the human consciousness. But the orthodox remedy is surely the most terrible of all mistakes, viz. *to get rid* of the burden by throwing it on Christ, or permitting him to take it.

If such transference of guilt to the innocent were possible, what could be meaner than to accept it, and profit by it? Better to go to any Hell than to enter Heaven on such terms! No! this *Sense of Sin* is the inevitable sorrow of an *imperfect* nature feeling the authority of a Perfect law planted in the conscience. But this fact, that God gives us to know and see better than we yet can realise, is the Divine stimulus that for ever urges us onwards, through penitence for the past purifying and improving the future. And even under the grief at shortcomings, what more consoling light do we need than the ever open forgiveness of the Father in Heaven? What other condition of that forgiveness did Christ ever name than simple repentance? except, indeed, the like willingness on our part to forgive an offending brother on the same condition. If this was not enough, why did he not tell us that an atonement was wanted as well?

TO MRS. BROOKS

TO SIGNORE BRACCIFORTI.

MAY 25, 1895.

Accept my warmest thanks for your generous remembrance of me at the moment of my step into the tenth decade of my life. It is a privilege most cheering to my heart to be thus recognised by one who has shown such consistent loyalty to truth, and never shrunk from sacrifices for conscience' sake. Such are the men whom I love and honour; and to be assured of their esteem and sympathy is a blessing that makes light of all privations. If the Giver of all good has put into my heart and brought out of it any message which has found response among my brethren here and there and drawn or held them nearer to Him than they would else have been, I am grateful to Him for the commission which I have most earnestly aspired to fulfil. Much harder has been your task; involving so large a clearance of obstructive and consolidated superstition before reaching the pure central Divine truths, which needed only development and application. In spite of some threatenings of reaction in the sacerdotal direction, I am persuaded that the old ecclesiastical creeds are paralysed and have lost their hold of the modern European mind; and that the drift of the living piety of our coming time is towards the simple spiritual Religion of Jesus Christ, which we are endeavouring to set free from its clinging adhesions of misconceptions and perversion.

TO MRS. BROOKS.

AUG. 15, 1889.

From my heart I thank you for allowing me some partnership in your sorrow. Would that in sharing it with you I could make your portion less! Yet this is a blind wish; for each of these bereavements must bring all its contents entire to the mourner, and I know that there is no part of your pathetic experience since the stroke fell which you would consent to cancel. And if so, after all, the true essence of sympathy is, not to divide, but to multiply, the lights and shadows of each loved life.

I well remember that bright and bonny baby of yours in London and easily realise all that he had become to you, and the noble promises now — broken? no, but carried away into the invisible, whither you cannot follow their image and record. Greater desolation can hardly be felt than from the

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first contrast, in thought, of that tender little nature, dependent on its only possible mother, and the seemingly blank infinitude into which it goes alone. What should the poor child do there, plucked from the home, to be flung into that great world? Yet, to the calmer and deeper vision which soon returns, that infinitude is no longer blank. There is the living Inventor and Source of the very love which is now wounded and looks up to Him through bitter tears; and will He who has devised the ties of home forget to smile upon the infant's waking and to charm away his fears? We know only that His resources are infinite for the development and perfecting of the moral and spiritual natures He has called into being; and that, in this or that of the "many mansions" of His house, the fitting school for every soul cannot but be found. Meanwhile, we are in a position to record the grievous side of the removals from stage to stage of being; we suffer at the departure; we are strangers to the scene and the reasons of the arrival. But the half which is given to knowledge is warrant enough to occupy the rest with tranquil faith. Can we not trust Him, though the shadows hide Him, so that, through the momentary darkness, we still leave our hand in His? With Him as our stay, the very hour of trembling ends in peace, like the anguish of Gethsemane; the dear blessings that fall away from us do but lapse into Him to reach a higher life; and the seeming wreck of the past that lies around us is turned into the material of a holier future. For myself, as the evening shades of life close around me, all that is included in my *world view*, and all my religion, resolves itself more and more into this simple and steadfast *Trust*, embracing whatever lies beyond the sphere of finite knowledge.

TO MRS. CARMICHAEL.

MAY 22, 1895.

I was delighted to hear from you, and, instead of being "disappointed" in you, think all the better of you for having so much benevolence to spare for one whom you are bound to regard as a lost heretic. You have joined a church among whose members I have found some of my most valued friends, — including (besides the late Cardinal Manning and Father Dalgairns) especially Wilfred Ward's distinguished father, with whom I had much intimate intercourse, and on whose side I almost always found myself in the discussions of the now defunct Metaphysical Society. So much in agreement

TO REV. J. E. CARPENTER

were we in regard to the grounds and essential principles of Morals and Religion, that in preparing for the press his book on "Nature and Grace," he sent me the proof-sheets as they were set up, for such comments as they might suggest to me. Our differences did not commence till we came to the historical and ecclesiastical superstructure raised upon this well-laid and solid base of spiritual experience, the piled-up tiers of which appeared to him compact as a rock, and to me a castle of cards. In the practical effects on character I have not myself observed any superiority, in force or elevation, in the Catholic type, either of populations in the mass or of individual excellence. But if the old faith enables you to realise the ideal which before you had strained after in vain, I should be the last to regret the change. Strong as my personal convictions are, I have never felt any wish to press them upon others who already have a religion which sustains them in a righteous life. And I even think that different forms of doctrinal belief are adapted to the needs of mankind in different stages of their mental and moral development; just as, in the growth of children towards maturity, the true picture of the universe as it is must be gradually opened out, scene after scene, each displaying some childish misconception in previous occupation. Too often missionary zeal attempts to change perforce the natural and only possible order of development, with the result of displacing one religion and spoiling a better.

TO REV. J. E. CARPENTER.

JAN. 22, 1888.

The only use of a teacher is to set in action the thinking powers of his pupils; and, till they strike into lines divergent from his, he has no conclusive evidence that he has performed his function.

FEB. 12, 1889.

Organisation which is to grasp multitudes must deal wholesale with the materials, and, avoiding borderland refinements, seize upon the common positive sentiment or aim which has the maximum of depth and largeness combined. I am persuaded that, in our churches, that is to be still found in the type of Religion and Life presented in the person of Christ; and that out of this ideal essence all may be most simply developed that is needed for the elevation of human character. Every proposal to quit this base only puts us upon a narrower

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and more transitory, and is made in concession to a mere ignorant use of the word "Christian," which it seems to me unfaithful to accept.

JULY 18, 1898.

Unavoidable pre-engagements to sundry Highland lakes and mountain tops have made me slow in answering your kind letter of the 9th, which brought with it so many delightful memories of Borrowdale adventure. I heartily approve of your suggestion respecting the Old Students' presentation of a pictorial window to the College Chapel at Oxford, and shall deem it a privilege to be answerable for £5 of the cost. Though I feel no scruple about having recourse to the Burne-Jones and Morris School of Sacred Art, I am of opinion that the design will require to be carefully watched if it is to be kept true to *our* conception of the Saviour's divine work, without any involuntary blending of colour from *theirs*. The longer I study the literary genesis and comparative contents of our Gospels, the more does the *securely historical nucleus* of their reports respecting the Person and Sayings of Jesus shrink and become overlaid with a diluting admixture of spoiling comments betraying the work of erroneous expectation or a later time; yet the more profound is my reverent reliance on that divine "Logos" as the pure expression of the Human Soul in its revealing experience of God. Lighted by inward affection and outward self-sacrifice into realisation of the highest Theism, Jesus had to remain true to the lower conditions of his country and his time, if he were to speak home to the hearts of his people. And so would come to pass an inevitable and unholy blending of popular tradition and transcendent sanctity of truth. The Synoptic Gospels, apart from their differences *inter se*, plainly contain, in each case, examples of an incongruous mixture of Israelitish mythology with the genuine oracles of eternal life; and it is only by spiritual analysis that the permanent Divine essence can be disengaged from its perishable historical appendages. This is but the old distinction between "the letter" and "the spirit," — never yet effectively carried out except by the Society of "Friends"; the Catholics' vow of allegiance being taken to "the Church," the Protestants' to "the letter of Scripture"; the "Friends," to the *inward* "*Spirit of God*" in the responding Conscience.

Looking at our College from this point of view, I think it lays too *preponderant* — not to say *exclusive* — a stress on

TO MR. P. H. COGGINS

unimpeachable criticism and interpretation of the text of Scripture; as if to get at their meaning and appropriate it was to fulfil the conditions of Christian discipleship. This Protestant scripturalism, happily loosening its hold, is absolutely fatal to any noble enthusiasm of piety in the present day; and the real disciple, who is caught up and transformed by the spirit of the Master, receives his regeneration from a few divinely cleansing words,—a beatitude here, a parable there, a cry of prayer beneath the midnight sky,—which lay open his intimate communion with the Father of spirits. Would that these glimpses, on which we may depend as unmodified by the fortuities of current tradition, were less scanty. They are infinitely precious.

. . . We are still, in my opinion, far behindhand in New Testament criticism and interpretation, and are thereby kept stationary in our hesitating attitude towards Religious Philosophy.

TO MR. P. H. COGGINS.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, SCOTLAND, Aug. 1, 1895.

DEAR SIR,—In trying to comply with your request on behalf of your boy, I fear that I have struck upon a vein of thought more significant to my age than to his. I can only hope that it may not always be useless to have suggestions presented into the full meaning of which one may *grow*.

Accompanying the letter was the following:—

Life and Death.

To the child new born Life has for a few years all the joy of a playground and a holiday; and Death, when he hears of it, the terror of a spectre in the dark. To the Christian reborn it is more awful to live than to die, seeing that he may live all wrong, but cannot die amiss; for the one, managed by his own weak hands, may at any moment become guilty; the other, determined by the wisest Will, cannot fail of being best. He who keeps sleepless watch over the purity of his thought and the rectitude of every choice, and then gives himself up in loving trust for all that happens, has found the secret of the perfect life.

JAMES MARTINEAU.

AUG. 1, 1895.

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The following was written in response to a letter from Mr. P. H. Coggins asking for some word from Dr. Martineau to be read at a meeting of the Unitarian Club of Philadelphia, held in memory of Dr. William H. Furness, then not long deceased:—

APRIL 12, 1896.

Though it has been out of my power to acknowledge your kind letter in time to comply with its request, I cannot withhold my assurance that no words recording the devoted attachment of your "Unitarian Club" to the person and memory of the late Dr. Furness can be too tender or fervent for the reverent affection which I have ever felt towards him. As we had never met, it has been a purely ideal affection not unlike that which brought both of us to the feet of One "whom, having not seen, we loved," and declined to leave when others "went away and walked with him no more." Without being able to accept the particular construction of the Evangelic history which approved itself to him, I clung and still cling as tenaciously as he did to the group of disciples who find, in the Personality of Jesus of Nazareth, the purest and truest realised expression of the right relation between the Human Spirit and the Divine. Here it was, if I mistake not, that our reverent friend found the central essence of the Christian faith and life; and the basis of permanent communion in our inherited religious worship and interpretation of duty. Apart from this historic type, in the vast and untracked plain of speculative thought, there may be *individual* pieties and goodness in countless directions; but hardly any proper *Church*, embracing an enduring brotherhood, and securing a spiritual discipline for the ages. *Philosophies* are always changing; *character* needs a persistency of habit and affection unknown to thought.

TO REV. V. D. DAVIS.

DEC. 29, 1888.

Your words of affectionate memory touch me deeply. Little as I have done to earn them, and unapt as my undemonstrative nature is to seek them, I yet live at heart so much in my old pupils, and draw so many romances from their experiences, that a little affection from them is more to me than louder appreciations from a relatively foreign world.

DEC. 22, 1891.

The attempt to make the word "Unitarian" mean not so much any doctrine as free thought, with a long train of glories to dazzle away the unwelcome original signification, is of a kind which, on reflection, cannot retain your approval. The *meaning* of an epithet surely is found in the quality in virtue of which it is applied. To earn the name "Unitarian," is anything requisite but to hold the Uni-personality of God as distinguished from the Tri-personality? *That*, then, is the word's meaning, and its whole meaning. One of whom it is predicated may be and have all sorts of things besides, some or other of which may come into your mind when you hear his doctrinal position defined; but these are absolutely foreign to the meaning of the word. It is not true, therefore, that "openness to doctrinal change" forms any part of the connotation of the word "Unitarian." To designate our religious body by a term which *burkes* its permanent characteristic and singles out an accident in its history is, in my opinion, at once a logical blunder and a moral unfaithfulness, induced by forgetfulness of all but ourselves and our time. . . .

The plea that, the name being given us by others, we shall be understood only when we take it, is with me a conclusive reason for declining it. They give it to us because *they* have no other rule for classifying the constituent parts of Christendom than the measure of their orthodoxy and their relation to the creeds. If we let them have their way and ourselves appropriate the description, we acquiesce in their rule; to protest against which, in hope of superseding it, is the special mission to which we are born and for which we live. By accepting the name we make sure, therefore, not of being understood, but of being misunderstood. . . .

There is, in short, no escape from the hopeless dilemma; Theology *moves* through the generations; Worshipping Bodies, with their spiritual discipline, *stay*. To seek a name for the latter from the vocabulary of the former must either break up the identity of the Church, or hamper and arrest the progress of Theology.

You cannot wonder at the grave regrets and apprehensions which, with these convictions, I feel in regard to the religious body which has supplied me with my life work. . . . I cannot but enter into Paul's feeling towards Israel, and own that "I have great sorrow in my heart, and could wish myself

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cast away for my brethren's sake," if they only could return to be "the children of the promise."

AUG. 13, 1894.

In what sense, you ask, is God "personally there" in the soul of Christ, otherwise or more than in the soul of every man? If He entirely fills and makes up the mind of Jesus, is not the *humanity* of the latter swallowed up, or left to consist only of his bodily organism? And in that case there is only *One* Person there, and the relation between *two* is lost.

By *Personality* I understand *self-conscious preferential agency*. Where the same volitional preference is, at the same moment, *twice* felt and acted on, *there* are *two Persons*. If the resulting *Act*, outward or inward, be *one*, they are *co-agents* in it. Each is self-conscious of what he wills; and each is aware of what the other wills; each, therefore, knows himself as a Person, and knows the other as a Person; and is "*personally there*." If one be Man and the other God, and the preference be Moral, Man venerates and God approves; and both love the same Righteousness. The co-operation of the two personalities does not appear to me difficult to conceive. Surely God may suggest or inspire the right and holy, while leaving Man free to do it or to refrain; if so, each personality has its clear field of intentional operation, and yet the result is a single act, God being answerable for the possibility, Man for the actuality. A holy volition — a holy character (the sum of such volitions) — can no more issue from *one* personality than a harmony or a unison can come from *one* sounded note; it is a *consonance*, and takes *two* at least to bring it out. And in the moral and spiritual life it is the Divine essence which contains the scale of graduated goodness; and the Divine voice within that, in each case, sets the leading note, inviting the Human to fall in with concordant or identical will.

God, in this view, is no doubt "personally there" in "all human souls, however imperfect"; only, however, in the antecedent promptings to right volitions, not in the determination to wrong ones, or the character as formed or modified by them. These are the discordant elements that jar with his perfection and grate upon his will.

The Divineness which I meant to claim for Jesus is no other than that which I recognise in every human soul which realises its possible communion with the Heavenly Father. And pre-eminence which I ascribe to him is simply one of

TO REV. J. FOSTER

degrece; so superlative, however, as to stand out in strong relief from the plane of ordinary history, and extort the belief of special revealing purpose from the Theist who has faith in the Providential education of the human race.

AUG. 22, 1894.

The doctrine which I describe in the words “merely *represented* by a foreign and resembling being,” and wish to exclude as antithetic to the *personal life* of God in the soul of Jesus Christ, is that of either Arian or Unitarian, who regards Jesus as a *creature* of this or that species, — angel or man, — set up for himself with self-moving faculties “in the image of God,” — a *miniature* of God, — on a larger or a smaller scale, but with no blending or interchange of consciousness. . . . The difference . . . is illustrated by the title which I remember writing on the outside of an early sermon, “The *Imitation* of God the Inspiration of Christ.” I should now express what I mean by saying “Christ the supreme example and revealer of the Immanence of God in the Human Conscience.”

TO REV. J. FOSTER.

MARCH 11, 1894.

For many reasons — partly personal, no doubt, but partly also far transcending all personal considerations — the sympathetic tone of your letter touches me deeply. Though held by conscientious conviction to a Nonconformist position, I have always looked with veneration and affection on the Church of England which excludes me from her communion, and which it is your privilege to serve. And it cannot but be consolatory to me in my involuntary exile to find that in the depths of the religious life we come upon possibilities of fellowship which our ecclesiastical organisations disown. If our English Christendom could be relieved of its overcharge of dogma, and surrendered to the sublime and lovely conditions of the spiritual life, as presented in the “*Imitatio Christi*,” the National Unity would assume a reality and power of which we can now hardly conceive. Some such dream came upon me in early years, and still lingers with me on the verge of my ninetieth year. I thank God if I have been preserved from doing wrong to this faith; and still more, if any word of mine has awakened or fostered it in others.

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MAY 15, 1895.

I trust you will not attribute the long delay of my thanks for your benedictory message on my recent birthday to any deficient sense of its value and great generosity. No assurance of sympathy and appreciation, of all which that anniversary brought to me, has more deeply touched me; for the craving for the widening of religious fellowship has always been intense with me; and, in particular, a strong blending of national with religious feeling has maintained in me a veneration for the Church of England which has rendered Nonconformity a necessity of conscience and not a willing preference; so that every evidence of lessening alienation, every opening of hope for returning unity and co-operation, without tampering with inward conviction, has a more welcome significance for me than the known concurrence of friends and fellow-worshippers.

I am censured by many of my theological comrades for my want of missionary zeal for purposes of *doctrinal conversion*. It is true that I shrink from disturbing anyone's faith by which he righteously lives, and even believe that different types of doctrine have a natural congruity with different stages of culture and character. These co-existences I would not try to tear asunder, though I would gladly, if I could, help to lift any soul from a lower stage to a higher. This, however, can be done only by appeal to the moral consciousness and spiritual affections which render higher ideals possible; apart from which mere detection of error and exposure of inconsistency will bring no "salvation." Often, I am persuaded, it takes a good deal of deep-rooted affectional piety *to bear*, without spiritual loss, a considerable change of dogmatic or even historical belief which has once received the orthodox stamp. Those, however, who are imbued with the ineradicable assurance that *the true is always the Divine* and, when first found, has the character and authority of Revelation, can never be afraid of losing harmony with God by relinquishing what He has never sanctioned or blest.

MARCH 1, 1896.

The joy of sympathy and the aspiration towards unity in matters of religious experience are to me so deep that I cannot adequately express my gratitude for your fervent response to what it has been given me to say on the Divine relations and contents of our human life.

TO MISS FROST

I see much to support your conviction of a hopeful spiritual change in the conception of the Christian essentials by the clergy and the reflective and instructed laity of your Church, and of some communions — especially Scotch — outside of it. The desire for fellowship in spite of intellectual difference, if not for unity, is producing conspicuous effects. . . . But the difficulty is enormous of stirring the dead weight of usage, tradition, and dogmatic language professing to define the Infinite, which presses on the soul of our time and imprisons its breath of life.

My eventide is far advanced, and I shall not see the coming fulfilment of Christ's Prayer for the union of his disciples with each other, with himself and with his Father and our Father. May it be yours to welcome its assured arrival!

APRIL 28, 1897.

Your generous message of benediction on the completion of my ninety-second year adds a delightful brightness to an anniversary already charged with grave and grateful thought; and most heartily do I thank you for words of sympathetic recognition which rarely pass across a theological interval so wide. So deep is the debt which I owe to the whole Christian literature of faith and piety, and to the holy lives of which it is the expression, that it is a grievous pain to me to be met, as often happens, with words of excommunication; and is correspondingly refreshing to have the welcome accorded to me of a true spiritual fellowship. It is too much to expect in these days that we should melt down our theological differences into a single *regula fidei*. But I do earnestly wish that, leaving each communion to its own inheritance of doctrine, we could organise ourselves into a *federation* of Christian Churches, co-operating for common social and spiritual work congenial to all, while leaving undisturbed the usages special to each. Until such an experiment is tried, we shall never know how closely and divinely we are bound together by the undying capacities of Love which make us Sons of God and Brethren to each other.

TO MISS FROST.

APRIL 24, 1891.

For the delay of my sincere thanks for your kind remembrance of my birthday I feel sure of your indulgence, in consideration of the rush of correspondence which, on such

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occasions, is involved in friendships far and wide. Could I but borrow Mr. Gladstone's rapid pen, a day would suffice for my acknowledgments all round. But old age shuts me up in a "slow coach," while he runs his bicycle down hill. Accept, however, at last a gratitude which is none the less true because its pace is slow. My life work no doubt is nearly done. Not that I have any desire to round it off and drop complacently into my easy-chair, as if I had earned an idle holiday. For no individual life can be more than a fragment in the great human story, or a thread or two in the Providential web which is for ever being woven. So, as long as strength remains to fling the shuttle, I do not reckon on altogether leaving the loom.

TO REV. PAUL R. FROTHINGHAM.

MARCH 10, 1893.

This summer will probably draw you for a time into the great vortex of the Chicago meeting of the waters, — the vast sweep of which, I must confess, rather terrifies than exalts my imagination. I can place as little trust in such "Parliaments of all Religions" as in an Ecumenical Council. All theological assemblies that I have ever attended, or distantly observed, have created more differentiation than union. It is the *unspoken religion* that lies beneath all words, in which we are at one; and it passes the wit of man to *define* without *separating*. Whatever *temporal* benefits may accrue from a concentrated exhibition of the industry and arts of all nations, I cannot be sanguine in my expectation of its *spiritual* results.

THE POLCHAR, June 19, 1893.

Among the many marks left by the genius of Emerson on the intellectual habits of your reading people, one of the most striking, I have often thought, is the taste for *epigram*, as the high-pressure engine charged with detached inspirations. His spiritual forces seemed to work chiefly in this way, by successive condensations of light into some brilliant flash of wisdom that instantly became a fixed star in the sky, — quite unlike a rhetorical gas-comet carrying its nucleus no-whither and sweeping half the heavens with a tail that can neither light nor hide anything. Many are the prophetic utterances which you may take out of Emerson and redeliver wherever the language is understood, without losing any portion of their

TO REV. DR. FURNESS

truth. But to no one else, of contemporary writers, would this experiment be less than fatal. . . . I have several times acquiesced in the wish of compilers to avail themselves of passages from my books. The excerpts being few, and hidden in a mass of more important matter, I waived all scruple. But when the question is of making a selection from my writings alone, the reluctance comes upon me in greater force. I am absolutely without Emerson's exceptional gift of vision and its expression. My function through life has been the study and teaching of Logic and Philosophy; and my whole modes of thought and writing have been forced into lines of *continuity*, leaving scarcely anything separable from its context. For this I have several times been punished by alighting upon extracts bearing my name of which I could make neither head nor tail till I had ferreted out the context. . . . My preference, therefore, would be to leave what I have published in its present form during the short remainder of my life.

TO REV. DR. FURNESS.

FEB. 29, 1888.

It is not difficult to me to dispense with *public* approval in matters of deep inward conviction. But here and there are a few loved and venerated men, whose sympathy at once intensifies my faith and doubles my joy in it, and this it is that makes your words¹ so precious to me. I pray you, do not worry yourself with my metaphysics;—they are but medicine for sickly minds, which the healthy may well fling away as they would “apples of Sodom.” It is the constructive part of the book in which alone I do profoundly care for fellowship; precisely because it is out of the sphere of “originality,” and only recites once more the eternal conditions of our common life and love. I believe in the permanent necessity of the philosophic schools which torment the wits of mankind. It is useless to rave at them as the scientific and scholarly men are apt to do. Their modes of thought lie behind the first assumptions of all that can be practically learned or taught, and will force themselves into consciousness with a few of the learners and teachers,—though unsuspected by the rest. And when once they speak out, they will not be put off till their rights have been determined and set

¹ In reference to “A Study of Religion.”

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clear of false pretensions set up on their behalf. The critical process to which, I believe, this task is possible gives no new revelation, but reinstates us where we intuitively stood, only with certainty secured that the ground is not hollow beneath us.

It is refreshing to hear of your continued immunity from all the usual disabilities of age. I am your junior by three years; but I could not legibly tell you so, had I not glasses for my eyes. And deafness in one ear obliges me to choose my place with care at any meeting where the interest depends on speech or music, and to manœuvre with a companion in a walk to get hold of his right arm. Else, this ninth decade is little different with me from its predecessors, unless it be that my work is slower and cannot be dashed off in haste as in younger days.

I thank you heartily for "The Faith of Jesus." I am with you in devoted acceptance of that faith in its essence, its self-evidence and its applications; though, to reach it, I should remove some of the alleged reports of it in the Gospels, which you are able to retain; and to hold it, do not find it requisite or possible to reckon among its effects the "signs and wonders" attached to it in the narrative. The features of a transcendent personality may be guaranteed to us by internal evidence. But external facts must rest on testimony; and *that* is shown, by the historical criticism of the last thirty years, to fail us completely, as I am obliged to own. In this there is to me far more gain than loss; the lines and touches of colour which have vanished from the prior image of Jesus have left his figure fainter indeed but diviner far than I had conceived before, and clearer than ever of all responsibility for the strange mythology by which Christendom has hid it from view. I have no faith in a religious future for those who renounce their allegiance to that personality; whether to try a Philosophical Theism, or a bare Ethical Ideal, without him.

APRIL 14, 1889.

Your charming letter of birthday greeting makes me feel as if, with the grasp of your loving hand, I stood by your side on the verge of two worlds but a step apart,—one in the twilight of tender memories, the other in the dawn of brighter hopes. I often think, in these evening hours of life, of what W. H. Channing said to me within two or three days of his departure, — "I have long lived so freely in the invisible

TO MR. T. HORNBLOWER GILL

future just as in the remembered past, that the boundary of the two worlds has almost vanished and reduced death to naught." To his intensely ideal nature, this was simply true. Those of us who, though in advance of his age, are still day-labourers here, with unfinished tasks that press for completion, may perhaps be pardoned if they have not yet reached the point of absolute indifference at which his spirit rested in suspense.

Gently as old age deals with me, your wonderful energy far outstrips my poor performance. I have left the pulpit, the lecture-room, the public meeting, and the private dinner-party, and now concentrate what faculty I have on quiet work within my own study.

TO MR. T. HORNBLOWER GILL.

JAN. 26, 1891.

What is the right thing to do, when you bring up your Samson strength and floor me, and then retire, begging me not to take the trouble of picking myself up again? Would not even a man of peace, like John Bright, try another round, before he consented to lie sprawling in the dust? I own that I dare not venture it, unless we could change the ground. I willingly look up to you as an *historical giant*; and if the Book of Acts could be adequately treated and tested as a history, giving an undistorted photograph of persons and facts, I should offer no resistance to your main plea for an early date, — that a biographer who knew the end could not stop short of it. To give the reasons why I cannot find the true key to the book in any such simple conception would be to write a treatise on it three times as long as the "Horæ Paulinæ," for the most part repeating or qualifying what has been already advanced by Zeller, Wellhausen, and Pfeleiderer. But, even without having to transport oneself to a new point of view, there are some definite indications that your early date is really not tenable. If we accept the book as the sequel to the Third Gospel, it is further removed from the destruction of Jerusalem, which was undeniably past when the Gospel was written (Luke xxi. 20 *sqq.*). The death of Paul was six years prior to that event. To the writer of Acts xx. 25 the life of Paul, it is evident, had already closed; and verses 29, 30 unmistakably describe the mischief done by the Gnostic schools of Asia Minor towards the middle of the second century. Indeed, the book, as I read it, reflects throughout —

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in its dominant ideas, its relation of parties, its Church stage of development and constitution — the *post*-apostolic Christianity, and quite misses or blurs the picture, preserved in the Pauline epistles, of the apostolic age.

The only *external* testimony that can have the least weight, as reporting the prevalent tradition about the book, is that of Irenæus. And he refers its composition to the time after the death of Peter and Paul (Hær. III. i. 1).

TO REV. JAMES HARWOOD.

FEB. 5, 1890.

I thank you heartily for the copy of your little Manual. I have read it with much sympathy, and with the more interest because I had previously a very vague idea of the interior nature and intended working of the Guilds now so prevalent. I fear I hardly deserve the credit you give me as a welcomer of the newer forms of activity in our churches; for, in truth, I look on them with very mixed feelings, and on some which I see here with serious disapprobation. I fully believe that a Guild like yours, under such control and guidance as you would exercise, might contribute much to strengthen and elevate the characters of the members. But such agencies appear to me to carry in them dangers which, under average conditions of management, threaten grave evils. The life of the spirit and its work in the conscience are essentially *private*, a secret relation between the soul and God; and cannot be made *social*, as matter of speech and virtual contract between man and man (or child and child), without loss of self-respect and native dignity. It is a betrayal of the secret of God. Between a parent and a child, between a true pastor and an *individual* who looks up to him, between two closely attached friends, the confidences of the inner life may be open and in common. But more witnesses they do not bear; and, if made the matter for a Limited Company or a Club, they lose their sanctity. They are apt to over-shoot the range of the ruder character, or to fall short of the aspirations of the more elevated, and draw both into an unreal zone of brotherhood, or else drive them into critical antipathy.

Social worship, by basing itself on the *Universal* human relations with God, which are, or ought to be, the subject-matter of the hymns and prayers prescribed for the *general voice*, reserves for the Preacher alone, before a silent assembly, the development of this common Religion into its

TO MISS HOLLINS

applications to the needs and duties of the personal life in young and old, man and woman, rich and poor; leaving the lesson to sink into the individual conscience, without question and without pledge.

. . . I acknowledge, however, that the verdict must be on the evidence, not of reasoned anticipations, but of realised fact.

TO MRS. A. HIGGINSON.

JUNE 6, 1889.

I wonder whether you mean to send in your name in support of the Ladies' Protest against conferring the political franchise on women. I rather want my party here to send their signatures. The Protest is well drawn, and, to me, convincing. I was in favour of the admission of women on the County Councils, and signed a memorial to that effect; but on the ground that these local bodies, like the Boards of Guardians and of Education, had charge of duties in which women are more at home than men. With the political franchise it is quite otherwise. I do not know how our political condition strikes you. But it seems to me that it is long since we have had an administration of affairs so admirable, for firmness, wisdom, and temper, as that of the present government.

TO MISS HOLLINS.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, Aug. 15, 1891.

The acceptance of finite limits of varying range is perhaps the chief discipline of life for minds capable of infinite aspirations; and the effort and prayer for its attainment are the source of what is sweetest in poetry and deepest in human piety. Each one, therefore, will realise what he was meant to be, by steadfastly doing the best that he or she may be able to do with unwasted strength for more.

May it not be that your difficulty is enhanced by your conception of the essence of human goodness as "the hunger for spiritual perfection"? For my part, I cannot look on this or any other type of self-consciousness as at all high in the scale of excellence, or free from the taint of æsthetic ambition. Till self-perfecting is replaced by self-oblivion in sacrificing love and service of others, the soul is not yet in the train of the heroes and saints of righteousness. Not that

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I would limit this love and service to direct acts of compassion and movements of reform in social manners and relations.

The searchers after truth, the interpreters of right, the revealers and creators of new beauty, have also their place in the same class, provided their work is in true devotion to their object, and not for the adornment or glory of themselves. But they too, in this devotion, are not exempt from the duty of working within the healthy limits of the faculties intrusted to them. . . .

The limits to aspiration imposed by physical conditions and outward circumstances soon become unfelt, when once they are recognised and provided for by a wise adjustment of habits, steadily adhered to till they become automatic. The fresher and intenser life, released in the remaining intervals, will be healthier and more availing for being unforced; and will condense more into its small increments than might be given forth in its effusive moods of overstrain.

But even were it not so, it would still remain the part of childlike trust and surrender to the Perfect Will to fall into the place assigned and do with joy the best work which it permits.

TO REV. A. W. JACKSON.

35 GORDON SQUARE, March 14, 1892.

With regard to the New Testament criticism, I am sure you must have at Cambridge far better counsellors than I am. In my late resumed studies I have relied chiefly on direct and close application to the Scriptures themselves, and though keeping myself up with the German periodical journals of Theology, have depended less than ever before on the favourite authorities of the different schools. But, having by me or within easy reach Lightfoot's, Westcott's, and Sanday's books, as well as your Norton's and Ezra Abbott's, Holtzmann's "*Einleitung in das Neue Testament*," Harnack's "*Dogmengeschichte*," Weizsäcker's "*Apostolisches Zeitalter der Chr. Kirche*," I have found in all these copious references to other writers, confirming or opposing, whose works I have consulted, when desirable, at the British Museum or elsewhere; often purchasing them for myself when needed for repeated use. Pfeiderer's English book, "*The Development of Theology in Germany and Great Britain*," is probably familiar to you as well as his German "*Das Urchristenthum*." Good editions of the earliest Christian

TO REV. A. W. JACKSON

literature — Otto's of "Justin Martyr," Dressel's and Lightfoot's of the "Apostolical Fathers," Hilgenfeld's of the "Novum Testamentum extra canonem receptum" — are indispensable, unless one lives under the same roof as a College or Public Library. . . .

You ask me in what light old age presents to me the world I am so soon to quit. Often do I wish that I could see it dressed in such a radiant sunshine of immediate promise as cheers the nonagenarian vigour of our dear friend Dr. Furness. But did I not "live by *faith*" — had I to "live by *sight*" of the social and spiritual tendencies preponderating now, I should breathe my parting word in time more with Jeremiah than with Isaiah. For our little Israel's participation in the future of English religious history I have less and less hope every year. But all the Divine possibilities remain locked in our humanity, and sure, either here or there, to free themselves into realisation. Resting in this, I can lay to sleep all impatient haste, and wait His time.

MAY 23, 1895.

The generous greeting which, to my surprise, has met me as a nonagenarian makes me thankful for the opposite discipline which I experienced sixty years ago, when even by my fellows I was treated like the naughty boy of a school whom nobody would countenance and everybody might kick. The misappreciation then and over-appreciation now happily balance each other, and will keep me, I hope, from turning giddy, and simply serve as a curious mark of the lowered theological temperature. Short of secularism itself, it is hardly possible to be a heretic *now*; but *then* it was enough to call in question the logic of Paul, the Messiahship of Jesus, or the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel. Doubtless there is now a latent preparedness of mind among impartial scholars for a recast of the early history of Christianity incompatible with the retention of any one of the Creeds yet formulated; and under the great difficulty of discriminating and saving the really Divine nucleus and its sacred Personality, the ecclesiastical traditions, with its cluster of unhistoric accretions of Gnostic speculations, will hold its nominal place long after the insecurity of its base has become known.

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TO PROFESSOR KNIGHT.

FEB. 14, 1886.

The startling announcement in last night's papers of the death of Principal Tulloch gives me a sad excuse for breaking my too long silence towards you, that I may beseech you to tell me something of an event for which I was so little prepared, and which I so deeply deplore. From its occurrence at *Torquay*, I cannot but surmise that it may have been preceded by a return of the same grievous experience which produced on me so profound and pathetic an impression in a mere half-hour's interview in 1881. The vigour with which he opened the next session, and his brightness and animation in a call upon [? me] a few months later, re-established my hopes that he had before him perhaps the best part of a useful and distinguished career. His influence is lost to the Church of Scotland at a time when it can ill be spared.

THE POLCHAR, June 17, 1886.

When you spoke of your probably being in London for Examination work in the latter part of June or the beginning of July, I was encouraged to hope that we might meet. But your answer to our Centenary invitation indicates, I fear, that your visit is not likely to occur within that week, on the Saturday evening of which we turn our faces northward again;—unless, indeed, the South St. Pancras election should detain me a day or two longer. The Conservative for whom I voted at the last election has very improperly started again, although Sir Julian Goldsmidt went with Lord Hartington on the Irish Bill; and I feel bound to protest against disturbing Sir Julian. This whole political madness of Gladstone's is, I fear, the beginning of a most disastrous episode in our history. Even if the country pronounces against it (about which I am not sanguine), the substitute proposals and leanings which it elicits in rivalry or opposition to it appear to me little less blind and mischievous; and the practice, now sanctioned by both parties, of admitting such fellows as Parnell to counsel, reduces the art of Government to utter degradation. Our time of decadence has too plainly set in. How I should like to talk these things over with you! and yet every reflection upon them turns to pain; for delusion and slavery to empty phrases seem to me to have fastened themselves as consuming parasites upon the public mind. . . .

TO PROFESSOR KNIGHT

To-morrow we all of us return to London for a week or ten days; actually shutting up this cottage till we reappear. I dread the week in London, made up, as it is to be, of perpetual public meetings, with such a number of *speaking*s that I threaten at home to be dumb for a month in apology for the unpardonable excess. I trust it is my last call to such publicity; for, repugnant to me always, it has become intensely so, as my habits have grown more quiet and my nerve less strong.

SEPT. 19, 1888.

These *Church subjects*, I confess, though always attracting me, fill me with despondency. The reading of your good Bishop's Charge, with the Lambeth Conference proposals, of which it treats, sinks me into *despair* of all ecclesiastical Christianity; so hopelessly vast is the gulf [? between] the whole instituted scheme of thought involved in it, and the real truth, beauty, and goodness secreted within the Religion of Christ. In the selection which Authority has made from the mixed elements inevitable in every historical product, the *Transient* seem to have been seized upon for consecration and enforcement, and the *Eternal* for suppression and contempt. How anyone who has acquaintance with the present stage reached by Biblical and Historical criticism can bear the puerilities and unrealities of ecclesiastical discussion, I cannot understand. The nearest to the mind of Christ appear to me to be among the people who believe the least of these things, and, were they only swept away, would build in a trice a spiritual Temple not made with hands. Yet I never feel this iconoclastic [? mood] except when I read or hear the lucubrations of Church Conferences and Synods. It was well for me that, from my residence here, I was unable to attend the London meeting of Nonconformist Ministers with the Bishops who were experimenting on the possibility of union. If I had not met the fate of Stephen, it would have been only because words are not stones.

EAST FARLEIGH, April 24, 1889.

In all my budget of friendly greetings that followed me hither on Monday last, there were no good wishes more precious to me than yours. They are the kind of treasure which make life still dear to me; and while they last, old age can never lose its brightness. How I wish that you could have realised my dream of having you and yours for our neighbours

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this summer. The stimulus of talk with you on the great topics which are supreme with us both is all that I need to help and quicken me in the work which still engages me, a work in which I am apt to flag through self-distrust and the failure of hope incident to solitary labour. It is so hard for waning faculty to detect its own decline, that I am ever in dread of self-deception, lest I should be going on too long and growing garrulous when I should be silent.

I am delighted to hear of your projected lectures at Salisbury. Will it fall in your way, I wonder, to study and criticise the curious type of vague or semi-theism which comes out in Nettleship's life of Thomas Hill Green, in vol. 3 of the collected works? It reveals a state of mind which I suspect to be very prevalent, but which can never set into any form of permanent influence. It is either the last faint streak of a dissolving nebula, or the first visible undulation of an ethereal medium that must condense into a central sun.

THE POLCHAR, Oct. 10, 1890.

Was ever a poor weak will assailed by such a shower of killing hits as you direct upon mine? a perfect *mitrailleuse* of persuasive pleas before which, it would seem, everything must go down. To be under your roof again, — to see and hear the "long desired" Edward Caird, as well as the other honoured guests whom you propose to bring together, — what more enticing group of privileges could be devised to play upon me? And yet I must harden myself against them all, though well aware that such opportunity can never occur again. I will not trouble you with reasons. The main fact is that our plans — involving a lady guest and fellow-traveller — are fixed for a return to town within this month, and engagements are made depending on this date. Moreover, though I am not unmindful of Cicero's advice, — "*resistendum est senectuti*," — I cannot hide from myself that I am but an unworthy intruder now (perhaps always was, had I known myself as well) upon the "colloquies of the gods," and am in my proper place only at home among my people and at my study-desk.

Do not think me ungrateful, but lay my refusal on *Anno Domini*, not on my will.

THE POLCHAR, Oct. 30, 1892.

I half reproach myself for an exceptionally unfruitful summer. The week in Dublin was profoundly interesting to me

TO PROFESSOR KNIGHT

on all accounts, private and public. In going through it, I felt as if I were completing my appointed lot, and winding off its latest thread at the very point of its first attachment. The visit, however, to Lord Rosse's and the great telescope was new and a most interesting episode.

APRIL 23, 1893.

Accept my warmest thanks for your kind remembrance of my anniversary, and the words of benediction with which you brighten the day. They tell me I am eighty-eight, but I only half believe it, having so little in my conscious life to bring it home to me.

MAY 12, 1895.

It is shocking to find that three weeks have slipped by since the receipt of your most generous and touching birthday greeting, still left by me in graceless silence. But in simple truth, the necessity has been laid upon me of answering the voluminous correspondence due to that day almost in the inverse order of its personal interest, beginning with the addresses of public bodies, passing through many surprising assurances of fellowship from cleric and lay members of churches which pronounce me excommunicate; and only at last entering the beloved circle of my spiritual home and select friends.

It would indeed be pleasant could I, on looking back over my long years of opportunity, appropriate, even in small measure, your far too appreciative estimate. Rather must I side with the critics who tell me that, instead of guiding others, I have always been disturbing them. The mere record of my own personal changes of theological conviction, and the withdrawal by myself of certain early publications from reproduction, seem to make good the charge of instability. The only answer I can make itself includes an acknowledgment of the impeachment, viz., that what has been relinquished is historical tradition which partially crumbles away under the skilled search for its foundation; while what has been retained is the living and present relation witnessed by consciousness itself, between the human spirit and the Divine, and when once known there, re-found and recognised in its perfection under the unique personality of "Christ, our Head." The substitution, in short, of Religion at *first-hand*, straight out of the immediate interaction between the Soul and God, for Religion at *second-hand*, fetched, by copying, out of anonymous traditions of the Eastern Mediterranean eighteen cen-

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turies ago, has been the really directing, though hardly conscious, aim of my responsible years of life. So far as it is one-sided, it will doubtless be corrected and supplemented by teachers of wider and deeper vision. I thank God if it has been intrusted with any function serviceable for the needs of its day.

APRIL 25, 1896.

I have had, at times, some fear of outliving the patience of my friends. But thus far,—even into this tenth decade, I have experienced nothing [? but] their forbearance and supporting affection. I owe much, I believe, to the happy privilege of having, through nearly eight out of my ten decades, been, as a teacher, continuously in contact with the young, and kept in sympathy with the developing thought and feeling of almost three generations. No man can have less excuse for falling out of touch with the living movements and problems of his latest time. It would be nothing less than a heinous sin in me to become superannuated. Yet such, assuredly, I am in the eyes of our Agnostics and Positivists.

JULY 13, 1897.

I am reading with much interest a remarkable book on the "Philosophy of Religion," by the French Professor Sabatier, lent me by Dr. Reith, the Free-Kirk Professor and Minister at Glasgow, now occupying the neighboring Manse for a few weeks. Sabatier is the Dean of the Faculty of Protestant Theology in the Collège de France. Sabatier's theology is a peculiar mixture of free-thinking criticism with reverence for the religion of Christ as the supreme point as yet reached of human thought on Divine things. The position indicates a considerable change in the French Protestantism since the time of Guizot.

TO MISS E. MAHLER.

THE POLCHAR, Aug. 17, 1896.

If, as you assure me, any writings of mine have helped to extricate you from the tangle of embarrassed thought, it is doubtless due to my having had to deal with the same problems and to clear a pathway through the thicket to the same light. . . . In oneself it is guilt to put up with conscious incoherences of thought and profession; but in others one can readily overlook the very same incoherences unconsciously.

TO MR. MARTIN

held and yet love and venerate the pieties which take their form. For myself I own that the literature to which I turn for the nurture and inspiration of Faith, Hope, and Love is almost exclusively the product of orthodox versions of the Christian religion. The Hymns of the Wesleys, the Prayers of the Friends, the Meditations of Law and Tauler, have a quickening and elevating power which I very rarely feel in the books on our Unitarian shelves. Yet I can less than ever appropriate, or even intellectually excuse, any distinctive article of the Trinitarian scheme of salvation.

TO MR. MARTIN.

APRIL 27, 1896.

MY DEAR MR. MARTIN, . . . It is, perhaps, inevitable that an old man who has spent all his life in this old European world should be unable to rush, in the last heat of his race, into the fleet movement of younger minds in a less patient hemisphere. If I have over-obeyed the precept *Festina lente*, time enough has been given me, as you remark, to put a considerable interval between the aspects of Divine truth from the earlier and the later points of view. But the change all through has been, as it appears to me, not *into* Agnosticism, but *out of* it, and each loss of *Creed* has been a clearance and a gain of *Faith*, — nay, the substitution of an *experience* of God for an unreal *imagination* of Him. The unspiritual *negation* of religion, whether in the form of the Scientist's Atheism, or the Hedonist's *summum bonum* = Happiness, or the Pseudo-Moralist's Utilitarian Ideal, I cannot but look upon with aversion, and disown as a dwarfing and mutilation of Humanity. Were we built upon that kind of pattern, there would be no room for worship, and no place for saint or prophet. I cannot pretend to stand in the midway between Ebal and Gerizim, and smile with impartial benevolence on both.

Do not, however, set me down as enrolled in the Church Militant. I join you, heart and soul, in the longing for nearer approach to religious unity and in the effort to promote it. You have fewer difficulties to encounter on the way to it than we have, and may well take the lead. But there are not wanting signs of preparedness, even here. They will not ripen in my short remnant of lingering on earth; but I shall close my eyes in faith.

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TO MR. A. J. MOTT.

MAY 9, 1895.

Though I have never deeply responded to the Hebrew prayer for length of days, I find myself in fact thankful for old age, so gently has it dealt with me, sparing to me still all the essential interests and affections and even activities of this life, as well as the unclouded trust of its early expansion into a higher. The extravagance of both the scepticism and fanaticism of the age would disturb me more did not both of them exhibit marks of being struck with decrepitude.

TO THE REV. PRIESTLEY PRIME.

DEC. 27, 1885.

Nothing so lightens the gathering shadows of old age as the friendship of the young, and the eager hopes which their noble aims and personal faithfulness awaken. If ever my heart sinks at the sight of the unconquered ills which afflict the world, I cast my eye upon this goodly company of new recruits for the Sacred War, and my faith revives.

DEC. 26, 1886.

It was not without much sadness that I resigned my right and power to help and counsel, so far as experience enabled me, the little band of soldiers of the Cross who were preparing for the future campaign against the remediable sins and sorrows of the world. From my changed position of spectator, I shall never cease to watch, with keen interest, the career of yourself and companions in the same high service. So great is my trust in the noble aims and self-sacrificing spirit of the rising generation of our ministers that my chief anxiety is, lest, in their humanitarian enthusiasm, they should be betrayed, like so many philanthropists of our time (including nearly the whole body of clergy), into vain and disastrous struggles against social and economic laws, which will be found as unyielding as the law of gravitation. I hope, however, that the intellectual mist may clear away before the "blindness in part" which "hath fallen upon Israel" on this side has become total.

JAN. 12, 1888.

I often wonder how it is that we ministers, who represent and wield the most blending and unifying power in the world,

TO THE REV. PRIESTLEY PRIME

—the Religion of Universal Love,—have always been and still are distinguished from other men, not by a more catholic spirit and versatile sympathies, but, on the contrary, by an intenser party zeal and a narrower intolerance of involuntary differences.

JAN. 3, 1892.

Your experience confirms my growing surmise, that the mission which had been consigned to us by our history is likely to pass to the Congregationalists in England and the Presbyterians in Scotland. Their escape from the old orthodox scheme is by a better path than ours. With us, insistence upon the simple Humanity of Christ has come to mean the *limitation of all Divineness* to the Father, leaving Man a mere item of creaturely existence under laws of Natural Necessity. With them the transfer of emphasis from the Atonement to the Incarnation means the retention of a Divine essence in Christ, as the Head and Type of Humanity in its realised Idea; so that Man and Life are lifted into kinship with God, instead of *what had been God* being reduced to the scale of mere Nature. The union of the two natures in Christ resolves itself into their union in Man, and links Heaven and Earth in relations of a common spirituality. It is easy to see how the Divineness of existence, instead of being driven off into the heights beyond life, is thus brought down into the depths within it, and diffuses there a multitude of sanctities that would else have been secularised. Hence, the feeling of reverence, the habits of piety, the aspirations of faith, the hopes of immortality, the devoutness of duty, which have so much lost their hold on our people, remain *real powers* among the liberalised orthodox, and enable them to carry their appeal home to the hearts of men in a way the secret of which has escaped from us. I hardly think we shall recover it now.

There is plenty of scope, however, for any young prophet who can bring into his mission the faith and fervour of more spiritual churches, in combination with the rationality and veracity of ours.

APRIL 26, 1894.

We shall never evangelise the world if we speak to men *as they are*. But the Spirit of God will take them by surprise, if we go to them full of faith and address them as they are *meant to be*.

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MAY 19, 1895.

You can hardly be less sanguine than I have been through life about our religious affairs, denominational and national. Yet action must proceed on the assumption that in the secret hearts of men there is, consciously or unconsciously, a response ready to leap forth on the touch of a believing appeal to latent spiritual truth and goodness. It is the very essence of our function in the prophetic life to take our stand on the "Mount" of the world as God means it to be, and to set this scene forth in its Divine light, and not be cast down by the aspect of things and men as they are. But till the Sacred Standard is raised before the eyes of men, they will stay where they are and will not follow. Take heart, then, dear friend; doubt not, fear not, and depend on it your work will prosper.

TO MISS RAWLINS.

JAN. 5, 1890.

I was present, on Tuesday last, at the funeral of Browning in Westminster Abbey, a most impressive and memorable scene, indicating a range and depth of influence exercised by the poet, of which I had no conception. Of late years I had seen so much of him as to contract a warm affection for him; his personality was more winning to me, *as a whole*, than his poetry, though that also, at its best, is wonderful for its versatility of insight and vigour of delineation.

JAN. 25, 1897.

The record of your experience touches me the more from its abundance and variety of *young* life, so different from the arrested history which constitutes my own; and leaves it but a happy fragment without a future in the world. This privation would have been more grievous to me had I not, as a teacher, been kept through all my active life, in touch with growing minds at every stage and never permitted to fall out of sympathy with their trials and their aspirations. My pupils amount to a vast family dispersed over a wide field of various duty, and almost all endeared to me by memory and sympathy.

TO REV. T. W. SCOTT.

35 GORDON SQUARE, W. C., Nov. 14, 1891.

I have seen no reason to alter the favourable opinion which I expressed at Leeds of either the open theological principle or the representative ecclesiastical constitution characteristic

TO MISS —

of the English Presbyterians of Baxter's school. Nor do I see anything to render their revival impracticable, if only there were the will to have recourse to a uniform and undogmatic Church order. But it is too plain that the historical descendants of those old Nonconformists have simply slipped down from a Trinitarian orthodoxy into a Unitarian orthodoxy, and have lost all appreciation of the catholicity indispensable to a Christian Church, as well as of the rules of moral order and spiritual qualifications essential to the efficient working of every religious organisation. To the formation of a *Unitarian Church* by combining our societies of similar theology, I greatly prefer their scattered and unorganised condition; and from such a Church I should have openly to secede. There is far less excuse for such a creation than for a Trinitarian Church, where the specified doctrine is reckoned among the conditions of salvation and is a spiritual essential of discipleship, and not simply an intellectual judgment. I greatly fear that the tendency in this undesirable—nay, fatal—direction is beyond arrest, and will issue in conferring an ecclesiastical character upon the British and Foreign Unitarian Association, at present a body of private subscribers to the propagation of a particular theology. Meanwhile, the Provincial Assemblies, old and new, are not yet gathered together under this or any other Head, and alone make any approach to the exercise of ecclesiastical influence. With you, I much prefer the Presbytery, as a regularly constituted and open court, to the occasionally elected and close Advisory Committee, for the functions committed to it. But, in the absence of the former, I should have voted for the latter, rather than leave things as they are. The evil of the present hap-hazard way of enrolling ministers and assigning pulpits is serious, and admits of some control by requiring, or at least recommending, the sanction of a small council of persons elected for their competency to judge. . . . It is vain to expect, however, that so short-lived and accidental a tribunal should carry the weight which a recognised and standing court would impart to its decisions.

TO MISS —.

OCT. 8, 1837.

I have often thought, during your enforced absences from home, of writing to you a word of (alas! unavailing) sympathy in your trying experience of interrupted health,—

LETTERS, 1885-1898

rendered the more severe by removing you from the responsible daughter's natural place by the bedside of her prostrated mother. Relief from that aggravation comes in the form of a new sorrow,—or, shall I say, a solemn and pathetic parting that must not be a sorrow?—in which I am so large a sharer that I cannot but say something of what is in our hearts. A shrinking of natural reverence oppresses me, in living intercourse, with a reserve which it is the privilege of death to remove; and now that we are severed by the interval of worlds, I may say that your mother has for many years been one of the sanctities of life and thought to me. Whilst her outward lot half tempted one to look on this scene of things as simply cruel, her inward spirit so transfigured it as to demonstrate it divine. The latter years of personal and family affliction naturally leave the strongest impression upon the memory of her friends. But her younger days of unbroken vigour are still fresh in my remembrance; when, in common with her sisters, she was conspicuous for a rare combination of eager intellect, in constant prayer for *light*, and deep affections, aspiring to all that is *good*, and devout humility, ready always to look up and trust. And though her term of allotted years seemed to be broken in two and half disabled, yet, after all, she had time enough for all the grand functions of a human soul,—to think, to act, to suffer,—and be purified by conquest in them all. We may well be thankful that the deliverance is come, and the welcome given into a more fitting and sacred society than ours. And if to any of her children should be assigned some partial touch of an experience like hers, they know whither to turn for their supporting saint,—or rather, the guardian “Angel, who always beholds the face of the Father in heaven.”

TO MR. OSWALD SIMON.

Nov. 5, 1896.

This rude claim of Authority—“I told you, so you know”; “Do it, or you’ll catch it”—has lost its persuasiveness for us; and to work it now is retrogradation. With us, the process is inverted. It is through the felt imperative claim inherent in *the morally higher call* that we *know it to be Divinely given*. The Sinai phenomena are out of reach and do not happen; the Moral intuition is living still, with all its revealing significance. We do not believe the sanctity be-

TO MR. BOSWORTH SMITH

cause it is written; it is written as sacred, *because it is believed.*

The immediate witness of God and all the Divine truth that concerns us is in our own hearts, and can pass from heart to heart by faithful and sympathetic interpretation; and to desert this living communion for questionable inferences from legendary miracles in support of a code of artificial rites and animal sacrifices appears to me a misconstruction of our duty, and a blindness to our true place in the course of time and the development of human experience. Blessed be Israel as our Schoolmaster! and doubly blessed when rejoicing in the matured form of a Divine Humanity transcending the first idea; and this, I believe, is within sight and possibility.

TO MR. BOSWORTH SMITH.

DEC. 4, 1887.

I assent most heartily to all that you say¹ of the elevating power of Islam, in virtue of its elementary principles. I assent, with far intenser convictions, to all that you say about the infinite superiority of Christianity, and the absolute duty, for those who feel this, of never stopping short of that Divinest of all gifts to men. And yet the Missionary problem is obscured to me by the evident correlation of all the elements of human culture, rendering the co-existence absolutely impossible of the purest and most spiritual religion with a condition of character and society swayed by passion and hardly yet emerging into intellectual and moral life. I will not say that undeveloped races, if evangelised, are no better for their baptism. But I do say that Christendom—nay, Christianity—is the worse for it; even if the recipient and the gift meet halfway, the religion of Christ becomes a shrivelled caricature, and loses its true grandeur and tender power. Our large modern knowledge of the lower types of mankind, and of the immense interval of capacity by which their several stages are separated, *must* modify our missionary aims and methods. And I am inclined to think that religious conversion cannot be kept to the front as the *first* aggression to be made upon barbarism; but that civilisation should be carried into new seats *in all its dimensions together*, or even in an order which shall assure a certain preparation of intelligence and conscience, *before* “the heavens are opened” and the “Dove descends.”

¹ In an article in the “Nineteenth Century.”

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TO REV. S. A. STEINTHAL.

MARCH 8, 1896.

After having so often borne what testimony I could in favour of catholicity in our congregational fellowship, and found it ineffective, I feel bound to accept my defeat and retire to the rear. The only result of our pleading hitherto has been the absurd combination of *Open Trust Deeds* for Chapels defining themselves by a *Close Name*; by which means the existing generation contrives to enjoy the double pleasure of *actual exclusiveness* and the cheap repute of *post-poned comprehensiveness*. They fail to see that the name *Unitarian* assumed by a Church is a warning to all other disciples that the place is not for fellowship with them.

If you and others who are like-minded in this matter are encouraged to move in it by protest or rediscussion, I will gladly sign any document which you prepare. But beyond this I feel that I should only injure you by what will be regarded as an irritating pertinacity on behalf of a baffled cause.

TO REV. C. J. STREET.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, Aug. 7, 1890.

I deplore with you the increasing resort to ecclesiastical Bazaars. Their success affects me with more shame than rejoicing. We have just had one here; and I told my neighbour, the Minister, that I would send him nothing for his wife's stall unless it were a velvet collecting-bag, labelled conspicuously "For gifts direct." My personal offering he accepted from my purse; but all the rest was got by fancy shop-keeping out of people persuaded to purchase what they did not want. It is no good sign of progress in the Christian life that we need to disguise the simple pieties and charities in the forms of the market and the exchange. I could welcome a prophet who should repeat the needful "cleansing of the temple."

JUNE 7, 1896.

Accept my cordial thanks for your compendious little volume on the great theme¹ old as human thought and yet for ever new. I am grateful if anything in my lectures upon it spoke to you, as you say, helpfully and congenially; for in systematic discussions on this subject I have rarely found

¹ Immortality.

TO MISS A. SWANWICK

any deepening of conviction, — and more often a disappointing sense of defective proof. Nor is this wonderful. For it is only *secondary* truths that admit of what is called *proof*; the premises of which are *given* in a little group of *primary*, which we have to take on trust and believe on the blended witness of our thinking and our affectional nature. If the *scientific intellect*, reasoning on the data of sense, cannot follow man further than the grave, *Love* and *Conscience* cannot bury him and have done with him there, but will follow him into the Invisible, which completes the justification of his whole nature. *Faith* is thus presupposed in *proof*, and also supplements and transcends it. And the whole process taken together is the function of Reason. I shall turn to your Treatise with much interest when I can find time to do it justice. But my table is covered always with an arrear of seven or eight books presented to me by the kindness of their authors, and waiting to be read. Yet I am not idle, but do my best to keep pace with my correspondents.

TO MISS A. SWANWICK.

JAN. 18, 1893.

I do not wonder that you find it a knotty problem to decide between the claims and the defects of the Ethical Societies. It is impossible not to welcome Moral Culture and coherent Moral convictions on any terms, where they can be induced or increased in minds previously ill furnished with them. And for the many who in these days have become alienated from all theological belief there is great need of some provision for holding fast the reverence for right and clearing the order of moral obligations. *For them*, Ethics are at the summit of life, — the crown of its meaning; and to sweep the clouds away from them can only increase the blessing of light. But then, you must be prepared to accept whatever may be shown you as the cloud is driven away, — whatever is hid beneath the mystery of Duty; even though *that* should be the very Presence Divine, the presupposition of which you had renounced at the beginning.

Now against this the Ethical Society makes express provision. It insists on holding Ethics to a *neutral position* towards Theism, — none the worse for being without it; none the better for being with it, having no dependence upon it for either root or fruit.

This assumed isolation of Ethics and elimination of the

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Theological idea from their meaning and contents is, to me, the falsest of all the propositions that have been advanced on the subject. It simply assassinates the living object of study at the outset, and then proceeds to dismember and dissect its corpse. . . .

The Ethical Societies, by their attempt to be rid of Theology, cripple their theories by anticipation, and leave no scope for more than the morality of expediency, or of ungrounded sentiment. For this reason I have never been able to join them, or to expect more from them than the personal satisfaction of the members who find a pleasant fellowship in them.

APRIL 23, 1893.

In those shadows [of my declining years] indeed I find no gloom or chill, — rather a relief from the dazzle of too fervid a life; but it is just in the toning down of the meridian intensities that the softer lights and tenderer tints of pathetic experience touch the soul and reach many a depth invisible before. . . . I am for *both* features of old age, and can welcome its outlook whether backwards or forwards; its exchange of energy for reflection, and its consciousness of unspent aspiration and persistent love, amid the wasting of strength and the caving-in of all that is perishable.

TO MRS. HUMPHRY WARD.

THE POLCHAR, June 7, 1892.

Knocked about at all angles for the last three or four weeks, like a foot-ball short of its goal, I have only just settled down to the reading and re-reading, with intense interest and two-thirds agreement, of your "New Forms of Christian Education." With the general conception unfolded in the paper, and brought to its practical application in the counsels of the central section, — from page 9 to 16 inclusive, — I am entirely at one with you, and full of gratitude for the admirable way in which you uphold "godly sincerity" in education, and put to shame all "liars for God" and patrons of Him, who protect Him by reticence. I doubt not you have experience of *esoteric* friends who tell you, "What you say is true; but you had better not have published it"; or, "There is no denying that the popular belief is an alloy of truth and mythology; but why let the secret out? think what is to become of the old women and children!" What but

TO MRS. HUMPHRY WARD

impiety itself is this education by pious fraud? The distinction which you draw between the *experimental* and the *critical* teaching, as preponderant respectively in the Sunday School and in the educated family, is highly important, and goes perhaps even deeper than in this particular application. The "experimental," appealing to the immediate moral consciousness, goes straight to the very seat of Religion in the child's own nature, and fetches thence a response, not of balancing judgment, but of intuitive affection. Here, then, the teacher addresses the common tribunal of humanity, present alike in the Sunday scholar and the Rugby boy; and there is no reason for trying the plea more often on the one than on the other. But the critical process deals with objective materials, comparison of texts, order of facts, concordance of sayings, coherence of character; for right judgment from which there is need of the trained perceptions and reasoning habit seldom to be expected except in the scholarly class. I profoundly share your conviction, however, that when once the springs of natural reverence in the conscience have been reached in either class, the true principles of critical selection have been set up, and the chief difficulties in sifting the history are practically swept away. They have to be faced; and may be faced without fear, where the mind is religiously prepared. You have so clearly shown the possibility of disengaging the spiritual image at the heart of the gospel from its questionable accessories that I trust you will not withhold such helpful hints from the increasing multitude of negligent parents and embarrassed teachers.

On the prior section of your paper, so ably epitomising the progress of biblical criticism, I have only one insignificant remark to make. It leaves, at least on me, the impression of a much shorter time than has been actually occupied in disqualifying the Scriptures for their old authoritative use, and too readily acquiesces in Mark Pattison's scant justice to such last-century critics as Anthony Collins, Jeremiah Jones, and Lardner. They were far more than pioneers clearing the way and collecting materials; and the light which the first threw on the interpretation of prophecy, the second on the mass of literature from which the canon was selected, the third on the early history of doctrine, has never been extinguished. To the study of their writings seventy years ago I owe by far the greater part of my present modes of critical opinion; all that has come since being but the natural development and application (*mutatis mutandis*, no doubt) of

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what I learned from them and their compeers. That the results, worked out and accumulated since, down to the time of Kuenen and Wellhausen, have burst upon the exoteric public chiefly within the last ten or fifteen years is true enough; but it is—I should say—the *distribution*, not the discovery, of the better light, which is thus recent and sudden. I hope I am not ungrateful to my many revered German instructors. But I cannot say—with understanding assent—that “to the Germans we owe the origin of history in its modern sense.” What the “*modern sense*” is I cannot guess, unless it be the Hegelian movement of “*Die Idee*” in triple pulses through the course of time and the changes of humanity. And this theory, surely, has been worked out, and has reached, if not passed, its time of curtailment. I am not apt to be a “*laudator temporis acti*,” but, as an old man, feel a little jealousy for the honour of predecessors who have been benefactors to me, and, it seems, have passed before me into oblivion.

It is in the third section of your paper, when at page 17 we pass from the Jesus of Galilee to the Jesus of Jerusalem, that I first feel a difficulty in following you. I can nohow find that last Act to be in one piece with the preceding; it affects me as the catastrophe of a tragedy tacked on to a sweet pastoral elegy. The inner life of Jesus which gives its unique expression to the prelude will not work the sequel, I fear, as you describe it. The supposed pretension to the Messiahship breaks the identity and changes the whole moral attitude and relations of the personality. His message hitherto had been that the time was at hand for the kingdom of righteousness on earth, to which, in common with his compatriots, he devoutly looked; he stood, in regard to it, on the same platform with them, and took it home to himself while delivering it to them,—marking his fellowship by sharing with them the baptism of repentance. Now, by a sudden transformation, he appears in the character of *the King*, the secret being revealed at the same moment to himself and to Peter, and allowed to break out aloud and rend the air of the approaches to Jerusalem. This total change of functions, this startling leap upon a throne, with legions at command and sentences of irreversible destiny to pass, it is impossible to make continuous with the characteristics of the Galilean Man of God. His message *then* was one of self-abnegation; now it is turned into one of self-proclamation,—a claim and not a service. And that claim, if really made by him to others,

TO MRS. HUMPHRY WARD

must carry in it what they understood by it,—the coming in the clouds of heaven, the downfall of the kingdoms of the earth, the judgment, and all the scene-shifting of “the last days.” And all these elements of the contemporary Messianic belief are attributed to him by the same Evangelists who make him appropriate the Messianic office at all. They must, in my opinion, either all be taken or all be left.

May it not be, however, as you suggest, that, with the dangers of Jerusalem in view, he framed to himself the original theory of a *suffering Messiah* at the very crisis of Peter’s confession, and so predicted his death while claiming his kingdom? Not only are there no traces of such a theory till after his departure, but it would not work at all without the sequel of the Resurrection of Him “whom the heavens were to receive till the restitution of all things.” It is not without reason, therefore, that the Evangelist conjoins with Christ’s prediction of his *death* the prediction also of his *resurrection* after three days. He could not, as Messiah, have believed in the one without the other. But we cannot doubt that the latter was imported into his prophecy after tradition had wrought it into his history. If, as is very possible, he intimated his forebodings of death at Jerusalem, it would be in his character of messenger, like that of John the Baptist, who also had died in the same service.

If you discard the current Jewish conceptions from the Messiahship in the case of Jesus, I can attach no definite meaning to such phrases as “*his mission*,” “the saving of his brethren,” “the realisation of the kingdom,” “his prophetic message”; and from page 17 I get an impression which reminds me too much of Renan’s idea that Jesus, having once committed himself to the Messianic claim in a moment of enthusiasm, went through with it because “no retreat was possible.”

So long as his death is regarded as either *official* (*i. e.*, incident to him as *Messiah*), or as in any way *intentional* on his part (*i. e.*, *for an end*), no intelligible account of it seems to me possible. It is needless to point out what a theological monstrosity it has been made by the endeavour to present it in this light. But I own a certain difficulty in interpreting the position that “he dies for the freedom of the spirit,”—unless, indeed, it refers to the words charged upon him at the trial: “Destroy this Temple, etc.” Doubtless he died *from* his spiritual teaching, so offensive to the official ritualism; but the word “*for*” seems to imply that he *chose death*

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as a means conducive to the efficacy of that teaching. Is it not truer to let it come in the natural play of conflicting tendencies, without treating it teleologically? What has in fact arisen from the cross may well be treated as *purposed* by the God of History; but to speak of Jesus as *dying to free* the slave and uplift the outcast, the woman, the poor, seems artificial, as assigning a projected end in view to the lovely spontaneities of his spirit. His personality, by the vestiges it left, unconsciously wrought the blessing which his death would seem to him most sure to disappoint. According to the Evangelists, the indictment which brought him to the cross charged him with claiming to be the Messiah, in the ordinary sense, involving *kingship*, and so high-treason against Cæsar. Did he claim the office, or did he not? If he did, the accusation was made good and his execution was legal. But in this case he perished *for an illusion*, for what he claimed was an unreality; and the Advent which was to usher in the kingdom never took place. On this hypothesis you account for his death by making him the victim of a fanatical expectation. And if you ascribe to him the claim, you must take along with it the alleged prediction of *his resurrection* as well as of his death; it is the provision for taking him whence he is to return. Not till you sweep all this away, fling off the robes and insignia of office, and let him be simply the herald of a spiritual revolution, which cannot work itself out in Jerusalem as it is, will the deadly conflict of selfish passions with Divine enthusiasm become clear which impelled the authorities to make away with him. Then, when the transcendent power of his character had made heavenly life an irresistible inference, his personal disciples, entangled in the Messianic network which embraced their world, had to bring their new birth and all its thought and love into accord with the scheme of their fathers' traditions and their prophets' promises. This they could do only by fitting the Messianic program—their ultimate ideal—on to the memories of their Galilean experiences and the pathetic drama which left them desolate and scattered them abroad. I quite agree with you (page 19) in referring the "sentences of self-assertion" ascribed to Jesus to the moulding influence of the disciples' belief. But what higher grade of "self-assertion" can there be than self-identification with Messiah?

You are so accustomed to exact reading and exact writing that whenever I stick fast in a sentence of yours which

TO REV. W. ORME WHITE

I cannot understand, I feel sure that the fault is my own, and lies in the absence of some clew which I ought to have at command. Here are a few words from page 21 which I have again and again pondered, without finding the light that is in them: "I can conceive a Christianity without the hope of God." What is "the hope of God" here meant? Can it be "belief in God"? That seems impossible; for an "*atheistic Christianity*" combines two absolutely contradictory conceptions. Jesus without a Father in heaven! such a one is neither the Jesus of history nor your ideal Jesus. And that by "Christianity" you mean the outcome of the historic personality is evident from your designating it in the next sentence as "the most striking and concrete testimony which *history affords* to the power of a Divine and Eternal life";—though again I am at a loss to know how, "without the hope of God," *any life* can be called "Divine and Eternal."

I did not mean, when I began this letter, to inflict upon you such an intolerable lucubration. But once afloat upon the broad surface of your delightful essay, I have not known where to take in sail and run for safe moorings. You will not estimate the proportion of my sympathy to my hesitancy by the number of lines respectively claimed for their expression. It is the nature of assent and approval to unify and to echo the same; of criticism to differentiate and spread forth alternatives; the former, full-toned and short; the latter, creaky and garrulous, and hard to reduce to silence. I am half inclined to fling my letter into the fire, instead of dropping it into the post-bag; for it has been written in pain from a sharp return of gout, and under the weight of blunted wits and spirits not too bright. I am ashamed to confess this; for, apart from my discontented foot, all here is in its perfection, and ought to render one insensible to the small personal grievances of life.

TO REV. W. ORME WHITE.

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, June 14, 1887.

I read the Walker memorials, especially your part in them, with much interest, and felt it a privilege to be associated, however slightly, with such an occasion. I am not much given to the old folks' complaint that "the former times were better than these"; but it does seem to me increasingly rare to meet with the massive type of mind and character exem-

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plified by Dr. Walker,¹—all solid gold and no filigree. There are perhaps, in our day, more men whom you must admire; but fewer, I fear, that you can *trust*. The change is visible in all departments. The widened area of learning is gained at some cost of its solidity; the accelerated development of the sciences tempts to illusory generalisations; and the growth of democracy subordinates the higher to the lower social and political intelligence. Doubtless the correction will come in course of time; though not without an intermediate crop of errors and sufferings which might have been spared.

JAN. 31, 1898.

We deeply sympathise with your anxiety occasioned by Mrs. White's impaired health. The evening shadows that gather round the closing of our earthly work bring inevitably a pathetic experience; opening, however, with more than compensation the brightening gleams of a diviner light. The year just passed has bereft me of several best-loved friends, — revered like F. W. Newman, as both Teacher and Colleague, or delighted-in like Richard H. Hutton, as pupil grown "wiser than his teachers." But the more nearly life-long these companionships have been, the less distant is the morrow of their restoration; for which surely the old non-agenarian may wait in quietude of faith.

We plainly want a New Reformation to give us a Religion that shall be tenable alike by the *natural soul* and by the *cultivated mind* of our age; and it can never be brought to the birth *alive* out of Messianic preconceptions, or ecclesiastical dogmas, or physical cosmogonies; but must be drawn fresh, like the beatitudes, from the Divine experiences of the Christ-like soul, which are self-evidencing and wait for no visual miracle to vouch them. All that we spiritually know is thus given us in the person of Jesus; but not all that is told us of his person is of this character, or is in itself credible; and till the needful discrimination is effected between these two elements (which has become more and more possible) our present Gospels will often mislead us. For in truth they are but anonymous traditions, authentic mixed with unauthentic, current in the second century. The Church has been (unwittingly) a cruel foster-mother to the infant Christianity and doomed it to a sickly life; and its last miracle will be

¹ James Walker, D.D., LL.D., sometime President of Harvard University.

TO MR. WILSON

to recover and come again in the power of its own simplicity. As yet, the signs are not numerous with us here of such a change; and religious declension keeps pace but too well with religious advance.

APRIL 30, 1898.

In the romantic moods of early enthusiasm the fancy took me that half my present age would amply test even a slippery soul and might well limit our desire of an eligible probation. Am I not reasonably humbled, then, by being judged in need of detention for a doubled test? And if so, may I perhaps hopefully pray to be not unready for the change of worlds? I dare not affirm; I only know that duty and love look more divine and the spiritual life more surely immortal than when I thought and spoke of them with less experience. The final mood of living Religion resolves itself for me into filial trust and undying aspiration. Here I can quietly rest, and in some small measure still actively work, till my call comes and takes me to other scenes.

TO MR. WILSON.

JUNE 27, 1897.

If I am differently affected from yourself towards Browning and Tennyson, it may be partly due to a strong personal attachment to both; and yet, in the case of Tennyson, the admiration and reverence were already deep before I had known him. I cannot at all admit the justice of your disparaging judgment of him. Loose and indefinite as his spiritual conceptions were, his soul was full of reverence, and he saved more religious faith than he impaired.

My nonagenarian years find me still deeply interested in the newer movements of thought within and beyond the range of scientific discovery; without, however, any painful disturbance to the essential elements of Christian trust and affection. From the last verge of life I look backward with deep gratitude and forward with tranquil hope of higher experiences. Death is stripped of its terrors by the assurance never shaken "*Non omnis moriar.*" Meanwhile the present scene is so full of moral and pathetic interest that I am thankful for the old age which allows me some little part in it to the last. I calmly wait the approaching call, in which I see not so much departure as restoration.

LETTERS, 1885-1898

TO MRS. ——. ¹

THE POLCHAR, ROTHIERMURCHUS, AVIEMORE, N. B.,
June 13, 1895.

DEAR MRS. —, — Though my memory is often at a loss for a date, the title of a book, or the author of a quoted saying, it retains and, like the photographic camera, reproduces the groups of friends who have been near me, or passed by me in long procession for more than eighty years. Whatever else may fade, the *human scene* of which I have been a witness and formed a part has lost few of its expressive lines and colours. So that, except for the change of your maiden name, I needed no recall of your identity. I knew that, since we met, the full responsibilities and grave realities of life had brought you their deep experiences, though no report had reached me of the particular contents of the drama. It cannot surprise me that it has had its tragic features; nor can I grieve for this, as the blending of shadows with the lights of life is, in my view, the condition of all the beauty, depth, and glory of character in the individual soul, and of all that is transcendent in the history of the moral world. It cannot but touch me deeply to be assured that any teaching of mine has been helpful to you, and a source of strength and peace in the trying hours of this experience. If it has been so, it is only because I had nothing to say beyond the simple report of my own inward life, and the relations in which it seemed to place me to the Father of spirits, and to those who were sharers with me of the same spiritual trusts. That "He is not far from any one of us," but communes with us immediately in the intimations of conscience, and mediately in the uplifting power over us of lives higher than our own, has ever been my deepest conviction; and when we all have it and live in it, we shall all agree. The differences and divisions all arise from quitting the personal religious relation, and looking abroad on various lines for some *external authority* that shall supply us with spiritual truth from material evidence. The many discordant theologies are all per-

¹ A lady who had attended his services in Little Portland Street Chapel in her youth, when she was a student at Bedford College, and, after many years, wrote to express her indebtedness to him.

TO MRS. ——

vaded by one concordant piety, as the undertone of their contradictory phrases.

Accept my warmest thanks for your words of gracious sympathy and

Believe me

Yours affectionately,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

Book II

PHILOSOPHY

PREFACE TO BOOK II

A SURVEY OF DR. MARTINEAU'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORK

THIS attempt to depict the philosophical side of Dr. Martineau's long and influential life calls for a few words of explanation. To show why circumstances have given me some little advantage for the execution of this task, I may be allowed to give a brief quotation from a paper contributed to the Memorial Number of the "Inquirer" at the time of Dr. Martineau's decease, with the additional remark that from 1853 to 1859 I was a student in Manchester New College and attended Dr. Martineau's College Lectures:—

"In 1875 I was invited to become one of the teaching-staff of the College, where for ten years I had the advantage of intercourse with my revered teacher, who was then the Principal. A new and most precious opportunity of gaining further insight into Dr. Martineau's thought and personal character was at this time afforded me by the great kindness of Dr. Martineau and his family; for at their invitation I for about twenty years spent two or three weeks of my annual holiday at Dr. Martineau's charming Highland home in Rothiemurchus Forest. And here I feel quite ashamed to say how, in my great eagerness to get light thrown by Dr. Martineau on all my mental perplexities, I used to ask philosophical questions in season and out of season, introducing the subject now at meal times, and now again when we were toiling up the steep sides of mighty Cairngorm or Ben-muick-dhui. I well deserved to

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be snubbed for these unseasonable obtrusions of my favourite topic; but never shall I forget the indulgent patience with which the Doctor heard and replied to the several statements of my difficulties. In later years I, at times, ventured to differ from him on some points, and he considered that my views sometimes came dangerously near to Pantheism; but nothing could exceed the courtesy and kindness with which he listened to my arguments and gave me in return his well-weighed opinion."

As I copy these words my heart is sorely saddened by the thought that since they were written the daughter, whose thoughtful mind and ever-ready kindness added so much to the pleasure and interest of these mountain excursions, has followed her dearly-loved father into the Unseen World.

The chief points of my philosophical talks with Dr. Martineau I was accustomed to write down at the close of the day, and in a few cases I have ventured in the following chapters to state opinions of his which I have become acquainted with only in this way. In the fifth chapter a brief reference is made to the chief matters of controversy between us in these frequent conversations. I may mention that I am not the only person who has enjoyed the privilege of combining mountain-climbing with metaphysical discussion in company with Dr. Martineau; for I remember hearing from a distinguished young Hegelian professor of philosophy how Dr. Martineau and he debated the fundamental principles of Absolute Idealism in the course of a long day's excursion to the top of Scafell Pike.

It may be desirable to refer to the obvious fact that in the accounts of Dr. Martineau's larger treatises given in

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the sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters, the necessities of space have compressed the description within very narrow limits. What has been attempted is to give an outline of the main argument, along with some illustrations of Dr. Martineau's style, and a reference to the more important of the criticisms which some of his views have evoked. My chief aim has been to make these chapters, and as far as possible the others also, both an inducement and a help to first-hand study of the original works.

I take this opportunity of expressing my hearty thanks to the many friends who, by lending me letters and in other ways, have given me help. I am particularly indebted to the Rev. Alexander Gordon for valuable information concerning the early history of Manchester College and some other matters. Grateful acknowledgment is also due from me to the Clarendon Press of Oxford for their kindness in allowing me to quote passages from "A Study of Religion" and "Types of Ethical Theory."

I need hardly say, in conclusion, that these pages are neither intended nor fitted to supersede in any way the excellent account of Dr. Martineau's philosophy of religion given in "James Martineau, A Biography and Study," by my friend Dr. A. W. Jackson. He and I have, of necessity, built our books on somewhat different lines. It was imperative on me to insert the more important of the philosophical letters from Dr. Martineau's pen which have come into my hands; and further, I have attempted a general survey of the whole of Dr. Martineau's philosophical work. The plan followed by Mr. Jackson has allowed him ample space to give, among other interesting expositions, a vivid and accurate presentation

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of the more striking features of Dr. Martineau's most important work, "A Study of Religion." I shall feel honoured if our two books are regarded as mutually complementary efforts to depict from somewhat different points of view the characteristic ideas of that highly-gifted and noble-minded teacher, to whom both he and I, in common with so many others, owe a deeper debt of gratitude than words are able to express.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

ST. GEORGE'S, LITTLEMORE, NEAR OXFORD,
May 1, 1902.

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WORK
OF
DR. JAMES MARTINEAU

Chapter I

THE HARTLEYAN PERIOD OF DR. MARTINEAU'S
PHILOSOPHY

WHEN one remembers the strong terms of depreciation in which Dr. Martineau in his later years spoke of the "miserable philosophy" which had so long hampered the intellectual expression of his higher life, the question naturally suggests itself, Why did his intensely strong ethical consciousness remain so long under this depressing yoke? And this question not only concerns Dr. Martineau, but it applies also to the case of such deeply conscientious and devout natures as Priestley, Belsham, Carpenter, Hutton, and a host of other choice spirits among the early English Unitarians. The reasons for this lengthened acquiescence of noble and religious minds in a necessarian doctrine of the will and a utilitarian theory of ethics are, I think, mainly two. The first is that it often takes a long time for a speculative belief to unfold its necessary implications; and the second, and far more important, is that there were powerful intellectual influences operative at the time which did very much to conceal the real antagonism between these philosophical dogmas and the Christian consciousness. The eminent thinker David Hartley, to whose study of the Laws

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of Association psychology is greatly indebted, had in his "Observations on Man" so applied his principles to the moral life as to convince himself and his disciples that the deterministic view of the will "affords sufficient foundation for commendation and blame, for the difference between virtue and vice, and for the justice of punishing vice according to the popular language." The Virtues, too, which in Hartley's view were first practised because they were found to be conducive to happiness, came afterwards, owing to the operation of the psychological "Law of Transference," to be valued for their own sake, just as in the miser's case the gold which is first sought as a means becomes at last desired as an end in itself. As then, it was supposed that Hartley had conclusively shown that all the ethical ideas and emotions which we indicate by such words as "moral responsibility," "sin," "repentance," and "remorse" are quite in harmony with the doctrine of necessity, it is not surprising that it was only by slow degrees that the fallacies involved in Hartley's explanations were clearly recognised. That at this period of his life Dr. Martineau in no way realised, as he afterwards so clearly did, the essential incompatibility between this doctrine and our ordinary moral and religious sentiments, is manifest from many passages in the first edition of the "Rationale of Religious Inquiry," published in 1836, when he was still in the Hartleyan stage of thought. And there can be no doubt that his intimate friend, the Rev. John Hamilton Thom, accurately expressed the fact when he said in 1885, on the occasion of Dr. Martineau's retirement from the offices of Principal and Professor in the College:—

"When I first knew Dr. Martineau, fifty-three years ago, his philosophy of the will was that of the necessarian, that of the 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' by James Mill, the father of the more illustrious John Stuart Mill. . . . It is possible that many in this room are not aware of the great transformation that Dr. Martineau has passed upon himself, but let no one

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think that his *spiritual identity* has undergone the least change. From this time to that, from that time to this, whether logically or not, — and anyone who knows Dr. Priestley's sermon on 'Habitual Devotion' will be slow to doubt the possibility, — his testimony was as clear and firm then as it is now, to a Divine Voice in conscience, to the responsibilities of the will for its choice between good and evil, and to the self-evidencing power of spiritual truth."

In the biographical part of these volumes an account has been given of Dr. Martineau's education and of the circumstances under which he finally resolved to dedicate his life to the Christian ministry, but it may be well to insert here a description of the character of the philosophical instruction given at that time in the College where Dr. Martineau received his ministerial training, and on which afterwards, during so many years, his eminent genius conferred such dignity.

While neither Dr. Priestley nor Mr. Belsham were directly connected with Manchester New College, they both indirectly exercised great influence over its philosophical teaching during the York period of its history (1803-1840). Though Dr. Priestley mainly agreed with the Socinians in regard to the person of Jesus, he did not derive his necessarianism from them; for the Socini were libertarians. His necessarianism was derived from the study of Collins and Hartley. In his Autobiography he says: "It was not without a struggle that I gave up my free-will." Priestley's materialism, however, did not come from Hartley (for Hartley appears to have believed in two parallel substances, mind and matter), but from his own scientific studies. His acceptance of Boscovich's view of matter, as constituted of centres of force, makes his materialism somewhat akin to spiritualism; and it is not improbable that this doctrine may have exercised some influence over Dr. Martineau's final conception of the nature of the external world. Mr. Belsham, who appears to have derived his doctrine of

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necessity from a study of the correspondence between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price, popularised Dr. Priestley's views, and it is most likely that it was his treatise, "The Elements of Mental and Moral Philosophy," which was used as the text-book at York in Dr. Martineau's time. It was in Mr. Belsham's classes at Daventry and afterwards at Hackney College that for the first time the materialistic and necessarian philosophy was taught in a Dissenting Academy. While Manchester College remained at its original seat (1786-1803), Priestleyan views had no representation in its teaching. It appears that the theological tutors during that period — Dr. Thomas Barnes and Rev. George Walker, F.R.S. — both made a considerable point of psychology, which would naturally go along with their Arian Christology. But neither during this early Manchester period, nor during the York period of the life of the College, did philosophy take such a prominent place in the curriculum as it had done in the earlier Dissenting Academies at Warrington, Daventry, etc.¹

This was no doubt due, in part at least, to the growing feeling in that age of "external evidences," that all the more important beliefs, such as the moral character of God, and the Immortality of the soul, are not mainly *philosophical questions at all*, but matters of direct revelation, and hence what we now call the "Philosophy of Religion" was not given to the professor of philosophy, but was discussed, under the title "Natural and Revealed Religion," by one of the theological tutors. We shall afterwards see that this arrangement was based on a conception of "Revealed Religion" wholly different from that which Dr. Martineau finally embraced and defended. The conse-

¹ "In these older Academies," writes Principal Gordon, "one might almost say that philosophy was the backbone; but then philosophy was a generic term covering physics as well as metaphysics. Ethics generally went with Theology until Henry Grove at the Taunton Academy made it a separate study."

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quence of this was that the philosophical part of the College course became an appendage to some more important function. Thus in the earlier Manchester period Dr. Thomas Barnes was tutor at once of Hebrew, Theology, Metaphysics, and Ethics, while at York, Dr. Martineau's teacher in philosophy, Rev. William Turner, M.A., is described as "Tutor in Mathematics and Natural and Experimental Philosophy"; and it was not till the year 1857, when Dr. Martineau was appointed Professor of *Religious*, as well as Mental and Moral, Philosophy, that Philosophy secured its rightful position in Manchester College, as a study co-ordinate in importance with that of Theology.

But not only in Manchester College, but in Britain generally, the interest taken at this time in philosophical studies contrasted very unfavorably with the flourishing condition of metaphysical thought in Germany, where the great Idealist systems were then taking such mighty hold on many minds. In France, too, the deep and wide-spread interest awakened by Victor Cousin's teaching, especially his critical Lectures on Locke's philosophy (1828-1830), and his impassioned appeal to the *impersonal reason* in the souls of all men, had given to philosophy that living influence on the thought and literature of France, which it still, to a considerable extent, exerts. Mr. J. J. Tayler, who studied in Germany in 1834-1835, and gave a most interesting "Retrospect of a Twelvemonth passed in Germany" in a series of papers contributed to the "Christian Teacher" in 1836, states how greatly he was impressed by the contrast between the enthusiasm for philosophical study which he found at the German Universities, and the comparative apathy which he had left at home; and he particularly mentions that at Göttingen and elsewhere he found the "Philosophy of Religion" a distinct and important subject. The following passage (p. 67) enables us to vividly realise the difference between philosophy in Ger-

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many and philosophy in England a few years after the date at which Dr. Martineau was pursuing his ministerial studies at Manchester College:—

“ Speculative philosophy occupies a far more important place in the German Universities than in ours, and the reigning system exercises a great influence in all departments of inquiry,—particularly in theology, criticism, and what is called *æsthetik*, or the principles of taste. An effect similar to this took place in England fifty or sixty years ago, with the prevalence of the Hartleyan doctrine of association of ideas, which was applied in the same extensive manner, especially by Dr. Priestley, to the vast range of subjects which his active mind embraced. Since that time this species of philosophy has fallen into disrepute with us; and had it not been for the Scotch philosophers, and some of the writings of Mackintosh, no additions would have been made to it for the last half-century. How different is the ever-restless philosophical activity of Germany! ”

To illustrate this Mr. Tayler then gives a long list of subjects connected with the higher philosophy which were studied during the summer-semester of 1835 at Halle; and there can be little doubt that it was this very tempting bill of fare, presented to his notice by his friend Mr. Tayler, which awakened in Dr. Martineau's mind a strong desire—realised in 1848-1849—to go himself and partake of this feast of German thought, that he might form his own judgment of its intrinsic worth.

But, as I have said, the Idealism and Eclecticism which were kindling philosophical enthusiasm on the Continent had, during James Martineau's student years, little influence on English thought. In the British Isles what philosophical interest existed was divided between the Hartleyan empirical school and the Scotch school of so-called “common sense”; and of these two antagonistic schools the former was the accepted guide in Manchester College.

In that institution the Rev. Charles Wellbeloved, who,

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up to 1809, appears to have combined the teaching of philosophy with that of theology, was a pupil of Belsham, and the Rev. William Turner, who then took the philosophy in hand, was the grandson of the William Turner who during Priestley's ministry at Leeds became his ardent disciple. The grandson, we learn, embraced, and for many years taught, without qualification, the philosophical views of his grandfather; but in 1825, in the latter part of James Martineau's studentship, Mr. Turner began to express himself somewhat doubtfully in regard to both Necessarianism and Materialism.

"As for my own opinion," he says, "I must confess that I have not been able wholly to satisfy my mind on the subject of Liberty and Necessity. Though the direct argument for Necessity appears unanswerable, yet the views which are deduced from the doctrine, even by Necessarian writers, are so startling, and it requires such an effort to accommodate our new views to the practice of life, and the use of Necessarian language to common language, that there are still some difficulties left on my mind."¹

But in his lectures he always adhered closely to the Hartleyan philosophy, and ardently followed it into all its applications to mind and morals.

"With the Scotch philosophy of Intuitive ideas and Common-sense principles (so called)," we are told by his pupil Mr. Edward Higginson, "he could keep no terms, being never satisfied to cut a knot which he thought he might by patient industry untie." The same pupil adds: "His philosophy of the origin of the moral sentiments and affections was throughout consistently Hartleyan. And while he could find no sound basis for the Obligation of Virtue, short of its tendency, as ordained by the sovereign Will of God, to produce the ultimate and truest Happiness of the agent as well as others, he found in the benign operation of the Associative

¹ *Vide* Memoir of the late William Turner, Junior, M.A., in the "Christian Reformer," 1854, p. 136.

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principle a sufficient vindication of his philosophy from being *selfish* in any bad sense of the term.”¹

It is evident, as we shall presently see from the first important philosophical article which Dr. Martineau wrote, that during his College career, and for at least ten years afterwards, he accepted the views of his philosophical tutor. There is, however, a noteworthy passage in his Biographical Memoranda which shows that he was not wholly satisfied with the Hartleyan Necessarianism and Utilitarianism, and which appears at the same time to indicate the existence in him and in his sister Harriet of a certain difference of mental constitution. In the summer vacation of 1824 his father gave to him and his sister the means of taking a month's pedestrian tour in Scotland; and during this excursion, in which occurred some interesting adventures, which in his later years Dr. Martineau was fond of recalling, he and his sister talked over the more striking subjects of the College lectures, especially those on philosophy; and Dr. Martineau writes:—

“My sister's acute, rapid, and incisive advance to a conclusion upon every point pleasantly relieved my slower judgment and gave me courage to dismiss suspense. I was at that time, and for several years after, an enthusiastic disciple of the determinist philosophy, and was strongly tainted with the *positivist* temper which is its frequent concomitant; yet not without such inward reserves and misgivings as to render welcome my sister's more firm and ready verdict. While she remained faithful through life to that early mode of thought, with me those ‘reserves and misgivings,’ suppressed for a while, recovered from the shock and gained the ascendancy. The divergence led to this result,—that while my sister changed her conclusions, and I my basis, we both cleared our-

¹ I learn from Mr. E. D. Priestley Evans's interesting “History of the New Meeting House at Kidderminster” that James Martineau was not the first of the York students to throw off the Priestleyan yoke. He was preceded by Mr. William Mountford, the gifted author of “Euthanasy,” who during his student years (1833-1838), when the Rev. William Hincks was tutor, altogether renounced the philosophy of Hartley and Mill.

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selves from incompatible admixtures, and paid the deference due to logical consistency and completeness."

It would appear from this passage not improbable that the influence of his elder sister's confident utterances in favor of determinism may have retained Dr. Martineau longer within the Hartleyan camp than would otherwise have been the case. After his departure from College we get no light thrown upon his mental history till the year 1835, except, indeed, that in his Memoranda he mentions that while he was in charge of Dr. Carpenter's school at Bristol, he was, through the recommendation of Dr. Pritchard, author of the "Physical History of Man," admitted to a small, almost private, Philosophical Society of about twelve members, at which

"I heard the ablest local men — including John Foster, Hera-path, Pritchard, and Conybeare — discuss the newest questions of the time, and the greatest questions of all time." The meetings of this society gave him "many a bright hour in a year which was one of great tension."

In 1833 he contributed to the "Monthly Repository" the warmly appreciative but, at the same time, critical estimate of Dr. Priestley. Though this article is of great interest in reference to the general character of Dr. Priestley's mind, it treats very briefly of his philosophical doctrines, and does not give, what we should have expected, any comparison between his views and those of his friend Dr. Price, whose writings had, we know, greatly influenced Dr. Channing. In revising this paper, in 1852, for the collection of his writings called "Miscellanies," Dr. Martineau made, in a few passages, important alterations, so that the original must be referred to by those who wish to trace the changes in the writer's philosophical ideas. Treating, for instance, of Priestley's unsatisfactory account of Memory and of the Idea of Power, Dr. Martineau says

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in the original article: "Throughout Priestley's works it would be vain to seek for the piercing analysis of Brown or James Mill, before whose gaze the most intricate and delicate of human emotions and the most evanescent trains of human ratiocination are arrested, questioned, and made to marshal themselves in their true places amid the nimble evolutions of the mind." But in the reprint the estimate of Brown's and Mill's performances is widely different, for the passage becomes: "Throughout Priestley's works it would be in vain to look for anything like the analytical ingenuity of which later writers belonging to the same school, especially Brown and Mill, afford such elaborate though unsatisfactory display."

About Dr. Martineau's first important philosophical publication some uncertainty hangs. When in the later years of his life he was asked whether there was in print any noteworthy expression of his views during the time when he was in intellectual sympathy with Hartley and James Mill, he referred the inquirers to an article of his on "Bentham's Deontology, or Science of Morality," which appeared in 1834 or 1835. As to the periodical in which this appeared, he told some friends, among whom were Principal Gordon and the Rev. A. W. Jackson, that it was the "Christian Reformer." These gentlemen, accordingly, have stated — the one in his article on Dr. Martineau in the "Dictionary of National Biography," and the other in his "James Martineau, A Biography and Study" — that the four papers on "Bentham's Deontology" in the "Christian Reformer" for 1835 form the article of which Dr. Martineau spoke. But in the notes of a conversation I had with him at the Polchar in 1885, I find written: "Fox, in the 'Monthly Repository,' gave Dr. Martineau's necessarian and utilitarian article on 'Bentham's Deontology.'" The question, then, is, Did Dr. Martineau write the article on Bentham's work which appeared in the

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"Monthly Repository" for September, 1834, or did he write the four papers on the same work which appeared in the "Christian Reformer" for 1835? He says himself, in his Memoranda, that, soon after his settlement at Paradise Street, "in consequence of some papers written for Mr. Fox's 'Monthly Repository' I was asked to enrol myself on the literary staff of the 'London Review,' and then commenced a habit of review writing, which, when kept in due subordination, I have found conducive to vigilance and exactitude in study, and which best disposed of all my spare time." The letter from Sir William Molesworth, inviting Dr. Martineau to join the philosophical radicals who started the "London Review," is before me, dated April, 1835, and in it he says: "I had the pleasure of reading an able and admirable article by you on 'Bentham's Deontology,' which excited in me the greatest desire to obtain from you some contributions to our work." The date of the letter shows that when it was written only the *first* of the four papers in the "Christian Reformer" could have appeared. The *external* evidence then would seem to be, on the whole, more favorable to the claims of the "Monthly Repository" article. But the *internal* evidence furnished both by the style and by the opinions is so strong as to be, I think, quite convincing; and we must suppose, therefore, that it was by a lapse of memory that Dr. Martineau sometimes referred to the "Christian Reformer" as the place of his article. Among the internal evidences that Dr. Martineau did not write the "Christian Reformer" papers, the following is perhaps the most cogent. It is characteristic of Dr. Martineau's ethical theory, not only in its matured form, but even as early as the first edition of the "Rationale of Religious Inquiry," which is nearly contemporaneous with the "Deontology" article, that he represents moral distinctions as depending, not on the Will of God, but on God's essential nature as progressively re-

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vealed in the human reason and conscience. Now the writer of the "Christian Reformer" papers says: "With the guidance of the records of revelation everything of the nature of *duty* must ultimately resolve itself into *respect to the Will of God*" (p. 712), while in the "Monthly Repository" article we read in reference to those moralists who take the Will of God as the measure of right: —

"What is the Will of God? Where is it to be found? Revelation can, at best, supply it only to the limited portion of mankind who admit the authority of the Scriptures. And of these many deny, and none can prove, that Christianity contained an ethical code; and the rest, while they inveigh against so heretical a doctrine, contribute to establish its truth by their entire disagreement respecting the nature of this code. Are we, then, to seek for the Will of God in nature? By what conceivable mark can we know it, but by that of happiness? This is the Divine signature by which alone Providence has made intelligible the oracles of human duty. In the mind of every theist, then, who admits the benevolence of God, the religious definition is co-extensive with the utilitarian; but the former, being derivative from the latter, cannot be permitted to supplant it" (p. 617).

It is not improbable that the Editor of the "Christian Reformer" was not wholly satisfied with this feature in the "Monthly Repository" article, and that it was owing to this that he inserted another review of the book in his own journal.

The main interest of this elaborate review of Bentham's work lies in the subtlety of thought and brilliancy of expression which the writer displays in his endeavour to combine a utilitarian theory of morals with the noble ethical ideas and sentiments which evidently pervaded and actuated his own mind. After quoting Bentham's statement: —

"Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so and never will while human nature is

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made of its present materials," the reviewer remarks: "Now with all respect for the Utilitarian philosopher, we appeal in this matter from him to the universal sentiments and language of mankind. Their feelings are in accordance with the maxim: 'If ye do good to them that do good to you, what thank have ye?' Show them that in his acts of kindness, a man is looking to his own ends, that he is meditating a draught on the good-will fund, and the spell of admiration is broken. It may be all very well; he may be a shrewd fellow enough and wonderfully long-sighted, but as for generosity or benevolence, this banking system will never win such praise. And the people are not wrong."

How, then, do these benevolent impulses arise? The reviewer replies: "The process is one with which every reader of Hartley is familiar." The approbation of others brings various good things; benevolence is found to secure this approbation, and it is at first practised with a view to this. By the Hartleyan "Law of Transference," however, the benevolence which was at first cultivated as a means becomes an end in itself, and the practice of it is found to be attended with very high and sweet internal satisfactions. The pleasures of sympathy blend with these satisfactions; and these inherent pleasures attending benevolence become so inseparable from the act that the latter cannot even strictly be said to be performed *for the sake of them*.

"It is impossible," continues the reviewer, "to find language which will unexceptionably describe the moral process involved in such cases as this. In popular phraseology [and in Dr. Martineau's at a later date] the agent would be said to sacrifice his own comfort for the sake of another person's; but as he is really happier in performing the act than in abstaining from it, this is an inaccurate account of the fact. . . . Perhaps the most exact of the popular accounts of such an act are, that which speaks of it as done *for its own sake*, and that which terms it *disinterested*; for as the word *interest* is used to describe the external advantages of conduct, *disinterested* is an epithet fitted to denote deeds which are willed solely from their internal qualities."

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Has, then, the reviewer, by travelling along Hartleyan lines, reached what is popularly meant by *disinterestedness*? It does not seem so; for he continues:—

“Disinterestedness does not consist in the annihilation of happiness, but in the acceptance of sympathetic in the place of individual enjoyment; and if moralists were to call on a man to relinquish personal pleasures, for which no compensation presented itself in any possible satisfactions of internal benevolence or outward recompense, the call would infallibly be made in vain; no case of obligation can be made out, no instrument exists for acting on the will.”

It would seem, then, from this, that the Benthamites might have retorted on the reviewer: “It appears, then, on your own showing, that a man in a rational and moral mood could feel no obligation to lift a little finger to help you, had he not the underlying assurance that he would derive some internal or external advantage from so doing.”

I have given this summary of the review both because it fairly represents the philosophical position of the more thoughtful Unitarians at the time when it was written, and because it will furnish a needful introduction to the later description of the very different ethical theory in which Dr. Martineau’s matured thought found satisfaction. He would himself in after years probably have said of this article, as we have seen he said of James Mill’s account of the origin of the Idea of Power, that it was “an elaborate but unsatisfactory display of analytical ingenuity.” At this date, however, James Mill was regarded by him as a very high authority in philosophy. Soon after his settlement in Liverpool Dr. Martineau began to give private lessons to some of the more thoughtful of the young people of his congregation, and I well remember the enthusiasm with which Miss Ellen Yates of the Dingle used to speak of her attendance at one of these classes. To the young women he lectured not only on philosophy, but also

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on European Literature, using as a text-book for the latter Sismondi's "Literature of Southern Europe"; for William Roscoe's writings had awakened in Liverpool great interest in the language and literature of Italy. On this subject Mr. William Thornely, now of Hampstead, writes the following interesting letter, dated Feb. 10, 1901:—

"I think it was in 1835 or 1836 that I first attended a small class of four or five, chiefly ladies, at Dr. Martineau's house, Mount Street, Liverpool. The philosophy of the mind was our subject, and we also wrote compositions. James Mill's 'Analysis of the Human Mind' was our text-book, and we went steadily through it, reading also other works, among which I remember Dr. Thomas Brown's Lectures and his great "Essay on Cause and Effect," in which he states that a cause is merely a constant antecedent. I also remember we were referred to Priestley's "Treatise on Necessity." With the doctrines of these books Dr. Martineau was thoroughly in accordance. A year or two later we went carefully through Mill's 'Logic.' I subsequently studied Mathematics and Astronomy with Dr. Martineau. There could not be a more delightful teacher. For many months I was quite alone with him. He never failed to give me his utmost energetic attention.

"I think it must have been in 1845 when, with two other young men, I attended his class on philosophy, and found all changed. We were at Park Nook by seven in the morning. He was always ready for us with the offer of a cup of coffee. I need hardly speak of the intense interest of these lectures. A great advantage this small class enjoyed was that Dr. Martineau most kindly allowed us to interrupt him when we wanted explanations."

The revolution in Dr. Martineau's fundamental philosophy indicated in this letter was in part brought about by the difficulties he encountered when endeavouring to give to the pupils above mentioned a satisfactory exposition of the views of James Mill and of Thomas Brown; and these difficulties became altogether insurmountable when in preparing his discourses for the celebrated Liverpool controversy he was compelled to fairly face the problem of Moral

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Evil. In his Memoranda he thus vividly recalls this momentous crisis in his intellectual history:—

“I can hardly say now what were the successive steps which removed me more and more from the school of philosophical opinion in which I had been trained. In my fondness for physical science I had accepted its fundamental conceptions and maxims as ultimate, and had been unconscious of the metaphysical problems which lay beyond. In this state of mind it was inevitable that the *Necessarian doctrine* should appear to have demonstrative certainty, for it is little more than a bare expression of the postulates of natural science, and hardly requires a single remove from its definitions. But in the very process of expounding and applying it I not only became aware of the distortion which it gave to the whole group of moral conceptions, but began to see that in *Causation* there was something behind the phænomenal sequence traced by inductive observation; and gradually the scheme which I had taken as a universal formula shrank within limits that did not include the Conscience of man or the Moral Government of God. Along with this discovery of a metaphysical realm, beyond the physical, came a new attitude of mind towards the early Christian modes of conception, especially those of the Apostle Paul, whose writings seemed to be totally transformed and to open up views of thought of which I had previously no glimpse.”

This quotation discloses the interesting fact that in the first eight years of his Liverpool ministry the two firm bases of his future theistic faith—the rational necessity of an adequate spiritual cause for the cosmos, and the ethical experience of a superhuman Presence and Authority in the Conscience—were gradually emerging into clear self-evidence before his thought.

In conversation he often referred to the writings of Dr. Channing as having powerfully co-operated with the other influences in bringing him to his final and decisive renunciation of the Hartleyan theory of ethics. It is somewhat remarkable that there is no clear evidence that either Dr. Richard Price's powerful “Review of the Principal Ques-

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tions and Difficulties in Morals " (which influenced Dr. Channing) or the writings of the Scotch intuitionists, Reid and Stewart, had much part in Dr. Martineau's philosophical conversion. It is not improbable that he may at this date have read and been somewhat affected by Victor Cousin's brilliant lectures, for we know that Cousin was being studied at that time by some Unitarians in England as well as by many in America; and in the "Christian Teacher" for 1837 — a periodical to which, after Mr. Thom assumed the editorship in 1838, Dr. Martineau occasionally contributed — there is an able paper headed "A Fragment of Philosophy," in which the writer speaks of M. Cousin's published works as "coming nearer to a perfect system of mental and moral philosophy than any other with which I am acquainted." And it is hardly possible that Sir William Hamilton's exposition and criticism of Cousin's views in his celebrated article on the "Philosophy of the Unconditioned" in the "Edinburgh Review" for October, 1829, could have failed to attract Dr. Martineau's attention. We know, too, that very shortly after his philosophical change, Dr. Martineau in his lectures at Manchester New College appealed to the writings of Maine de Biran, Royer-Collard, Cousin, and Jouffroy in confirmation of his own account of the idea of Cause, and that he recommended to both the students and his private pupils the careful study of Cousin's criticism of Locke's philosophy.

But whatever may have been the influences which concurred in effecting this fundamental transformation in Dr. Martineau's philosophical system, there can be little doubt that when he preached the striking sermon on "The Christian View of Moral Evil" the process was virtually completed. That discourse gives expression in the most emphatic terms to the doctrine of Ethical Individualism, which forms the keynote of his moral philosophy.

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“This sense,” he says, “of individual accountability — notwithstanding the ingenuity of orthodox divines on the one hand, and necessarian philosophers on the other — is impaired by all reference of the evil that is in us to *any source beyond ourselves*. . . . There is no persuasion more indispensable to this state of mind, and consequently no impression which Christianity more profoundly leaves upon the heart than that of the *personal origin and personal identity of sin*, — its individual incommunicable character. . . . Hence it appears impossible to defend the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity — which presents God to us as the author of sin and suffering — from the charge of invading the sense of personal responsibility.”

It is not surprising, then, that when the printed copy of this sermon reached Boston, Dr. Channing at once (Nov. 29, 1839) wrote to Dr. Martineau: —

“The part of your discourse which gave me the sincerest delight, and for which I would especially thank you, is that in which you protest against the doctrine of philosophical necessity. Nothing for a long time has given me so much pleasure. I have felt that this doctrine, with its natural connexions, was a mill-stone round the neck of Unitarianism in England. I know no one who has so clearly and strongly pointed out as yourself its inconsistency with moral sentiments in God, and with the exercise of moral sentiments towards him by his creatures. I have always lamented that Dr. Priestley’s authority has fastened this doctrine on his followers.”

It must not be supposed from this radical alteration in Dr. Martineau’s metaphysical and ethical philosophy that the character of his sermons after this date underwent any serious change. As we have seen, the Hartleyan application of the associative processes for a long time caused many Unitarian preachers to believe that necessarian and utilitarian views were quite compatible with the purest disinterestedness in morals, and with the sincerest sentiments of repentance and prayerful aspiration in religion. The chief consequence of the philosophical transformation

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was the disappearance of that haunting suspicion of incongruity between the pulpit utterances and the underlying philosophy from which, during his Hartleyan days, Dr. Martineau could never wholly free himself. He had never been able to find complete satisfaction in Dr. Priestley's candid acknowledgment that

“a Necessarian who, as such, believes that *nothing goes wrong*, but that everything is under the best direction possible, himself and his conduct, as part of an immense and perfect whole, included, cannot accuse himself of having done wrong in the ultimate sense of the words. He has, therefore, in this strict sense, nothing to do with repentance, confession, or pardon, which are all adapted to a different imperfect and fallacious view of things”;¹

and, therefore, he experienced a delightful sense of freedom and relief when he became convinced of the falsity of the Hartleyan metaphysics and accepted in its place an intuitional philosophy, in the light of which sin, repentance, and the consciousness of reconciliation with the indwelling Father were seen to be facts in fullest accord with the soul's deepest and clearest insight into ultimate reality. When referring in his Biographical Memoranda to the necessity which his change of basis imposed on him of re-writing all his philosophical lectures, Dr. Martineau adds:—

“For all this, however, there was ample compensation in the sense of inward deliverance which I seemed to gain from artificial system into natural speech. It was an escape from a logical cage into the open air. I breathed more freely. The horizon enlarged, I could mingle with the world and believe in what I saw and felt, without refracting it through a glass, which construed it into something else. I could use the language of men—of their love and hate, of remorse and resolve, of repentance and prayer—in its simplicity without any ‘*Subauditur*’ which neutralises its sense.”

¹ Priestley's Works, Vol. III. p. 518.

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'As there has appeared in print more than once the statement that Dr. Martineau discarded his necessarian and utilitarian principles, owing to contact with German thought at the time of his fifteen months' stay in Germany, in 1848-1849, it is necessary to point out that this is manifestly a mistake. Some account will afterwards be given of the important influence upon his culture, which he ascribed to his study at that time of German philosophy; but his own statement in the preface to the "Types of Ethical Theory," "I thus came into the same plight, in respect of the cognitive and æsthetic side of life, that had already befallen me in regard to the moral," distinctly shows that the Hartleyan ethics had been previously abandoned. And that this is the fact is placed beyond a doubt, not only by his own words in conversation, but by the character of his writings from 1839 to 1848.

Chapter II

THE LECTURES IN MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE

AFTER the fundamental change in Dr. Martineau's metaphysical principles described in the preceding chapter, his philosophical teaching remained for the rest of his long life substantially unaltered and self-consistent. The modifications which it underwent were all the outcome of and in harmony with the basal principles which he adopted in 1839. Surprise has been expressed that his three great works should have proceeded from the pen of an octogenarian writer; but it must be remembered that, with the exception of a portion of the "Seat of Authority," and of the striking chapter on "Hedonism with Evolution" in the "Types of Ethical Theory," the leading ideas of these important volumes had for many years been discussed, session after session, in his College Lectures, and by repeated revision had reached the maturity of thought and perfection of form which they now present.

The revolution in Dr. Martineau's philosophical thought, which brought him into happy accord with Dr. Channing, at the same time occasioned an intellectual divergence, though no breach in friendship, between him and another eminent thinker for whose personal character and great philosophical gifts and culture he always entertained a high respect, namely, Mr. John Stuart Mill. When in 1835 Dr. Martineau was invited to form one of the literary staff of the new "London Review," along with the two Mills, Blanco White, Peacock, E. L. Bulwer, etc.,

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Mr. J. S. Mill, in writing to welcome him into this journalistic partnership, expressed the warm interest with which he had read his papers on Priestley in the "Monthly Repository," and added: "The last two pages of the concluding paper made an impression upon me which will never be effaced. In a subsequent paper of my own in the 'Repository,' headed 'The Two Kinds of Poetry' (October, 1833), I attempted to carry out your speculation into some of those ulterior consequences which you had rather indicated than stated."

When, then, Dr. Martineau was in 1840 appointed Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy in Manchester New College, he sent to Mr. Mill a copy of his Introductory Lecture and the Syllabus of his Course. In acknowledging these on May 21, 1841, Mr. Mill says: "I had not been an uninterested observer of the affiliation of Manchester New College with the University of London"; and then follow the noteworthy words which so well express the basal idea on which the teaching in the College rests:—

"But I was not aware till I read your letter that the plan of instruction was founded upon the principle which I have always most earnestly contended for as the only one on which a University suitable to an age of unsettled creeds can stand, namely, that of leaving each Professor unfettered as to his premisses and conclusions, without regard to what may be taught by the rest. Besides all the other important recommendations of this principle, it is the only one which in our time allows such professorships to be filled by men of real superiority, whose speculations have the power of exciting interest in the subject. Such men can less and less endure to be told what they are to teach."

After referring to the near approaching completion of his own important work on "Logic," Mr. Mill, in a passage which Dr. Martineau has in part reproduced in the preface to the "Types of Ethical Theory," expresses his desire

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that his friend, if satisfied with the "Logic," would himself take up, systematically, some other part of the great subject of philosophy.

"As a Professor," he continues, "you will, I know, take up the whole; but I do not want to have to wait for your Lectures, which, like Brown's, will no doubt be published some day; but before that time I may very likely be studying them in another state of existence. I have been very much interested by your Introductory Lecture and Syllabus. I shall never forget the time when I was myself under that awful shadow you speak of, nor how I got from under it, but it is all written down in my book. Are not your general metaphysical opinions a shade or two more German than they used to be?"

The expression "awful shadow" refers to the following words in Dr. Martineau's Introductory Lecture:—

"It is probable that in the secret history of every noble and inquisitive mind there is a passage darkened by the awful shadow of the conception of Necessity; and it is certain that in the open conflict of debate, there is no question which has so long served to train and sharpen the weapons of dialectic skill."

As is well known, Mr. Mill in his "Logic" explains how he had to his own satisfaction cast off the incubus of fatalism by the reflection that a man's own volitions and moral decisions are important causes in the formation of his moral character; though at the same time he still regarded these moral decisions as the inevitable consequents of the antecedent psychological states. It is not improbable that at this date Mr. Mill did not clearly perceive that his mode of escape from the depressing yoke of necessity would in no way satisfy a thinker like Dr. Martineau, to whom it appeared self-evident that there can be no real basis for moral responsibility apart from the possession by the human soul, in its moral self-determinations, of a power of free choice between equally possible alternatives. But

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whether or not Mr. Mill was at this date distinctly aware of the essential difference between his conception of moral freedom and Dr. Martineau's, it seems exceedingly likely that the reference to the influence of German metaphysics, in the concluding sentence of his letter, does not refer so much to Dr. Martineau's assertion of Free-will as to the unmistakable indications both in the Lecture and in the Syllabus that the writer is looking to another source than Sensations and the principle of Association for the genesis of the most fundamental ideas, and particularly of the all-important ideas of Causation and of Moral Obligation. This was the essential apostasy from Hartleyan principles and methods, which Mr. Mill's sharp eyes at once detected, and the great significance of which in reference to the future philosophical relations between himself and his friend he must, to some extent, have foreseen.

In ascribing this change to German influence he was not altogether wrong; but in all probability the immediate stimulus in this direction came to Dr. Martineau not from Germany but from France, or, rather, from France and Scotland combined. Mr. Jackson in his vivid picture of the intellectual traits of Dr. Martineau's mind shows true insight when he says:—

“In some of his mental characteristics he seems of the German type. Yet was he French in his origin; and it may well be that the moulding of generations by which he became an Englishman left in him something of the genius of his ancestry.”¹

I should be inclined to go even further, and say that in his carefulness to find a solid basis in psychological fact for all his metaphysical and ethical constructions, as well as in the artistic graces of his style, he presents more affinity with Cousin and Jouffroy than with any con-

¹ “James Martineau, A Biography and Study,” p. 130.

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temporary philosophical school of either Germany or Britain. Royer-Collard and Jouffroy had already introduced to French students the writings of Reid and Dugald Stewart; and the blending in these French Eclectics of sober Scotch psychology with certain Kantian and Hegelian ideas was at this time exercising considerable influence over the Transcendentalists of New England. The elaborate discussion of the Idea of Cause, which was one of the chief features of his course of lectures on Mental Philosophy, shows that Dr. Martineau found support for his conclusions in Cousin's lectures on Locke, and still more in the writings of Maine de Biran. Indeed, Dr. Martineau's account of the meaning of the Causal Idea, which plays such a leading part in his arguments for Theism, and of the relation of Cause to Will, is almost identical with that of Maine de Biran; though in all probability these thinkers arrived at the same results independently of each other.

In Dr. Martineau's first course of Lectures in Manchester New College morals and religion were included under "Mental Philosophy." The subjects to which he afterwards confined the title "Mental Philosophy" were in the first course described as "Apprehensive States of Mind," and corresponded to Dr. Bain's work on "The Senses and the Intellect," while "The Affective States of Mind" embraced "The Emotions and the Will." The Philosophy of Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion, which afterwards in Dr. Martineau's hands grew into the "Types of Ethical Theory" and "A Study of Religion" appear in his first course as brief sub-divisions of this second department of Mental Philosophy.

The first part of this course, that on Mental Philosophy proper, underwent great changes; and Dr. Martineau, in 1877, thus describes its successive forms:—

"The disadvantages under which my first course on Mental Philosophy was produced prevented me from being long sat-

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isfied with it. It aimed at combining the analyses of the English Empirical school with the critical idealism of Kant; but, except in particular parts, the relations between them were not properly worked out. After a few years, when my reading had been enlarged, especially by the Study of Hegel, a second course was substituted, prepared on a different plan. And subsequently this also was set aside in favour of a third course, having more the character of independent construction and less of critical commentary on doctrines."

This elaborate series of lectures, which is about equal in extent to the "Types of Ethical Theory," was never quite completed. It still, as a whole, remains unprinted, though important sections of it, especially the treatment of the all-important Idea of Cause and of the Ideas of Time and Space, have been in part incorporated in "A Study of Religion" and in some of the published Articles and Essays. Combining, as it does, very careful psychological analysis with a profound discussion of the metaphysical ideas and problems to which that analysis opens the way, this important work is a worthy companion to the two other great courses, which, somewhat modified and enlarged, form the "Types of Ethical Theory" and "A Study of Religion." After an explanation of the threefold division of philosophy into Logic, or Mental Philosophy, *Æsthetics*, and Ethics, corresponding respectively to Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, the lectures are then directed upon the first of these branches of philosophy as the proper subject of the course. The method pursued is to treat in succession Sensation, Perception, Comparison, and Understanding as embracing all the mental phænomena with which Logical Psychology has to deal, and in connection with the analyses of these four states and activities of Mind to discuss the metaphysical ideas, such as Personal Identity, Time, Space, Cause, etc., which these psychological experiences suggest and involve. The sensations of Smell, Taste, and Hearing are first thoroughly analysed, and it

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is shown that as in connection with these three senses the mind is mainly passive, and the activity of the will is not called forth, these sensations do not of themselves admit us to any knowledge of an external world or lead to any metaphysical insight. They are, therefore, from a philosophical point of view, of minor importance, and are hence named by Dr. Martineau the Impercipient Senses.

But when we turn to the Sense of Touch (including the Muscular Sense) and to the Sense of Sight, the case is quite otherwise. These senses are connected with the muscular apparatus, and are therefore felt in association with the mind's volitional activity. Through this fact it is that they, and especially the former of them, admit us to a knowledge of the Self as contrasted with the Not-Self or external world, and thus convert subjective Sensations into objective Perceptions. They are therefore fitly termed by Dr. Martineau "the Percipient Senses"; and so important are the metaphysical ideas and problems which arise in our consciousness through these Senses, or rather through the mind's volitional activity with which these senses are associated, that more than half of the sixty lectures which form this long course are occupied with a most searching and elaborate exposition and examination of the psychology of these senses and of the philosophical ideas and beliefs which they suggest. The most influential of these philosophical ideas is that of Cause; and the importance which Dr. Martineau attaches to this inquiry is explained and justified by the fact that on the result of it largely depends the validity of one of the two main considerations on which, as explained in "A Study of Religion," a rational theistic belief is founded. The mere feeling that attends the contraction of the muscles would not of itself, in Dr. Martineau's view, give rise to any more philosophical insight than the impercipient senses do. It is to the Sense of Effort which the mind itself experiences

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when it wills to move the muscles, and to the Feeling of Resistance when its volition is opposed that the belief in a real external world is due. This experience reveals to us at once the existence of the Self as an active principle, and of the Not-Self as a corresponding active principle resisting the Self; and as we are conscious of exercising Will, we necessarily assume, contends Dr. Martineau, that the principle which opposes us is also a self-conscious Will; for this consciousness of an antithesis carries with it the belief that the two members of the antithesis are of the same kind, and as we know the one to be self-conscious Will we necessarily conclude that the other is of the same nature.

Here an important controversy arises which receives a candid and full exposition in these lectures, and which is not, I believe, adequately set forth in Dr. Martineau's printed works. In maintaining that the resistance which Nature makes to our volitions is a resistance which can only proceed from a self-conscious Will, Dr. Martineau is quite at one with V. Cousin's very gifted and original teacher in philosophy, Maine de Biran. But on this particular point V. Cousin dissents from his master, and, in Sir William Hamilton's opinion, is successful in refuting his master's doctrine. Cousin agrees with Dr. Martineau in referring the knowledge which we have of our own causality to the sense of Effort and the experience of Resistance, and he also agrees with him that this experience reveals to us that there must be an external cause for the felt resistance to our volitions; but in Cousin's judgment we are not obliged to conclude, as Dr. Martineau maintains we are, that this cause is self-conscious Will; and recent philosophy shows that Cousin's view has many supporters. The difference between the two theories about the essential nature of Cause is not, however, fundamental in its bearing on Theism; for Cousin on teleological grounds comes to the

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same conclusion as Dr. Martineau does that the cosmos is clearly the expression of one intelligent and purposive Cause; and as in our case intelligence manifests itself only through volition, we naturally conclude that the idea of Will best expresses the mode of activity of the Supreme Cause. But the difference between these two great thinkers greatly affects a subordinate though important question. In Cousin's theory of Cause there is nothing to render it impossible or improbable that the Supreme Cause may have called into existence created or secondary causes, such as the monads or elements of the material world, which may have a certain amount of real existence and activity of their own, though devoid of consciousness; but on Dr. Martineau's theory this would be impossible, for real causation with him necessarily involves consciousness and a choice between alternatives. This subject will come up again in a later chapter in connection with the theory of God's relation to the cosmos which is expounded in "A Study of Religion." In Dr. Martineau's view what Science calls "Force" is a mere abstraction from the idea of self-conscious Will; it is Will with the elements of consciousness and purpose for the time ignored; or, as he expresses it, is "Will *minus* Purpose." Along with this experience of resisted volitional effort, Dr. Martineau maintains that not only the antithesis of the Self and the Not-Self, but also the equally important antithesis of the Here and the There, *i. e.*, the Idea of Space, arises in the mind. After a searching examination of the various attempts that have been made by such psychologists as James Mill and Professor Bain to discover a wholly empirical origin for this idea, Dr. Martineau finds them all unsatisfactory, and, accordingly, agrees with Kant, that its source must be sought in the mind itself.

In regard to the Idea of Time, too, Dr. Martineau, after a critical survey of the views of the chief philosophical

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authorities, arrives at the conclusion that, though some idea of finite times may be reached *à posteriori*, Time as a necessary and universal principle of experience must, like Space, be revealed from an *à priori* source. While, however, Dr. Martineau thus essentially agrees with Kant's account of the *origin* of these two ideas, he entirely dissents from Kant's doctrine that they may be only man's subjective way of perceiving and thinking, and have no objective validity. In his view they hold good of all reality, and of all thought, Divine as well as human. Thus Time and Space possess in his philosophy the same real character which they do in the spontaneous judgments of mankind; and his conclusions on this important question are in the main endorsed by those psychologists and philosophers who agree with Prof. G. T. Ladd, of Yale University, in his recent "Theory of Reality" that "Time and Space are forms of cognition of so fundamental a character as to lay valid claim to have their ground in the very nature of reality." In reference to the idealist view of Time and Space, Dr. Martineau, at the close of the lectures which discuss the Idea of Time, thus expresses himself:—

"We solve no mystery, therefore, by plunging into the *idealism*, to which, as Jacobi has conclusively shown, Kant's doctrine of the pure subjectivity of space and time inevitably leads; hence, while we admit that they are objects of *à priori* knowledge given us through the subjective action of our own perceptive faculty, we must retain them as objects of real and not imaginary knowledge,—the infinite, uncreated, eternal data which constitute the negative conditions of all being and all phenomena."

The idea of Motion is explained in accordance with the objectivity of Space and Time, and in expounding it Dr. Martineau takes occasion to examine and reject the doctrine, elaborately set forth and defended by Professor Trendelenburg in his "Logische Untersuchungen," that

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Motion is a feature common to both Thought and Matter, and therefore serves as the means of intelligibly inter-relating these two forms of reality.

"In common," says Dr. Martineau, "with all the great metaphysicians both of Greece and Germany, Trendelenburg regards it as the great problem of all philosophy to find a common medium between existence and thought whereby they may communicate with one another. It is assumed that if Matter and Mind were different throughout, they could have nothing to do with each other, but would be on opposite sides of an impassable chasm; the fact that instead of this, they are on such terms of constant intercourse and good understanding implies (it is supposed) *that there is something which may be predicated of both*, and out of which, as from a genetic point, they both proceed in their divergent courses of development. This common feature which Plato found in his *εἶδη*, Spinoza in his unity of Substance, Atomists and the Materialists generally in Matter, Hegel in the *Idee*, Trendelenburg finds in Motion."

Dr. Martineau argues at some length against Trendelenburg's theory, but his chief objection to it is that "*successive acts of mental attention are not motion*, not even when they follow out some fancied movement. As well might we identify any other percipient act with the attribute perceived, and say, for example, that our idea of red is red, our idea of hot, hot, and of solid, solid." The considerations urged in these lectures against Trendelenburg's characteristic doctrine are given in a briefer form in the article on Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,¹ in which article Dr. Martineau vigorously endorses Sir W. Hamilton's condemnation of the dogma, so generally accepted by metaphysicians, that "like only can know like"; and this position is consistently maintained throughout his philosophical writings. The two lectures which discuss this Idea of Motion give also a most interesting

¹ "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses," Vol. III. p. 457.

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account of the puzzles or sophisms such as that of "Achilles and the Tortoise," whereby the Greek thinkers of the Eleatic school sought to prove that motion is intrinsically inconceivable and impossible. After criticising the many "solutions" of these sophisms that have been proposed by able thinkers, Dr. Martineau contends that the plausibility of Zeno's attempted refutation of the reality of motion is founded on "the artifice of using the infinite divisibility of one of the two quantities (Space and Time) and ignoring it of the other."

One other extensive and valuable section of this course on Mental Philosophy calls for mention, viz., that in which, in connection with the percipient sense of Sight, the various views concerning the primitive and the acquired visual perceptions, which from the time of Plato and Aristotle to the present day have been favourite topics for controversy, are fully expounded and criticised. The objections urged by recent savants and philosophers against Berkeley's Theory of Vision, especially those presented by Mr. Samuel Bailey, of Sheffield, are elaborately discussed, but they do not, in Dr. Martineau's view, substantially impair the soundness of the Bishop's judgment, for the results of the ten lectures on Sight are thus summed up:—

"On the whole, then, we conclude that modern criticism has done but little to shake the principles of Berkeley's theory. The chief correction which it needs—namely, a doctrine of objectivity, which shall separate Sensation from Perception—is equally wanting to his opponents. And if he was mistaken in some of his predictions as to the probable experience of a person born blind and suddenly endowed with vision, this is to be ascribed rather to the fact that such cases very imperfectly fulfil the conditions of the theory than to any essential misconception in that theory itself."

Throughout this course Dr. Martineau expressed his firm belief that no physiological researches into brain and

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brain functions were likely to throw any important light on philosophical questions.¹ His views on this subject are briefly given in the following letter to his pupil and friend Mr. Richard H. Hutton. The manuscript referred to is that of an article which appeared in the "National Review" for January, 1856, under the title "Atheism," and which, as is evident from this letter, was written by Dr. J. D. Morell. This article reviewed, among other books, Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Psychology," which had just been published.

LIVERPOOL, Nov. 4, 1855.

MY DEAR RICHARD,—I have read too little of Herbert Spencer to do more with this manuscript than reduce it to mere *exposition*, with only such terms of praise as may leave the way open to any required amount of dissent. Spencer is so able a man that we may safely leave on the paper free acknowledgments of skill and acuteness. Morell is here and was talking with me on Thursday about the book. I cannot help feeling a good deal of distrust of Morell's judgment on these matters; he is so obviously taken captive by Spencer, and so ill able to resist the Positivist doctrine of which he admits the book is a development. I am much more disturbed by Morell's *summary of results* at the end of his paper than by anything in his notice of Herbert Spencer. With all possible good-will towards physiology, and desire that the *parallelism of phenomena*—physical and mental—should be carefully noticed, I have no expectation of psychological results from merging mental philosophy in the study of organic functions. It therefore appears to me that the whole series of Morell's principles is false, and puts the science on a rotten base. Nor can I find that any *results* whatever have been attained by the physiological school entitling them to turn round so contemptuously on the old psychologists. Whatever becomes of comparative physiology in its future triumphs, it will never destroy the fundamental importance of the ancient "Self-knowledge." But Morell sets the two in rivalry and

¹ Professor Pringle-Pattison has recently expressed a similar opinion with regard to the psychophysical researches now so much in vogue. "We need not," he says, "look for light from this quarter upon the problems of philosophy and the deeper mysteries of being."—"Man's Place in the Cosmos," p. 51.

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gives the palm to the former. Is it right that we should be committed to this in the "National"?

Ever affectionately yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

R. H. HUTTON, Esq.

I have given a somewhat extended analysis of this important course on Mental Philosophy, partly because it is the only one of three chief series of College lectures, which is not at present accessible in print, and partly because some general acquaintance with his views on the subjects discussed in it will, I believe, be helpful towards the fuller understanding of the descriptions to be given later on in this book of his published works on the Philosophy of Ethics and of Religion. It may become a question for consideration in the future whether it is desirable to publish in its entirety, or in part, this long and interesting, though unfortunately not wholly completed, course, so that the intellectual as well as the ethical and religious sides of the author's thinking may be studied in close connection with each other. At all events, the publication of certain portions of these lectures, and particularly of the very elaborate critical examination of the origin and meaning of the Ideas of Power and Cause, — a subject which Dr. Martineau had made peculiarly his own, — would, I believe, have interest for present thought, and prove a seasonable corrective to much current speculation on this most important question.

Before passing on to give a brief account of the way in which the two other great courses of lectures gradually shaped themselves, it is necessary to explain that with the affiliation of Manchester New College with the University of London, which took place at the time when Dr. Martineau was appointed to the philosophical chair, it became necessary to provide, in addition to the above-mentioned,

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advanced lectures to the senior students, elementary courses on Mental and Moral Philosophy to meet the needs of the junior students in their preparation for graduation in London. Hence from 1840 to 1875 Dr. Martineau gave also two series of simpler lectures, which gradually increased in size and importance, one of which treated of Logical Psychology and also of Deductive and Inductive Logic, while the other gave a description and criticism of the chief ethical theories which had influenced British thought from Hobbes to the present time. In reference to the first of these courses, he writes in his Biographical Memoranda:—

“Logic I have always taught from text-books, interrupted by special *excursus* on topics of difficulty, and have resorted to a variety of guides, — Whately, Thomson, Hamilton, Trendelenburg, Mill, Mansel, Bain, — deeming it important that the student, by familiarity with several nomenclatures, should learn to break-up and re-form his thought, so as not to become the slave of any one set of abstractions. With considerable surprise I have found that, as a discipline in precision and flexibility, no study is more serviceable than that of Aristotle himself.”

In accordance with this high estimate of the value of direct contact with Aristotle's thought, he was accustomed at one period to get the undergraduates to translate to him from the original Greek the admirable selection of passages from Aristotle's logical treatises contained in Trendelenburg's “*Elementa Logices Aristoteleæ Adnotata*.”

The course of lectures on Ethics, which was ultimately published under the title “Types of Ethical Theory,” will form the subject of a later chapter. As given to the students, it was divided into two courses: the first, under the title “Ethical Theories,” corresponded to Vol. I., and treated of the unpsychological ethical theories of Plato, Spinoza, and Comte; while the second course, entitled “Psychological Ethics, a Sequel to Ethical Theories,” was largely

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identical with the present Vol. II. The growth of this course is thus explained by Dr. Martineau in 1877:—

“In Moral Philosophy I began with simply annotating Butler and Paley,—the text-books prescribed by the University of London. Lecturing afterwards to a class of graduates, I quitted this narrow ground and wrote a more advanced course, blending historical with systematic method. Becoming dissatisfied with mere revision and enlargement of these lectures, and fancying that I saw further into my subject, I began again, and cast it into a form which excluded from use all the former material.”

At this date Dr. Martineau thought that “his life was too far advanced to allow reasonable hope of completing this final course on Ethics.” Happily more of life and of mental energy was in store for him than he had reckoned on, for he lived to make considerable additions to these lectures, especially the long and important section on “Hedonism with Evolution” (called forth by the writings of Darwin, Spencer, and their followers); and at the time when he retired from his professorship, in 1885, he had given to the course that finished form which it now presents in the “Types of Ethical Theory.”

With respect to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, it must be remembered that it was not till Dr. Martineau's removal from Liverpool to London, in 1857, that he was appointed expressly Professor of “Religious” as well as of Mental and Moral Philosophy. Up to this date the philosophy of religion had been attached as a sub-section first to the course on Mental Philosophy, which, as we see from the published Syllabus for 1840, included then both Ethics and Religion, and afterwards to the course on Moral Philosophy. This distinct specification of “religion” as a subject for philosophical treatment is very significant; for it indicates that by 1857 the distinction between “natural” and “revealed” religion was in the

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view of the majority of the supporters of Manchester New College losing the meaning which it had in the writings of Priestley, Belsham, and their disciples, and was acquiring the meaning which it now bears in Dr. Martineau's "Seat of Authority in Religion"; that is to say, the word "revelation" was beginning to signify not some particular historical disclosure authenticated by miracles, but that progressive self-revelation which God makes of his existence and of his character in the divinest experiences of the human soul. In the Biographical Memoranda Dr. Martineau thus explains the development of his treatment of the Philosophy of Religion:—

"The several courses on Logical Psychology, Logic, and Ethics prepared the way for an investigation of the philosophical grounds and problems of Religion. At first it seemed sufficient to annex this investigation to the Theory of Ethics, and treat the *spiritual* relations of man as essentially the *moral* in their transcendent form. But with the rise of new conceptions of Force, and the growth of Agnostic doctrines, and the extension of Law to the Evolution of Species, a revision became necessary of the older representation of Divine Agency, and a reconsideration of the Ultimate Principles of Human Knowledge. To provide adequately for the critical discussion of this new or rather revived class of subjects, I discarded the compendious course which had met the wants of earlier years, and replaced it by a fresh and substantive treatment of the whole theme of Religion, in its *physical* and *metaphysical*, as well as its *ethical* aspects. This task still occupies me."

The lectures here referred to were given to the students under the title "Grounds and Truths of Religion"; and in a revised and somewhat enlarged form they now constitute the published "Study of Religion."

The view which Dr. Martineau took of the relation between the three important courses of lectures which have now been described is thus explained by himself in a paragraph of a long letter written, at the time of the rearrange-

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ment of the college work in 1857, to his friend Mr. J. J. Tayler, who was then the Principal of the College:—

“I believe that there will be perfect accord between your teachings and my own at every important point which brings them into contact and comparison. Imperfectly as I have worked out the conception, I always hope to form at last a symmetrical whole of the three courses, — Intellectual, Moral and Religious Philosophy; the two first as bases sustaining in common the last as the summit of our spiritual life. Faith in the Infinite God seems to have a twofold root; viz., in the Axioms, or first truths, of Reason, and, distinctively, in the necessary idea of *Causation*, which supplies the *Dynamical* element of Theism; and in the Intuitions of *Conscience*, which constrain us to know that our moral life is a Trust, susceptible of sympathy with the Divine life or of alienation from it. This supplies the faith in a *Holy* as well as a Causal God. Intellectual philosophy terminates in the disengagement, from all derivative truths and logical processes, of the primitive data of Reason. Moral philosophy lays bare, in like manner, the foundations of ethical belief. The one brings out the categories for the interpretation of Nature; the other, for Self-interpretation; and these two unite and culminate in the apprehension of God. Thus the courses of Lectures on Mental and Ethical science are so framed (as far as they go) as to converge upon the course on Natural Religion, and to furnish its first principles. The constructive part of this course, in which the simple faith in one God, Infinite, Creative, Holy, — in a Providential Moral Order of the world, and in Human Immortality, — are evolved and justified, is already in existence; but it will need a good deal of filling-in, and must especially be enlarged by a critical survey of the several methods of reasoning by which eminent writers of different schools have sought the same truths.”

Before concluding the account of Dr. Martineau's College Lectures some reference is called for to a course on Political Economy. His first appointment on the Staff of Manchester New College in 1840 was as “Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy.” Considering that this course was a subsidiary one, and that therefore

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the preparation for it can have occupied no very great proportion of the writer's time, it is remarkable what thorough acquaintance it displays with the literature of Political Economy up to that time. This course was given in a more popular form in Cross Street Chapel, Manchester, to persons who were unable to attend the College classes. Mr. Walter Ashton, who was one of those who took advantage of these lectures, has kindly lent me his carefully written report of them. After an Introduction containing a Definition of the Science, and an admirable sketch of its history, Dr. Martineau divides his subject under the three heads of Production, Exchange, and Partition. Under the first of these divisions the questions concerning Labour and Capital are discussed, under the second the different views of the real character of Value; while under Partition, or Distribution, Wages, Profit, Rent, and the Public Revenue, are successively investigated. In the earlier lectures Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" is expounded and, in the main, accepted, though its weak points are indicated with great acuteness. In the second and third divisions Ricardo's "Principles of Political Economy" — at that time the standard work on the subject — is taken as the basis, and his theories of "Value" and of "Rent" are lucidly explained, and to some extent criticised. On the now important question as to the ownership of the Land, Dr. Martineau does not say much, but he briefly points out some of the consequences which result from the existing arrangement, and adds that

"there is nothing in the present system of society which has excited, and still excites, so strong a prejudice amongst certain classes as the monopoly of land. There is even an association now, in England, for the avowed purpose of gradually working out the surrender of all lands to the state."¹

¹ It must be remembered that this report of the Lectures does not profess to be *verbatim*.

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It appears both from these Lectures and from his letters to his friend Prof. F. W. Newman, that Dr. Martineau, while decidedly opposed to all socialistic theories, was yet far from being in sympathy with the extreme *laissez-faire* school. On the publication of Professor Newman's interesting "Lectures on Political Economy," delivered at the Ladies' College in Bedford Square, that book was very ably reviewed by Mr. R. H. Hutton in an article on "Moral Limits to Economic Theory and Socialist Counter-theory" in the "Prospective" for August, 1851. In this review Mr. Hutton contends that "there are various cases in which both individuals and governments are bound to interfere to modify the unrestricted action of the competitive principle," and he thinks that there are passages in Professor Newman's lectures which appear to condemn all such interference by the state. Professor Newman attributed the article to Dr. Martineau, and, accordingly, wrote to him to explain that in this respect it had somewhat misrepresented his real views. It seems worth while to give Dr. Martineau's reply to Professor Newman's letter, as it indicates clearly his attitude at that date towards the Christian Socialists on the one hand and the ultra-individualists on the other. The letter is dated Sept. 29, 1851.

MY DEAR NEWMAN,— Even before I thank you for your gratifying mistake in reference to the "Prospective" article and your acute criticism upon it, let me introduce to your friendly regard a lady with whom your severer studies have not, I dare say, prevented your forming already a delightful acquaintance. I shall put this letter in the hands of Miss Frederika Bremer, now on her return to Sweden after two years' absence in America. If you find half the interest and pleasure in her society and conversation which we have felt, you will thank me for enriching you with a new friend. But my particular object in making her known to you is to prevent her carrying home without correction the impressions in favour of socialistic doctrine which she has received from the writings of Mr. Kingsley, and, ere she sees you, will probably

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have had confirmed by personal intercourse. I promised to open her way to acquaintance with him on condition that she would balance his influence by seeking also yours. "Alton Locke" has laid powerful hold on her imagination and feelings, and has given greater tenacity to impressions already imparted by certain phalansteries which she visited in the United States. I am afraid of her pen becoming committed to the delusive schemes of these people; and I trust mainly to you to divert her humane sympathies into a better direction. You are so much at home in these subjects, and have such a happy art of illustrating them by concrete instances, fixing a truth or an argument on the memory and fancy, that no one is so likely to afford her true guidance.

I could not say this if there was any great difference between us on the topics discussed in your very interesting Lectures. In fact neither in them nor in Mr. Hutton's Review do I find much to dissent from. On matters purely economical the variance seems to me inconsiderable; but I certainly do agree with him in setting up, at particular points, a moral resistance to the full swing of economical laws. I think it should be held *infamous* to offer wages touching upon the physical minimum, and to live on the profits of capital productive only on this condition. I should despise myself were I to do so; and I cannot but sympathise fully with the vehement abhorrence felt towards slop-shops. The inability to support a trading concern except on condition of so low a rate of *wages* ought, I think, to operate as no less a sufficient reason for abandoning it than the yield by it of a low rate of *profits*. It may be very true that the labour in these cases is of little worth and the labourer of low character; and what you say of the *moral* causes of misery among the working classes is most painfully indisputable. But for the exhibition and cure of this very evil, and the introduction of a better moral organisation, it seems to me important to create a sharp line of demarcation separating the respectable self-subsisting workman from the idle profligate; and a rule which should fling these last at once into the mass of pauperism and corruption that cannot be left to itself would be a great gain. In a condition like ours, of crowded civilisation, there will always be a helpless mass of this kind that must be dealt with by the public will. Were it sufficiently disengaged before the view, socialist speculators would limit themselves to schemes for a remedial organisation addressed to it alone. But so long as it is spread as a morbid element through the whole body of workers, they will embrace in their

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projects the entire system of society, and in exposing the rotten will attack the sound. All this, I am conscious, is very vague. But the unchecked operation of economical laws, in the absence of any religion to guide, console, and ennoble, crushes the mediocre and weak, without reducing their relative numbers. It is useless to reproach them with their follies and incapacities. They will never themselves create the means of amendment or learn what, to others, would be the lessons of experience. They must be cared for; and whatever be the methods adopted, the outlay for their maintenance will be (as the poor-law already is) a concession on the part of Political Economy to the principle of Socialism.

Again, in another letter to Professor Newman in the same year, Dr. Martineau says that he is looking forward to his friend's "Lectures on Political Economy" for help towards the better understanding of the principles of Christian Socialism, and then continues:—

"The great danger of our present tendencies appears to be, lest, in quest of other and more convenient classifications, the *family group* should be destroyed as the unit of Society; and not the family only, but all those *mixed* assortments of human beings that are the true nurseries of excellence. . . . I do not like any direction of effort, which widens the interval between different classes, ranks, and ages, or which despairs of the old-fashioned feeling of Parental responsibility. I am not blind to the immense difficulty of attacking the evils of our large towns by a method of moral detail, rather than by the accumulated power of a mechanical organisation. But still the principle seems to me sound; and the reform which should set *all things right with one person* would surely be better than a reform which should set *one thing right with a hundred persons*."

The following very suggestive letter on the best method of giving practical effect to the sentiment of Benevolence was written in 1848 to the Rev. T. Elford Poynting,¹ father of the Rev. Charles T. Poynting, of Manchester, and of Prof. J. H. Poynting, D.Sc., D. Litt., F.R.S., of the University of Birmingham.

¹ Author of "The Temple of Education" and "Glimpses of the Heaven that lies around us."

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LIVERPOOL, Jan. 24, 1848.

MY DEAR MR. POYNTING, — . . . You start a great question, which I feel myself quite unable to solve. I admire your systematic way of advancing your lines of conquest over one province after another of the great field of Morals; and leaving your garrisons in secure occupation behind you, while you push on to new victories. I often wish for the power of working out regularly such large operations. But I always find that moral truths present themselves to me in detail; and the only use I can make of my reason is to unite the points afterwards into a series of connected posts. Hence the largeness of your thesis terrifies me. If you asked me whether Monton Parsonage is too capacious and comfortable for you, with so many poor cottages and union workhouses around you, I should say without hesitation, "Not a bit; build a new room as soon as you want it and can pay for it; get a Turkey carpet for the old one; and make your nest so snug that human life may go on within it without clashing against externals, or thinking of its own machinery." So far as the *money question* goes, I hold in the main by the doctrine of the Economists, — that the *least* beneficent thing a man can do with his funds is to *give them*; and that every fraction of his income diverted from expenditure into charity is turned to inferior social account; for it is plainly better that the recipient should give labour for what he gets, than give nothing. If I give away this year, by badly clothing myself and family, £20, usually spent in cloth and cotton, I simply transfer the purchasing power from the person who has earned it to those who have not. They will use it probably for different purposes; and demand will be slackened for *my* articles, increased for *theirs*. This disturbance of the usual balance of employments is in itself a great evil, introducing far more distress in the discouraged trades than advantage to the rest. If instead of supposing it a temporary disturbance we introduce it as a regular principle of life, the effect evidently is, to dispense with objects *less necessary* and multiply those *more necessary*; to concentrate the energies of society on the production of mere aliment and coarse clothing. But where is this to stop? The rule by which I am determined to give is, that my neighbours want more urgently than I do; they want *fustian*, which can be got if I will only relinquish my *cloth*, etc. But this argument will always remain, so long as any difference remains between their lot and mine. The tendency, therefore, is, to bring the whole of society down to the pauper's standard,

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and engage all human labour in the production of what are called "necessaries," — that is, in mere animal self-continuation. It appears to me that the Barker principle would simply reduce us to semi-barbarous life, making over the ascendancy to the lowest wants of our nature; and that the very inequalities which it deplores are nothing but the results and expression of the upward tendency of better social powers and wants as compared with worse. The moral limits of what is called "luxury" are to be sought, I am persuaded, not in the obligations of *benevolence*, but in the operation of it upon *personal character*; and the tendency in every man to become a slave to customary indulgences. I was amused, in conversing on this matter, the other day, with an extremely able man, — an assistant Poor-law Commissioner, — to hear him say, as the result of his experience, that *one* benevolent lady was enough to pauperise a whole parish. The fault, however, of the Economists seems to me to be their erection of a general into a universal rule. If the seasons never failed, if epidemics never raged, if the *average* human conditions were all constant, there would be no occasion to depart from their principle. But if all are put, by unproductive harvests, on short commons, and the larder does not hold enough for the ordinary consumption of the family, it is barbarous for superfluity to insist upon its rights and let the weakest starve. More effort must then be spent on getting food; less on procuring clothes and ornaments. This takes away the purchasing power from those who live by manufactures; and unless they are helped over the crisis, they must perish. These special cases are constantly occurring in particular neighbourhoods, and *individual* specialties are never absent from anyone's view; in times like the present, they spread over a whole community. So that there is always room for exceptional expenditure and self-denial in everyone; and for exceptional *individuals*, wholly devoting themselves to the wants of others. But the excellence which we respect in both cases depends on its *being exceptional*. If charity were to be the *rule* of expenditure, and the "doing of good" to be the rule of human conduct, such an aim at the Millennium would only ensure the End of the world. This simply brings us back to the old-fashioned doctrine of common sense and Christian kindness, that men should have something "*to spare*" for offices of humane fellow-feeling, — an expression implying that the main engagement of their resources must be allowed to go in another direction. No system of life can be preached

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as *obligatory*, which, noble as it may be in particular persons, called to it by special dispositions and convictions, would not bear general adoption without becoming abused and pernicious. After all, do we not allow the *pecuniary* element of benevolence to engage too much of our attention? If more *personal labour and intercourse* were given by us, and maintained in a natural neighbourly way among the poor within immediate reach of our proper sphere, and occasions of kind deeds were seized, as they arose, throughout the range of our knowledge and acquaintance, without regard to the nominal distinction of rich or poor, the sorrows of the world would be more effectually lightened, than by the kind of systematic and semi-official and wholly officious philanthropy, which perverts the moral taste of the present day. I did not intend to inflict this long homily. I fear in your present mood you will think me no better than Jeremy Bentham. Nevertheless, I pray you, consult for the comforts of Monton Parsonage, and the due flannelling and porridging of my little namesake; or else, — if your wife ever forgives you, I will not.

With kindest regards,

Ever most truly yours,

REV. T. E. POYNTING.

JAMES MARTINEAU.

In his Lectures on Political Economy Dr. Martineau referred to J. S. Mill's "Essay on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy" as being evidently the production of an economist of the first rank; and, accordingly, when there appeared, in 1848, that writer's classical work, "Principles of Political Economy, with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy," — a work with which Dr. Martineau was in substantial agreement, though he deprecated Mill's high estimate of the importance of Malthus's "Essay on the Principles of Population," — he saw that Political Economy was a subject for the study of which Mr. Mill's mind was admirably fitted, and so, henceforth, he concentrated his own attention on those questions of pure philosophy and religion in which he felt a still deeper interest.

Chapter III

EARLY REVIEWS. CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROF. F. W. NEWMAN

THE history of Dr. Martineau's philosophical thinking falls naturally into three stages: first, the Hartleyan period, which has been depicted in the first chapter, and which ended about 1839, when he released himself from the influence of Hartley and Priestley, and so brought his Conscience and his Ethical Theory into accord; the second stage extends from 1839 to 1849, and ends with that year of study in Germany, the result of which had so much to do with enriching and deepening his philosophical views; the third and concluding stage covered half his lifetime, and it was, of course, in this final stage that all his more important philosophical works were given to the world.

But though the third stage, which embraces the latter half of the nineteenth century, was the great productive period of his life, the second stage, which is to be described in this chapter, contains writings, in the shape of review-articles and correspondence, which are well worthy of notice, alike for their intrinsic value and for the great light they throw on the maturer works which succeeded them.

The present chapter will, accordingly, include (I.) the earlier articles of metaphysical importance and (II.) Dr. Martineau's philosophical correspondence about this time with his life-long friend Prof. F. W. Newman; while the following chapter will be devoted to the influential year of study in Germany, and to the correspondence connected

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with that period. This will close the second stage in the history of his philosophical thought; and we shall thus be prepared to survey, in the succeeding chapters, the later "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses," the "Study of Spinoza," and at somewhat greater length the two larger treatises by which Dr. Martineau's position among the world's great philosophers will finally be determined.

I. Of the philosophical papers which he contributed to periodicals during the Hartleyan stage of his thought we found only one of any moment, and that was described and criticised in the first chapter. After his great "Palinodia," as he sometimes called it, and before his studies in Berlin, there are four articles of conspicuous merit; namely, his review of Dr. Whewell's ethical writings; his criticism of Dr. Morell's "History of Philosophy," — a brilliant attempt to overthrow the religious philosophy of Victor Cousin —; the article on Theodore Parker; and, finally, the article on that great preacher, to whom he was so much indebted for his philosophical regeneration, Dr. W. E. Channing.

The criticism of Dr. Whewell is contained in two articles, which appeared in the "Prospective Review" for 1845 and 1846. The main significance of these papers lies in the fact that they prove that almost immediately after Dr. Martineau rejected Necessarianism he formed that characteristic conception of the Conscience, as being an original faculty of the soul for discerning the difference of ethical rank among conflicting motives, or springs of action, which forty years after appears substantially unchanged though more elaborated in the "Types of Ethical Theory." In opposition to the theory of a Moral Sense which is supposed to discern at once the moral quality of a motive, Dr. Martineau contends that

"every moral judgment is relative, and involves a comparison of two terms. This fact that every ethical decision is in truth

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a *preference*, an election of one act as higher than another, appears to us of fundamental importance in the analysis of the moral sentiments. It prevents our speaking of Conscience as a *Sense*; for sense discerns its objects singly, conscience only in pairs. . . . We think that when the same occasion calls up simultaneously two or more springs of action, immediately in their juxtaposition, we intuitively discern the higher quality of one than another, giving it a divine and authoritative right of preference; but when the whole series of springs of action has been experienced, the feeling or 'knowledge with ourselves' of their relative rank constitutes the individual conscience; that all human beings, when their conscience is faithfully interpreted, as infallibly arrive at the same series of moral estimates as at the same set of rational truths; that it is, therefore, no less correct to speak of a universal conscience than of a universal reason in mankind; and that on this community of nature alone rests the possibility of ethical science. From these propositions it will be evident that the moral constitution of the mind presents itself to us under the image not of an absolute monarchy over equal subjects, such as appears in Butler's scheme, but of a natural aristocracy or complete system of ranks, among our principles of conduct, on observance of which depends the order and worth of our life."¹

When Prof. H. Sidgwick published his "Methods of Ethics" in 1869, in the chapter on "Motives or Springs of Action considered as Subjects of Moral Judgment," he criticised the above passage; but as he thought it possible that Dr. Martineau might have changed his opinion in the course of years, he courteously sent him a "proof" of the criticism, asking for comment on it. This called forth an important letter from Dr. Martineau, which will be given when we reach this point in the chapter on the "Types of Ethical Theory." The passage given above called forth a suggestive letter from Dr. Martineau's intimate friend, and former pupil, Mr. R. H. Hutton, a summary of which, by Dr. Martineau's hand, will find most fitting insertion here: —

¹ "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses," Vol. III. p. 347-350.

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"Referring to my Review of Whewell, he appeals to me to draw up a graduated *table of springs of action*; [this is done in the 'Types of Ethical Theory'] and he suggests (about the *measure* of guilt) that the guilt, in preferring a lower spring of action, is proportional to the amount of voluntary effort which the agent *could expend*, but *did not*, in resistance to the lower nature; so that the guilt of any action varies with the residuum of voluntary effort *not employed*, which the agent *might have employed*; and the pain which he *deserves* is exactly that involved in the subsequent enforcement of the *sacrifice declined*. Often, when we, under temptation, do the *right act*, we are conscious of *not surrendering without terms*, but that if the temptation had not been light or moderate we *should have gone wrong*; so that right action is not without a residue of guilt."

A few months after the review of Whewell there appeared in the "Prospective," in 1846, two important philosophical articles: one, in the February number, on Theodore Parker's "Discourse of Religion," the other, in the November number, on Dr. J. D. Morell's "History of Modern Philosophy." I will deal first with the latter of these; for, if I am not mistaken, a clear understanding of Dr. Martineau's views as expressed in this paper will serve to elucidate, to some extent, the criticism passed by him on the "Discourse of Religion." Along with the article on Dr. Morell's book should be read another paper by Dr. Martineau, namely, that on "Philosophical Christianity in France," given in the "Prospective" of February, 1848, for both papers are largely occupied with an examination of the views of Victor Cousin and his disciples. The first of these papers is not reprinted in the collected "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses." If these articles are compared with Dr. Martineau's thoughtful Essay on "The Five Points of Christian Faith," given in the "Christian Teacher," for 1841, a certain change of attitude towards Cousin's philosophy becomes evident; and this change is of such an important character that a correct appre-

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hension of it is quite indispensable to a sound interpretation and appreciation both of Dr. Martineau's sermons and of his later philosophy. I may be excused, therefore, for dwelling at some length upon it. In the paper in the "Christian Teacher," p. 452, Dr. Martineau says:—

"The relation which thus subsists between the human conscience and the Divine excellence leads us to avow a faith in the strictly *divine and inspired character of our own highest desires and best affections*. We are *conscious* of them, and so they cannot but be part of our personality."

To this passage the following important Note is appended:—

"Perhaps we should rather say 'they cannot be alien to our nature.' The word 'personality' is used by philosophical writers to denote that which is *peculiar*, as well as essential, to our individual self. In this strict sense, the moral and spiritual affections are *impersonal*, according to the doctrine of the context which treats them as constituting a *participation in the Divine nature*. The metaphysical reader will perceive here a resemblance to the theory of Victor Cousin, who maintains that the *will* of the human being is the specific faculty in which alone consists his 'personality'; and that the intuitive reason by which we have knowledge of the unlimited and Absolute Cause, as well as of ourselves and the universe as related effects, is *independent* and *impersonal*,—a faculty not peculiar to the subject, but 'from the bosom of consciousness extending to the Infinite, and reaching to the Being of beings.' . . . At the opposite pole to this doctrine, which makes the perceptions of 'Reason' a part of the activity of God, lies the system of Kant and Fichte, which represents God as an ideal formation—it may be, therefore, a fiction—from the activity of the 'Reason.' The doctrine maintained by me in the text, though resembling that of Kant in one or two of its phrases, far more nearly approaches Cousin in its spirit."

I shall endeavour to show in the last chapter of this book that the doctrine of this Note, viz., that man in his rational, ethical, æsthetic, and spiritual experience directly

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“participates in the Divine nature,” and therefore immediately apprehends the Divine Presence, inspires all Dr. Martineau’s grandest and truest utterances, though it finds but little distinct expression in his formulated philosophy.

It appears probable that in the interval between 1840 and 1846 Dr. Martineau had become alarmed by a perception of the danger to which the doctrine set forth in the above Note is exposed; the danger, that is, of easily gliding into Pantheism, and that he had seen this undesirable transformation realised in the case of some of the more extreme members of the New England Transcendental School. But be this as it may, it is not possible to read his later references to Cousin without feeling that Dr. Martineau was no longer inclined to accept Cousin’s doctrine that man has a direct knowledge of God in His absolute reality. In a passage quoted by Dr. Martineau from the “5^e Leçon” of the “Histoire de la Philosophie,” M. Cousin first explains, in agreement with Dr. Martineau, that the discovery by man that he is limited by the resistance of external objects first reveals man to himself; but the Self which is thus discovered is a *finite* self; its very existence springs out of its limitations and finiteness; and the external objects that resist the action of the Self are also discerned as *finite*.

“It is, then,” he continues, “through this mutual opposition that we apprehend ourselves; this opposition is permanent in the consciousness, and extends throughout it. But this opposition, observe, gentlemen, resolves itself into one single idea,—that of the finite. This *me* that we are is finite; the *not-me* which limits it is itself finite, and limited by the *me*; they are both so, but in different degrees; we are then still in the finite. *Is there not something else in consciousness?* Yes, gentlemen; while consciousness seizes upon the *me* as finite, in opposition to the *not-me* as finite, it refers this finite, bounded, relative, contingent *me* and *not-me* to a superior, absolute, necessary unity, which contains and explains them, and which possesses all the characteristics opposed to

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those which the *me* finds in itself and in the correlative *not-me*. This unity is absolute, as the *me* and *not-me* are relative. This unity is an ultimate substance, while the *me* and *not-me* are dependent substances. Moreover, this superior unity is not only a substance, it is cause also. In fact the *me* detects itself only in its acts, as a cause acting upon the external world; and the external world awakens the knowledge of the *me* by the impressions which it makes upon it. This finite cause is the world, and as it is a finite cause, and the *me* also is a finite cause, the unity,—the substance which contains the *me* and the *not-me*,—being a cause, must consequently be in its nature an Infinite Cause."

In 1841 Dr. Martineau would, I believe, in the main, have agreed with this answer which Cousin gives to the question, "Is there not something else in consciousness than these experiences which, after all, do not carry us beyond the finite and the dependent?" He would probably have said, Yes, there is also in our consciousness the Eternal Reason, that immanent Divine Presence, in which all human beings participate, and in virtue of that participation have positive ideas of the Infinite, the Eternal, the Absolute, and can experience that spiritual faith, aspiration, and affection which springs out of the progressive self-revelation of God in the consciousness. In 1846, however, he shrinks from this mode of exposition, and replies to Cousin as follows:—

"The reverence in which we hold the meditations of deep thinkers so fills us with self-distrust that we often shrink from expressing a dissent more probably due to our ignorance than to their mistake. But we must confess it to be strange news to us, that beyond the range of the *me* and the *not-me* there is a third somewhat, under the designation of the *Absolute*, or the *Absolute Cause*. We had always supposed that the sphere of a conception and that of its contradictory were all-comprehending; and that any object of thought absent from the one must be found in the other. Of anything, be it real or ideal, which is excluded both from the mind and from all else than the mind, we can form not the faintest notion; and whoever makes assertions about it talks to us, in an unknown tongue.

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We know well indeed the purpose which this metaphysical invention is intended to serve; that it is an attempt to rescue the mind from its relative position; to carry its knowledge beyond phænomena, and give it insight into things *per se*; to bridge over the supposed chasm between psychology and ontology. We know also the result in which it inevitably terminates; that this third term, once admitted successively, swallows up the other two, which, so long as they remain, dispute all its claims, and leaves it no alternative but to annihilate them or go out itself; and that so it comes to reign alone, and establish the triumph of Pantheism."

I can, with far more justice than Dr. Martineau, repeat the words with which he begins this criticism, for I feel much hesitation in expressing an opinion as to which of these eminent thinkers has here the most truth on his side. But my impression is that Dr. Martineau does not do full justice to Cousin when he alleges against him the logical principle that the *me* and the *not-me* together must include the universe of reality. Cousin understands by the *me* and the *not-me* simply the two divisions of finite and dependent existences, man and nature, and his contention is that there are in the human mind ideas of infinity, of absolute causality, of self-existence, which could not arise unless there were more in our consciousness than can be explained by our sensations and the experience of resistance to our volitional efforts. Now Dr. Martineau himself, in this article, also maintains that there is something else, viz., the idea of Infinity. We have, he says, a necessary idea of Infinite Space, and "the synthesis in the Not-Self, of the ideas of Space and Will, gives the idea of the Infinity of God." It was in this way that he reached the idea of God as "an Infinite Mind"; but he never appears to have fully realised the difficulty that the "mind" or "will" which he thus supposes to give, by synthesis with the idea of Infinite Space, the idea of God, is the *human* mind or will, and *that will* we do not feel to be *self-existent*. No synthesis,

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therefore, of such a will with Infinity could, it seems to me, give an adequate idea of the Absolute or Self-existent God.

But according to Dr. Martineau's other view, as expressed in the Note given above, we gain the idea of God's Infinitude directly from the fact that we, in a certain true sense, "participate in the Divine nature"; and having thus reached the idea of the Infinite by God's self-revelation in our inner life, we may apply that idea to Space. While the former conception of God appears to be the dominant one in his intellectual and formal philosophy, the latter, I believe, underlies his profoundest ethical and religious teaching; and, as I shall afterwards endeavour to show, is the conception which forms the central principle of his philosophy of religion. If it be true, then, as I venture to think it is, that this *direct apprehension* of God as Infinite and Self-existent is implied throughout Dr. Martineau's philosophy, there would appear to be a very close affinity between Victor Cousin's *knowledge of the Absolute* and Dr. Martineau's *immediate vision of the immanent God*.

What has now been said renders it unnecessary to dwell at any length on the two reviews of Theodore Parker's "Discourse on Religion," which appeared, the one in the "Prospective Review" for February, 1846, and the other under the title "Strauss and Parker" in the "Westminster" for April, 1847. That same vivid consciousness of the immanence of God in the soul which inspired Cousin's "Lectures" asserted itself also with exuberant vivacity and force in Theodore Parker's noble soul; and, as was the case at times with Paul, and many of the great mystics, it sometimes so engrossed his interest that the fact that the human Will is made partially independent of God, and, therefore, morally responsible and capable of sinning, is, occasionally, apparently forgotten or ignored. Theodore Parker protests, and rightly, against extreme anthropo-

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morphic conceptions of God; but whether the expression "Will," derived from our own experience, adequately describes the activity of God in nature and in the human mind (as Dr. Martineau in this and other writings eloquently and forcibly contends it does), or whether, as applied to the Eternal, the word "Will" must be interpreted as symbolical of a reality beyond our power of complete comprehension, Theodore Parker appears to agree with Dr. Martineau that our moral consciousness clearly testifies to the fact that human wills can and do at times resist the legitimate authority of the *Moral Ideal*. Nevertheless, in his eagerness to repudiate the popular theological error that God's presence and activity is manifested, not in the ordinary phenomena of nature and human life, but only in exceptional and so-called miraculous events, Parker at times appears to carry the agency of the "Being infinite in Power, Wisdom, and Goodness," upon whom we feel ourselves to be "dependent," not only through the whole of the physical, but also through the psychical world, and in so doing to undermine the foundations of that very interpersonal relation between God and his rational creatures, the production of which both Dr. Martineau and Prof. John Fiske regard as the supreme purpose for the gradual realisation of which the vast eras of physical and psychical evolution were called into existence. As Dr. Martineau eloquently expresses it: —

"Shocked at the banishment of God, as a living Agent, from the actual scenes and recent ages of the world, he has recalled the Almighty Presence with such power as to make an absence of all else; and when we look for the objects that should be his correlatives, the beings that should receive His regards, the theatre that was waiting for His energy, they are gone. Perhaps we shall be asked, 'What then? Can there be in human faith an excess of Deity?' Is there anything you would care to save 'from the general merging of all inferior causes'? Yes, we reply there is one thing that must not be overwhelmed, even by an invasion of the Infinite

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Glory. Let all besides perish if you will; but when you open the windows of heaven upon this godless earth, and bring back the sacred flood to swallow up each brute rebellious power, let there be an ark of safety built (it is Heaven's own warning word) to preserve the *Human Will* from annihilation; for if this sink too, the divine irruption designed to purify does but turn creation into a vast Dead Sea occupied by God. Theodore Parker has failed to perceive this."

The criticism passed in this review on Theodore Parker's account of Inspiration is highly suggestive, and should be read in connection with Dr. Martineau's more matured views, on this question, which are given in the "Seat of Authority" in the chapter on "'Natural' and 'Revealed Religion.'" In the later work it is shown that in a certain sense of the word "Revelation," Theodore Parker's declaration that the "Principia" of Newton was the work of an inspired man, is justifiable. For Dr. Martineau there contends that both Revelation and Intuition imply communion between the Divine mind and the human; but he adds the important qualification that it is only those intuitions which throw light upon our spiritual relations as personal beings that constitute the object matter of *religious knowledge*, and that beyond this sphere "it is not usual to carry the word 'Revelation.' Else, these primary cognitions" of Space and Time, Substance and Causality, "simply as *data* at first hand, might well be called intellectual revelations; and as not found among phænomena of nature, but standing as prior conditions of them all, might even aspire to the epithet *supernatural*." Hence it appears that there is no serious difference between Theodore Parker and his critic on this basal question.

The testimony which these two articles bear to the heroic love of truth and of humanity which characterised Parker is confirmed by the words in which Dr. Martineau describes the impression made upon him by Parker's visit to him in Liverpool in 1844:—

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“When he had gone, I had the delightful consciousness of a new and rare friendship with a man of truly noble and lofty nature. I remember my comparing my fresh personal impression of him with the previous literary one, and coming to the conclusion that his stature was higher as a *practical reformer* than as *great thinker*. The particular conversations which led me to this estimate I cannot recall. But I gained from him rather less than I had expected on speculative matters, and vastly more in relation to social and moral questions.”

In juxtaposition with this high estimate of one of America's noblest sons, it is fitting to place Dr. Martineau's impression concerning Parker's contemporary and fellow-countryman, — the great and unique Emerson. It is to be regretted that our sources of information are confined to three letters from Dr. Martineau's pen, two of which will now be given; while the third, that written to the Rev. E. I. Fripp, will be found in the next chapter. All these letters belong to a much later time in Dr. Martineau's life than that described in the present chapter; but they refer to impressions formed at this period. The following passage from Mr. O. B. Frothingham's "Transcendentalism in New England" will partially explain why it was that, notwithstanding Dr. Martineau's warm admiration and love for this supremely gifted seer, Emerson's constructive writings necessarily failed to give complete satisfaction to a thinker who was aiming to reach a self-consistent *Weltanschauung* which should harmonise the rational beliefs of the questioning intellect with the deliverances of the conscience and the heart.

"Emerson," says Mr. Frothingham, "neither dogmatizes nor defines. On the contrary, his chief anxiety seems to be to avoid committing himself to opinions. He gives no description of God that will class him as theist or pantheist; no definition of immortality that justifies his readers in imputing to him any form of the popular belief in regard to it. Does he believe in personal immortality? It is impertinent to ask. He will not be questioned; not because he doubts, but be-

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cause his beliefs are so rich, various, and many-sided that he is unwilling, by laying emphasis on any one, to do apparent injustice to others. He will be held to no definitions; he will be reduced to no final statements."

On this I would remark that Emerson, in regard to this question of personal immortality, does appear to doubt and to waver in his judgment, and the words in his grand "Threnody" —

"What is excellent,
As God lives, is permanent,
Hearts are dust, hearts' loves remain,
Heart's love will meet thee again" —

clearly indicate that there were times in his spiritual experience when his belief in personal immortality was as firm and positive as Dr. Martineau's.

The first and most important letter is dated Dec. 31, 1882, and is written to Emerson's personal friend Mr. Alexander Ireland, of Manchester.

MY DEAR SIR, — I cannot more pleasantly close the year than by discharging one of its last claims upon my gratitude, due to you for your very interesting sketch of Emerson's life. I found a great charm in it when it appeared mainly as a series of reminiscences of his English visits, and the charm is doubled in the volume recently published. Though I could never find in Emerson's effusions as a *Vates* so rich a vein of thought or so awakening a power as his most devoted readers were able to recognise, yet in his own personality he appeared to me almost all that is noble, lovely, and venerable; and in his critical and ethical writings, where he commented on the given matter of life, manners, and character, to rise to the very perfection of moral judgment, pure and keen without a trace of Cynicism, and with a selecting enthusiasm for all beauty and good, calm and passionless because full of faith in them as the permanency of the world.

I first heard of him in 1830, from Henry Ware and his wife, who visited me in my early married life in Dublin; and I have a faint impression that even then he was spoken of by the elder minister with a shade of reserve, as if the want of congeniality between the evangelical pastor and the indepen-

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dent thinker was already inwardly felt. Three years afterwards, in 1833, he sought me out in Liverpool, introduced by Henry Ware, and told me the story of his scruple about the Communion. He was then in a very indeterminate state of mind about questions on religion, and I was struck with the mixture of clear decision on the subject which had led to action, and of modest suspense on topics which he had not fully thought out. But I made up my mind that he would not be likely to return to the ministry. If, as would appear from your volume, he was a good Greek scholar and a student of Plato's dialogues, I suppose he must have sometimes underrated his own attainments. For I well remember addressing some question to him after his first lecture on "Representative Men," in 1847, about one of his citations, or statements of opinion, and his reply that, life being too short to allow of seeking knowledge at the fountain-head, he was thankful for such an interpreter of Plato as Victor Cousin on whom he had depended. It was that second visit that left upon me an indelible impression of the depth and greatness of his nature.

It is curious that no one of the photographs seems to me to reproduce the characteristic expression of his face. My memory demands something between the first and second, with supplementary touches which are not in either.

With hearty thanks and best wishes,

I remain, yours faithfully,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

ALEXANDER IRELAND, Esq.

The second letter, referring to Emerson, is dated Jan. 6, 1890, and is addressed to another of Emerson's personal friends, — Mr. R. C. Hall, of Liverpool.

MY DEAR MR. HALL, — As the New Year refuses to loiter on its way to suit an old man's tardy pace, I am sadly belated with my offering of thanks for your kind and faithful remembrance of us in the distribution of your annual benedictions. . . . I have great sympathy with Emerson's confession that he is, and can never cease to be, haunted by "the letter he is intending to write," but which still remains unwritten. The life of him, by Cabot, in which this occurs, is interesting me greatly, and fixing my impression of him more distinctly than either my memory or my reading had defined for me before. A most winning and delightful personality on the side of the

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affections and conscience, he somewhat disappoints me intellectually. With deep and lovely flashes of insight, characteristic of real genius, I find mixed many dicta which, though striking in their epigrammatic form, do not speak to me as *true*. And the failure of coherent continuity of thought, apparently commended to him by a mistaken interpretation of the Kantian distinction of *Understanding* and *Reason*, leave his fine materials in an unorganised and patternless condition. Much as I love the man, I seek in vain to *learn* from him. The fault is probably in me. I do not mean to criticise him, but only to describe my felt relation to him.

I remain, always,

Yours very sincerely,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

The last of the important review-articles which Dr. Martineau wrote prior to his stay in Germany, also refers to a distinguished American, its subject being the Memoir of Dr. W. E. Channing. The paper given in the first volume of "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses" is composed of two articles, the former of which appeared in the "Prospective" for August, 1848, the latter in the "Westminster" for January, 1849. Although valuable as a study of character and for the very lucid and graphic picture it gives of the difference between Priestleyan Unitarianism and the Unitarianism of Channing's writings, the article has no great philosophical interest. How thankful Dr. Martineau felt, at the time of his great philosophical change, for the stimulus and help which he derived from the clear moral insight and glowing enthusiasm of Channing's writings we have already seen. But beyond moral purity and fervour he discerned no great philosophical penetration and grasp in Dr. Channing's mind.

"In casting," he says, "our eyes backward over Channing's career, it is easy to assign him his place in literature and life, and to name his characteristics. It would be absurd to range him in the first class of writers; he produced — he could have produced — no great work in history, philosophy,

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or art, to enter into the education of other times; what he has written will not, perhaps, very long be read. His influence, however, though not fitted for permanence, has been both wide and deep. . . . Channing's profound *moral sensibility* became the source of all his thought; supplied his clue through every question; gave a complexion to his view of nature, history, and life; and imparted to him that mixture of reserve and refinement with enthusiasm and fire which his portrait so curiously expresses."

The following passage from a letter written by Dr. Channing to Dr. Martineau, Sept. 10, 1841, in reference to the New England Transcendentalists, among whom were some Unitarian ministers, strikingly illustrates the former's incapacity to fully appreciate great philosophical questions:—

"Here, as in England, we have a stir. Happily we have no material anti-supernaturalists. Our reformers are spiritualists and hold many grand truths, but in identifying themselves a good deal with Cousin's crude system, they have lost the life of an original movement. Some among them seem to lean to the anti-miraculous, have got the German notion of myths, etc., and, I fear, are loosening their hold on Christ. They are anxious to depend on the soul's immediate connection with God. They fear lest Christ be made a barrier between the soul and the Supreme, and are in danger of substituting private inspiration for Christianity; should they go thus far, my hopes from them will cease wholly; but as yet the elements are in great agitation, and it is hard to say how they will arrange themselves."

We can hardly doubt that the last two sentences of this extract must have extorted an amiable smile from Dr. Martineau, for at that date he was far on the road to, if he had not already reached, the firm conviction that all Christianity, in the case both of its founder and his disciples, springs entirely out of this decried "private inspiration," and that it is solely by an appeal to this same immediate revelation that its authority and its divinity can

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be tested and allowed. As Mr. Jackson admirably expresses it:—

“The basal principle of Dr. Martineau’s theology is his Theism. Many would say they are theists because they are Christian; on the authority of Christ they believe in God. Dr. Martineau on the contrary is a Christian because he is a theist. He believes in Christ, for he articulates a divine word which *he* has also heard.”¹

II. What remains of the philosophical correspondence between Dr. Martineau and his friends at this period of his life consists almost entirely of the letters which passed between him and Prof. F. W. Newman, Mr. R. H. Hutton, and the Rev. J. H. Thom. The correspondence with Mr. Newman will now be given. That with Mr. Hutton and Mr. Thom is connected for the most part with Dr. Martineau’s residence in Germany, and will, therefore, have more fitting place in the succeeding chapter. Dr. Martineau considered it very fortunate that among his colleagues in Manchester he found in Prof. F. W. Newman a spirit so congenial with his own. They soon formed a close friendship, and when, to their great mutual regret, they were locally separated, in 1846, by Professor Newman’s acceptance of the post of Professor of Latin in University College, London, they commenced a frequent correspondence which continued, with few intermissions, all their lives. Professor Newman had no great taste for pure metaphysics; his theological beliefs were founded more upon immediate moral and spiritual experience than upon philosophical reasoning, so that the letters more generally discussed questions of practical ethics connected with political economy, sociology, and also with international duties, on which subject Professor Newman had very pronounced opinions. In the preceding chapter two of Dr. Martineau’s letters to Professor Newman were given in

¹ “James Martineau, A Study and Biography,” p. 182.

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illustration of the views which he expounded as Professor of Political Economy. Several letters also passed between them expressing difference of opinion regarding the moral perfection of Jesus, and some of these have been given in Book I. It is worth noticing, however, that in this controversy Dr. Martineau did not claim for Jesus exhaustive moral insight, but only perfect fidelity to the ideal as he discerned it.

“Christ’s excellence,” he says, “is thus far unique in history, and to our present apprehensions concurring with the moral ideal of humanity. That no higher human being can ever appear on earth we would by no means venture to affirm. When Jesus himself said, ‘Why callest thou me good? None is good save One, that is God,’ he must have had a thought in his mind beyond his own reality, and he thus points to possibilities which he did not exhaust.”

When Professor Newman’s works, “The Soul” and “Phases of Faith,” were published, the reviews of these books in the “Prospective” gave occasion to an interesting interchange of letters of a semi-philosophical character. The article on “The Soul” was really written by Mr. J. J. Tayler; but Professor Newman, at first, ascribed it to Dr. Martineau, and wrote to him in consequence. The following is Dr. Martineau’s reply:—

FEBRUARY 1, 1850.

MY DEAR NEWMAN,—My long and wayward silences bring no reproach from you, and shall have no excuse from me. I believe my feeling has been that, until I had read your book, and brought up my mind more nearly to the hour, I had no business to write to you.

Now I have read “The Soul,” and shall bless you for it, with thanks I cannot speak, so long as I have a Soul that lives. Nothing that I have ever read—unless some scattered thoughts of Pascal’s—has come so close to me, and so strengthened a deep but too shrinking faith. . . . Your book is not one that I can criticise, and where I cannot heartily assent I feel more inclined to doubt myself than it. The chief thing that affects me with a certain obscure dissatisfaction is your sharp distinc-

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tion between the several powers of human nature and your absolute isolation of the *Soul* as the region of exclusive communication with God.

For myself, I am not conscious of anything adequately corresponding with this. The action of the conscience and the human affections appear to me inseparably blended with the purest insight and the highest aspirations of Faith; and the conscious communion with God seems the work of no special organ of our being, but the clear and holy kindling of the *entire mind*, — at least of *every faculty* which Infinite Perfection can engage. Hence I cannot always feel the reality of your contrast between spiritual and unspiritual evidence of divine truth, or join in your slight upon the Metaphysics of faith. The spiritual element, I cannot but think, does not in all persons take the form of intuition; but in minds of the Platonic cast fuses itself into one with philosophic thought, and discerns the Infinite Purity through a glorified cloud of reason and reflexion. Why throw discredit on the reasonings of such minds as unspiritual? True, metaphysics imply no soul; but many souls find their vision helped by metaphysics, and quite as many, I should say, among the simple and untaught as among the cultivated class. In short, the Pauline class of souls appears to me not the *only* one, but the Platonic order to be no less naturally stationed in the world; neither appears to be a corruption of the other, or entitled to do more than prefer its own appointed method of access to the Source of Light. In the same way, I doubt whether you do justice to the resources of *conscience* and the class of *legal* religionists; though here my sympathies, against my judgment, are entirely with you.

Ever, my dear Newman, affectionately yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

A short time before this letter was written Dr. Martineau received a letter from Mr. Richard H. Hutton, treating of the same subject, which he thus condenses:—

“Mr. Tayler’s ‘Prospective Review’ article on Newman’s ‘The Soul,’ etc., draws from Richard a fine and just critique upon the book and its ‘evangelical’ basis, which substitutes the religion of *personal gratitude for salvation* in place of the religion of *veneration and aspiration of conscience for moral*

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perfection, and, therefore, leaves *Self and its well-being* as the centre, instead of the *infinitely Holy and Perfect Mind that communes with us and leads us on*. Hence the utterly immoral vicarious doctrine, and a conception of *Sin* which makes it not *guilt*, but *poison*; and hence the substitution, in the evangelical piety, of the Pauline theology for that of Christ himself."

It is necessary, now, to insert two letters to Dr. Martineau from Mr. Newman, as they explain Dr. Martineau's important reply to them. The first letter is interesting as showing that Hegelianism was taught at Oxford several years before Prof. T. H. Green's genius and moral enthusiasm brought it into such prominence.

MAY, 1851.

MY DEAR MARTINEAU, — You have performed a painful but wholesome duty in your review of Atkinson and Martineau. To me it is a satisfaction to find you so pointedly avow that there is no logical coherence in their book, — I do not speak of sentences, but of the entire substance, — for I now and then distrust my own understanding of recondite metaphysics, when my only reply is to undervalue the good sense, and the common sense of one who professes to have devoted so much time and effort to it. What *has* the Mesmerism to do with Atheism? was my constant cry while I read the book.

It also gratified me that you gave the seal of your judgment (and Jacobi's) to what I fancied was a sort of discovery of my own, viz., that the arguments against Theism are arguments against Moral Distinctions. In short, Morality, Free-will, and Theism, all three, fall or stand together. This appears to me to be just now the thing which needs to be practically laid before common people. . . . Let me add that I know Mr. Holyoake of late. He is a very candid, kind, simple-minded man, who has taken to puffing off me and my book on the Soul very strangely, but I believe very sincerely, and in order to refute Theism in my person. He was shamefully persecuted at law some years back, and is a true enthusiast in his cause. His moral goodness gives power to his doctrine. Now it would be very important to show that the two are in collision. At the same time I do not feel much alarm at an Atheism which is spread by such agencies. It surely can only be a transition towards a new and better re-

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ligion. Where the heart retains a love and reverence for goodness, it is essentially a worshipper, and will find a God in due time.

The stronghold of philosophic Atheism seems to me to be the dogma of the inductive philosophy, "All we know is phenomena." I often used to hear this at Oxford, from clerical teachers! and always resisted it, though not then imagining its anti-religious tendency. When last I was in Oxford, in Balliol walls (1846), the same doctrine was propounded by an eminent gentleman, a clerical tutor, who is said to be deep in Hegel, and he set me down (almost in so many words) as very puzzle-headed because I resisted it. You make me wonder that I have not always answered as you do. My resistance to Dr. Thomas Brown I have sometimes suspected to be fanatical, but indeed it is not for nothing.

Your doctrine that all Power is Will seems to me to need explanations which amount to evasions. But perhaps I am still in some confusion. My "Political Economy" will not *satisfy* you in the defective points, yet it leans in your direction.

Ever affectionately yours,

F. W. NEWMAN.

The second, which is dated a year later, explains itself: —

MY DEAR MARTINEAU, — Chapman makes me nervous by talking of stereotyping cheaply my book on the Soul, and begs me to add *my last corrections* to it. In order to meet objections from very opposite quarters, I am disposed to prefix an introductory Section on the "Metaphysics of Morals." No living man is to me so lucid on these subjects as you are. How much I owe to you I do not know; for my habit is to fuse together all that I learn from every quarter. I *believe* that much which I learned from Aristotle I have only *re-*learned more clearly from you. But I often am diffident as to my correctness of phraseology, where I have some confidence that I am fundamentally right. I take the liberty of sending for your criticism the new section. It is not so compressed as I wish; but I fear that if I omit *all* reasons and *all* illustrations, I shall again be misunderstood. Neither your sister nor Mr. Holyoake appears to me to have had the least idea what I held or meant on these matters. The latter now admits he had quite misconceived me. His Anti-theism is

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wholly built on the doctrine of Necessity; so, I think, is the Atkinson-Martineau view. Holyoake believes his view *eminently* Moral; and I think that to his mind it will really be a practical refutation of his Anti-theism if he can be shown that it is unfavourable to Morals.

I do not pretend that Law exists as clearly in the domain of Will as elsewhere. (This is his great objection to me.) Am I going too far in my concession? I do not intend to *assert* that such a sphere is not one for (even) Divine foreknowledge; but neither am I able to assert that it is. I shall cancel one short section in the book, if I insert this. Forgive haste, and

Believe me ever yours affectionately,

F. W. NEWMAN.

Two days after the despatch of this letter, Professor Newman received from Dr. Martineau a very elaborate reply, commenting on the more important of the eleven paragraphs of the "new Section," which his friend had sent for his consideration. The letter is very long, but it appears desirable to insert it entire, as it gives in epitome the chief features of Dr. Martineau's theory of the relation of God both to the phenomena of Nature and to the Moral consciousness of man, and when studied in connection with "The Soul; her Sorrows and her Aspirations" (which must be read in the second and later editions, containing the "Introductory Remarks") affords a most instructive insight into the distinct characteristics of these two highly gifted exponents of the philosophy of religion, and serves to explain why Mr Newman was never able to feel in complete sympathy with the Unitarian circle of religionists. The letter contains also a most acute criticism of the philosophy of Mr. J. S. Mill and his followers, which was at that time the dominant one in this country.

LIVERPOOL, May 14, 1852.

MY DEAR NEWMAN, — If you are not a Christian, you have more Christian virtues than all the saints in the calendar, that you can so easily forgive me my sins of omission. That

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"Moses was the meekest of men" is no longer an historical any more than it is a moral truth. To say nothing, however, of my own doings, positive or negative, I am truly rejoiced to hear of the projected new edition of "The Soul." It is one of the two or three books which I love with a feeling of measureless gratitude, and that stand off, at long intervals in my memory, as milestones, marking great stages in my spiritual life. How you, with your clear and wide vision, can ever have found any use in my poor glasses — that leave so much still dim to my own view — I cannot imagine. But if each will but honestly report what he sees, we can hardly fail, I suppose, to be of some help to one another.

I think you can scarcely improve the Introductory Remarks, which appear to me to present, briefly and forcibly, a summary of the most important principles involved in the doctrines of the book. An opponent will have no excuse for the further misunderstanding of your fundamental positions, and may lay his finger on the particular point which he thinks proper to attack. The part which, with a view to the Atkinson and (I should think) the Holyoake doctrine, I should like to see a little strengthened, is the statement in No. 7 of the ultimate ground of Moral Truth. These objectors recognise no *Science of Consciousness*, and either avowedly or virtually reduce us to evidence of *Perception* and the intellectual rules applicable to it. Hence their notions of "Morality" begin with external actions as observed in other men, and traced in their physical consequences; and results in a scheme of eudæmonist policy, which never reaches the living centre and source of *obligation*. The right to proceed in the opposite direction and find the elements and interpretation of moral truth *within* us in reflexion on our own acts requires, perhaps, a word of vindication. The controversy is really one between *Physics*, which the objector would advance to universal empire, and *Morals*, for which we would claim a separate province and jurisdiction. Unless the feeling can be brought home to Mr. Holyoake that the Sentiment and Belief of *Obligation* are indispensable to *Morals*, and make all the difference between the breaking-in of a horse and the training of a man, it will be impossible to convince him of the unfavourable tendency of his doctrine, which does actually leave "*motives*" and *interests* undisturbed, and leaves room for *rules of conduct*, while annihilating *Duty* altogether.

I do not think you concede at all too much respecting the relation of Law and Will. Free-will, it appears to me, is so

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far from excluding Law, that were Law shut out as an impossibility, Free-will must go too. If I can determine myself in a single instance, I can do no less in any number of analogous cases; and am as little precluded from *establishing a habit* as from *performing* an insulated act. This habit is a Law which I make for myself; and an observer, after watching for a while, can predict my procedure. Nothing but the *absence of Free-will* could deny this possibility to me. It remains, however, always open to me to break away from the analogy hitherto given out, and disappoint the observer's prediction. A free mind, in short, is as able to bind as to loose itself, and leaves indefinite scope for Law and prediction, only with the perpetual reserve of potential variation. The *certainty* arising from such law may evidently range over every degree of *probability*, but can never become *absolute*. There is no possible proof that Law exists, in any more stringent sense than this, in Nature, whose uniformities are perfectly explicable to us as the continuous self-determinations of God, always open to possible change of direction, however kept steady by faithfulness of purpose. *Necessity* can never be proved on the mere evidence of Law, unless, indeed, the Law be of the *à priori* kind, reached, not by inductive method, but by a deduction from some primary axioms of thought. The German Pantheists *do* attribute this geometrical character to all Science, and are accordingly, as it seems to me, the only consistent Necessarians; Law and Necessity being synonymous with them. But our English Necessarians are invariably *Inductive* people, hostile to all *à priori* claims in Physical Knowledge; thus uniting, with inconsistency the most manifest, a Logic of Science which withholds Law from ever becoming tantamount to Necessity, and a Logic of Religion, which assumes the identity of the two.

Would it not be possible to show Holyoake that, in arguing from Necessity to Atheism, he tacitly concedes Free-will? "Nature," he says, "reveals no God; there is no trace of a directing Mind being present there; for only see! everything happens by inexorable rule; nothing can be other than it is; there is no God!" In this reasoning the *presence of Necessity* is taken as a mark of the *absence of Mind*; and we are virtually told that we must get this necessity out of the way, or reclaim some province from it, before we can expect men to recognise the possibility of a living Mind. Can there be a plainer confession than this, that the ideas of Necessity and of Mind are felt to be incompatible? How else should the

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one be thrust before us as a stumbling-block to bar our way to the other? Thus the atheist of this class demands, as an indispensable mark of a Divine Mind, the very Freedom which at the same time he pronounces not only absent from the *human* but impossible to *any* Mind.

I observe that you adopt the Aristotelian mode of describing moral phænomena, — as a choice of *Ends*. Perhaps it is best to do, considering the superior clearness of this objective language, especially where it is so close upon the truth as here. Otherwise this phraseology affects me with a slight feeling of psychological inaccuracy. In a case of moral conflict, I should rather say we choose which *principle* of action we will follow, than which *end* we will secure. And I fancy there is an advantage in this form of expression, because the *principles* in the mind are comparatively few, and admit of easy enumeration as a list of impulses; while the *ends*, entangling themselves with external conditions in countless combinations, are irreducible to definition, and involve us, when we try to estimate them, in exercises of mere rational judgment and considerations of possibility and expediency, very proper in the concrete cases, but foreign to the problem, *quâ moral*. But for the purposes of a condensed exposition, I incline to believe your phraseology the best. Could you not, however, describe the effects of these “*Ends*” upon us by some other epithet than “pleasing”? It seems too much to keep out of view the feeling of higher worth and authority which may often be the only attraction towards an end which we are under sharp temptation to abandon.

Is it quite a satisfactory account of the relation of the Mind to Truth to call the Mind the *Test* of Truth? It is only the *phrase* — not, of course, the thought — that stopped me as I read. The word “*Test*” is objective and implies something used by the Mind as *Tester*; and though the Mind may undoubtedly use itself in this way, — reflectively consulting its own consciousness, — yet it would be well, perhaps, to distinguish in the phraseology the consulting and the consulted mind, by saying, *e. g.*, that the Mind, in its quest of truth, can have no appeal from its own intuitive judgments, or from the beliefs involved in the exercise of its own faculties. Nothing can be more just and forcible than your detaching Moral from Historical truth (No. 8). Only is there not the qualifying side, that, though nothing which happens in history can *constitute* right and wrong absolutely, it may reveal them relatively, by presenting higher conceptions and enlarg-

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ing the depth of moral experience; and so quite alter the concrete obligations by altering the development of subsequent persons. Thus the cancelling from history *now* of any portion of the past is not to be regarded as morally the same thing for the world, as if its personages and events had *never come upon the field*, or been, at least, set there by human belief. You do not in the least intend to deny the action of historical personages on the morals of mankind; but stupid people may pervert your meaning in some such way.

With these trifling reservations you carry me altogether with you in your exposition.

I am longing to open your "Regal Rome," but am afraid I cannot get at its interior till after midsummer, when possibly some little leisure may be attainable. I want much also to see your Address to the Italian Society; especially as I hear it lays down the Ethics of International Sympathy. I have no hope from any European Revolution *except Mazzini's*.

Ever affectionately yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

In answer to the above, Professor Newman, in writing to Dr. Martineau, on June 2, 1852, says:—

"Many thanks for your very useful criticisms and hints. On some of these profound subjects I do not always dare to say *just* what you say; and I think I discern that you must secretly disown some of the sentences which I have printed. Still I hope I have benefited by your remarks; and I almost think Holyoake will in consequence find my 'logic' less vulnerable than he has thought."

After this date the correspondence between the two friends does not often touch on purely philosophical subjects. Mr. Newman's "Palinodia," in his later life, in reference to the belief in personal immortality, was very painful to Dr. Martineau, as it was to another very near friend of them both,—Miss Frances Power Cobbe; but though it made a philosophical and theological breach between them, that breach was always effectually bridged over by the strength of their affection, and by the certainty each possessed of the purity and nobility of the other's character.

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On the publication of "A Study of Religion" Professor Newman wrote to Dr. Martineau a warmly appreciative letter; and when, on the appearance of the "Seat of Authority," Newman starts the old question about the moral and spiritual rank of Jesus, Martineau begins a long reply with the words:—

"For several reasons I enter with you on controverted subjects with some reluctance, and the first of these is that I am so much at one with you (prior to the 'Palinodia') that your 'Theism' is in its essence tantamount to my 'Christianity.'"

Chapter IV

STUDIES IN BERLIN. LETTERS TO REV. J. H. THOM AND MR. R. H. HUTTON

WITH the exception of his course on Political Economy, all Dr. Martineau's College Lectures, as well as all his more important philosophical works, took their final shape after his year of study in Germany, 1848-1849, and, therefore, to understand his mental history it is necessary to form a clear conception of the effect which this contact with German philosophical culture had upon his fundamental ideas. We saw at the close of the first chapter that on the basal ethical questions of the freedom of the Will and of the essential character of moral Intuition, the Necessarianism and the Utilitarianism of Hartley and Priestley had already been discarded when, in 1840, he began his career as Professor of Philosophy in Manchester New College. This is confirmed by the following passage from an interesting letter written by Dr. Martineau, in 1894, to the Rev. E. I. Fripp, who had asked him whether Emerson's writings had exercised much influence on his thought:—

“As for Emerson, I have ever had, since his first visit to England, in the ‘thirties,’ a strong affection for him, personally. A purer and nobler soul I have never known. And flashes of thought dart from his writings that are as lightening set fast to gleam for ever where it strikes. But for want of coherent continuity, I do not find my account in reading him in his speculative moods, but only in his descriptive and critical productions,—‘English Traits,’ ‘Representative Men,’ etc. I am not conscious of owing much mental change to him. I am more in debt to Channing; but the ‘Palinodia’ in philo-

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sophical doctrine was mainly brought about in the process of working-out my own teaching for congregational and other classes, in the first seven years of my Liverpool ministry. Then it was that I contracted 'my insanity about conscience,'¹ which it is now too late to remedy."

But though he had fully satisfied himself as to the true interpretation of the moral consciousness, he had not, as yet, fashioned for himself a *Weltanschauung* or theory of ultimate reality, in which these truths of ethical experience would find a fitting place and be seen to stand in harmonious relations with the other elements of thought and knowledge. This complete philosophical system it was that the well-spent Semester in Berlin effectually assisted him to reach. After those strenuous months of attention to lectures, and of private reading,

"the metaphysic of the world had," he says, "come home to me, and never again could I say that phænomena, in their clusters and chains, were all; or find myself in a universe with no categories but the like and the unlike, the synchronous and the successive. The possible *is*, whether it happens or not, and its categories of the right, the beautiful, the necessarily true, may have their contents defined, and held ready for realisation whatever centuries lapse ere they appear."²

Discerning that all phænomena owe their existence and the laws of sequence among them to a spiritual causality of which they are the expression, he at the same time perceived that while the study of Phænomena and their successions is the proper function of the various Sciences, the research into the nature and character of the invisible Cause or Causes of these phænomena is the proper business

¹ This little pleasantry is to be explained by the circumstance that Dr. Martineau was aware that some of the younger ministers were inclined to think that he insisted too exclusively on the "Conscience" as the chief source of spiritual insight; while, on the other hand, another distinguished Unitarian preacher was wont to place his especial, and perhaps also somewhat too exclusive, emphasis on "Divine Love."

² "Types of Ethical Theory," preface to second edition, p. 14.

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of Philosophy. By this division of labour the whole group of natural sciences is left absolutely free to legitimate development without the possibility of collision with either Ethics or Theology. It must not be supposed, however, that Dr. Martineau found in Germany a ready-made system of philosophy which he carefully studied and then adopted. On the contrary, as we saw in the course on Mental Philosophy, he entirely dissents from the metaphysical theory so fully elaborated by his chief teacher Professor Trendelenburg. And not only so, but in his Address at the commencement of the College session in 1854, he emphatically says: "It is with deliberate conviction that I profess allegiance to the English psychological method, and build up all my hope for philosophy on accurate self-knowledge." Further, as will be presently evident, he confesses his disappointment at discovering that *all* the recent German philosophies were essentially defective in their *rationale* of man's ethical experience. What he really gained from his studies in Berlin was such an increased insight into the history of philosophical thought, and especially into the chief systems of ancient Greece and of modern Germany, that his mind was put into the best possible condition for attaining to a complete and consistent philosophical unification of the several rational, ethical, and religious ideas which were at this time vigorously asserting themselves within his inner life. In his Biographical Memoranda he thus lucidly describes the character and the effects of his Berlin studies:—

"A short experience convinced me that, for the purpose of my special studies, I should gain most by reading a good deal and hearing a little. I closely attended Trendelenburg's two courses, — of Logic and of the History of Philosophy, — writing out my notes, with all the citations, in the evenings. Beyond the references which these lectures included, I read only *two authors*, — Plato and Hegel, — having greatly felt my need of a better insight into both. Curiosity indeed, or

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personal admiration, tempted me, now and then, into the lecture-rooms of Gabler, Michelet, Vatke, Neander, Boeckh, Ranke; but from these fascinating excursions into remoter fields I returned only more persuaded of the need of concentration on my selected objects. For a long time I found myself baffled by the difficulties of Hegel; nor did I gain any help from either the expository logic of Gabler or the rhetoric of Michelet. Often—let me confess it—I struggled for days with a page or two of the ‘Encyklopädie,’ and tried and rejected several keys of interpretation before the real bearings of the passage revealed themselves to me. Indirectly, I was much aided by consulting his writings in *the order of their production*, and also by following his method in its application to history. The light thus thrown forward from the growth and backward from the results of his Logical Process is the only effective commentary upon its systematic construction. Though Hegel produced in me no conviction, but rather threw me back upon the position of Kant, yet the study of him affords, I think, a discipline of great value, *disenchancing many beguiling abstractions*, and accustoming the mind to unmask the forms and processes of thought, whether in itself or in the movements of history. In virtue of some affinity between the ancient Greek and the modern German modes of thought (depending, I believe, on a Pantheistic conception of the world common to both), I was astonished at the reciprocal lights that passed between them when they were studied together. Phrases and doctrines in each which no English exposition had rendered intelligible cleared themselves at once when represented in terms of the other; *so that I constantly seemed to make two discoveries in one act*. No doubt this is an experience which, with proper reading, might have been made at home. But when you are steeped in the influences of a foreign language, it forces you to take the tincture of its characteristics.”

This vivid description of the impression left upon Dr. Martineau’s mind by his Berlin experiences requires to be supplemented by some expression of the conclusions he reached respecting the bearing of the German philosophy of that time on ethical and theological ideas. His judgment on this question is emphatically given in a letter from Berlin to his intimate friend Rev. J. H. Thom, dated Feb.

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25, 1849; that is, about a month before the close of the winter Semester. After warm words of admiration for Professor Trendelenburg's personal character, and an expression of opinion that, though not a powerful original thinker, he was a master in the knowledge of Greek philosophy, and the perfect model of an honest and intelligent interpreter, the letter continues:—

“His Lectures on the History of Philosophy have precisely hit my wants, not imposing a system upon me, and obliging me to struggle with the temptations of a disciple or a partisan, but affording faithful guidance to sources of both ancient Greek and modern German systems, and presenting in the best way an occasion for the review and correction of my own opinions. I certainly feel that my horizon is greatly enlarged, and that the effort has not been wholly in vain to reach the point of view—so remote from ours—whence the objects of philosophical research are here regarded. I am astonished at the extent of my ignorance. I find I knew nothing of the course of thought since Kant; and that though I had read a good deal, it was with no more effect than attended the studies of the Israelites, who, when Moses was read, had a veil before their eyes. It is impossible to lose sight, in all one's observations, of the tendency of systems in relation to character and faith. It is my sad persuasion that the direction taken by *all* recent German philosophy, though comprising nominally opposite schools, is quite irreconcilable not only with Christianity, but with all forms of religion which place men under a Personal God and a proper Law of Duty. Their theories have been developed just as they would have been if the principles of action and the moral sentiments had for the last half-century been absolutely *scored out* of human nature, and men had been made up entirely of the ingredients requisite for the dialectician, the naturalist, and the artist. Moral Philosophy does not exist; not a Lecture on the subject is given in this vast University; not a book treats of it among the hundreds to which Leipzig semi-annually gives birth; and wherever, in the criticism of systems, any great Moral Ideas are touched upon, it is in a manner which shows, so far as I can judge, an unfamiliarity with the very conditions of the primary moral problems. This I take to be the *πρωτων ψευδος* of the German speculative thought, fruitful in

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results, but especially developing itself into a religion wholly Pantheistic. Schleiermacher's influence, in so many ways good, has in this respect, I think, been disastrous. Not any of the theological parties in existence have any chance of counteracting the philosophical tendency; one of them, indeed, represented here by Vatke, itself embodies that tendency in an extreme form; the other two — the rigid orthodox, led by Hengstenberg, and the mild unheterodox, headed by Neander — are unprovided with any defence against the philosophers, and have no weapons but dogmatism, historical reverence, and mere sentiment, which have no more effect upon speculation than steel upon ghosts. Should a new life of political action be really opening upon the country, the enlargement of men's moral consciousness in actual struggle is more likely to work a cure than are helpless efforts by learned men themselves under the secret influence of the disease they deplore."

The gloom of this picture would have been somewhat relieved if Dr. Martineau had been aware that there was then lecturing at Göttingen a young Professor of eminent ability whose views had close affinity with his own; who believed, as firmly as Dr. Martineau, in the real freedom of the Will, and who maintained with him that "insight into what ought to be will alone open our eyes to discern what is." But Rudolph Hermann Lotze had not yet published his profound yet fascinating "Microcosmus" and his "Metaphysik" had not, it appears, at this date excited much attention in Berlin. For several years now Lotze's philosophy has exercised a great and beneficent influence over the religious and theological thought of Germany. Theologians of the Vatke type have lost their power; and the numerous disciples of Albrecht Ritschl, who occupy so many German pulpits, are as glad to avail themselves of the works of Lotze as many Anglican and Nonconformist ministers in this country are to seek the solution of their philosophical difficulties in the "Types of Ethical Theory" or "A Study of Religion." Indeed, there would be no great inappropriateness in describing Hermann Lotze as the Ger-

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man Martineau. But while Dr. Martineau noted with satisfaction in his later years the spread of Lotze's views, he also remarked, in conversation, that the bulk of the strictly philosophical professors and students in the German Universities did not appear to be greatly affected by Lotze's ethical and religious doctrines. He pointed out that the theorisings of the Absolute Idealists had, indeed, largely lost their power to charm, but that, in part, probably through reaction from their unsubstantial speculations, the philosophical interest of Germany had, in the main, passed over to psychophysical researches and to non-metaphysical psychology, and that, so far as could be gathered from the writings of Wundt and his disciples, the change from the old Idealism did not appear to him to promise, at present, much real gain to the philosophy of either Ethics or Religion.

Though Hegelianism, as a system of philosophy, is hardly represented at the present time in the great German Universities, yet some of the distinguished *Hegelianer* are still with us; and, in concluding this account of Dr. Martineau's chief mental relations with Germany, I am glad to be able to give, as a companion to the letter to Mr. Thom in 1849, another letter, written nearly thirty years later, in which Dr. Martineau refers to the then surviving representatives of the Hegelian faith. Since this letter was written to the Rev. S. A. Steinthal in November, 1877, the short list of these noble veterans has, alas, grown shorter still.

MY DEAR MR. STEINTHAL, — It is true that the generation of genuine disciples of Hegel in Germany has almost passed away, and their attitude of mind is now represented chiefly in other countries, *e. g.*, by Professor Vera at Naples, and by Edward Caird at Glasgow, and Wallace and Green at Oxford. Erdmann, however, still remains, if I mistake not, at Halle, — a man whose adhesion does honour to any system which he undertakes to expound. And I have never heard

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of Carl Ludwig Michelet quitting the scene. I fancy he is still lecturing in Berlin. But, though he is a personal disciple of Hegel, my impressions of his qualifications are not very favourable. I gained them as a hearer of two or three lectures in the winter of 1848. Eduard Zeller, the nephew of Strauss, is too independent a thinker to be ranked as the sworn disciple of any school. But he began as an Hegelian, and apparently retains the fundamental principles of his earlier philosophy. Of all the living teachers in Germany, he appears to me the most masterly, accomplished, and lucid; with the still higher advantage—which I can hardly allow to Kuno Fischer, otherwise his compeer—of fine critical temper and judicial fairness.

I have not, however, kept myself well up with the recent appointments in the German Universities; and there may be other men worthy of mention of whom I am unable to speak.

Ever faithfully yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

Among the letters on philosophical subjects which Dr. Martineau received about this time there were probably none which had a greater interest for him, and to which he attached more weight, than those written to him by the late Mr. Richard Holt Hutton, who attained considerable fame as the influential Editor of the "Spectator," as a subtle analyst of the character and genius of distinguished authors, and also as a very able theological and philosophical writer. Mr. Hutton's review-articles at one time bore so close a resemblance to Dr. Martineau's, both in thought and style, that when, in 1866 and 1867, Mr. W. V. Spencer of Boston collected into two volumes, under the title "Essays, Philosophical and Theological" the more important of Dr. Martineau's essays and reviews, he, by mistake, inserted in the first volume an excellent article on "Revelation: What it is Not, and What it Is," which is from Mr. Hutton's pen. How this great influence of Dr. Martineau's mind over Mr. Hutton's came about calls for a brief explanation.

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Mr. Hutton was a student in Divinity at Manchester New College in the Session 1847-1848, and, therefore, a hearer of Dr. Martineau's lectures on philosophy. He soon began to feel an intense admiration both for the eminent ability and for the high personal character of his Professor; and so in a very few years the relation of pupil to teacher developed into warm personal friendship. And when in later years Mr. Hutton, mainly under the influence of the Rev. F. Denison Maurice, became dissatisfied with the Unitarian theology, and attached himself to those Christians who recognise an eternal "Society" in the Godhead, he still retained the old affection for Dr. Martineau, and the reverence for his profound metaphysical insight. In philosophy Dr. Martineau was still his beloved master, and, notwithstanding the great difference between them, in regard to some of the topics discussed in the "Seat of Authority," Mr. Hutton to the end of his life maintained that "Dr. Martineau's teaching, as a whole, is by far the ablest vindication, which the nineteenth century has produced, of the philosophy implicitly assumed in Christianity." The pupil and his former teacher were co-members of the famous "Metaphysical Society" through the twelve years of its existence; and when in the "nineties" that Society was in a modified form resuscitated, under the name of the "Synthetic Society," they were associated in this philosophical club also. When Dr. Martineau in 1885 retired from the offices of Principal and Professor in Manchester New College, Mr. Hutton, in a speech made at a meeting of the Trustees, held in connection with Dr. Martineau's retirement, thus pleasantly recalled the happy time when (thirty-six years before) he had lived for a while in Berlin in the same house with the Martineaus:—

"Yesterday, in that speech to which we all listened with so much delight, Dr. Martineau referred to a passage in the 'Gorgias' of Plato, in which the man of the world of that

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day remonstrates with Socrates about talking to two or three boys in a corner. I have often been 'in a corner' in the sense we more often attach to that word in the nursery than any other. [Laughter.] But I am proud to say I was in that historic corner to which Dr. Martineau last night referred. [Hear, hear.] As far as I remember, it was a corner of a room, in a certain street in Berlin, in 1849, where we gathered round a stove which was supplied with a double amount of fuel. The Thermometer was not much above Zero, and we were not only padded up to the chin, but our feet enclosed in what we used to call the '*höhere Einheit*' of a fur shoe. It was there that my mind was subjected to that strenuous influence, and that he illustrated to his pupils, one or two of them, the same earnestness in undertaking the severe and less agreeable forms of study which he impressed upon us last night. I remember the delight with which we read the 'Gorgias' as a holiday task; and I remember the fruitless search after Hegel's pure being and pure nothing. [Laughter and Cheers.] I may say of Dr. Martineau, as one of the poets of the day said of his teacher:—

“‘But vigorous teachers seized my youth,
And purged its faith, and trimmed its fire;
Showed me the high white star of truth,—
There bade me gaze, and there aspire.’”

“Throughout not only the time of my connection with Manchester New College, but the time of that memorable Berlin winter, I was subject to influences of which I could wish to see many better and a great many more results. Still, it is something that I am not ungrateful for those influences which I really felt.”

The Martineaus remained in Germany till the autumn of 1849, but Mr. Hutton returned to England in the spring, and took his M.A. degree (with the Gold Medal) in the University of London in the summer of that year. In reply to a letter informing him of Mr. Hutton's success, Dr. Martineau wrote to him from Warmbrunn (Aug. 11, 1849), and after congratulating him, he continues:—

“Your report of the Examination interested me greatly, and marks out pretty exactly, I fancy, the direction which English examiners in philosophy are likely to follow for many

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years to come. In the present state of University instruction in these matters, no excursion beyond the routine of English writers can well be ventured, except into Aristotle and his expositors. I am glad if you could even fancy anything you had from me of use to you; it is something to have given the external occasion for you to work out your own views on matters of so profound an interest, but for the rest I shall return home with the humiliating feeling that whatever I have done must be done over again; and that in all these years of teaching I have learned only what to avoid. Greatly do I lay to heart what you say about the need of a new work on the foundations of Morals; and if I thought that real good would accrue, I would gladly sacrifice any aim at theoretical perfection of form or logical order of succession, in order to meet a living want. But the supposed good itself depends greatly on the thorough *grounding* of one's doctrine, so as to render it, as far as possible, unassailable, except by going down to the very base whence all philosophy springs. At present I cannot, to my satisfaction, adjust the relations of the psychological method I have hitherto pursued to the Absolute Idealism of Spinoza and Hegel, so as to assuage the warfare inevitable between schemes of thought so incompatible; and with the increasing tendency manifest in England towards some modification of Spinozism, it is necessary to have a mind quite clear upon this point. Without intending to get into poor Brandis's condition, and reserve only a few years of old age for the final construction of a philosophical faith, I have been thankful for a year simply to enlarge my horizon by pursuits scantily possible at *home*; and have deliberately left the working up of the materials into positive results to the years of practical labour to which, if life and adequate health be granted, I shall now return. By the end of one College Session I shall see pretty well what it may be possible to do.

"To anyone who reckons a man's reading by pages, I should be ashamed to give an account of my work since the last report I sent you. It has been confined almost to Plato and Hegel. I finished the 'Republic' some time ago, and closed it with the melancholy feeling of a long leave-taking from the greatest and most delightful of all one's masters in philosophy. The change to Hegel is not flattering to one's indolence or enriching to one's imagination; and the worst of it is, that by no effort is it possible to accelerate one's speed, the interpretation of his paragraphs being like the solution of a

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problem which may clear itself in an hour or may take a week, and meanwhile bars all further progress. I shall not be able to manage more than his 'Logic'; but I am glad to feel it possible to draw breath and see one's way in this *thinest and obscurest heaven of metaphysics*. . . .

"Yours affectionately,

"JAMES MARTINEAU."

On the profound question of the relation between the action of the Divine Personality and the human in man's inner life, the following interchange of ideas is of no little interest. In his condensed account of letters received by him, Dr. Martineau says:—

"In a letter dated Nov. 1, 1849, Mr. R. H. Hutton expounds the mode in which he tries to bring the personality of God and Man into intelligible relation without impairing either; providing for the immanent agency of God in both outward nature and in the faculties of man, methodised in laws that do not bend for moral ends, but are simply a fixed basis for reliance; concurrently with this, maintaining a communion of *inspiration* or fellowship of moral idealism for the guidance of the soul's selective will, this latter *free* power being impaired by every encroachment of the animal and selfish nature, and brought to intenser glow by self-surrender; so that it is enfeebled by personal sin and inherited defect. His solution does not, I fear, reach the heart of the difficulty of providing separate spheres for the *two wills*, and yet preserving the *infinitude of one*. Of his *absolute infinitude* God will surely have to forego something in order to leave room for created beings really free to determine an alternative."

On Nov. 10, 1849, Dr. Martineau, who has by this time returned to Liverpool, replies to Mr. Hutton's letter by the following:—

MY DEAR RICHARD, — . . . I fear that in this hasty note I can give no answer to your important philosophical question. I have never yet thought out to my own satisfaction the mode of drawing the separating line between the Divine and human minds. Do you not, however, concede the whole point when you admit the agency of God in mere instinct *in the same sense as in physical nature*? In that case His present activity

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is admitted, only denied to be *moral* activity, and, in the instance of instinct assumed by the hypothesis to be *un-moral*, I do not see how this denial can be called in question. There seems, however, no reason why, merely on account of the *un-moral* character of the instinct, you should refer it at once to man and put it down in the same category as the will. Why not say—the Will is man's sphere; all beyond Will is God's; the un-moral his natural, the moral his spiritual agency? In the concrete facts all these may be inextricably mixed, and no doubt, so far as there has been voluntary injury to the original instincts, they must be regarded as having a spoiled divinity,—the human blended with the divine. The word “*inspiration*” appears to me to be properly reserved for the highest or spiritual agency of God.

.
Ever affectionately yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

Dr. Martineau summarises as follows Mr. Hutton's reply to this letter, and appears to accept the opinions in it as in complete accord with his own:—

“Adverting to my remarks on the theory advanced in his previous letter, he does not think that his idea of human personality differs from mine, unless it be by attaching a stronger importance to the changes wrought in the original instincts by *voluntary actions*, both of *our own* and of our progenitors; so that their state, at any given time, is a resultant of what *God has given*, and of its past treatment; and that which, *in itself and its divine intent* is constituted for *useful ends* (as Butler shows), may become subservient to *undivine ends*; and sin in the parent may entail defect in the child; and natural instinct may promote *lower suggestions* than would have presented themselves had there been no yielding to temptation. *Not every actual impulse of the involuntary kind* can be recognised as *inspiration*; and nothing can be more repulsive and mischievous than to treat as ‘inspired’ the spontaneity of imaginative genius in Goethe or Byron, irrespective of their moral qualities; the divine agency being there ‘depressed and deranged’ by our own. Better far is the commonplace view which treats such cases as an exercise of *spoiled natural faculty*, with which, having given it, God has nothing to do; though this conception is less exact.”

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When J. S. Mill's important work on "Logic" appeared Mr. Hutton criticised it with remarkable acuteness in an article on "Mill and Whewell on the Logic of Induction" in the "Prospective Review" for February, 1850. In the second edition of the "System of Logic" Mr. Mill refers at length to Mr. Hutton's strictures on his view of the "law of causation," and speaks of him as "an intelligent reviewer." In reference to this Dr. Martineau writes:—

LIVERPOOL, Jan. 16, 1851.

MY DEAR RICHARD,— . . . I have just got J. S. Mill's new edition. I am very glad he has noticed your strictures, and in such considerate terms; though he has been apparently too lazy to make himself master of the chief bearings of the discussion. I am very much struck, on looking through his Causation chapters again, with what seems to me his thoroughly untrue and artificial psychology; and not less so with the utter exclusion, on his principles, of every possibility of Theism. His critique on the "Volitional Theory of Causation" appears to me exceedingly weak, rendered so by the contemptuous spirit in which, notwithstanding the composure of his manner, it is evident he has addressed himself to the refutation. On the whole, I never had so bad an opinion of the Successional doctrine of Causation as this new defence has given me. I want much to go at once more thoroughly into the logic of the mathematical doctrine of Chances. But my mathematical books—I fear also my mathematical knowledge—are old and not up to the present method of exposition; and I must ask your counsel and help. Sometime or other I must get a regular mathematical course out of you, before I am too old to learn. Do come and let us settle all sorts of delightful plans.

Ever your affectionate

JAMES MARTINEAU.

In answer to a letter from Mr. Hutton containing, it would seem, some inquiry about Dr. Martineau's views in regard to Thomas Carlyle's glorification of the "unconscious" element in genius, Dr. Martineau wrote (on Dec. 31, 1853) a profoundly interesting and suggestive answer. It should be read in connection with the sixth sermon in

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the second volume of the "Endeavours," on "Christian Self-Consciousness," in which occur the words:—

"With sighs and irresistible longings does this noble writer look back upon imaginary ages of involuntary heroism, when the great and good knew not their greatness and goodness, and genius was found which was a secret to itself, and ever lived for God's sake, instead of for their own. Could he realise his dream of perfection, he would stock the world with unconscious activity, and fill it with men who know not what they do. This celebrated paradox could never occupy a mind like Mr. Carlyle's, did it not envelop an important and seasonable truth."

What that truth is Dr. Martineau explains to some extent in the sermon from which the extract is taken; but from the following letter we gain, I think, clearer insight into this mystery, and become aware of the existence in Dr. Martineau's mind of a precious vein of thought running down into the deepest things in morals and religion. As we ponder over its most suggestive sentences, gratitude for what it gives us can hardly fail to mingle with a strong desire that we possessed more than we do of the expressions of Dr. Martineau's thinking when he was in this deep and semi-mystical mood:—

DEAR RICHARD,— There does not seem to me to be any real difference between your doctrine and mine as to the power of conscious and unconscious faith; and I have badly expressed my meaning if it looks at all like Carlyle's "unconscious" theory, which I do not hold. I am far from thinking that a *moral truth* loses its practical power by becoming self-conscious; and I do not doubt that the will may apply it unwearied to the organisation of the life. But I cannot divest myself of the idea that there is a difference in this respect between a *moral conviction* directed upon a finite truth and a *religious reverence* tending to an Infinite object. This feeling which lies high up above the proximate springs of the will seems to me to undergo perpetual change and development, and to have its headquarters ever young and fresh, while its elder currents become tepid and flow away. In

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progressive individuals and in the growth of societies the deepest tastes, the inmost worship surely never rest, but pass on to new ideals. Nor is it wonderful that a sentiment which demands the *Infinite* should find it only by *Eternal* phases of succession. Every attempt to realise the object in shapes of finite thought must be provisional, and in its detail suicidal; for it must yield at last to the neglected claims of some element which at first had pined obscurely, but asserts its power at last. Whatever new truth accrues from these successive aspects of conception and belief is permanently won for our knowledge, and may be applied and used like any other knowledge; but it is transferred from the sphere of *religion* to that of *morals*, and belongs rather to science than to faith. And on the other hand, whatever error was embodied in the same form falls away, and has its burial-place marked in the catacombs of nescience. This is all that I mean by the *waning* of conscious beliefs. It implies only a change in the character of their influence; and meanwhile their specifically *religious* efficacy is succeeded to by fresh reverence rising from behind and energising into power. I do think that in this process the point of greatest weakness and declension is that at which attempts are made, by self-sophistication and intellectual artifice, to detain integrally, in the pretended sphere of religion, a mode of thought for which the time is come to store the grain and blow the chaff away. Far from connecting this idea with any sceptical distrust of objective reality in religion as attainable by man, I rather find it to mean that the Holy Spirit is perpetually passing through the silent spaces of the soul, and suffusing them with inexhaustible colouring of beauty. And however much self-consciousness may characterise modern thought, there is no more chance of its abolishing the unconscious life than there is of the growth of knowledge finishing up the Infinite on which it makes the semblance of encroachment. No doubt it is in the middle ground, where the borders mingle of divine reverence and human recognition, that the sublimest balance of character is found, with which neither angelic instinct nor applied morals can be compared. But the two realms cannot mingle their confines unless *both are there*; and the relation between them seems to me pretty much what I have described.

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God be with you, dear Richard,

Ever your affectionate

JAMES MARTINEAU.

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Between this letter from Dr. Martineau to Mr. Hutton and the next letter to him of philosophical and theological significance, there appears to be a period of about eight years. In the meantime Mr. Hutton was gradually drawing nearer to the position of Maurice, viz., that it is only by accepting the doctrine of a wholly exceptional and unique Incarnation in Jesus "we can keep a God essentially *social* before our hearts and minds." If, then, the evening party, to which the following letter conveys an invitation, included Dr. Martineau, Mr. Maurice, and also the younger thinker, whom each of these eminent men could claim, though in different ways, as his fervent disciple, it must surely have been a singularly interesting gathering. The "National" article referred to in the letter is probably that on "Old Creeds and New Beliefs" in the "National Review" for January, 1861.

FEB. 10, 1861.

MY DEAR RICHARD, — On Friday evening next we are expecting Mr. Byrne (Mr. Maurice's Assistant in Vere Street) and his wife to spend the evening with us, and a few friends, including, I hope, Mr. Maurice. I chose the Friday mainly because I knew it to be your town evening, and I hope you will find the power and the will to join us about eight o'clock. Mr. Byrne is an interesting man, and if you do not know him, I am sure you would be pleased to make his acquaintance. We can contrive then, if not before, to exchange a few needful words about the next "National." I should rather like to see the volume you mentioned on the "Philosophy of History." I have read Mr. Maurice's notes on the "National" article with much interest, — though I confess with some perplexity, even with your interpretation to help me. His horror of "instincts" (the word is no favourite with me, and his ascription of its idea to me is quite erroneous) seems to me founded on an arbitrary mode of drawing the distinction between what is *natural* and what is *supernatural* in human consciousness. Of course nothing that belongs to *our* personality can be a controlling rule for what the Divine personality reveals, but, on the contrary, must yield to the para-

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mount authority of the latter. The only question is, where and how are we, in our thought, to run the line between them? What Mr. Tayler calls "*religious instincts*," etc., may be the very same thing in reality as Mr. Maurice means by the *voice of the Son of God*, the *Revelation* that speaks from the Spirit in Scripture to the Spirit living in us. Mr. Maurice objects to them as lying on the human side of the line; if Mr. Tayler and I trust them, it is because we see in them the supernatural character which sets them on the Divine side. For myself, I have never regarded what is called religious philosophy as anything but the attempt of the human mind to construe to itself, as it best can, the Divine Facts and Realities, which anyhow enter the conscious life of Humanity. To these Realities it has reverently to submit itself; and the notion of reducing them within the limits of its preconceived formulas and substituting the human ideas for the Divine things, Mr. Maurice cannot repudiate more emphatically than I do. But what a strange invitation note I am writing!

Ever, dear Richard,

Very affectionately yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

The philosophical correspondence between Dr. Martineau and his old pupil appears to have become unfrequent after this time, though they remained firm friends, and often met at the meetings of the Metaphysical Society and elsewhere. Mr. Hutton's searching, but warmly appreciative, reviews in the "*Spectator*" of Dr. Martineau's larger works as they successively appeared, clearly show that there was still much sympathy between him and his old teacher on questions of philosophy. But in theology they were now ranged on opposite sides. It is a fundamental principle of Dr. Martineau's religious philosophy that all essential theological truth is capable of verification in the experience of the wisest and most spiritually minded persons; and that dogmas which do not admit of any such verification are *ipso facto* no part of God's eternal Gospel to Humanity. But this the followers of Mr. Maurice would not allow. As Dr. Martineau admirably

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puts it in his article on "Tracts for the Priests and People" in the "National Review" for October, 1861:—

"The truth is, this [Mr. Maurice's] school has never succeeded in settling accounts between the Eternal Divine facts, spiritually revealed by the ever-living witness, and the historical phenomena of the past, which, however connected with religion, are *cognisable* only through human testimony. In the joy of having found the former, even Mr. Maurice forgets the different tenure of the latter, involves them in the same feeling and treatment as if they, too, were entities apprehensible to-day independently of yesterday, and free from the contingencies of probable evidence."

When Dr. Martineau and his pupil were sitting round the stove in the Berlin lodging-house they were at one in the belief that "Divine Philosophy" embraces in its sweep the study of all the profound verities of Revealed Religion; but when in after years the pupil followed another Master, and came to hold that "if we had no vestige of the Incarnation in history we should have no reason for believing it,"¹ he set up a quite different conception of "Revealed Religion," and a conception which, in Dr. Martineau's judgment, made an unnatural and irrational rupture between Philosophy and Theology, and undermined that basal truth on which they both are founded; the truth, namely, of the direct and immediate self-revelation of the Eternal in the consciousness of Humanity.

¹ "Essays, Theological and Literary," by R. H. Hutton, M.A., Vol. I. p. 223.

Chapter V

“ESSAYS, REVIEWS, AND ADDRESSES.” THE METAPHYSICAL AND SYNTHETIC SOCIETIES

IN the long interval between the return from Germany, in 1849, and the publication of the “Study of Spinoza,” in 1882, Dr. Martineau’s contributions to philosophical thought were all small in outward form, however weighty in ideas, and took the shape either of Articles for the periodicals, of Papers, such as those written for the Metaphysical Society, or of occasional Addresses at the opening of the College Sessions. All of these that Dr. Martineau considered most worthy of preservation he, in 1890 and 1891, collected into four volumes and published under the title “Essays, Reviews, and Addresses.” After the appearance of these volumes he gave to the world only one writing of philosophical importance, and that was a review of Mr. A. J. Balfour’s “Foundations of Belief.” This final article displays wonderful mental vigour, considering that the writer was in his ninetieth year; and it has special interest as containing Dr. Martineau’s only published expression of opinion on Hegelianism. Reference will be made to this article in the last chapter. In the preface to the third volume of the collection, Dr. Martineau remarks of this volume what holds good more or less of all the four: “The discussions in this volume may be regarded as tentatives which gradually prepared the way for the more systematic expositions of the ‘Types of Ethical Theory’ and the ‘Study of Religion,’ and, in some meas-

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ure, of the ‘Seat of Authority in Religion.’” As the greater part of these papers were first published as review-articles in journals, it may be as well to give, at the outset, a brief enumeration of the various periodicals in which they appeared; but it must be understood that the following account is confined to articles which have more or less *philosophical* significance.

As we saw in the first chapter, Dr. Martineau’s first published philosophic essay of any moment was the review of “Bentham’s Deontology” in the “Monthly Repository” (at that time edited by W. J. Fox) for 1834. In 1835 he associated himself with Mr. J. S. Mill and others on the staff of the “London Review”; but that journal only lasted one year under that name, and Dr. Martineau’s only contribution to it, of any importance, was not philosophical, being an article on Blanco White’s “Second Travels of an Irish Gentleman in Search of a Religion.” In 1836 the “London” was amalgamated with the “Westminster Review,” and became the “London and Westminster.” In 1841 it was altered back to the “Westminster,” and so remained till 1847, when it became the “Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review.” It still retained this name at the time when Dr. Martineau, on the establishment of the “National Review” in 1855, ceased to be connected with it.¹ Comparatively little of Dr. Martineau’s *meta-*

¹ In Prof. F. W. Newman’s little book on “The Early History of the Late Cardinal Newman,” he refers to the “Westminster Review” as “our chief Atheistic organ”; and he adds in a note (p. 103): “The reason I say this is, that Dr. James Martineau declined to continue writing for it because it interpolated Atheistic articles between his Theistic articles.” In the “Westminster” for March, 1891, the Editor or some competent authority makes the following comment on Professor Newman’s statement: “The general attitude of the ‘Review’ has been impartial between Theism and Atheism, and might best be described as ‘agnostic.’ Professor Newman’s statement is news to us and we doubt its correctness. On one occasion, the Editor received from Dr. Martineau, either directly or through a mutual friend, a proposal to contribute a review of Harriet Martineau’s abridged translation of Comte’s ‘Philosophie Positive.’ As the Editor was of opinion that the work reviewed by Dr. Martineau would

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physical writings found its way into the "Westminster." Indeed, the only articles of his in the "Westminster" that have any bearing on philosophy are the one on "Strauss and Parker" in April, 1847, and that on "Channing" in January, 1849; and both on Theodore Parker and on Channing Dr. Martineau has expressed himself more fully in papers of about the same date in the "Prospective Review." It is clear from internal evidence that he wrote the philosophical and theological section of the critical summary of "Contemporary Literature" in the "Westminster" during 1854; and it is possible that he did the same for the years 1852 and 1853.

After the delivery of the celebrated Liverpool Lectures, which revealed Dr. Martineau's changed philosophical position, he contributed occasionally to the "Christian Teacher," of which Mr. Thom was Editor; but his only paper there of any philosophical significance is the remarkable one on "The Five Points of Christian Faith," in which, as we saw in the third chapter, he showed a decided leaning towards Victor Cousin's religious philosophy. In 1845 the "Prospective Review" (under the editorship of Dr. Martineau, Mr. Thom, and Mr. Charles Wicksteed) took the place of the "Christian Teacher," and to this journal

be criticised in a thoroughly hostile spirit, the proposal was assented to on the condition that a note should be prefixed to the article disclaiming editorial responsibility for the contents of it. This condition was not agreeable to Dr. Martineau, who, therefore, did not write the article. We have good reason for believing that, excepting in this case, Dr. Martineau never expressed unwillingness to contribute to the 'Westminster'; and moreover, for a considerable period he himself wrote the Theological section of the 'Contemporary Literature.'"

In his Biographical Memoranda, Dr. Martineau, after referring to a proposal in 1853-1854 to merge the "Prospective Review" in the "Westminster Review," says: "Instead of this, the 'Prospective' was expanded into the 'National Review.' This move was preferred because the tone of the 'Westminster' was becoming more and more uncongenial with the philosophical and religious convictions of the Editors of the 'Prospective'; and they could not with satisfaction surrender their function, and transfer their own literary work into hands that often indeed gave valuable help to their main objects, but often also visited them with slight or injury."

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Dr. Martineau was a frequent contributor. The philosophical articles in the “Prospective Review” prior to Dr. Martineau’s residence in Germany are the two critiques of Whewell’s ethical works, the noteworthy review of Morell’s “History of Modern Philosophy,” and the two elaborate papers on “Theodore Parker” and “Channing.” These articles have been described and examined in the third chapter.

The year of study in Berlin had a marked effect on both the breadth and depth of Dr. Martineau’s philosophical insight; and during the “fifties” and the “sixties” there issued from his pen a splendid series of philosophical articles, as finished in expression as they are powerful in thought, dealing with the chief philosophical thinkers and movements of the time. While the “Prospective” continued to exist, which was till 1854, these articles appeared in its pages; and on the “Prospective” being succeeded in 1855 by the “National Review” (edited by Dr. Martineau, Mr. R. H. Hutton, and Mr. Walter Bagehot), this high-toned and very able quarterly became the vehicle for conveying Dr. Martineau’s thoughts to the world. When, to the serious injury of the higher intellectual interests of this country, the “National Review” came to an end in 1864, Dr. Martineau almost ceased contributing to English journals, and the one or two articles he wrote after this date went to the “Contemporary Review.” To this later period of his life belong also three highly important College Addresses, which will be described below. Between 1872 and 1875, Dr. Martineau wrote a series of theological papers in a New England monthly journal, “Old and New”; but the series broke off abruptly, owing to the sudden collapse of this periodical. Of these papers, one entitled “God in Nature” was reprinted in the “Theological Review” for July, 1872; and in 1890 all of them were incorporated in the “Seat of Authority in Religion,” of which they form

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the earlier chapters; and this work completely realises the scheme which Dr. Martineau had in his mind when he commenced writing for "Old and New." To complete the list of Dr. Martineau's philosophical contributions to periodical literature it must be added that in answer to an elaborate criticism of the "Types of Ethical Theory" by Prof. H. Sidgwick in "Mind" for July, 1885, Dr. Martineau wrote in the October number of that journal (which at the time was edited by his friend Prof. G. Croom Robertson) a rather long and important reply, which throws new light upon a difficult point in his own ethical theory. Prof. H. Sidgwick replied to this, and his reply called forth a short rejoinder from Dr. Martineau in "Mind" for January, 1886.

Dr. Martineau's smaller treatises, written after his return from Germany, may be classified under the following heads; and it is to be noticed that all the papers cited below (with the exception of the article on "Mesmeric Atheism" in the "Prospective" for May, 1851, and that on "Plato, His Physics and Metaphysics" ¹ in the "National" for April, 1861) are contained in the four volumes of "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses." ²

1. *General Papers on Philosophy*: "Scope of Mental and Moral Philosophy," *Coll. Add.* 1841, IV.; "A Plea for Philosophical Studies," *Coll. Add.* 1854, IV.; "Theology in Relation to Progressive Knowledge," *Coll. Add.* 1865, IV.; "A Word for Scientific Theology," *Coll. Add.* 1868, IV.
2. *Logical Paper*: "Mr. Samuel Bailey's 'Theory of Reasoning,'" *Pros.* 1852, III.
3. *Personal Sketches*: "Lessing's Theology and Times," *Pros.* 1854, I.; "Personal Influences in Present The-

¹ This article is given in the American collection of "Essays, Philosophical and Theological," by James Martineau, Vol. II.

² In the following classification *Pros.* stands for "Prospective Review," *Nat.* for "National Review," *Cont.* for "Contemporary Review," and *Coll. Add.* for "College Addresses." The year of the original publication is then given; and the Roman numerals indicate in which volume of the reprinted "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses" it will be found.

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- ology: J. H. Newman, S. T. Coleridge, T. Carlyle,” *Nat.* 1856, I.; “Auguste Comte’s Life and Philosophy,” *Nat.* 1858, I.; “Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Life and Times,” *Nat.* 1859, I.
4. *Historical Articles*: “Kingsley’s ‘Phaethon,’” *Pros.* 1853, II.; “Kingsley’s ‘Alexandria and her Schools,’” *Pros.* 1854, II.; “Plato, His Physics and Metaphysics,” *Nat.* 1861.
 5. *On the Theory of Human Knowledge* (Epistemology): “Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy,” *Pros.* 1853, III.; “Mansel’s Limits of Religious Thought,” *Nat.* 1859, III.; “Science, Nescience, and Faith,” *Nat.* 1862, III.
 6. *Criticisms of Sensational Idealism*: “John Stuart Mill’s Philosophy,” *Nat.* 1859, III.; “Alexander Bain’s Cerebral Psychology,” *Nat.* 1860, III.
 7. *On the Philosophical Foundations of Theism*: “Hans Christian Oersted; One Mind in Nature,” *Pros.* 1852, III.; “Nature and God,” *Nat.* 1860, III.; “Tracts for Priests and People,” *Nat.* 1861, II.; “Is there any Axiom of Causality?”¹ *Cont.* 1870, III.
 8. *Criticisms of Recent Agnosticism*:—
 - (a) *Materialism*: “Mesmeric Atheism,” *Pros.* 1851; “Religion as Affected by Modern Materialism,” *Coll. Add.* 1874, IV.; “Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology,” *Cont.* 1876, IV.
 - (b) *Non-theistic Theories of Evolution*: “Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man,” *Cont.* 1872, IV.
 9. *The Connection between Ethics and Religion*: “Ideal Substitutes for God,” *Coll. Add.* 1879, IV.; “Relation between Ethics and Religion,” *Coll. Add.* 1881, IV.

The order in which these “Essays, Reviews, and Addresses” are arranged in the above classification corresponds on the whole with the actual order in which they successively appeared; and that order may be, to some extent, explained by considering the changing intellectual conditions in the world of thought during the long period during which Dr. Martineau’s creative activity continued. As has been pointed out in an earlier chapter, the three large and important works

¹ This paper was previously read before the Metaphysical Society, on June 15, 1870.

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which Dr. Martineau gave to the world after he had entered upon his eightieth year are not to be regarded as, except to a very small extent, new productions of that period of his life. The two first of them are almost entirely his great courses of College Lectures revised and, where necessary, completed for publication; and the earlier part of the "Seat of Authority" in like manner presents ideas which had been gradually accumulating for many years. But while Dr. Martineau was thus gradually embodying the new results of his reading and reflection in his College Lectures, which he, no doubt, from an early period of his career, intended for ultimate publication as the *magnum opus* of his life, he was at the same time giving to the thinking portion of the public, in the detached form of Review-articles and printed Addresses the more important of these new features in his philosophical system; and hence his students and the many readers of his contributions to the Reviews were already, to a great extent, in possession of the main principles which pervade and unify his larger works. In this way his influence gradually penetrated into and did much to modify and elevate contemporary thought, both in the sphere of science and in that of theology. His profound yet brilliant criticism of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy in the "Prospective," and that grand procession of striking articles in the "National" — "Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought," "Nature and God," "Science, Nescience, and Faith" — arrested the attention of popular writers and journalists, and through them the great formative ideas expressed in these papers passed in a diluted form into the newspapers and the pulpits, and thus helped to give a higher and a more idealistic tone to the literature and to the preaching of the time. As Dr. Forsyth admirably expresses it, in his elaborate appreciation and criticism of Dr. Martineau and his philosophy:¹ —

¹ "London Quarterly Review," April, 1900.

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“He was one of the trinity of spiritual powers who, as theologians, have had a subtle and commanding influence on the thoughts of the nineteenth century, men marked not only by power, but also by distinction of mind and style. The reference, of course, is, beside himself, to Maurice and J. H. Newman. His style alone would have given him influence, — so lucent, jewelled, over-polished at times, perhaps, but never metallic; full of fancy — sometimes too full — and of imagery now scientific, now poetic; full of delicacy, lithe as steel, with a careful felicity ‘saying the unsayable.’ Newman alone ranked with him in this regard. But all three had a style, along with a wondrous penetrativeness of intellect, spiritual imagination, and ideal charm.”

Evidences of the truth of Dr. Forsyth’s vivid picture of the exquisite and varied beauties of Dr. Martineau’s style are to be found in countless passages in these four volumes, especially in the papers enumerated in classes 3 and 4; and I much regret that the narrow limits of the space at my disposal do not allow me to adorn these pages with some illustrations. One sample, however, I cannot refrain from giving; it is a description of the remarkable parallelism presented in Mr. Kingsley’s “Alexandria and Her Schools” between the intellectual and religious condition of that great city in the declining years of the Roman Empire, and the present state of things in London, Paris, and New York. If the parallelism held good when this fascinating paper was written in 1857, it certainly is not less true and striking in these present days of Theosophy and “Christian Science.”

“Mr. Kingsley, it has long been evident, is haunted by a supposed analogy between the Neoplatonic period of the declining empire and the intellectual tendencies of the present age. And certainly if any believer in the metempsychosis chose to identify Margaret Fuller with Hypatia, Emerson with Porphyry, the Poughkeepsie seer with Jamblichus, and Frederick Maurice with Clement, grounds of recognition would not be wanting. Nor does the parallelism wholly fail in the broad features of the two ages. The decline of

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ancient faith without mature successor to take the vacant throne; the attempt of metaphysics to fit the soul with a religion; the pretensions of intuition and ecstasy; the sudden birth, from the very eggs of a high-flown spiritualism, of mystagogues and mesmerists, as larvæ are born of butterflies; the growth of world-cities and world-science, with their public libraries and institutes, their botanic and zoölogic gardens, their cheap baths and open parks; the joint diffusion of taste and demoralisation, of asceticism and intemperance; the increase of a proletary class amid the growing humanity of society and the laws; the frequency of frightful epidemics; the combination of gigantic enterprises and immense commerce with decay at the heart of private life;—afford undoubtedly a curious group of symptoms common to the Europe of that day and of this. And when Mr. Kingsley justifies, by appeal to the example of the Old World, his despair of any philosophy or theology which substitutes opinions about God for faith in him, and idolises its own dogma instead of trusting his living guidance, we think his estimate not less seasonable than it is just. For all time the difference is infinite between the partisan of beliefs and the man whose heart is set upon reality,—between one who is lifted up in the pride of his representative notions and another to whose humility the divine truth is present in person; and whether the old orthodox forms or the new-light images be the better type of thought is a barren controversy, breeding only error and nursing only conceit till the mood of advocacy be changed; and they are no longer appropriated as *our* ideal scheme, but surrendered to God's realism. Our century also, no less than the third and fourth, requires to be recalled from subjective systems to objective fact; to cease prating of the 'Religious Sentiment' in the august hearing of the very God; and, instead of straining the fine metaphysic wing to seek him in the seventh heaven, simply to let him be here and tell us what to do. In fetching this lesson out of the Alexandrine history, and warning us of the difference between worship of human intellect and reverence for divine truth, Mr. Kingsley renders good service."¹

But while the force of Dr. Martineau's reasoning, aided by the high finish of his style, had great influence on both

¹ Essays, Vol. II. p. 312.

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theological and philosophical thought during the second half of the century, by refuting the irrational dogmatism of the theologians, on the one hand, and the anti-theistic assumptions of scientists on the other, it must be remembered that the intellectual environment amid which he lived, and the progressive changes in that environment, determined, in great measure, the direction of his mental energy and the character of his publications. The works of every great thinker are at once the outcome of the dominant thought of his age, and at the same time agents in the remoulding and development of that thought. It was Dr. Martineau's rather unusual fortune to have seen, during the fifty years of his literary activity, some remarkable revolutions in British philosophical thought. At the time when he began to publish these Review-articles there were in Britain two schools of thought struggling for the mastery, of which the one was passing into its declining years, while the other was young and full of vigour. The former of these was the Scotch school; not, however, as it had been in the time of Reid and Stewart, but as it had become under the influence of the strong personality and immense philosophical erudition of Sir William Hamilton. In the celebrated paper in the “Edinburgh” in 1829, on “The Philosophy of the Unconditioned,” which gained European fame, Hamilton, while manifesting great admiration for Victor Cousin, and receiving help from him in support of his own favourite doctrine of “Natural Realism,” had used the Kantian philosophy as a means of discrediting Cousin's claims to a positive knowledge of the Absolute. In 1850 Hamilton's influence was still powerful, and had been increased by the publication in 1846 of his edition of Reid's works with its marvellously learned and acute Supplementary Dissertations.

But while Hamilton was the supreme authority in the Scotch metropolis, there was arising, in the English capital, a

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new school of teachers, among whom Mr. John Stuart Mill, Dr. Martineau's former colleague on the staff of the "London Review," took the lead. These thinkers looked to the recently established London University as the great promise of the future. There Metaphysics was to be studied merely as a historical matter, Mental *Philosophy* was to become Mental *Science*; and the attention of psychologists being thus diverted from the futile study of *noïmena* to the fertile study of *phænomena* and the processes of association among them, it was supposed that the science of Mind would soon acquire the same positive and progressive character which happily characterised the cultivation of the Natural Sciences.

Such was the condition of philosophical affairs in this country when Dr. Martineau returned from Berlin, in 1849. In 1852, in his review in the "Prospective" of Oersted's "Soul in Nature," he sketched an outline of his own positive religious philosophy; an outline which was a forecast of the elaborate presentation of his religious philosophy given in 1860 in that magnificent article on "Nature and God," which ranks among the very finest of his productions. In the meantime, however, he directed his critical powers upon the two philosophies which were contending for dominance over the British mind. With the old Scotch school he had strong mental affinities, and Sir William Hamilton's vast philosophical knowledge, and his powerful reassertion of Reid's Realism and Dualism, had a great charm for him; but with Hamilton's complete ontological scepticism he had not the slightest sympathy; nor was he at all prepared to follow Hamilton in recovering, by the way of the Moral Consciousness and Faith, theological verities, to which the Reason declined to allow any validity. Hence originated that important paper in the "Prospective" on "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy"; in which Dr. Martineau points out with great lucidity Hamilton's fundamental inconsis-

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ency, and while he, himself, is not prepared to defend in its entirety the continental ontology, he expounds another method, by which he thinks adequate theological insight may be attained and justified.

“Let it be admitted at once,” he says, “that all knowledge is relative. . . . But the objects of ontological quest are not lost to us in being only relatively discerned. Because God can be contemplated only like other objects of thought, as differenced from our subjective selves, is it needful to say that he is merely phenomenal to us and not cognisable in his reality?”¹

That Dr. Martineau really believed that we do know God *in his reality* is evident from countless passages in his writings; but I must confess that I feel great difficulty in understanding how we could possibly reach this knowledge if He were differenced from our subjective selves in the same way as “other objects of thought” are. If He only revealed Himself *to* us as other *noûmena*² do, we might have a cognition of Him as “the infinite Not-me” or as “an Infinite Mind”; but, so far as I can see, we should in this way never apprehend Him “in his reality”; it is just because He reveals Himself *in* us, in a way no other object of thought possibly can do, that we do come to know Him in His essential nature, that is to say, to know Him as the Absolute One on whom both the *me* and the *not-me* with their mutual relativity alike depend. This is virtually the same question as that to which I called attention before in the third lecture, in connection with Dr. Martineau’s criticism of Victor Cousin’s doctrine of man’s intuition of the Absolute. My excuse for again referring to it is, that Dr. Martineau in many of his profoundest and most beautiful passages, as, for instance, when

¹ Vol. III. p. 480.

² For the sense in which Dr. Martineau uses the word *noûmenon* see the Ninth Lecture.

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he says that "No merely finite being can possibly believe the Infinite," appears to be practically recognising the existence in man of an immediate apprehension of God which is quite different from the relative mode in which we come to know "other objects of thought." Whether this direct apprehension of God can be strictly called "knowledge" depends upon how we define "knowledge"; but, if I rightly interpret Dr. Martineau's writings, he certainly assumed that in that Divine revelation which is made in us through the universal principles of thought, and through the divinely authoritative ideals of Beauty, Righteousness, and Love, we have a genuine, though very imperfect, insight into the absolute reality of God.

While Dr. Martineau thus felt partial dissatisfaction with Hamilton, owing to the latter's ontological scepticism, he was entirely out of sympathy with the sensational idealists; and, accordingly, in his article on "John 'Stuart Mill," in which he does fullest justice to Mill's masterly treatment of subjects which, like Political Economy, involve no questions of ultimate metaphysics, he entirely demolishes, as he does also in the companion paper on "Professor Bain's Cerebral Psychology," the Sensationalist's explanation of Reality and Causality.

Just at the time when the followers of Hamilton and those of Mill and Bain were thus vehemently contending with each other, and Dr. Martineau was holding his own independently of both, two fresh and quite unexpected claimants for philosophical supremacy appeared upon the scene. Of these one sprang into birth on British soil; the other was of German extraction. The motto of the former was "Evolution and Heredity," that of the latter the "Absolute Reality of Thought"; but each of them vigorously attacked the fundamental principles, both of the Edinburgh intuitionists and of the London sensationalists; and it is one of the most dramatic events in

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the history of philosophical thought that, in less than twenty years, these new-comers had between them managed to dethrone and dispossess both of the pretenders to philosophic rule with whom Dr. Martineau had, in previous years, such brilliant encounters. From this circumstance it comes about that Dr. Martineau's earlier polemics, powerful as they were, have now not much more than a literary and historical interest. Of this he was himself well aware, for in a letter written March 14, 1892, to the Rev. A. W. Jackson, in reply to Mr. Jackson's request for advice in regard to the most effective course of philosophical reading, he says:—

“My only fear is, lest, through having the subjects of study suggested by the sum of an octogenarian's work, you should overtask yourself with labour on literature superseded by fresher products on the same lines. The philosophical problems discussed by Hamilton and Mansel, by Mill and Bain, still survive and reward thorough and independent study. But they have fallen into new attitudes and their living interest has shifted to other aspects, thrown forward partly by the development of the Hegelian school, partly by the Darwinian revival of the Evolution hypothesis of Lucretius. To be dealt with effectually for the present generation, these problems, though full of historical interest, need to be taken up at their modern end.”

But to Dr. Martineau's later work, — to his criticism of Mr. Spencer and Professor Tyndall, — this advice is not intended to apply. The views against which these later controversial essays are directed still keep their hold on the public mind, and seem indeed to be yearly strengthening that hold; and therefore for students of present philosophy the papers referred to retain a strong and living interest. It is to be noted that it was only against the former of the two new philosophies that Dr. Martineau publicly entered the lists. In private talks and letters, however, he, at times, attacked the latter somewhat smartly, though he knew Prof.

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T. H. Green well, and loved him much, but thought that at heart Green, like most passionately ethical natures, was much more of a Kantian and Lotzian than of a Hegelian. It must be borne in mind that though Ferrier of St. Andrews, and Hutchison Stirling of Edinburgh, had some years before introduced Hegelian ideas to British thinkers, Green did not become a great power at Oxford, nor the two Cairds at Glasgow till Dr. Martineau was close upon his seventieth year; and strange to say, he never fully realised the powerful attraction which Absolute Idealism has for many minds, nor at all anticipated the lengthened influence it was destined to exert on both sides of the Atlantic.

But if Hegelianism is still a great power in the living thought of our time, Spencerianism is certainly not less so; and it was to this phase of the *Zeitgeist* that Dr. Martineau particularly addressed himself. Spencer's philosophy has a metaphysical as well as a scientific side, and it was this metaphysical factor in it, as developed in his "First Principles," which placed him in the same category with such theological Agnostics as Sir W. Hamilton and Dean Mansel. Against the position of this rather curious agnostic trio (consisting of a Divine, a Philosopher, and a Scientist) Dr. Martineau, in the masterly paper on "Science, Nescience, and Faith," brought to bear all the resources of his rich philosophic erudition and of his great dialectic skill. With this paper is closely connected the similar but less comprehensive one on "Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought"; and both of them, to some extent, restate the same epistemological principles to which I have referred in connection with the article on "Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy."

All these impressive papers prove, I think, conclusively that the phænomena of nature owe their origin to spiritual activity, and that the right clue to the meaning of all cau-

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sality is found in our consciousness of volitional Effort. As the cosmical forces appear to be interchangeable, and in their aggregate produce the organic unity of the world, Dr. Martineau successfully contends that they are all modes of activity of One Self-Existent Spirit. Mr. Spencer argues that such a Self-Existent Spirit is “inconceivable”; to which Dr. Martineau aptly replies:—

“We cannot answer for the consciousness of others; and in the face of this frequent assertion we hardly like to speak for ourselves. Yet after repeated reflection we cannot at all detect this alleged ‘impossibility.’ To form an *image* of any infinitude,—be it of time, space, or number,—to go mentally through it by successive steps of representation, is indeed impossible; not less so than to traverse it in our finite perception and experience. But to have the *thought* of it as an idea of the Reason, not of the phantasy, and to assign that thought a constituent place in valid beliefs and consistent reasoning, appears to us not only possible, but inevitable; and the large part it plays in mathematical science alone suffices to indicate its worth for the intellect.”

The article on “Nature and God” and that on “Science, Nescience, and Faith” exhibit a feature in Dr. Martineau’s philosophy of the cosmos which was often a subject of debate between us, and which as it presented a serious difficulty to my mind may be a stumbling-block to other readers who accept in the main Dr. Martineau’s philosophy. The doctrine I refer to is, that the Infinite Mind in fashioning the cosmos is conditioned in the exercise of His Causality by the independent existence of Infinite Space, and, probably, also by that of self-existent Matter.

“Our age,” says Dr. Martineau, “professes itself weary of the old mechanical Deism, and cries out for the Immanent and Living God. It is well; but even for Immanency itself there must be something wherein to dwell; and for Life something wherein to act. Mind, to think out its problems,—unless these problems are a dream,—cannot be monistic,—a mere subjective infinitude,—its tides and eddies all within. What resource, then, have we when we seek for something

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objective to God? The first and simplest, in which accordingly philosophy has never failed to take refuge, is *Space*. Inconceivable by us except as co-extensive and co-eternal with him, yet independent of him, it lies ready with all its contents of geometrical property for the induction of his Reason." In a succeeding passage Dr. Martineau further contends that "there must be something else than Space (viz., Matter) objective to God."¹

Whether we agree, or disagree, with Dr. Martineau on this question, it must not be supposed that he regarded his views on this particular subject as an indispensable part of the foundation on which he erects the grand fabric of his philosophy of Theism. Beyond a doubt he himself was firmly convinced not only of the objective reality of Space, but also of its existence independently of God; and he also saw good reason for agreeing with Plato, that Matter is an eternal *datum* on which the will and thought of the Supreme Being are impressed; but this conviction did not prevent him from expressing much admiration for Lotze's "Microcosmus," in which treatise both the Kantian view of Space is accepted and the Supreme Being is represented as by a differentiation of His own substance, creating a cosmos of finite existences. In Mr. Herbert Spencer's reply to Dr. Martineau's paper on "Science, Nescience, and Faith" he urges that Dr. Martineau can give no clearer account of his mystery of Eternal Space and Eternal Matter as existing independently of God, than he [Mr. Spencer] can give of his Unknowable Absolute; and, in conclusion, he asks:—

"Is it not better candidly to acknowledge the incompetence of our intelligence, rather than to persist in calling that an explanation which does but disguise the inexplicable? Whatever answer each may give to this question, he cannot rightly blame those who, finding in themselves an indestructible consciousness of an Ultimate Cause, whence proceed alike

¹ Essays, Vol. III. p. 173.

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what we call the Material Universe, and what we call Mind, refrain from affirming anything respecting it; because they find it as inscrutable in nature as it is inconceivable in extent and duration.”¹

There does not exist any reply by Dr. Martineau to Mr. Spencer's criticism, but it would not, I think, be foreign to the spirit of Dr. Martineau's teaching to say in response to the above quotation that Mr. Spencer himself admits that the Ultimate Cause is an Omnipresent Power and that it is certainly not lower than personal. The Theist, then, may confidently argue that the principles of thought, which make the cosmical effects intelligible to the human mind, must needs belong also to the Ultimate Cause whence those effects proceed. And, further, he may reasonably urge that the gradually developing Moral Ideal in Humanity, which carries with it the categorical imperative, cannot be other than an imperfect but real and progressive self-revelation by the Ultimate Cause of its own essential character and ends. Again, if the Ultimate Cause produces, as it does, self-conscious personalities, all the essential principles of life and personality must needs be involved in the nature of this Ultimate Cause; and, therefore, the Absolute is by no means essentially and wholly unknowable by the human mind.

The many volumes of the “Synthetic System of Philosophy,” which follow the “*First Principles*,” constitute a very elaborate attempt to give such an account of the Evolution of the Cosmos as shall dispense with the domination of the process by Infinite Intelligence and Will. Against the non-Theistic principles of this side of the Spencerian philosophy Dr. Martineau argues with great clearness and force in the essay on “Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man”; and this paper also called forth from

¹ “Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative,” by Herbert Spencer, Vol. III. p. 300.

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Mr. Spencer a reply, which, under the title of "Mr. Martineau on Evolution," now forms the tenth chapter of the third volume of his "Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative."

Two years after the publication of Dr. Martineau's above-mentioned criticism of the Spencerian form of the doctrine of Evolution, Dr. Tyndall gave his celebrated Address at Belfast, in which he advocated in a more poetic and pantheistic spirit a conception of the development of the cosmos, which was as much opposed as Mr. Spencer's to Dr. Martineau's conception of a theistic origin and maintenance of the universe. The main ideas of the Belfast Address were accordingly expounded and keenly criticised, in the following October, by Dr. Martineau in his brilliant and effective Address, at the opening of the College Session, on "Religion as affected by Modern Materialism." To this Professor Tyndall replied in a paper which first appeared in the "Fortnightly Review," but the matter of which was afterwards embodied in the "Reflections on Materialism," which now forms the Introduction to the second part of his "Fragments of Science." The paper in the "Fortnightly" elicited from Dr. Martineau a long and closely reasoned rejoinder, which appeared first in the "Contemporary Review," and is now printed in Vol. IV. of the "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses," under the title "Modern Materialism: its Attitude towards Theology." It is, of course, not possible for me, in this sketch of Dr. Martineau's philosophical views, to find space to set forth and examine the chief considerations by which in his criticisms of Mr. Spencer's and Professor Tyndall's evolutionary theories he is led to the conclusion that matter can only be said to contain "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life" on the understanding that in matter and its evolution is immanent and manifested the Thought and Will of the Self-Existent Eter-

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nal; but in the sixth chapter, which treats of the “Types of Ethical Theory,” Dr. Martineau’s fundamental ideas on the process of Evolution will be briefly presented. In that chapter too, and also in the chapter on “A Study of Religion,” I shall endeavour to give some expression to the grand truth which inspires one of the latest and certainly one of the most eloquent and impressive of his College Addresses, namely, that delivered in 1879 on “Ideal Substitutes for God.” This Address deepened the impression of Dr. Martineau’s great philosophical powers, already made, both in literary and in religious circles, by his searching criticisms of Spencer and Tyndall; and it was the combined effect of these striking utterances which raised Dr. Martineau to the admitted rank of the foremost philosophical exponent and champion of the great basal principles of Theism and rational Christianity.

Dr. Martineau’s use of the word “Atheist” in these papers called forth some protest; for those thinkers in the present day who are unable to profess a definite theistic belief feel that their mental attitude towards the Ultimate Cause is more accurately expressed by that convenient word of Professor Huxley’s coinage, — “Agnostic.” Dr. Martineau in his Biographical Memoranda thus justifies his use of the word in the article on “Mesmeric Atheism”: —

“As to the verbal question, ‘Atheism’ has always been understood to mean not the denial of a ‘First Cause’ ἀπλῶς, but the denial that the ‘First Cause’ is God, *i. e.*, an Intending and Governing Mind; nor can we depart from this usage without the absurd result of treating Büchner and those who find their ‘First Cause’ in ‘Matter and Force’ as Theists.”

In the article on “Nature and God” Dr. Martineau happened to use the words “Theist” and “Atheist” in a way which led Mr. Spencer to think that writers holding his view were described as Atheists. This he naturally felt to be an injustice, and the following letter, written by

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Dr. Martineau to Dr. W. R. Alger, gives an interesting explanation of the unintended offence. I may add that Dr. Martineau and Mr. Spencer were on friendly terms as co-members of the Athenæum, and once Dr. Martineau told me with a smile that after he and Mr. Spencer had been discussing for some time, Mr. Spencer said: "Now, Dr. Martineau, let us drop philosophy and try our hands at a game of billiards."

OCT. 26, 1871.

MY DEAR ALGER, — Dear friend, I lost not a moment, after receipt of your letter, in going to call on Herbert Spencer, who had not sent me your note. I have seen him this morning, and had a long and satisfactory *éclaircissement*. My offence, it seems, consisted (1) in attributing to him a belief in a "background" instead of a "power" behind phenomena; (2) in omitting to describe his attitude of denial towards Pantheism and Atheism as well as towards Theism; (3) in suffering my Essays to appear in England in a volume without notice of his remonstrance.

He now understands (1) that the word "background" was not intended to *exclude the idea* of activity involved in "power," though failing to suggest it; (2) that my subject being *Theism*, I had nothing to do with his attitude towards *Atheism* and *Pantheism*; (3) that I did not know what the volume of Essays would contain, and had forgotten all about my review of him; but, in case of a future edition, will gladly set myself right by a note of explanation.

I have nothing but honour for him; and owe too much to him to have any interest but in understanding his thought exactly as it is. I frankly told him so; and that I felt that he was not a man to let speculative differences become a ground of personal aversion. He declared himself quite satisfied; and so far as consists with his exceptional sensitiveness to dissentient criticism, I fully believe he is so. And so, dear friend, your good wishes have already attained their accomplishment. I know this will give you a gleam of comfort.

Ever your affectionate JAMES MARTINEAU.

At the opening of his essay on "The New Affinities of Faith," written in connection with the proposed "Free Christian Union," Dr. Martineau says:—

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“ Foreigners have often complained of the intricacy of English religious phenomena. The present age is eliciting from the confusion two conspicuous features,—a return to Sacerdotal usage, and the erection of an ideal of secular good into a systematic faith. . . . Did we look at the progress of these two forces alone, we might fancy our world surrendered to the alternative, so often threatened, ‘Rome or Atheism.’ ”

This called forth a remonstrance from Prof. H. Sidgwick, in reply to which Dr. Martineau wrote:—

10 GORDON STREET, Feb. 6, 1869.

DEAR MR. SIDGWICK,—I am sincerely obliged by your criticisms, and will briefly report how they affect me. The sentence or two on *Atheism* I cannot admit to be “rhetorical,” if by this phrase you mark the *semblance* of truth as opposed to the reality. It seems to me rigorously true that modern science—correlation of forces and Darwinian theory included—has not in the smallest degree altered the logical weights in the Theistic problem. And Laplace’s remark itself shows that it was as easy to him as it is to Darwin to dispense with the idea of a Personal God. If the Divine Cause were resorted to only for the residuary phenomena for which scientific hypotheses found no place, I should feel with you that the enlargement of the field of Law rendered more difficult the recognition of Personal Causation. But being unable to admit any scientific discovery of *Force*, and regarding it as a postulate of Thought, and in that form equivalent to the idea of *Will*, I cannot but claim for Theism the field of Law, just as much as what lies beyond it; and then it is a matter of total indifference (religiously) where the line is run between the reclaimed and the unreclaimed phenomena. Conversely, the scientific idolatry of unknown “Forces” was just as seductive and as atheistic in the age of Epicurus as it is in ours. My position is that the *size* of the known Cosmos makes no difference. In other words, the problem is Metaphysical, not Physical, and is unaffected by the advance of Physical Science. On this point, therefore, the text is true to me; and a change in it, adequate to meet your feeling, would be untrue to me.

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Believe me ever

Yours very truly,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

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While Dr. Martineau was thus, during the "sixties" and "seventies," by means of his pen, contending for important issues with the more prominent scientific exponents of the philosophy of the cosmos, he was also in company with some other eminent Theists, meeting several of these same philosophers and scientists for *viva voce* debate at the monthly gatherings of the Metaphysical Society. A brief account, therefore, of the nature of this society and of Dr. Martineau's connection with it will be here in place.

The Society originated in a conversation which took place in the house of Mr. James Knowles (now the Editor of the "Nineteenth Century"), where Mr. (later Lord) Tennyson was among the guests; and it appears that it was Lord Tennyson who suggested the formation of a society, the main object of which should be the submitting to searching criticism the intellectual foundations of the spreading Positivism and Agnosticism; and for this purpose it was at first proposed to confine the membership to thinkers of a theistic stamp. Eminent men who were on this side of the question were sounded as to their willingness to become members, and Dr. Martineau's reply was to this effect:—

"I feel the deepest interest in these problems, and for the equal chance of gaining and giving light would gladly join in discussing them with gnostics and agnostics alike; but a society of gnostics to put down agnostics I cannot approve and could not join."

The scheme was accordingly altered to meet Dr. Martineau's wishes, and able agnostics, like Professors Tyn dall and Huxley, were invited, and readily assented.

"It was feared at first," writes Dr. Martineau, "that the modified project would be unacceptable to the two or three professional theologians who had already been committed; but they readily acceded to the proposal, and at the first meet-

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ing it was distinctly settled that the members crediting each other with a pure quest of truth would confer together on terms of respectful fellowship, and never visit with reproach the most unreserved statement of reasoned belief or unbelief."

Dr. Martineau adds that as far as he could remember this initial understanding was observed throughout the history of the Society. Only in a single instance, and that at one of the earliest meetings, was there any infraction of this principle. The solitary exception is thus graphically described by Mr. Wilfrid Ward in his most interesting work on "William George Ward and the Catholic Revival"; and he gives Mr. Froude as his authority for the incident:—

"A speaker at one of the first meetings laid down emphatically as a necessary condition to success, that no element of moral reprobation must appear in the debates. There was a pause, and then Dr. Ward said: 'While acquiescing in this condition as a general rule, I think it cannot be expected that Christian thinkers shall give no sign of the horror with which they would view the spread of such extreme opinions as those advocated by Mr. Huxley.' Another pause ensued, and then Mr. Huxley said: 'As Dr. Ward has spoken, I must say in fairness that it will be very difficult for me to conceal my feelings as to the intellectual degradation which would come of the general acceptance of such views as Dr. Ward holds.' No answer was given; but the single speech on either side brought home then and there to all, including the speakers, that if such a tone were admitted the Society could not last a day. From that time onward no word of the kind was ever heard."

At the head of the list of members occur the names of Lord Tennyson and Mr. Gladstone; these are followed by those of Lord Selbourne, the Archbishop of York, Dr. James Martineau, Prof. Henry Sidgwick, Mr. R. H. Hutton, and Mr. Ruskin; *Catholics*, as Archbishop Manning, Father Dalgairns, Dr. Ward, and Dr. Gasquet; *Agnostic men of science*, as Professors Tyndall and Huxley; and

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Gnostic men of science and physicians, as Dr. W. B. Carpenter, Professor Mivart, Dr. Andrew Clark, and Sir William Gull; with several others. Mr. J. S. Mill and Mr. Herbert Spencer could not be induced to join. Mr. James Knowles was the honorary secretary during nearly all the twelve years of the Society's existence, but towards the end his place was taken by Sir Frederick Pollock. The chairmen were elected for a year, and among them were Mr. Gladstone, Lord Selbourne, Mr. Huxley, Dr. Ward, and Dr. Martineau. And when after twelve years the Society came to an end, because, as Mr. Knowles explains it, "the members knew each other's views and there seemed little to be said which had not been already repeated more than once," the final meeting was held in Dr. Martineau's house under his chairmanship, and the last resolution passed was "that the Chairman be requested to accept the Minute-book, with the documents thereto belonging, as a token of the Society's thanks for his services during the past year." The meetings were first held in Willis's Rooms, but later in the Grosvenor Hotel. After dining together the members sat round a table with a sheet of blank foolscap paper before each one, which was not often used for notes, but sometimes served for other purposes. Professor Huxley, it was said, was fond of drawing sketches and portraits on his sheet, and when I became a member in its later years, I recollect noticing the distinguished author of "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt" similarly engaged while listening with amused interest to the conflict of the philosophies. Not only were the debates often of high interest, but the mere spectacle of several highly gifted thinkers, of very different types of faculty and genius, and with such a variety of facial expression, was itself a treat of no mean order. Towards the close of the evening the debate often passed into a conversation, and the genial affability with which the most

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eminent among them freely interchanged ideas with the humbler members suggested the fancy that we in modern times were enjoying a feast of reason in somewhat of the old Athenian style. In an account of the meetings which Sir M. E. Grant Duff gave to Mr. Wilfrid Ward, he says:—

“I do not remember that the Laureate took any part in the discussion, but his mere presence added dignity to a dignified assemblage. . . . I remember after the dissolution of the Society the late Archbishop of York told me he was more struck with the metaphysical ability of Father Dalgairns and of Mr. James Martineau than by that of any other of the disputants.”

Dr. Martineau felt high respect for the philosophical ability and moral earnestness of the Catholic members; and he writes: “For myself I can say that if I had gained nothing from the Metaphysical Society but the impression of Father Dalgairns’s personality, I should have been for ever grateful to it”; and in conversation he spoke with admiration of the convincing force of the remarkable paper read before the Society by Father Dalgairns on “The Personality of God,” which paper appeared afterwards in an enlarged form in the “Contemporary Review.”

Fortunately, the late Mr. R. H. Hutton¹ has left a charming description of one of the most attractive of these monthly meetings,—that on Dec. 10, 1872. He first most happily characterises the more prominent members present, and then gives a vivid statement of the chief points in the various speeches. Of Dr. Martineau and Professors Huxley and Tyndall he says:—

“The noble and steadfast, but somewhat melancholy, faith which seemed to be sculptured on Dr. Martineau’s massive brow shaded off into wistfulness in the glance of his eyes.

¹ “The Nineteenth Century,” August, 1885.

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Professor Huxley, who always had a definite standard for every question which he regarded as discussible at all, yet made you feel that his slender definite creed in no way represented the cravings of his large nature. Professor Tyndall's eloquent addresses frequently culminated with some pathetic indication of the mystery which to him surrounded the moral life."

The paper of the evening was written by that acute and powerful Catholic thinker Dr. W. G. Ward, then Editor of the "Dublin Review," and was on the question, "Can Experience prove the Uniformity of Nature?" the writer's main object evidently being to remove philosophical objections to the reality of physical miracles. It is curious that there was no Kantian or Hegelian among the speakers, for they all appeared to agree that the doctrine of the Uniformity of Nature was not based on any logical necessity, but was, as Huxley expressed it, no more than "a working hypothesis" for the explanation of natural phenomena. Professor Huxley maintained, however, that it was a hypothesis that had been so constantly verified by experience that, though he was willing to examine the evidence for alleged miracles, he thought that the probability of their unreality was immensely great. Dr. Martineau agreed with Professor Huxley that the question of miracles was a question of evidence, but he dissented entirely from his phenomenal view of Causation.

"I cannot doubt for a moment," he said, "that cause and effect are connected together by efficient links, nor that if Force *outside* of us means the same thing as Force *inside* of us, the relation of Cause and Effect is as necessary — unless some Higher Power interferes to modify the cause — as the relation of premisses to conclusion."

He thought it highly probable that this Higher Power does not interfere in the physical world, but in the sphere of consciousness he recognised the reality of such interference, and said:—

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“In my view it is quite unreasonable to deny that there are indirect but conclusive proof in history that such supernatural influences have transformed, and do habitually still transform, the characters of the very greatest of our race.”

At a meeting held about a year before the one just referred to, Professor Huxley read a paper on the question, “Has the Frog a Soul; and of what nature is that Soul, supposing it to exist?” On this occasion an amusing incident occurred, described to me by Dr. Martineau years ago, which I cannot refrain from recalling, especially as it involves a principle of great philosophical importance. After the paper had been read, in which the writer expresses his adhesion to the automatic doctrine that “purposive operations may be effected by matter without the help of a soul,” the noble chairman said to Professor Huxley:—

“I happened to be walking this morning along Oxford Street, intending to go to the Marble Arch; but before I got to Oxford Circus something suggested to me that I wanted a new pair of boots, and, as my boot-maker lives in Regent Street, when I reached the Circus I turned down into that street. Now am I to understand, Professor Huxley, that your opinion is that the entrance of that idea into my mind had no causal connection with the changed direction of my limbs?”

To this question the Professor replied: “Such certainly is my opinion.” After the utterance of this dictum by so high an authority, the Chairman could say no more.

During the twelve years the Society existed only two papers were read by Dr. Martineau, but each of them was on a subject of prime significance. The first on June 15, 1870, discussed the question, “Is there any Axiom of Causality?” which paper was afterwards printed in the “Contemporary Review,” and is now in Vol. III. of “Essays, Reviews, and Addresses.” The second, on April 17, 1877, was on “The Supposed Conflict between Efficient and Final Causation.”

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In reference to the former of these papers the following extract from a letter written by Dr. Martineau on Aug. 26, 1870, to his friend the Rev. Charles Wicksteed is of deep interest:—

“It must be confessed, I fear, that the modern scientific doctrine as conceived by Huxley, Darwin, Tyndall—to say nothing of the Comtists—is fundamentally atheistic. Yet from both Tyndall and Huxley I have heard admissions (in arguments at the Metaphysical Society) which are logically inconsistent with their negative position in regard to religion. When in June last I read a paper at the Metaphysical Society on the doctrine of Causation, Huxley was expected to appear against it as Protagonistes, in his usual incisive way. To my surprise he avowed his assent to the main psychological doctrine of the paper,—that *physically* we have no cognisance of causation; that *intellectually* we are obliged to think it; and that in thinking it we necessarily identify it with *Will*. But whether this psychological necessity might not be a psychological illusion seemed to be his doubt. To speak of the ‘Unknown Power’ as an *orderly tendency*, shaping things into systems which are objects of intellectual apprehension to us, he admits to be unobjectionable; but to suppose Personal design in relation to so vast a universe seemed to be somehow baffling to his imagination. I asked him why, if his own mind could read and interpret this vast system *à posteriori*, so as to be thus affected by its magnificence, it should be deemed out of the question that the highest Mind should project it *à priori*? He could only say that Personality, as he measured it, was not equal to the immensity of the product. And it was easy to see that, as a physiologist, he was accustomed to look at the human personal attributes as merely emerging from the simply vital phenomena at their culminating point; and that this Naturalist’s estimate of them rose up to damp and quench his inward reading of them from the consciousness of intellectual light and moral freedom.”

To this account of the Metaphysical Society it is fitting to append a brief description of the kindred club, the Synthetic Society, of which Dr. Martineau was a member during the last few years of his life. With what individual the idea of this society originated, I do not know;

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but probably with one of the surviving members of the old Metaphysical Society, among whom were Mr. A. J. Balfour, Mr. R. H. Hutton, and Prof. Henry Sidgwick. All these took part in the project, and with them have been associated, among others, the present Bishop of Worcester (then Canon Gore), Mr. Gerald Balfour, the Rev. Dr. Clark, Sir Alfred Lyall, Mr. Haldane, Prof. Oliver Lodge, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, Prof. James Ward, Mr. George Wyndham, and Mr. Wilfrid Ward, the gifted son of that distinguished member of the Metaphysical Society, whose philosophical powers and spiritual worth Dr. Martineau so highly esteemed. The two last-named gentlemen acted as the Honorary Secretaries. The general object of the Synthetic Society is similar to that of the Metaphysical Society, except that the originators thought it better to confine the membership so far as possible to thinkers who were not thoroughly committed to agnostic principles, and, therefore, thought it possible to attain to some measure of real insight into the essential nature of the Ground and Cause of the Universe. When it was proposed to Dr. Martineau to join this new Society he wrote the following letter, which evinces such mental vigour, both in the clearness of the thought and the grace of the expression, that as the production of a nonagenarian writer it is probably almost unique. I copy it from a communication by Mr. Ward to the "Times" soon after Dr. Martineau's decease.

35 GORDON SQUARE, Feb. 21, 1896.

DEAR MR. WARD,—When the Metaphysical Society was founded, at the suggestion of Tennyson, in the hope of checking the growth of Agnosticism, I declined to take part in it, unless the opposed parties were brought face to face on equal terms as seekers of the Truth. Something of the same feeling still clings to me; and I doubt the possibility of keeping clear of the fundamental matters on which they are at issue in any thorough discussion of the varieties of Gnosticism. The really misplaced people in the old Society were those

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who had no belief in metaphysics at all, and could only treat their problems with impatience or derision. To these members the end which the Society had in view was not only unattainable but unreal; and an evening spent in quest of it was a futile waste of life.

I certainly feel that we could have prospered better without this class of members, to whom the questions discussed were closed before the attempt to answer them. And if the term "Synthetical" is intended to bespeak a recognition of more than phenomena as the object of possible knowledge, and is deemed more effectual for the purpose than "Metaphysical," I see no adequate reason against the limitation which it imposes. Those of us who are already in agreement on a fundamental epistemological question, may help each other by comparing our several views of what the ulterior Reality is, which is delivered to us in aspects so various. I gladly, therefore, and thankfully accept the invitation with which you honour me. I cannot hope, in the last verge of life, to contribute anything but sympathy to the meetings of the Society. But I have not outlived the habit of learning evermore from my fellows; and this privilege offered me has an irresistible attraction.

Believe me, always,

Yours very sincerely,

WILFRID WARD, Esq.

JAMES MARTINEAU.

The first meeting was held, under the presidency of the Bishop of Rochester, in February, 1896. There was a large and distinguished gathering both at the dinner and at the meeting afterwards. Mr. Wilfrid Ward read a very interesting paper on the objects of the "Synthetic Society." This was followed by a discussion in which Dr. Martineau took an active part, insisting in an able speech on the point that in regard to philosophical insight no real distinction can be drawn between the social and the individual standpoint. He spoke also at some length at the following meeting in March, and contributed a paper in May. Owing to increasing deafness he, in February, 1898, resigned his active membership in the Society, but he remained an honorary member till his death.

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I had the privilege of sitting by his side during the first discussion, and I noticed that his printed copy of the paper for the evening was then, as in the time of the old Metaphysical Society, closely annotated with his short-hand comments, showing that at that advanced age he felt the same warm interest in the "deep things of the Spirit," and concentrated his attention on them with the same conscientious earnestness as in the best days of his physical and intellectual vigour. Round the table with him on that occasion sat his old pupil and lifelong friend Mr. R. H. Hutton, and Prof. Henry Sidgwick, with whom Dr. Martineau had been so intimately associated in the effort to establish a "Free Christian Union." Alas, in the course of one short lustrum all three had passed into the Unseen World — three men so utterly different in their theological conclusions, but so entirely at one in their complete devotion to Truth and to the Moral Ideal.

Chapter VI

"TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY"

To fully realise the value of Dr. Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory," and to understand the important influence it is fitted to exert on present culture, it is necessary to clearly perceive what is the special aspect of truth and reality which it expounds and emphasises. Dr. Martineau's writings declare and illustrate the fact that the self-revelation of the Divine in the human, of God in man, presents three distinct modes, and that the ideal wise man is he in whom all these three modes are combined and harmoniously developed.¹

First: God is revealed in man's *rational* nature; in the Reason which enables the mind to rise above itself, to discern laws and general principles, and thus to progressively attain to a more complete and self-consistent conception of the universe. Exclusive or predominant interest in the exercise of this faculty constitutes Intellectualism. Its chief defect is that it empties the universe of its rich personal element, both in reference to God and to man. It is not favourable to either public or private devotion; and it is little concerned about personal immortality. It knows nothing of Sin in the religious sense; Free-will is its *bête noire*, for it stands in the way of that logical unification of the cosmos which forms the pure intellectualist's supreme aim.

¹ Cf. "Essays, Reviews, and Addresses," Vol. IV. p. 580, for the distinction between "the Religion of *Causation*, the Religion of *Conscience*, and the Religion of the *Spirit*."

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Second: God is revealed in man's *moral* nature; in the Conscience with its categorical imperative. On this side of his relation to God man becomes aware of a Divine Authority which asserts a right to control his personal desires and aims; he realises the fact of felt alienation from, and felt reconciliation with, the Eternal. This ethical experience makes manifest the Moral Freedom of man and the possibility of Sin. The defect of exclusive Ethicalism is that it leads to the conception of God as an external Lawgiver, and shows no adequate appreciation of the immanent presence of God in all the higher experiences of the soul, nor any deep sense of personal communion with Him.

Third: God is revealed in man's *spiritual* nature; in the consciousness of His immediate presence in the Moral Ideal, in the Ideal of Beauty, in the promptings of Divine Love. The experience of this aspect of Divinity in Humanity imparts ideality to the character; kindles sentiments of devotion, and awakens a growing sense of relationship and spiritual community with all men and with the inner life of nature. The defect of extreme and exclusive Spiritualism or Mysticism is, that it tends to merge the human in the Divine, and in the enjoyment of ideal imaginations to lose both intellectual and moral energy.

Now, of these three aspects of the self-revelation of God in man, Dr. Martineau in his writings generally, but especially in the book which I am about to describe, emphasises and develops the Ethical one. This was certainly the predominant interest with him, and sometimes, I think, his writings betray the defects of excessive Ethicalism; but the intellectual and the mystical sides of his nature were by no means starved; and hence he presents points of contact and sympathy with minds of different types. But in this present age of extreme Intellectualism, when

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the Freedom of the Will is being widely denied or even sneered at, and the belief and interest in Personal Immortality is consequently weakened, there can be no more wholesome tonic for the ailments of society than Dr. Martineau's eloquent and uncompromising exposition of the reality and the sublimity of the moral element in human nature. There may be, and I believe are, certain features in Dr. Martineau's admirable and original analysis of our springs of action, and particularly in his description of the mode in which we reach a progressive perception of their relative ethical rank, which more recent thought has shown to require considerable modification, but with regard to the fundamental principles of Ethics, — the intuitive insight of the conscience; the reality of moral freedom and responsibility, the source of moral authority and the all-important relationship between Ethics and Religion, — this great work expounds and insists upon essential truths which can never become obsolete, because they rest upon, and are confirmed by, everyday facts in the inner experience of mankind.

The character of Dr. Martineau's mind eminently qualified him for the task of analysing and interpreting the moral consciousness. His intense interest in the ethical side of human life induced the most careful attention to the psychology of the subject. The philosopher whose main interests are scientific or metaphysical is under strong temptation to distort and misrepresent ethical phænomena. Intellectual, moral, and spiritual experiences, although they are often combined in consciousness, have yet entirely distinct characters, and any attempt to confound them and to take the deliverances of the one as a key to explain the others must be fatal to true philosophical insight. A thinker like Professor Ferrier, of St. Andrews, for instance, — of whom his biographer, Professor Lushington, writes: "His interest in ethical speculations seemed to

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me to be entirely subordinate to his metaphysical; and any ethical doctrine which he reached took its cast from his demonstrative theory of knowledge and existence,” — could hardly be expected to be a trustworthy authority on questions of ethical theory; and this to some extent holds good of several recent treatises on Ethics. In modern times the influence of Christian thought has brought the permanent worth and significance of the moral side of human nature into clear consciousness, and hence the modern philosopher is not so likely as was the ancient philosopher to make his ethical views dependent on a preconceived metaphysical theory of the cosmos. Accordingly, though even in recent years there have been influential philosophers — such as Hegel and Auguste Comte — who have approached Ethics after the Greek fashion, yet the great majority of religious teachers and moralists now follow the example of philosophers like Kant, Lotze, and Dr. Martineau; that is to say, they build their ethical theory on the solid foundation of their moral consciousness; and then, if they go on to form a *Weltanschauung*, a theory of the cosmos as a whole, they take good care that it shall be a theory which does not distort or violate that immediate ethical and spiritual experience through which they have every day conscious relations with the Eternal Ground and Cause of all existences. The following passage from the Introduction to the “Types of Ethical Theory” admirably describes this fundamental distinction between the two modes of philosophising: —

“What the objects are which constitute the scene around man may be expressed in two words, — Nature and God; understanding by the former the totality of perceptible phænomena, and by the latter the eternal ground and cause whose essence they express. These two are the companions that no one can ever quit, change as he may his place, his age, his society; they fill the very path of time on which he travels, and the fields of space into which he looks; and the

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questions what they are, and what exactly they have to do with him, cannot but affect the decision of what he ought to be. Whether you will first address yourselves to *them*, or rather make your commencement with *him*, may seem a matter of small moment, inasmuch as all three must be relatively surveyed; but in fact it makes the greatest difference, — the whole difference between the most opposite schools of opinion, between an objective and a subjective genesis of doctrine, between ancient and modern philosophy. If you give priority to the study of nature and God, and resort to them as your nearest given objects, you are certain to regard them as the better known, and to carry the conceptions you gain about them into the remaining field as your interpreters and guides; you will explain the human mind by their analogy, and expect in it a mere extension of their being. If, on the other hand, you permit the human mind to take the lead of these objects in your inquiry, the order of inference will naturally be reversed; and with the feeling that it is the better known, you will rather believe what the soul says of them, than what they have to say about the soul. In both instances, no doubt, they stand related to man as macrocosm to microcosm; and we may be asked, 'What matters it whether we think of man as a finite epitome of the universe, or of the universe as the infinite counterpart of man?' In the last resort, the difference, I believe, will be found to consist in this, — that when self-consciousness is resorted to as the primary oracle, an assurance is obtained, and is carried out into the scheme of things, of a free preferential power; but when the external whole is the first interrogated it affords no means of detecting such a power, but, exhibiting to the eye of observation a course of necessary evolution, tempts our thought to force the same type of development upon the human soul. In the one case we obtain a volitional theory of nature; in the other, a naturalistic theory of volition; and on the resulting schemes of morals the great difference is impressed, that according to the respective modes of procedure the doctrine of proper responsibility is admitted or denied. Thus, then, we obtain our first distinction of method, deducing it simply from the opposite lines of direction which the order of investigation may take. Ethics may pursue their course and construct their body of doctrine either from the moral sentiments outwards into the system of the world, or from the system of the world inwards to the moral sentiments. The former method may be called *Psychologic*; the latter we will for the pres-

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ent oppose to it by the mere negative designation of the *Unpsychologic*.”¹

Those ethical theories which are reached by the Psychologic road (including Dr. Martineau's own) are fully expounded and analysed in the second volume, while the first volume is devoted to a study of the Unpsychologic moralists, and includes lucid expositions of the relation between their respective philosophical systems. Of such systems those of Plato, Spinoza, and Comte are taken as the typical representatives. Plato represents those philosophers who believe that the universe is the visible manifestation of an Eternal Intelligent Cause, but who regard that Cause as having in itself infinite resources which are not at all exhausted in the actual universe. Such a metaphysical system is called “Transcendental,” because it represents God's being as altogether transcending its manifestations in the world of phenomena. Between this theory and Dr. Martineau's own theory, as described in “A Study of Religion,” there is a close affinity, since both the philosophical systems represent God as infinitely richer than the cosmos which he fashions, and therefore as not confined and necessitated in his causality by his own existing manifestations, but constantly able to introduce quite new physical and psychical elements into the actual world. Hence it is not surprising that Dr. Martineau, in common with the most profound Christian thinkers, had an intense admiration and love for this philosopher. The following passage, in which Dr. Martineau impressively depicts how in Plato's mind the principles of later Christian ethics were struggling to find expression through incompatible Hellenic conceptions, may be taken as a fair sample of the penetrating insight and great descriptive power which pervade this masterly volume. The sentiment directed towards moral character by the Greeks

¹ Vol. I. p. 2.

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"is no other than that which may be felt towards a fine form or a noble face; or towards the products of Art and Science; or towards the several types of intellectual genius. All these belong, in this theory, to one and the same category; they are the essential principles, the eternal life, the formative thoughts of the universe, cropping up into manifestation on the human stage; and all are to be welcomed with the same kind of admiration. This complete merging of all moral approbation in the love of beauty and truth is especially visible in the system of Plato; and has its distinctness expressed in his Socratic doctrine, that virtue is an *ἐπιστήμη* that may be taught. It is evident that no distinction is drawn, in such a scheme, between natural and moral evil; no room is left for *guilt*, as opposed to *ignorance*; or for *retribution*, as different from *discipline*. Yet it is remarkable that Plato could not hold himself exclusively to this point of view; the instincts of his nature were too much for the restraints of a philosophy, comprehensive indeed, but still short of the compass of his mind; and when, as at the close of his Republic, his dialectic, unequal to the inner pressure of his moral inspiration, bursts its formal shell, and takes flight upon the air of myth, he proclaims penalties to sin quite too solemn, were it but a mental ugliness, and even, in cases of extreme guilt, announces them as eternal. This, however, is little else than the revolt of his inmost moral sentiment against the checks of his philosophy; and that his philosophy necessitated the revolt, and found no place for feelings that insisted on expression, enables us to mark the great defect of the whole method."¹

The metaphysical systems represented by Spinoza, since they deny God's transcendence of the universe, are termed the Immanentist. They, accordingly, regard all that is in the Supreme Cause as finding actual expression in the existing phenomena. The influence of such a philosophical system upon ethical theory is obvious; it renders the personality of God inconceivable, and deprives man of all moral freedom.²

¹ P. II.

² *Vide* the eighth chapter of this book for the exposition and criticism of Spinoza's theory of ethics.

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The Transcendental and Immanent systems exhaust all possible unpsychological ethics of the *metaphysical* type, but there still remain the systems which deny all possible knowledge of, and therefore take no interest in, non-phænomenal Causes. Such systems Dr. Martineau terms *physical*. Of these Comte's Positivism is chosen as the most elaborate and consistent example. These systems necessarily break up the separate individuality of human souls, and thus remove the basis of moral freedom and personal responsibility.

It was forgotten by some of the critics of the “Types of Ethical Theory” that Dr. Martineau, in expounding these three classes of systems, which all issue in unpsychological ethical theories, clearly recognises the fact that incidentally such systems may contain much valuable ethical teaching. He places Aristotle's ethical doctrine in the unpsychological class, but he still finds much true ethical psychology in his writings, and he often read portions of the “Nicomachean Ethics” with his pupils. Spinoza's great work, too, abounds in anticipations of the subtle and elaborate psychology of recent times. In the development of systems dominated by metaphysical conceptions “there is ample room both for subsidiary inductions and for mental analysis.” Still, as the metaphysical system gives the character to the ethics, “it is necessary to begin with their metaphysics and proceed to their physics before attempting to present their ethical doctrine.” Such a course is not necessary in the case of writers whose ethical doctrine is developed independently of their metaphysical assumptions; and, therefore, “no one would ever think of throwing into such a form an account of a modern moralist, really psychological, as Hobbes or Butler, Stewart or Sidgwick.”¹

¹ Preface to second edition, p. xxvi.

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This classification of unpsychological ethical theories suggests the question of the philosophical position of two theories which are very prevalent at the present time, viz., the Hegelian and the Spencerian. With regard to the former, it is, I think, to be regretted that Dr. Martineau did not choose Hegel instead of Spinoza as the representative of the Immanentist moralists; for Dr. Martineau's exposition and criticism of Hegel's ethics would have been most seasonable and valuable. When, however, the Lectures, on which the "Types of Ethical Theory" are founded, were written, Dr. Martineau had no anticipation that Hegel's ethical views would acquire their present influence. As to Mr. Spencer, he is indeed an ontologist of a very pronounced character; but his doctrine of the Unknowable Absolute has no practical bearing on his ethics, and, therefore, as an ethical writer he is fitly placed by Dr. Martineau among the evolutionary Hedonists in the psychological series.

The second volume, as I have said, is devoted to *psychological* theories; theories, that is, which rest not on a previous conception of the character of the cosmos as a whole, but on the special study of the facts of man's conscious life, *i. e.*, on the results of psychological analysis. The question, accordingly, on which the whole arrangement of this volume depends, is, Does psychological analysis show that there are special features in our ethical experience which do not admit of being derived from, and, therefore, of being explained by, other more elementary factors of the inner life of man? Dr. Martineau maintains, in common with Bishop Butler, that there are fundamental ethical experiences which are essentially *unique*, and which, therefore, no analytical subtlety can resolve into unethical elements. The true ethical theory, then, in his view is what he terms *Idiopsychological*; the word *ιδιος* here indicating that Ethics has a special territory of

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its own in man's inner life, and cannot, therefore, be made a subordinate appanage to either the sensational, the intellectual, or the æsthetic division of psychological phenomena. The first Book, accordingly, which forms about a half of this second volume, is a very complete exposition of Dr. Martineau's own ethical theory, and, therefore, is the portion of the work which has the highest interest and value.

The second half of the volume discusses various *Hetero-psychological* theories,—that is, the theories which find the ultimate source of man's ethical ideas and sentiments not in an original ethical constitution of our nature, but in some *other* department of human experience, which is supposed by these thinkers to be wider in its range and more primordial in character than are the ethical aspects of human self-consciousness. These Hetero-psychological theories naturally fall into three classes. Firstly, those which interpret Ethics as an outcome of man's *sensational* experience. These are described by Dr. Martineau under the heading “Hedonist Ethics.” Such ethical theories undergo a subordinate division according as they rest, as do the theories of Hobbes, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Professor Bain, on the psychology of the individual man, or like the ethical views of Darwin and Mr. Spencer, include, by way of Evolution and Heredity, the psychology of the present man's human and animal progenitors. Of these sub-divisions the former is described as “Utilitarian Hedonism,” the latter as “Hedonist Evolution.” Secondly, those theories which regard ethical ideas as explicable from the universal *intellectual* intuitions of the mind. The advocates of this view are usually termed rational moralists, but Dr. Martineau distinguishes their systems as Di-noetic Ethics. Under this head come Cudworth, Clarke, and Price; and as these writers build upon ultimate intuitions of the mind, and generally emphasise the doctrine

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of Free-will, there is in some respects a close affinity between their views and those of the Idiopsychologic moralists. Thirdly and lastly, we have what Dr. Martineau distinguishes as *Æsthetic Ethics*, of which the most important instances are the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. These thinkers represent the moral sentiments as arising out of the intuitive perception of the *Beautiful*. But the sense of the Beautiful may attach either to appreciation of the benevolent affections, or to what is charming and lovely in temper and action; as Dr. Martineau expresses it, "our sentiment towards conduct may be supposed to come from good will or from good taste." One would rather expect, therefore, that there would be found separate exponents of these two distinct aspects of *Æsthetic Ethics*. Practically, however, no such division is made, and this occasions a difficulty in defining exactly the character of this ethical theory. But the distinctive feature which separates it from that of the Dianoetic School is thus lucidly described:—

"It so happens that both these principles have committed their cause to the same advocates, who plead, with apparent unconsciousness of change, now in terms of the one, and then in those of the other, and seem to blend them in thought, much as the Greeks melted the *καλὸν καγαθὸν* into one conception and almost into one word. Hence it is difficult to designate with precision the writers who remain for review,—Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Whether the term which they emphasise is the *Moral Sense*, or *Disinterested Affection*, they seek their key to the judgments of conscience in some form of inward emotion, and not in the mind's submission to the truth of external things; so that the Right is not, as with the previous School, felt because it is known, but known because it is somehow felt. To this new turn of thought we certainly owe a vast accession of fine psychological observation, and subtle analyses of human manners and character. The change from Hobbes to Hutcheson is little less than from Rabelais to George Eliot."¹

¹ Vol. II. p. 485.

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It should be added that in the case both of the Dianoetic and of the *Æsthetic* moralists the interest of the book is greatly enhanced by the prefixing to the account of each ethical system a graphic picture of the “Life and Personality” of the author. Those who have read the fascinating biography which occupies the first hundred pages of “A Study of Spinoza” will fully understand the additional value and attractiveness thus given to the purely philosophical treatment of the subject. The narrow limits of space imposed upon me, and the importance of trying to give a fair account of Dr. Martineau’s own ethical theory, render it impossible for me to dwell upon his most able description and criticism of the views of Heteropsychological writers. One of these ethical theories, however, will demand some attention,—that one, I mean, which represents and defends the principle of Hedonist Ethics; for this theory, especially in the evolutionary form given to it by Darwin and Mr. Spencer, is still one of the two dominant powers in living ethical thought, the other being the Hegelian theory of Ethics, which Dr. Martineau in these volumes does not directly discuss. It was this theory, too, as represented by J. S. Mill, Professor Bain, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and, to some extent, by Professor Tyndall, which evoked the greater number of that remarkable succession of Articles, Essays, and Addresses of which a description was given in the preceding chapter.

I propose, then, first to make an attempt to describe the main features in the Idiopsychological theory, referring in the proper place to the more important of the strictures which they have called forth. I will then briefly deal with Evolutionary Hedonism by the help of Dr. Martineau’s luminous interpretation and criticism of that now increasingly influential doctrine.

“The broad fact,” says Dr. Martineau, “stated in its unanalysed form, of which Ethics has to find the interpretation,

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is this, — that distinctively as men we have an irresistible tendency to *approve* and *disapprove*, to pass judgment of right and wrong. Wherever approbation falls, there we cannot help recognising merit; wherever disapprobation, demerit.”¹

It has often been pointed out that in all civilised nations there are two sets of words used to express ethical ideas. The one set denotes *habits* and *customs*, for these are the original ideas out of which grow the meaning of the words *Morals* and *Ethics*, and the German *Sitten*; the other set, of which Duty and Obligation are examples, indicate a binding or restraining principle. According to the empirical school the primary ethical experience is expressed by the former set, and the binding principle, which appears in such words as Duty, is derived originally from the enforced restraint which society puts on those who violate the social usages. Dr. Martineau, on the other hand, maintains that it is just because the sentiments of moral right and wrong are *the characteristics of human nature* that the system of action which they call up receives the name of *Mores*, or *established ways*; and that the outer binding power of society would give rise to no sense of Right were it not accompanied and endorsed by the individual's own consciousness of inner obligation.

Beginning with the obvious remark that it is only persons and not things that can be objects of moral judgments, Dr. Martineau proceeds to answer the question, Do we pass moral judgment upon the external action or upon the motives which prompted the action? In deciding that the judgment is passed upon the motives, he finds himself in agreement with all the leading moralists, including Mr. Spencer, Mr. Leslie Stephen, and T. H. Green. But when he propounds the further question, Do we pass moral judgment on the actions of *others* before we pass them on *our own*? he finds himself nearly deserted by recent English

¹ Vol. II. p. 18.

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writers on ethics. In opposition to him both Mr. Spencer and Mr. Sidgwick assert that our first ethical perceptions are directed upon other persons. Dr. Martineau, however, defends his view by reasons that appear to me incontrovertible; for he argues that if after passing judgment on the conduct of others we discover that we misapprehended their *motives*, that discovery leads at once to a revision of our judgment. And if, further, any act of our own has won approval from others, while we ourselves know it proceeded from unworthy motives, we mentally dissent from the external judgment. Hence it appears evident that our moral judgments concerning the conduct of others depend upon our attributing that conduct to motives, the moral value of which we have first discovered in our own case.

After distinguishing between a *spontaneity* and a *volition*, and explaining that for a voluntary act it is necessary that not less than two impulses should be present, Dr. Martineau proceeds to express and establish a vital principle in his ethical theory, which is thus enunciated:—

“This plurality of simultaneous tendencies, however, would still present no case for moral judgment were it not also felt to be a plurality of *simultaneous tendencies*. I must lay a separate stress upon each of these two words: (a) the impulses must be simultaneous *inter se*; and (b) they must both be possibilities *to us*.”¹

The second of these necessary conditions of moral judgment introduces Dr. Martineau's doctrine of the Self in its relation to the Character, and involves the contention that true Moral Freedom, *i. e.*, a power of choice between equally possible alternatives, is essential to the very existence of genuine morality and moral responsibility.

Through a striking but by no means inexplicable concurrence at the present time of the excessive Intellec-

¹ Vol. II. p. 37.

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tualism of the Absolute Idealists with a like one-sidedness in the world of scientific thought, the doctrine of the Freedom of the Will is just now widely ignored or denied, and finds no expression in many recent ethical treatises. One prominent writer of the Hegelian school makes the strangely inaccurate statement that Lotze and Dr. Martineau are the only eminent recent philosophers in whom the belief in Free-will has survived; while another Professor of the same school complacently informs his readers that "it is now generally recognised that Determinists and Libertarians simply represent opposite sides of the same truth, and that the [Hegelian] idea of *self-determination* combines the two sides." To Dr. Martineau's question, How can an act of self-determination which admits of no choice between alternatives, and, therefore, cannot conceivably be other than it is, be an act for which the agent is to be held morally responsible, and a fit subject for praise or blame? these writers furnish no satisfactory answer. Self-condemnation and Remorse are sentiments for which their philosophy affords no rational explanation or justification. For myself I cannot but believe with Dr. Martineau that the time will come when the ethical thought, both of England and America, will endeavour to duly emphasise and not to *explain away* the most impressive and significant feature in the moral consciousness of mankind. When that day comes, and the dawning of it is probably not very far off, this chapter of Dr. Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory," and the far fuller treatment of this important subject in "A Study of Religion," will be valued as a very treasure-house of sound ethical ideas, and as an effectual means of removing the present wide-spread rupture between the philosophy of the lecture-rooms and the ethics and religion of the pulpits.

We come now to an original feature in Dr. Martineau's ethical theory, which involves some most important truths;

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but commingled with these are other ideas which are not, I think, altogether proof against critical assaults. The permanent truths, however, are the essential elements in his ethical and religious doctrine, and if the questionable factors are modified or removed, the foundations of his philosophy as a bulwark of rational Theism remain substantially unshaken. He first shows that we do not call an action of ours wrong unless we are conscious of a comparison between two motives or springs of action, and are also conscious that we have freely preferred the worst. Hence results the following canon of right and wrong: “Every action is right which in the presence of a lower principle follows a higher; and every action is wrong which in the presence of a higher principle follows a lower.” How, then, do we discover the relative ethical rank of these springs of action? Dr. Martineau maintains that “their *moral valuation* intuitively results from their *simultaneous appearance*.” When they arise together in consciousness and conflict, the mind, without any reasoning process, directly discerns which has the higher moral worth, and therefore the rightful claim upon the will. The chief aim, then, of the ethical philosopher is to investigate these springs of action and to ascertain their relative ethical rank. Dr. Martineau, accordingly, first draws up a psychological classification of the motive principles of our nature, under the four heads of Propensions, Passions, Affections, and Sentiments, and then by means of immediate intuition arranges them in their ethical order. As a preliminary, however, he makes an important division of the springs of action into two classes, — *Primary* and *Secondary*; the former including the primitive impulses and desires which have each their appropriate objects; the latter being the desires which arise for the particular *pleasures* which have been experienced in the act of realising the primary springs of action. These secondary springs of action are intuitively felt to

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be of inferior moral worth to the corresponding primaries. This part of Dr. Martineau's work abounds in instances of acute insight into human character and in original psychological analyses of great permanent value. For these the reader must turn to the work itself, and he will find the careful study of this section most rewarding. This elaborate investigation results in the following ethical arrangement of our impulses and desires:—

Lowest.

1. Secondary Passions: Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions: Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.
3. Primary Organic Propensions: Appetites.
4. Primary Animal Propensions: Spontaneous Activity.
5. Love of Gain (reflective, derivative from appetite).
6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings).
7. Primary Passions: Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.
8. Causal Energy: Love of Power, or Ambition; Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments: Love of Culture.
10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration.
11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social, with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.

Highest.

In this scale, the lowest, the Secondary Passions, are the only ones which are always inadmissible, being absolutely bad. All the others have a relative moral value. It must be admitted, I think, that this arrangement, on the

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whole, corresponds with the relative rank which the springs of action assume in the spontaneous judgments of society under the present condition of civilisation, and as such is a remarkable and valuable product and proof of Dr. Martineau's great analytical power; but as an ultimate *rationale* of the mode and results of man's ethical insight, it appears open to serious criticism.¹ In the first place it may be objected that the determination of the ethical rank of desires is not unfrequently determined by the intensity of the desire, *i. e.*, the nature and the number of the objects on which the desire is directed, and that therefore an ethical classification of desires in abstraction from their objects is not wholly practicable. But the most formidable difficulty in the way of directly applying Dr. Martineau's canon of right and wrong is that stated by Professor Sidgwick, viz., that in any moral conflict the comparison ultimately decisive is “not between the lower motives primarily conflicting, but between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which these lower motives respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end or ends of reasonable action.”² It appears that before Professor Sidgwick published his “Methods of Ethics” he courteously sent to Dr. Martineau a copy of his remarks on the ethical theory sketched by Dr. Martineau in his review of Whewell's works, and wished to know whether he had correctly interpreted Dr. Martineau's views. In reply Dr. Martineau writes:—

¹ For critical examinations of this theory, reference may be made to Professor Sidgwick's “Methods of Ethics,” Book III. Chap. VII. (“Motives or Springs of Action as Subjects of Moral Judgment”). Professor Dyde's article on “The Idiopsychological Ethics of Martineau,” “Journal of Speculative Philosophy,” Vol. XXII. p. 138. Dr. Hertz's “Ethical System of James Martineau.” Dr. Mellone's “Philosophical Criticism and Construction,” p. 355-360.

² “Methods of Ethics,” Book III. Chap. XII. 3.

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10 GORDON STREET, W. C., Oct. 10, 1874.

MY DEAR MR. SIDGWICK, — I return with many thanks both Proof and MS., which I have read with the utmost interest, and with as much care as a distracting week will allow me to concentrate upon anything.

I acknowledge, and indeed have myself felt and stated (though not in print) the difficulties attaching to the doctrine which you so effectively criticise. I do not, however, think them insuperable or so considerable as the difficulties which the doctrine removes. But I find it impossible to present my case to you with any effect, from my want of any adequate conception of your point of view, and also from the imperfect way in which I have presented my own doctrine in the Whewell paper. Without a complete restatement I could not indicate the mode in which, as it seems to me, the force of your objections is in a great measure escaped. The fundamental difference between us is, I believe, that you regard our judgment of *others'* actions as the primary moral fact, whilst I find it in judgment upon *our own*. To me there is no moral element at all in our judgment of others except so far forth as they are *ourselves over again*, and symbolise our own moral experience; and apart from this their acts would be related to us only as those of the brutes. The valuation of "Motives" I have never regarded as a method for determining the *actions* proper to pursue. I quite admit the need of objective rules for this purpose; only their application comes in, I should say, after the *Moral* problem — of the right *spring* — has been decided.

I have no objection to admit the "Moral Sentiments" themselves among the scale of possible impulses. If present, however, they cannot decide between the claims of the two competing impulses whose presence constitutes the problem; but can only add themselves on as an intensification to the felt authority of the higher.

I wish I could do more justice to your acute and careful remarks. But I write in extreme haste.

Believe me ever

Yours most sincerely,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

H. SIDGWICK, Esq.

It is to be noted that if we accept Mr. Sidgwick's account of the form of the ultimate choice made in seasons

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of *moral conflict*, and hold that the comparison is between a particular prompting to action and the felt claims of our highest moral ideal, this does not at all affect Dr. Martineau's main position. It still remains true that our motives to action are of different ethical rank; that we intuitively discern this difference, and that we are free to take sides either with the importunate craving for personal gratification or with that moral ideal which awakens our reverence and claims our obedience. The essential truth in this feature of Dr. Martineau's ethical theory, and also the modifications in that theory suggested by recent ethical thought, are thus lucidly and, I believe, accurately expressed by Dr. S. H. Mellone:—

“We retain what is deepest and truest in Dr. Martineau's system; we accept his doctrine that our ‘springs of action’—understood as consciously purposive desires—cannot be divided into two classes, the absolute right and wrong, but arrange themselves in a scale of moral worth and have various degrees therein; we recognise gratefully his insistence on the truth that every one of our ‘natural tendencies’ is ethically justified *in its proper place*, and his brief but profound interpretation of moral progress as the gradual organisation of such tendencies, high and low, and of our reflection upon them, into ‘social consensus and religion.’ We say, with Dr. Martineau, that ‘*any* knowledge with ourselves, large or small, which we may have of the superior right of one spring of action over another comes under the head of *conscience*,’ and that this is the true form of the moral judgment; but this judgment of the relative worth of our desires is not based merely on a special kind of feeling which arises when two of them meet; it is based on a comparison of their objects with what *for the time being* is taken as the supreme Ideal of life as a whole. In view of such an Ideal their organisation takes place, as the historical evolution of morality proceeds.”¹

This supreme Ideal of life rises from age to age according as, under the conditions of increasing knowledge and enlarged social experience, the philosophers and

¹ “Philosophical Criticism and Construction,” p. 358.

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prophets of mankind attain to the intuitive perception of higher and more comprehensive ethical principles. The sentiment of Reverence which Dr. Martineau describes as the supreme term in the moral hierarchy can hardly, I think, be conceived as a "spring of action" in the same sense as the other members of the scale, for it appears to be simply the emotion we feel towards the immanent Divine Presence who reveals Himself in us and to us through the Moral Ideal.¹ And as this Ideal of life ascends, a modification necessarily takes place in our estimate of the relative rank of our springs of action; and therefore it is probable that the above scale of motives drawn up by Dr. Martineau and which corresponds with his stage of ethical insight differs in important particulars from one which would have been drawn up by a pre-Stoical and pre-Christian philosopher such as Aristotle. And this, I believe, is implied in many passages of Dr. Martineau's writings.

A most luminous and fertile distinction is that drawn by Dr. Martineau between the Canon of Principles and the Canon of Consequences. It is quite possible, and indeed common, for different persons to accept the same ethical principle but to differ entirely in their method of giving practical effect to it. The same principle may prompt one man to give alms indiscriminately to beggars, and prompt another to refuse to give alms, and instead to subscribe liberally to a Charity Organisation Society. As Dr. Martineau strikingly expresses it in a private letter, "The Spring of Action selected may work itself out in any one of several different lines; *e.g.*, Social benevolence may organise a communistic or nihilistic conspiracy, or may build an Infirmary, or found a University." The perception of ethical principles is a matter of *insight*; the wise or unwise application of them is a matter of more

¹ Cf. Dr. Mellone's "Leaders of Religious Thought," p. 164.

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or less *foresight*. Hence the actual discrepancies in ethical judgment are to be traced back to either of two different sources. They may arise from the fact that an individual or a nation has made a real advance in ethical insight, has become inspired by a richer and higher moral ideal, so that lines of conduct once thought *morally indifferent* are now discerned to be *morally obligatory*. But these discrepancies are frequently of a much more superficial character, and are occasioned simply by the circumstance that people who are actuated by the same ethical principles differ greatly in practical wisdom; that is to say, in the ability to realise their ideal effectually by a proper appeal to the Canon of Consequences.

One of the most important of the chapters on Idiopsychological Ethics is that which deals with the “Nature of Moral Authority”; as, however, this subject is closely connected with the question of the relation of the Divine Personality to the human, it will be better discussed in connection with “A Study of Religion.”

Before taking leave of Dr. Martineau’s own ethical system, I will briefly refer to his treatment of difficult cases of casuistry. In his most interesting chapter on “Veracity” he justifies untruths to brigands, etc., on the ground that they have put themselves “beyond the pale of the social organism,” and that therefore as there is no “common understanding between them and the rest of society, the obligation of veracity does not extend to their case.” This solution is not, I think, wholly satisfactory. It will be of interest, however, to compare what is said in that chapter with the following letter written by Dr. Martineau to a young student who had asked his opinion on the following question: “A school-fellow, to save his mother’s life, and consequently to shield his young sisters and brothers from orphanhood, told her every day until she recovered a certain lie which injured no one. Did he

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sin?" In reply to this Dr. Martineau wrote a long letter, the important portion of which I append; and I may add that this instance is only one of numerous cases in which Dr. Martineau, out of sheer goodness of heart, took the greatest pains to meet the needs of unknown correspondents who appealed to him for intellectual help.

5 GORDON STREET, Feb. 6, 1878.

DEAR SIR, — I would gladly disengage you, if I had time and skill, from the meshes of casuistry in which you find yourself and your friend entangled. . . . It would be a long business to work out the Scale of Springs of Action and justify the relative rank which I should assign to them. But certainly the Reverence for Veracity (which is a composite, not a simple principle) would stand in it higher than the filial Affection which in the case you mention came into conflict with it; so that I cannot justify the lie, though the competition is sufficiently close to make one's judgment very lenient. In such cases, the most plausible computation of consequences is apt to be very misleading. Those which immediately impend loom large before the view; while remoter ones may be the more important. If deception was habitually practised upon sick people, the bitterness of sickness would be indefinitely increased. I believe it a true rule to say that we have nothing to do with consequences *till* we have secured the right principle in its sway. Its *inevitable* operation does not lie at our door, but remains with the Providence of the World. But its *contingent* operation, according as it is wisely or foolishly directed, comes into our problem.

Yours truly,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

It appears from this that Dr. Martineau would not have endorsed Jacobi's confession, — "I would lie like Desdemona."

I will now turn to that section of the Hetero-psychological Moralists on the refutation of whose views especially Dr. Martineau put forth all his great philosophical powers. The chapter on "Utilitarian Hedonism" is in curious contrast with his treatment of the same doctrine

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in his review of “Bentham’s Deontology,” in 1834; for in 1885 he most thoroughly exposes the fallacy of his early attempt to extract true “disinterestedness” out of Necessarianism and Utilitarianism. Bentham’s statement in the “Deontology” of his own position in regard to Intuitionism is, as Dr. Martineau shows, virtually a *reductio ad absurdum* of his doctrine.

“It is,” says Bentham, “very idle to talk about *duties*; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive; and talk about it as we may, the word will not become a rule of conduct. A man, a moralist, gets into an elbow-chair, and pours forth pompous dogmatisms about *duty* and *duties*. Why is he not listened to? because every man is thinking about interests. It is a part of his very nature to think about interests; and with them the well-judging moralist will find it for *his* interest to begin. Let him say what he pleases, — to interest, duty must and will be made subservient.”

Dr. Martineau’s demonstration that this view is in clear opposition to a sound analysis of psychological phænomena is powerfully confirmed by the fact, which he points out, that the two most eminent thinkers, who in recent years have defended Utilitarianism, have between them entirely surrendered Bentham’s fundamental principles. For Bentham’s system rests on two assumptions, — first, that pleasure is an adequate measure of moral obligation, and secondly, that all moral motives are traceable back to selfish desires. The first of these was virtually given up by Mr. J. S. Mill, when he maintained that there are such *qualitative* differences in pleasure that no amount of a lower pleasure can be regarded as equivalent in value to even a small amount of the higher sort; for this clearly confesses that it is not the pleasure but the principle with which the pleasure is connected that really decides the right or wrong of conduct. And, on the other hand, Prof. H. Sidgwick, by his contention that the idea of “ought” or “duty” is quite ultimate or unanalysable, has shown that

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in his view Utilitarianism cannot be made to rest upon an egoistic basis.

But the pre-Darwinian form of the doctrine of Hedonism is now rapidly losing its interest, and it is to Dr. Martineau's exposition and criticism of what he terms "Hedonism with Evolution" that students of ethics will most eagerly turn. The vague and unverified potency ascribed to Heredity by writers of this school makes the controversy with them somewhat unsatisfactory to a thinker like Dr. Martineau, with his almost Greek passion for clear definition. He thus contrasts, in semi-humorous words, his old intellectual opponents with these new-fashioned experientialists with whom, in the interests of his own firm Theistic faith, he feels called upon to do battle:—

"The masculine egoistic Hedonism of Hobbes and Helvetius boldly appealed for confirmation to the clear inward experience of men and women who could confirm or contradict them. To escape their paradoxes, their modern followers take refuge from this strong light in an earlier twilight, where nobody can tell exactly what goes on; and the extreme fondness which they show for tossing about psychological babies, and wringing from them *ambiguas voces* about how they feel, is natural, in proportion as their doctrine is hard to prove. And if the confessional of each single life has this blank prelude, how much more completely hid from view must be the inward autobiography, not of acknowledged ancestors merely, but of pre-existent races, that grin and set their teeth at their descendants from the walls of a museum? By spinning out your process indefinitely, you gain time enough for anything to take place, but too much for anything to be seen; in the very act of creating the evidence, you hide it all away; and the real result is, that you make the story what you please, and no one can put it to the test. If Hobbes, as often happens, gives us a piece of droll psychology, everyone who knows himself can tell whether it is true or false, and lay his finger on any distortion it contains. If Darwin describes the inward conflict of an extinct baboon, he paints a fancy picture of what remains for ever without witness."¹

¹ Vol. II. p. 365.

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Of the powerful course of argument by which Dr. Martineau rebuts the claim which the evolutionist makes to have explained the genesis of moral ideas and sentiments out of previous unmoral conditions, I can, in this brief chapter, only present the slightest outline. The mere establishment of the fact that certain higher modes of existence very gradually emerge from and succeed lower modes in no way proves that the lower modes have in themselves any competency to give rise to the higher ones.

Most of the critics of Mr. Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy" commence by asking him how he explains the origin of organic forms out of previous inorganic substances. Mr. Spencer naturally objects to this *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, and points out that we are already acquainted with physical changes which are in some degree analogous with this passage from the inorganic to the organic world. He also explains that the part of his philosophy that should deal with this problem has not been published. Dr. Martineau has evidently on this point some sympathy with Mr. Spencer, for when he sets forth the "Hitches in the Evolutionary Deduction," which he declares to be inexplicable in the absence of some new metaphysical causality, he does not begin with the incoming of *organism* upon the planet, but with the incoming of *feeling* or *consciousness*. He maintains, it is true, that throughout the whole course of evolution we must assume a constant metaphysical causality; but it is clear that he finds the incontestable proofs of that causality in these striking innovations which he distinguishes as "Hitches."

"My argument," he says, "affirms the general proposition, that evolution consists in the perpetual emergence of *something new which is an increment of being* upon its prior term, and therefore more than its equivalent, and entitled to equal confidence and higher rank. This, however, though holding good throughout, has an exceptionally forcible validity at certain stages of the evolution, on which it is desirable

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to pause. Though all the differences evolved are something new, and may fall upon an observer's mere perception as equally new, yet, when scrutinised by reason, some may prove to be, like an unsuspected property of a geometrical figure, only a new grouping of data and relations already in hand." ¹

Dr. Martineau, accordingly, thinks it just conceivable that chemical atomic forces may not only be equal to depositing a crystal, but also "to the weaving of the tissue of the plant, or storing up a future for it in its seed." But be it as it may with regard to unconscious organic life, there can be no doubt that the appearance of Feeling presents a clear case of a new beginning.

"Once equipped," says Dr. Martineau, "with this new departure, the evolutionist may resume his continuous course and pursue it far without pause or hitch; only that now he advances along the line, not of physical, but of mental laws, and transfers himself for guidance from the naturalist to the psychologist. . . . So long as the thinking process is traced onward to more and more elaborate forms, as in a continuous direction, there is nothing to stop the way from the 'long-eared quadruped' to Shakespeare." ²

When, however, psychical evolution reaches the point when the conscious human being becomes capable of discerning the difference between Right and Wrong and of exercising choice in regard to them, "we are introduced to the consciousness of Free-will and the dawn of the Moral idea; of which, I venture to say, the prior psychology can no more give an admissible account than can the laws of matter and motion, in their physiological application, give an account of simple consciousness." ³

I sometimes asked Dr. Martineau whether these new features which successively present themselves in the course of evolution may not be conceived as latent or *potentially* existent in the lower forms of life; and that just as moral and religious ideas are only potentially present in

¹ Vol. II. p. 393.

² *Ib.*, p. 396.

³ *Ib.*, p. 397.

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the infant, so the specially human faculties, including even the freedom of the will, may not be dormant in the anthropoid ape, and only await the needful conditions for their awakening in consciousness. If so, there may, after all, be some element of truth in that well-known remark of Professor Tyndall's about “matter” which created such excitement in theological circles. I could not myself see that Dr. Martineau's main argument would be at all weakened by the acceptance of this doctrine of “potentiality”; provided that we maintain as Lotze does that the Eternal Spirit is immanent in and active in all the elementary constituents of the universe. It should be added, however, that Lotze agreed with Dr. Martineau in regarding each human soul as involving a new act of Divine creation. Dr. Martineau in reply explained the cogent reasons which led him to strongly dissent from the idea of the “potential” presence of higher capabilities in the lower stages of evolution. In this he appears to be supported by Dr. A. R. Wallace, the co-discoverer of the “origin of species,” and the following quotations from that writer's very able work on “Darwinism,” which appeared five years after the “Types of Ethical Theory,” afford a remarkable confirmation, from an eminent scientific authority, of Dr. Martineau's view of the new *increments of being* which successively emerge in the process of development. The only difference between the two writers is that Dr. Wallace sees an essential “hitch” in the passage from the inorganic to the organic, while Dr. Martineau, as we have seen, expresses himself as uncertain on this point:—

“It will, no doubt,” says Dr. Wallace, “be urged that the admitted continuity of man's progress from the brute does not admit of the introduction of new causes, and that we have no evidence of the sudden change of nature which such introduction would bring about. The fallacy as to new causes involving any breach of continuity, or any sudden or abrupt change in the effects, has already been shown; but we will

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further point out that there are at least *three stages in the development of the organic world when some new cause or power must necessarily have come into action.*

"The first stage is from inorganic to organic, when the earliest vegetable cell, or the living protoplasm out of which it arose, first appeared. . . . Here we have indications of *a new power at work, which we may term vitality*, since it gives to certain forms of matter all those characters and properties which constitute Life. The next stage is still more marvellous, *still more completely beyond all possibility of explanation by matter, its laws and forces.* It is the introduction of sensation or consciousness, constituting the fundamental distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms. . . . The third stage is, as we have seen, the existence in man of a number of his most characteristic and noblest faculties,—those which raise him furthest above the brutes and open up possibilities of almost indefinite advancement. *These faculties could not possibly have been developed by means of the same laws which have determined the progressive development of the organic world in general, and also of man's physical organism.* These three distinct stages of progress from the inorganic world of matter and motion up to man point clearly to an unseen universe,—to a world of spirit, to which the world of matter is altogether subordinate."¹

Dr. Martineau, having reached by a somewhat different route the same conclusion as Dr. Wallace's, viz., that Mr. Spencer's endeavour to find the source of man's moral intuitions in the merely animal consciousness is entirely unsuccessful, then proceeds, in one of the most profound and richly suggestive sections of his work, to explain how, in virtue of the presence of the universal principles of reason and morality in all men, "Conscience develops into Social Consensus and Religion." Inspired by the authoritative ethical ideal a man comes to feel that the moral claims of society on him are but another form of the claims of his own higher nature on himself; he feels "that the public interest that pleads with him is *his* interest too; the society that withstands him is *his* society: it

¹ "Darwinism," p. 463-476.

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is no foreign and intrusive power that confronts and stops the madness of his pleasure or his passion, but his own share of an altruistic zeal and love that throb in other hearts as well.” Nor does the moral evolution stop “when it has moulded into form the existing average of ethical sympathy.” Through the mouths of Reformers and Prophets an ideal is revealed which transcends the actual, and thus arises the conception of “a Kingdom of God in which at last wrong shall wear itself out and the energies of life shall be harmonised and its affections perfected. Under this aspect it is, that the moral evolution of Society, unable to rest in the *State*, aspires to transcend it in the *Church*. . . . The ever-widening conscience of faithful men feels in allegiance bound to nothing short of this; it cannot but pass on from Ethics to Religion.”¹

¹ “Types of Ethical Theory,” Vol. II. p. 403-405.

Chapter VII

"A STUDY OF RELIGION"

To bring into clear relief the essential truths which are enunciated in "A Study of Religion," it is desirable first to exhibit the resemblances and the differences between Dr. Martineau's philosophy of religion and the other forms of philosophical and religious thought which at the present time are also influential in many minds. It is clear that we are now living amid a fermentation of ideas on this subject such as always precedes a new birth in metaphysical and theological conceptions. The three philosophical systems which appear most likely to contribute important factors to that philosophy of religion which is now taking shape, and which will dominate the theological thought of the next hundred years, are the systems of Hegel, of Lotze, and of James Martineau. The permanent element in religious thought which German Idealism came into the world to furnish is already deeply imbibed, and is operative both in general and in philosophical literature. That element may be described as the recognition of the eternal presence and self-revelation of God in the human consciousness. As a complete system, Hegelianism has proved its inadequacy to interpret and satisfy the moral and religious nature of man. It has lost its hold on the pulpits of Germany, and it will ere long, no doubt, experience the same fate in America. The Determinism which belongs to its very essence is incompatible with the ideas of sin, repentance, and true moral responsibility; and in reference to personal Immortality it furnishes no substantial grounds

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for hope. But the other two systems are full of promise for the future of religious thought; and, if I mistake not, the philosophy of religion of the twentieth century will combine and harmonise eternal truths which are enshrined in Martineau's “Study of Religion” and Lotze's “Microcosmus.” That Dr. Martineau was well aware of this affinity between his philosophy and Lotze's, and that he believed the two systems would co-operate and at length blend in the coming philosophy of religion, can be clearly shown by an extract from a letter written by him, in 1892, to the Rev. A. W. Jackson. After speaking in terms of warm appreciation of Prof. Henry Jones's book on “Browning as a Philosopher and Thinker,” Dr. Martineau continues:

“I incline to augur from it that Jones will perhaps work himself clear of Hegelianism in the process of teaching and applying it. There are signs, at least, of a consciousness of what it cannot achieve. In that case he would only be following the course of the two brothers Seth, — Andrew, Professor at Edinburgh, and James, Professor at Dalhousie College, Halifax, the author of an excellent pamphlet, ‘Freedom as Ethical Postulate,’ in which he insists on the fact of *Personality* as irresolvable by any phænomenal or mechanical theory of causation. Under the pressure of the same difficulty the younger brother, Andrew, had previously renounced his College creed and justified the change in his little book ‘Hegelianism and Personality.’ Both these publications are well worth study; they are probably the first symptoms of a turn in the philosophical tide; the authors are eminently able and earnest thinkers, well furnished for their work. Of the German conductors out of the Hegelian *impasse*, Lotze is the most satisfactory known to me, and Mr. Bosanquet has now made his writings accessible in English, except, indeed, his ‘*Mikrokosmos*’ [now also admirably translated], the only one of which I can personally speak.”

That Dr. Martineau was not mistaken in his anticipation of a coming turn in the philosophical tide is made probable from the fact that in Oxford, the chief centre of British Hegelianism, the eminent scholar and preacher

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Dr. Hastings Rashdall, of New College, whose work on "Doctrine and Development" exhibits close affinity with Dr. Martineau's philosophical views, says in "The Journal of Theological Studies" for January, 1902, p. 186:—

"It is a pity that the philosophical equipment of so many of our thoughtful theologians should often be rather a slight tincture of Hegelianism than a serious study of the one original modern thinker of the very highest rank, whose thought is profoundly and without qualification Christian,—Hermann Lotze."

In conversation Dr. Martineau, during the last few years of his life, expressed his conviction that Prof. Andrew Seth (now Pringle-Pattison) and his brother James (now Andrew's colleague in the University of Edinburgh) would more and more influence for good the religious and theological ideas in this country; and he thought very highly both of "Man's Place in the Cosmos," by Andrew, and of "A Study of Ethical Principles," by James Seth. He also expected that Prof. James Ward, of Cambridge, would do good work in the same direction. It is noticeable that all these thinkers are more or less disciples of Lotze.

Before, then, attempting an outline of the leading ideas in Dr. Martineau's great work, I will briefly indicate the chief distinction between his system and that of Lotze; but I should premise that the distinction is much more in outward form than in inward spirit. Both writers reach the same "Belief in an Ever-living God, that is, of a Divine Mind and Will, ruling the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind," though perhaps there may be, as I shall presently explain, a certain difference in breadth and depth between Dr. Martineau's conception of a "Divine Mind and Will" and Lotze's conception of "The Perfect Personality of God." The most important distinction between these two philosophers of religion is

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indicated by the fact that one would call himself a Monist, and the other declares himself a Dualist. In treating of Prof. S. S. Laurie's work “*Metaphysica Nova at Vetusta*,” of which the second title is “*A Return to Dualism*,” Dr. Martineau says:—

“I perceive from his second title that I have the honour to stand beside him in the forlorn hope against which all the batteries of modern philosophy are concentrating their fire.”¹

In terming himself a Dualist, Dr. Martineau no doubt refers to his belief in the eternal existence of Space and, possibly, of Matter in independence of God.

Now if Lotze's Monism were pantheistic Monism, such as Hegelianism is, there could be no close affinity between his philosophy of religion and that of Dr. Martineau. But spiritualistic Monists fall into two classes, which, in reference to ethics and religion, differ essentially from one another. The Hegelians are not only Monists, but their Monism is of a sort which does not admit the existence in man of a personality and will in any way distinct from, and independent of, God's being and causality. Lotze, on the other hand, and those who side with him, though they are Monists, inasmuch as they believe that there is only one substance in the Universe, viz., Spiritual Life and Energy, yet at the same time believe that the Eternal God, who by the partial differentiation of his own essential being calls into existence the world of nature and humanity, has also, while remaining immanent in all his creatures, given to these finite and dependent existences in progressive degrees a real selfhood; which selfhood culminates in that self-consciousness and moral freedom in man which enables him both to know and even to resist God.²

¹ Vol. I. p. 169.

² This relation between Dualism and the two forms of Monism is lucidly expressed in the following extract from a recent essay on “*Die gegenwärtigen*”

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According to this view, God is immanent and active both in the inorganic and in the organic world; and in the latter He, without the animal's consciousness of the purpose, controls and directs its instinctive life. And when, as Prof. John Fiske has so well explained, physical evolution reaches its acme and the all-important and unending process of psychical evolution takes its place, then for the first time the Creator begins to take the creature into His intimate confidence; and in man's rational, æsthetic, moral, and spiritual nature makes an immediate but progressive revelation of His own presence and His own character. In so doing He confers on man that real freedom of will which enables him to enter into genuine moral and personal relations with the Father within him. It necessarily follows from this view that the most direct and satisfactory evidence of the existence and character of God is the intuition and moral evidence, and that the cosmological and teleological arguments, immensely valuable as they are, only serve to confirm this immediate intuitive insight into God's essential being, and to harmonise that insight with man's scientific knowledge of the phænomena of the cosmos.¹ Hence is it, as Dr.

Richtungen der Religionsphilosophie in England," by Newton H. Marshall (Berlin, 1902): "Bradley erklärte den Gedanken des Selbst für eine Illusion, für blosser Erscheinung. Er ist sowohl erkenntnistheoretisch als metaphysisch ein Monist, und in dieser Beziehung vertritt er konsequent den objectiven Idealismus. Martineau im Gegentheil ist sowohl erkenntnistheoretisch als metaphysisch ein Dualist und behauptet, dass der Pantheist nach seinem eigenem Kriterium des Wissens keinen festen Grund unter den Füßen hat. 'Du kannst dich selbst nicht einen Pantheisten nennen, ohne in einen Widerspruch zu gerathen.'" ("A Study of Religion," Band II. S. 137.) This writer then explains that Lotze and his followers occupy an intermediate position, being Monists in their metaphysics, but Dualists in their views on epistemology and causations (p. 95).

¹ Cf. Prof. William Knight's admirable article on "Theism: Desiderata in the Theistic Argument," "British Quarterly Review" for July, 1871, in which Professor Knight contends that Theism is most securely based on the soul's direct intuition of the self-revealing God. In writing to Professor Knight on July 11, 1871, Dr. Martineau says: "I am greatly obliged by the opportunity of reading your very interesting and searching article in the 'British

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Martineau often pointed out, that man is religious long before he is philosophical. It is owing to this circumstance that the views of Dr. Martineau concerning the mode of God's action in the physical cosmos, interesting and important as they are to the metaphysical student, do not, I venture to think, exert the same convincing force as do those immortal utterances of his, as profound in meaning as they are divinely eloquent, in which he speaks with the firm conviction of felt personal communion with the indwelling God. Such experiences as these have an ethical and also a spiritual character; and in both respects (but especially in the former) Dr. Martineau's writings are instinct with truth and reality; they nerve the reader for nobler moral effort, and at the same time respond to and satisfy the mystic longings of his soul.

One of the most important chapters in the Idiopsychological section of the “Types of Ethical Theory” is that in which Dr. Martineau examines the various accounts which have been given of the “Nature of Moral Authority”; and after rejecting as unsatisfactory both the Hedonist and the Hegelian interpretations says:—

“If the sense of authority means anything, it means the discernment of something *higher than we*, having claims on our

Quarterly.’ With its constructive part I find myself in entire accordance; unless it be that I should hesitate as a matter of form to treat the apprehension of God as an immediate intuition. Rather does it seem to me the necessary interpretation of two or three confluent intuitions,—of Causality, of Obligation, of Beauty,—of which it finds the unity and repose. This is rather a difference of *statement* than of *thought*; and I do not know that there is anything to choose between the two modes of putting the case. But I fancy that the recognition of a plurality of sources enables us to give a better account of the broken lights of faith which gleam upon us in imperfect religions, short of the vision of the Living God.” In like manner, in a letter to Mr. R. H. Hutton, which has been given in full in the fourth chapter, Dr. Martineau writes: “I have never regarded what is called religious philosophy as anything but the attempt of the human mind to construe to itself as it best can the Divine Facts and Realities which anyhow enter the conscious life of Humanity.” Cf. Dr. F. H. Hedge's “Ways of the Spirit” (p. 186-209); also Emerson's essay on the “Over-Soul.”

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self, — therefore no mere part of it, — hovering over and transcending our personality, though also mingling with our consciousness and manifested through its intimations. If I rightly interpret this sentiment, I cannot therefore stop within my own limits, but am irresistibly carried on to the recognition of another than I. Nor does that 'other' remain without further witness; the predicate 'higher than I' takes me yet a step beyond; for what am I? A *person*; 'higher' than whom no 'thing' assuredly—no mere phænomenon—can be; but only *another Person*, greater and higher and of deeper insight."¹

Now Lotze would probably have accepted this interpretation, but he would have further explained that an important distinction must be made between the personality of God and that of man. The word "person" as applied to man indicates a finite and dependent being in whose rational and moral nature God reveals Himself. It is evident that the word cannot, with this limitation attaching to it, be adequate to express our idea of God. Man does not feel himself to be a self-existent being; in the depths of his inner life he becomes aware that he is dependent for his existence on the Absolute or Self-Existent One. He is conscious, too, that the faculties of his personality are all limited. Man's individual being accordingly must be conceived as essentially imperfect; it cannot fully attain unto the ideal of personality. God must understand,—what man cannot understand,—viz., the ground of His own being; and further in God's nature all our progressive Ideals are completed, and are no longer ideal but eternally Real. God, therefore, is the One Perfect Personality; all human personalities are intrinsically defective, and they can only by degrees assimilate their character to the perfection of the self-revealing God.²

Though Dr. Martineau has not, I think, expressly dealt with this question, there is good reason to believe that he

¹ "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II. p. 104.

² Cf. Lotze's "Microcosmus," Book IX. Chap. IV.

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would not have recognised any essential difference between Lotze's view and his own; and that both philosophers would agree that it is to a fainter or more vivid apprehension of the immanence and self-revelation of the Perfect Personality of God in the human soul that the consciousness of Moral Authority is due.

There is one rather important question on which the views of Dr. Martineau and those of Lotze appear to be really at variance, — the question, I mean, of the objective reality of Space. By Lotze's disciples Space is generally regarded not as objectively real, but as a symbolic representation in human minds of the mode in which the several dynamic, or noumenal, existences which constitute the universe are related to and act upon each other. There can be little doubt, I think, that the doctrine of real Space existing independently of God, in which He is omnipresent and ever putting forth volitional energies, is a perplexing feature in Dr. Martineau's cosmical philosophy. The existence, too, of the Soul in Space is hardly, I think, realisable in thought. In a letter written to Rev. R. A. Armstrong, in 1888, Dr. Martineau says:—

“I am obliged to confess outright that to me Space is the condition of *all* existence; not of *body* only, which shares its dimensions, but of *Soul* also, which, in being a cognitive subject, must have its *objects*, and in its consciousness of a Self must live in antithesis to another than self. I cannot affect to rise above the ‘common consciousness’ in this matter.”

On this statement Mr. Armstrong makes the following comment:—

“For my own part, I can as little think of Soul as conditioned by Space as of Body not so conditioned.”

The question, however, is whether either the Soul or the spiritual principles which constitute the Body can appropriately be said to exist in Space; and for myself, I feel

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convinced that we must either agree with Dr. Martineau that both Soul and Body are in Space, or hold with Kant and Lotze that the idea of existence in Space is not applicable either to the human soul or to any other noumenal reality.

Probably, however, Mr. Armstrong, in the above remark, refers only to the *phænomenal manifestations* of the elements of Body to our perceptive faculty; but it must be remembered that, as Dr. Martineau has conclusively shown, when Spirit, too, *manifests itself* in the physical realm, its manifestations also can only be *spatially* perceived.

Having thus briefly indicated the relation of Dr. Martineau's philosophy to the other living philosophy of religion, which he regarded as most akin to his own, I turn now to the two volumes in which he embodied his ripest thought on the foundations of religious belief. "A Study of Religion" opens with an Introduction which is certainly not the least valuable part of the work. It discusses the two fundamental questions, What is Religion? and Why Ethics before Religion? The answer to the first of these questions reveals one of the most essential and effective principles of Dr. Martineau's philosophy, the eloquent expression of which, in his writings, has already done eminent service to contemporary thought, and cannot fail to exert powerful influence in the future; for it is a principle which lies at the very basis of all genuine and powerful religion.

Dr. Martineau first points out that it has become customary to water down the meaning of the term "Religion" to a degree which empties it entirely of every idea of personal and moral relationship between the human soul and God. In Sir John Seeley's brilliant volume on "Natural Religion," we are told that in the conception of Religion formed by the man of Science, for whom the cosmos is

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all in all, “ the word ‘ God ’ is only a synonym for ‘ Nature ’ ”; that in the field of nature “ he feels himself to stand in the presence of an infinite and eternal being,” nay, a “ divine being ”; so that “ he is as truly a theist as he who bends down in prayer.” Sir John Seeley defines “ Religion ” as “ Habitual and permanent admiration ”; thus every form of enthusiasm, be it of Science, of Art, or of Morals, suffices as a basis on which to found a claim to the use of this august word. In like manner the founder of Positivism, seeing the great value for ethical purposes of the idea of a personality behind the phenomena of nature, to give them unity and to kindle warmth of interest in the universe, suggested that, though as a matter of fact there is no evidence of the existence of such a personality, nevertheless the *idea* of such a being might be cherished in the form of *poetry*; and he maintained that in this way poetry might give us, by way of the imagination, an adequate equivalent for the theistic ideas which science and philosophy had banished from the region of the Real. In the same spirit Friedrich Lange, in his able “ History of Materialism,” endeavours to show that it has not been *truth*, but *illusions*, which have kindled spiritual enthusiasm and founded the great religions of the world. But Lange fails to see that even when religious enthusiasm was kindled by superstitions which were not consistent with the highest culture of the age in which they arose, nevertheless the beliefs which kindled this religious fervour were regarded by the believers themselves as *in complete accord with Reality*; and that the moment people began to see that the objects of their belief have no other existence than in the imagination, the religious movement at once collapses. As Heinrich Lang of Zürich replied to Lange: —

“ Religions have ever fallen when people no longer believe in them, that is, have come to see that their doctrines are only

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poems and not truth. Poems hold their own if they æsthetically satisfy; religions fall if they are no longer believed in."

Dr. Martineau, in that most powerful College Address, in 1879, on "Ideal Substitutes for God," administered a very keen, but very necessary, criticism to this enfeebling tendency of over-refined culture to substitute emotions awakened by merely subjective ideas for genuine reverence directed upon metaphysical and spiritual reality. In the present work he again teaches in eloquent and impressive words the same all-important lesson:—

"Amid all the sickly talk about 'ideals,' which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that, so long as they are dreams of future possibility, and not faiths in present realities, so long as they are mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, and not its personal surrender to immediate communion with an Infinite Perfection, they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles, gay in the sunshine, and broken by the passing wind. You do not so much as touch the threshold of religion, so long as you are detained by the phantoms of your thought; the very gate of entrance to it, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real; no transient brush of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls; short of this there is *no object* given you, and you have not even reached the specific point of '*admiration*.' Within the limits of pure sincerity no one can *worship* either a nature beneath him or an idea within him; however big may be the one, though it comprise all forces and all stars, if that be all, it will be venerable to no spirit that can comprehend it; and however fine may be the other, if it be but a dreamer's image, a phenomenon of perishable consciousness, it can never be more than the personality that has it, so as to make him its suppliant."¹

In answer to the second question, — Why Ethics before Religion?—Dr. Martineau shows that the ethical consciousness reveals the presence of an authority that is in us but not of us, and which we spontaneously feel has a right to

¹ Vol. I. p. 12.

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govern us. We may with unquestioning and childlike trust simply reverence and obey this authority; or we may, and, indeed, sooner or later we must, begin to think about it; then, according to the spirit in which we study this experience, our spontaneous trust will pass either into divine insight, and thus rise into that true religious sentiment in which the source of the authority becomes an object of worship; or if we apply to it simply the critical understanding, its sacred character may be explained away and we may come to believe that the consciousness of its divine authority which once possessed us was an illusion, and that in reality there was nothing more than our own disguised self-interest, or else the reflection upon us of the sentiments of the society around us. Hence as Dr. Martineau tersely expresses it:—

“Ethics must either perfect itself in Religion, or disintegrate itself into Hedonism; and there is an inevitable gravitation in all anti-theological thinkers to the ‘greatest happiness’ principle.”

As the deepest and truest religion thus springs out of and is founded on moral experience, it was logically necessary that the study of “Ethical Theories” should precede the study of “Religion.” The development of the ethical consciousness as described in this introductory chapter is of the deepest interest, and well deserves most careful study. Dr. Martineau shows, for instance, how it naturally leads to a faith in personal immortality; for

“if the moral relations revealed in our consciousness are ectypal miniatures of eternal realities in God, it is impossible not to raise the question of their duration in us; for there is something incongruous in supposing that a communion on our part with an eternal being, in respect of eternal verities central to his essence, should have just begun to know itself for what it is, and then be extinguished.”¹

¹ Vol. I. p. 29.

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Now, leaving the Introduction, we find that the rest of the work falls naturally into four divisions. The First Book is an epistemological treatise, — that is to say, a study of the nature and limits of human intelligence, — with a view to ascertain whether man's cognitive faculties admit him to any real and satisfactory insight into the nature of God.

The Second Book constitutes the substance of the work, for it establishes the two main principles on which Dr. Martineau's "Ethical Theism" is built. The first chapter of this book treats of "God as Cause," and reaches, through the examination of the idea of Causality, the conclusion that God is the Eternal Will on whom the natural world depends for its existence. It is then shown, by an appeal to the evidences of design in natural phænomena, that the actual facts of the universe abundantly confirm the theory of its origination in purposive personal volition. In the second chapter (with which the second volume opens) is established what is, after all, the chief indestructible foundation of Ethical Religion, viz., the immediate evidence through the conscience that the soul is dependent on and inspired by a Being in whose nature all conceivable moral perfections are realised. As then, the Power, which limits our activity in the outer world, must proceed from the same source as the Authority which we recognise in our inner life; the Metaphysics of the first chapter and the Ethics of the second converge to one centre and together establish the fundamental principle of Theism, viz., "Belief in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind." The third chapter of this second book concludes the grand Theistic Argument by adducing clear evidence to prove that the Moral character of God as progressively revealed in man's ethical ideals is not at variance with the manifestation of His Causality as exhibited in the phænomena of the visible universe.

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The Third Book reviews the philosophical theories which are, in Dr. Martineau's view, incompatible with the foregoing doctrine of Theism; and the work concludes with a statement of the rational grounds of Personal Immortality.

This brief summary will, perhaps, enable the reader to grasp the dominant idea which unifies the work, and to see how the various lines of argument concur to establish and justify the central principle of all religious belief. To turn now to the examination of the several books; my opening remark will not seem a very encouraging one, for it is that the book which is first in order is also the hardest to thoroughly comprehend. The Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology) is now engaging the attention of some of the ablest of living thinkers. The successful handling of this subject requires great power of psychological analysis, keen subtlety of thought, and, it may be added, the deepest ethical and spiritual experience of personal relationship and communion with the immanent Eternal One. In Dr. Martineau's gifted and deeply religious soul these high qualifications were happily combined, and the result is a really valuable contribution to our insight into this profound subject. Still it is difficult reading, and if the thorough mastery of this book were absolutely indispensable to the clear comprehension of the other three, the average reader would, in most cases, be excluded from participation in the feast of reason which “divine philosophy” has here provided. If Dr. Martineau's epistemology resembled that of Hegel and resulted in what Sir William Hamilton describes as the Hegelian paradox “that the world of Common Sense and the world of Philosophy are, to each other, worlds upside down,”¹ certainly this “Study of Religion” would be, what much of Hegel's writing is, a sealed book save to the few initiated spirits.

¹ “Hamilton's Edition of Reid,” p. 797.

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Fortunately, however, the result of Dr. Martineau's investigations into the limits of human knowledge is quite different from the above. He reaches the conclusion that the judgments of Common Sense are, in the main, perfectly reliable; and therefore though the careful study of this book will give the reader more intelligent insight into what is involved in our ordinary judgments about the external world, about our own causality, about the exercise of our freedom of choice in moments of temptation, and our sentiment of dependence on and communion with the Father within us, it will not make any essential change in the conclusions which spontaneously suggest themselves to the unsophisticated mind.

But while inability to fully comprehend Book I. will not disqualify the reader for a fair understanding of the rest of the work, a thorough grasp of it will be of essential service to those persons who have dipped enough into current scientific speculations to become agnostic, but have not penetrated to the deeper philosophy which restores and clarifies the intellectual and spiritual vision of the soul. To thinkers in this unsatisfactory condition this profoundly thoughtful discussion opens a way of escape from mental darkness to where the light is gleaming.

Since, then, Dr. Martineau's epistemology promises effectual relief from the prevalent Agnosticism, and since also it lies at the foundation of all his philosophising, it is necessary to dwell at some length on the principles established in this somewhat abstruse section of the work. Nearly all recent philosophical thought, be it idealistic or realistic, has one feature in common, viz., that it denies all positive insight into anything else than the mere flow of phænomena. Dr. Martineau submits to keen examination the British empirical idealism of Hume and the two Mills, the philosophy of Kant and the German idealistic systems which sprang out of that philosophy, the

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pessimistic systems of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, and the worship of “the Unknowable,” as presented in Mr. Spencer’s writings, and he finds that one and all, though in varying ways, either deny the possibility of any knowledge that God is personal or the possession of moral freedom by man. But as both of these principles are absolutely essential to real worship and to the recognition of moral and spiritual relations between the Soul and God, this condition of things cannot be passively acquiesced in by earnest thinkers of this or any other time; and Dr. Martineau only echoes the deepest sentiments of the noblest souls when he says:—

“This despair of religious knowledge must be encountered at the outset; for if it be well founded every step of advance can only take us farther astray; and if it be unfounded it leaves us, like a victim of the black art, imprisoned within a magic circle which, though needing but a breath to blow it away, we cannot pass; in a world whose chief relations are cut off in the midst and quenched in fatal darkness; with mind adjusted to the finite, as if that were all, and heart that has no ideal except what is not real, with a clinging sense of dependence, and nothing but necessity to depend upon. We cannot afford either to enter a Paradise of fools or to miss any Heaven of the wise, and must pause and guard our steps where the ways divide.”¹

Historians of philosophy admit that almost all the recent philosophical speculations and theories have sprung out of the original thought of Hume on the one hand, or of Kant on the other; and Kant himself has told us that he was awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by the startling nature of Hume’s plausible resolution of the relation of Cause and Effect into a mere time-relation of succession among sensible phænomena. Kant, on reflection, rightly judged that there was a *necessary* relation between causes and their

¹ Vol. I. p. 36.

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effects, and that as the senses perceive no such relation, there must be in our experience something which is contributed by the thinking mind itself. In this, argues Dr. Martineau, Kant was entirely right; the analysis of our experience reveals that knowledge of the universe has two distinct sources, — the *senses*, which give us insight into the order of phænomena, and the *intuitions of the mind* through which we become acquainted with the metaphysical causes, or noumena, to whose activity phænomena are due. The criterion of the phænomenal side of knowledge is its conformity with the deliverance of our senses; the criterion of the metaphysical side is its conformity with the primary intuitions of the mind. Neither of these criteria can be substituted for the other; each is authoritative in respect to those aspects of reality which belong to its own province. If, then, Kant was right in recognising these two distinct features in our experience, where did he go astray? It would be difficult, I think, to find in any philosophical work a more striking instance of acuteness and clear insight than that exhibited by Dr. Martineau in exposing Kant's basal error.

Kant had been started on his career of original thought by his consciousness of the unsatisfactory character of that account of Cause which made it merely a *contingent* relation between phænomena. He felt sure that it was a *necessary* relation, but, still, he accepted Hume's idea that it was no more than a *relation between phænomena*. He overlooked the fact that the essence of the idea involves *metaphysical reality and activity*, the notion of Cause being derived, as Dr. Martineau, Sir John Herschel, and a host of other psychologists and savants have pointed out, from our consciousness of personal volition and effort. Hence no study of phænomenal effects could ever give us an adequate account of Causation. Kant, having arrived at the conclusion that the human mind im-

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poses the idea of Space upon all its sensations, maintained that by the study of the relations between these spatial phænomena all the causality involved could be ascertained. Dr. Martineau, with very good reason, contends that Kant gives an erroneous account of the genesis of this intuition of Space. According to Dr. Martineau the experience of *passive* sensations would not awaken this idea, for it presents itself for the first time on the occasion of our putting forth causal activity, and feeling that our activity is checked by opposing energies. Hence, in his view, the experience of Causation is prior to the idea of Space. He contends, therefore, that Kant's method of explaining physical Causation as simply a necessary thought relation between spatial phænomena is utterly at variance with the psychological origin both of the idea of Cause and of that of Space. Dr. Martineau's epistemology, accordingly, recalls the word “Cause” to its original meaning of a metaphysical activity; and he shows that, although all study of reality involves the study of phænomena (for noumenal entities and their phænomenal effects are inseparable), we must so explain the world of phænomena, which the senses reveal, as not to violate the primitive intuitions of the mind. These intuitions assure us of our personal causality; they assure us also of our moral freedom; and, therefore, no inferences drawn from phænomenal sequences, whether in the physical or the psychical sphere, can avail to overrule these ultimate pronouncements of our rational and moral nature. If, says Dr. Martineau, we cannot *prove* the truth of these intuitions as we can prove scientific laws, we nevertheless accept them as authenticated by the very constitution of our minds. Thus does Dr. Martineau's epistemology vindicate the true causality and the moral freedom of the human will; and we shall find that in Book II. he proceeds to extend this idea of causal volition till it covers and explains the nature

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and the activity of the Eternal Cause and Ground of the universe.

Having thus justified belief in the reality of the external world as an aggregate of metaphysical causes which limit and resist our volitional activity, Dr. Martineau turns to the consideration of the idea of Space, and he accepts (what many eminent psychologists now decline to do) the Kantian account of its intuitional origin. But while Kant argues that, as we cannot help perceiving things as in Space, therefore the Space-idea is probably only a *subjective* form, or necessity of our human thinking; Dr. Martineau, on the contrary, maintains that the very circumstance that we cannot think Space away is a valid reason for believing that it exists objectively there. While Dr. Martineau has clearly established that there are mental intuitions, such as the idea of our own causality and of the metaphysical reality of the universe, which cannot reasonably be impugned, it may be questioned, I think, whether the belief that Space is an objective reality falls into this category. And I mention this, because, as I have said in a previous chapter, Dr. Martineau did not regard this belief as absolutely essential to the stability of his philosophy of religion.

The last section of the Epistemology deals with the fundamental question of "The Relativity of Human Knowledge." It contains a most forcible criticism and refutation of the now prevalent doctrine that "all we know is phænomena."

"If," says Dr. Martineau, "'knowledge' is to be defined to include only the phænomenal or objective term, then, of course, *noûmena* are unknown except as phænomena cognisable in our personality. . . . But none the less shall I rest and move with assured certainty upon them; and if you will not let me say '*I know them*,' I will be content to say '*I trust them*.' That they are my given way of thinking is the best possible reason why I should listen to no proposals to think

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otherwise. It only therefore amounts to this, — that the subjective postulates are accepted under one name, the objective data under another; but the difference between ‘trust’ in the one case and ‘knowledge’ in the other marks no distinction of certainty; simply the outer and the inner side of one indivisible act of the intellect.”¹

In criticising Mr. Spencer’s doctrine of the “Unknowable,” Dr. Martineau, while dissenting from his agnostic conclusion, does full justice to the great worth of the philosophical system which that life-long Truth-seeker has so elaboratively fashioned: —

“Mr. Spencer’s testimony against the purely phænomenal doctrine is of high value. The importance which he attaches to this characteristic of his, as relieving with a sense of reverence the hard self-confidence of special science or dogmatic materialism, is scarcely less so; for it betrays his appreciation of that outlook beyond the region of phænomena for the conditions of religion which cannot eventually be content to gaze into an abyss without reply. But men will not permanently be persuaded by him that, while they may be sure there is more than phænomena, they cannot tell what else there is.”²

Leaving now the epistemological section of the work, we enter upon the Second Book; in the first chapter of which Dr. Martineau expounds the first of his two great confirmations of Theistic Faith. This he does by unfolding the contents of that all-important *metaphysical* idea of Cause, which his epistemology has rescued from the scepticism of the Phænomenalists, and which he now makes use of to give a satisfactory answer to that basal question about the origin and cause of the universe which cannot fail to present itself to every thoughtful mind.

Dr. Martineau directs attention first to the untenable character of the view of Causation taken by the empirical philosophers and by many scientists; and in the course of

¹ Vol. I. p. 123.

² *Ib.*, p. 125.

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this discussion he exhibits not only his great philosophical power, but also that extensive and exact knowledge of the physical sciences which enables him to combat scientific scepticism on its own ground. Prof. Otto Pfleiderer, in his interesting review of "A Study of Religion" in the "*Jahrbücher für Protestantische Theologie*" for 1889, remarks that some Germans were of opinion that Dr. Martineau had introduced rather too much scientific matter into a treatise on the philosophy of religion; and he replies to this objection in the following striking passage:—

"It must not be forgotten that to-day it is precisely from the scientific side that the most serious dangers threaten religious faith, and these dangers cannot be warded off by ignoring them, or by causing faith to take refuge in the realm of subjective ideals while surrendering to scepticism the realm of reality. This method, too usual with us, is, it is true, the more convenient one; but we must not deceive ourselves about the fact that such a method is convincing only to those who were previously convinced, and that it can give no help and support to that large class of mankind who are familiar with the sciences, and who are wavering in painful uncertainty between doubt and belief. I cannot deny that the brave manner in which this octogenarian English theologian takes the bull by the horns, fights atheistic science with its own weapons and brings it back to faith, impresses me ten times more than the diplomatic arts of our apologists who try to get round this most dangerous enemy, and celebrate their victories only at those points where nobody attacks them" (p. 45).

In refutation of that conception of the casual relation which has obtained from the days of Hume and Kant up to the time of J. S. Mill and Comte, viz., that this relation indicates merely an order of succession among phenomena, Dr. Martineau adduces several cases of uniform succession where no idea of cause is suggested, and refers to instances of causation, like that of gravitation, where the cause is simultaneous with the effect. In reference to J. S. Mill's

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explanation that a cause is the assemblage of phænomenal antecedents, Dr. Martineau agrees with Dr. W. B. Carpenter that it is only those antecedents which are conceived to have a *dynamical* character that really satisfy the demand for Causation. The result, then, of Dr. Martineau's investigation is to confirm the deliberate judgment of Sir John Herschel, which, as Dr. Martineau remarks, has often been criticised but never shaken: —

“It is our own immediate consciousness of *effort* when we exert force to put matter in motion, or to oppose and neutralise force, which gives us this internal conviction of *power* and *causation* so far as it refers to the material world, and compels us to believe that whenever we see material objects put in motion from a state of rest, or deflected from their rectilinear paths and changed in their velocities, if already in motion, it is in consequence of such an *effort somehow* exerted, though not accompanied with *our* consciousness.”¹

At the close of an interesting sketch of Dr. Martineau's life by the late Prof. C. C. Everett, there is a brief estimate of Dr. Martineau's philosophy. It is written from the Hegelian standpoint, and one passage in it is very important; for, if it could be substantiated, it would go far to undermine the first of the two principles on which Dr. Martineau's philosophy of religion mainly rests: —

“In Dr. Martineau's philosophy,” says Professor Everett, “we have what may be called a theology of will, and a system of the universe that is absolutely luminous. It is easy to understand how congenial this must have been to the keen intellect and the virile nature of Martineau. It might be of interest to discuss the question whether the basis thus laid is sufficient for the vast superstructure that was reared upon it. Our later psychology has, however, made such a discussion useless by taking away the basis itself. We now know that the ‘sense of effort’ is an illusion. The feeling to which we give the name results from the rigidity of the muscles occasioned by reaction against outside resistance. It is carried to

¹ “Treatise on Astronomy,” p. 370.

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the brain by the nerves of sensation, and the motor nerves have absolutely nothing to do with it. We know that thought tends to transform itself into deed. If we had in the mind only a single idea, and this represented some act, the act would at once be performed. The same would be true if the idea of the act were sufficiently intense to overpower all inhibiting ideas that might be present. The will addresses itself not to acts but to thoughts. It holds an idea before the mind until this idea becomes intense enough to carry itself into activity.”¹

I have quoted the whole passage for fear of misrepresenting Professor Everett's view. As to the latter part of this statement, it is probably true that, as many psychologists of high repute hold, the action of the self, or will, is not directly on the brain, but on the *idea* of the movement to be performed. Dr. W. B. Carpenter, for instance, whose view of the “sense of effort” agrees with Dr. Martineau's, maintains that it is by “attention to the idea” that the mind controls the muscular movements; and more or less of effort is put forth and felt in this act of attention. Now Professor Everett himself apparently takes this view, for he speaks of “holding an idea before the mind till the idea becomes intense enough”; and surely this act itself must involve a mental “sense of effort.”

But evidently what he had in his mind when he spoke of the “later psychology” as removing the basis of Dr. Martineau's superstructure was the view held by Ribot, and some other empirical psychologists, that there is nothing in the “sense of effort” but the sensation connected with the contraction of the particular muscles; that is to say, a passive sensation. Now this view has been far too eagerly assumed by some Hegelians to be correct, because it just fits in with their doctrine that there does not exist any metaphysical self in man to put forth causal activity; and therefore they would like to believe that there is no actual mental consciousness of effort thus exerted. It

¹ “Atlantic Monthly,” September, 1900, p. 326.

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would be difficult, probably, to find much “later psychology,” or much more justly authoritative psychology, than that taught by the two eminent American psychologists Professor James, of Harvard, and Prof. J. Mark Baldwin, of Princeton University. Now Professor James, after a most elaborate analysis of the “sense of effort,” arrives at the conclusion that “muscular effort, properly so called, and mental effort must be distinguished; and what is called ‘muscular exertion’ is a compound of the two.”¹ And as to the particular idealistic form of the doctrine advocated by Professor Everett, Professor Baldwin thus refers to it, and shows how it unintentionally but inevitably plays into the hands of the sensationalists and the materialists:—

“All that we know and do by volition, and never know or do without it, reinforces the claim of *effort* as a new agency. The current idealism makes the same mistake [as Ribot and Horwicz do] and throws away one of its keenest weapons against materialism—strange as the case may seem. The idealist (Green) says, ‘All knowledge is through consciousness, therefore we can never get outside consciousness; there are no differences between active and passive states of feeling.’ ‘Exactly,’ replies the materialist (Maudsley), ‘your feeling of self is passive like everything else: the unity of mind is the unity of the nervous system, and consciousness is an epiphenomenon.’”²

While Dr. Martineau’s derivation of the idea of “Power” or “Causation” from the consciousness of personal effort is thus conclusively established by such eminent scientific men as Sir John Herschel, Dr. W. B. Carpenter and the two living psychologists just mentioned, it receives also support from some of the most distinguished philosophers. Eduard Zeller, for instance, thus emphatically expresses himself:—

“We ourselves are the one only cause of whose mode of action we have immediate knowledge through inner intuition.

¹ “Mind,” Vol. V. p. 582.

² “Handbook of Psychology (Feeling and Will),” p. 341.

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For his notion of causality, man is at the outset guided by no other clue than the analogy of his own willing and doing.”¹

From this insight into the true origin and nature of the idea of Cause we are enabled to analyse the scientific man's conception of Causation. This conception really involves *two* beliefs which, though they blend in his thought, are quite distinct from one another, and rest upon entirely different foundations. One of these beliefs is that which Dr. Martineau has so fully and lucidly explained for us, that every phenomenon must have a noumenal or metaphysical cause; the other is the belief in the uniformity, as it is called, of nature. The first of these, as Zeller says, rests upon “an immediate intuition of the mind,” and so cannot be got rid of; the second is shown by Dr. Martineau to be an induction from man's sentient experience; and hence, though it may be immensely probable, carries with it no absolute certainty. It is the first of these beliefs which compels the mind to ask for a non-phenomenal cause for every phenomenon, and as we know of only one kind of noumenal cause, namely, Will, we naturally suppose, when we see a change, that either will or something analogous to will has caused it. Hence the child, when he personifies the objects around him, or the savage, when he attributes the events in nature to the agency of invisible deities, are both of them proceeding on the right principle; but experience leads them to a wiser application of that principle. Observation of the uniformity of nature gradually turns the Polytheist into a Theist. The many wills are replaced by the one Supreme Will; Nature is seen to be explicable by certain universal laws; these laws must be the constant modes of the Divine Volition. The conviction thus reached is further confirmed by the discoveries of Science. The principle of the Trans-

¹ Vol. I. p. 183.

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formation of Energy supports the belief that all forms of force are in their essential character one and the same; and the reasonable presumption is that this essential character is to be learned from the one sole form of energy whose inner nature is revealed to us in our personal consciousness. Present scientific theories about energy also powerfully confirm the belief in the *metaphysical* nature of Causation; for it is utterly impossible to form a clear idea of such expressions as “Correlation of Forces” and “Tendencies to Motion” without introducing into the thought a noumenal element.

In Dr. Martineau's Cosmology there are no unconscious *second causes*. The sole causes in the universe are God and rational beings. The inorganic world results from the direct volitional action of God in all the so-called material elements which constitute the universe. In the case of living beings, God, as it were, “plants out” and lends to the animals a certain measure of His infinite energy. The animals, however, are not, in Dr. Martineau's view, true causes; for they exercise no volitional choice between alternatives. When Dr. Martineau was asked how such true causes as human souls came into existence, he said by God's self-individuation, which view closely resembles that of Lotze, and of that able thinker the late Prof. Joseph le Conte.¹

In this Cosmology it is very necessary to distinguish between the essential and the non-essential factors. The essential elements in the doctrine — those, I mean, in which Dr. Martineau finds the intellectual basis of theistic belief — appear to be as follows: The first principle is that all phænomena are the effects of “noumena” or metaphysical causes, and these metaphysical causes are God himself and all human Personalities; the second principle is that these human Personalities are themselves

¹ Cf. “The Conception of God,” p. 76.

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in some way dependent for their existence upon God's causality. Hence follows the conclusion, which constitutes one of the foundations of Theism, viz., that all existences, including both the phænomena which God directly causes and the noumena which he calls into being, owe their origin to the one Self-Existent Will.

In regard to the other factors in Dr. Martineau's Cosmology which I have referred to as "non-essential," I feel sure that he would willingly have allowed, and indeed did constantly allow, that there are some features in his theory of God, Man, and Nature, and their mutual relations which are not self-evident, and therefore of a speculative character. Many competent philosophers, for instance, believe in the existence of Second Causes, and would not ascribe the visible cosmos to the *direct* action of God's causality. Thus Dr. W. G. Ward, of whose philosophical acumen Dr. Martineau had the highest opinion, says:—

"Dr. Martineau holds that no substance can be a cause, even a secondary one, unless it possess intelligence. I feel great respect and gratitude to Dr. Martineau for his very valuable labours in the cause of true philosophy; but on this particular tenet I am obliged to dissent from him with much confidence."¹

In like manner Mr. R. H. Hutton, Dr. Martineau's old pupil, in a letter to the Rev. R. A. Armstrong, published in the second edition of this writer's admirable work on "God and the Soul," thus expresses himself:—

"It seems to me that the moment you get to organisation, you get a portion of creative power alienated, as it were, from the centre of divine motive and character, and started for itself under the direction of anything but divine motives, to set forth the divine teaching as to what very limited lives, with very limited powers and instincts, really mean. The plant even is, I imagine, a preparation for an individuality cut off

¹ "The Philosophy of Theism," Vol. I. p. 335.

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from the immediate life and character of God, a first step in the great staircase that leads up to man. . . . I think individuality is a preparation for free-will, but that it exists long before will; it exists even in the plant, and it is distinct enough in the animal, even though the animal has not yet risen to the stage of any kind of volition.”¹

This is in general agreement with Lotze's view; but Lotze goes further, and thinks it *most probable* that even the elements of the physical world have a small measure of individuality, “so that all things really possess in different degrees of perfection that selfhood by which an immanent product of the Infinite becomes what we call Real.”²

But all these thinkers believe that such secondary metaphysical causes are not self-existent, and so require for their origin the creative causality of God. Their form of the Cosmological Argument, then, possesses the same validity as Dr. Martineau's form; for whatever be the exact nature of the dependent and subsidiary causation in the universe, in any case it must, by philosophical necessity, be referred for its origination and maintenance to the one Self-Existent Being, “the Cause of causes.”

Having thus reached by an *à priori* road this belief in a Self-Existent Will as the Ground and Cause of the Cosmos, Dr. Martineau now turns to the actual universe to ask whether it bears on the face of it marks of having derived its existence from Intelligent Volition. In the report of a striking Lecture on Dr. James Martineau, given by Rev. Philip H. Wicksteed, at the Passmore Edwards settlement, occurs the following interesting statement:—

“At that time [in the ‘sixties’] Dr. Martineau had not only departed from the orthodox theological position, but in his lectures he used to attack a great part of what was called natural theology. He was most contemptuous of the argu-

¹ P. 22.

² “Microcosmus,” Vol. II. p. 647. (English Translation.)

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ment from design, and he (the lecturer) remembered him referring to those people who 'walked through the mysterious glades of nature with the elastic step of the connoisseur, and patronised the ingenuity of the Almighty.' But when the Darwinian theory of evolution was advanced, he deliberately turned round, and at the very moment when the argument from design seemed to have completely gone, he started and built it up into one of the most striking parts of his great book on religion."

The same opinion is expressed in a somewhat milder form by Principal Gordon, in his article on Dr. Martineau in the "Dictionary of National Biography." My attendance on Dr. Martineau's Lectures was earlier by two or three years than that of these gentlemen, and I distinctly remember the tone of disparagement of which they speak; but my impression is that it referred not so much to the argument itself as to the use made of it by Paley and the authors of the "Bridgewater Treatises." These writers attempted to *found* their Theism on this teleological argument; but Dr. Martineau, though he, like Kant, considered the argument to be a valuable *confirmation* to a belief in a Personal God independently obtained, never at any time thought that it was competent by itself to establish such a belief. It was the undue pretensions of these writers and their over-confidence in insisting on very doubtful indications of design that awakened that feeling, somewhat akin to contempt, which Mr. Wicksteed mentions. But when the Darwinian form of the doctrine of Evolution claimed to have undermined and invalidated the argument altogether, and thus indirectly threw discredit on Dr. Martineau's theory that the Cause and Ground of the Cosmos is rational Will, then he bestirred himself; and there can be no doubt that in the course of the careful biological study into which he was led in his examination of the Darwinian theory, he discovered such manifest instances of evident intelligent purpose that the design argument

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now appeared to him to be vastly stronger than he had before supposed it to be. In his case Darwin's writings, so far from weakening his teleological faith, intensified it; and the result was the production of that masterly chapter on the “Place of Teleology,” in which Dr. Martineau adduces such evident instances of intelligent purpose manifested by way of Selection, Combination, and Gradation, that as a contribution to the literature of Natural Theology his work throws the writings of earlier teleologists quite into the shade. It is neither possible nor needful for me to give here any of the many happily chosen illustrations and proofs of design; for this section of Dr. Martineau's work is sure to draw readers, not only by its own great lucidity and attractions, but also from the fact that it contains a more thorough and effective treatment than can elsewhere be found of a subject to which no earnest mind in the present day can at all afford to be indifferent. Professors Huxley and Romanes had already admitted that the evolutionary process in its entirety could only be explained by assuming the immanent action of intelligence; and now Dr. Martineau has re-inspired into the old teleological argument more than its primitive vigour by adducing the clearest proof of rational purpose, not merely in Evolution as a whole, but in particular concrete instances as well. Dr. Martineau also endorses by his own reasoning the conclusion reached by von Hartmann, who, after carefully calculating the chances against the actual progressive evolution of species, if no agencies save those assumed by Darwin were at work, found that the odds against such a happy result of fortuitous variations are immensely great. While this proves that some other principles must be operative in the process in addition to those of which the Darwinians take cognisance, other biologists, such as Professor Henslow, have shown that it is exceedingly probable that there exists a formative principle in

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organisms which prompts them to respond to the influences of their environment; and this explains, what Dr. Martineau points out, the remarkable absence of any evidence of the existence of those ill-adapted and abortive forms of which, on purely Darwinian principles, we should expect to find a multitude. Thus the concluding sections of this chapter corroborate the conclusion arrived at in the earlier part that the activity of an Infinite Mind is manifested in the universe.

In the *second* and *third* chapters of Book II. we have, probably, the greatest and most characteristic product of Dr. Martineau's genius. At the beginning of the sixth chapter I expressed the opinion that it is as the exponent and interpreter of the *ethical* aspect of God's self-revelation in humanity that he may be regarded as the most representative and impressive thinker of the present time; and these two chapters afford, I think, abundant confirmation of this judgment. In the previous chapter he has unfolded the contents of the Dualism of Perception, and shown how through the experience of resistance to our volitional energy we discern our relation to an objective world of metaphysical entities; and now, in this second chapter, he turns to a still more important source of spiritual insight, the Dualism of the Conscience. In the consciousness which we have of the presence of a rightful Authority, which judges and at times forbids the gratification of our strongest personal desires, we are admitted to the knowledge of another form of objective metaphysical reality. But whereas the Dualism of Perception reveals to us directly the presence of metaphysical energies *lower* than ourselves, the Dualism of the Conscience discloses a metaphysical reality altogether *higher* than our own personal life.

And just as in the case of the Dualism of Perception Dr. Martineau found it necessary to refute the empirical philosophers who declare that "all we know is Phæ-

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nomena,” so now before he can develop the inexhaustibly rich contents of our ethical insight, he has first to deal with those empirical moralists who endeavour to explain the Categorical Imperative as no more than an illusory product of our egoistic desires and our sympathies combined with the pressure upon individual minds of social opinion and social force. With admirable clearness he points out that the authority which we assign to the higher over the lower of our conflicting springs of action cannot have its explanation in the interested preferences of men, but is “an order of claim which is seated in the constitution of things and belongs to them whenever they appear on the theatre of a voluntary nature.” If our humanity were at the summit of self-conscious being, if there were no appeal to any higher Authority than the verdict of society, how are we to account, he asks, for the fact that this moral imperative at times opposes and forbids even our strongest personal and social affections? Surely these experiences all point to the presence of a Higher Personality in direct communion with our souls; it is here at last and here alone that “the objective authority of what the inward conscience tells finds its explanation and its home; and hither it is that we are brought, in proportion as our self-knowledge is deep, and our moral ideal is lofty and complete.”¹

The unavoidable brevity of this sketch allows me simply to indicate the grand central truth which this eloquent and profound chapter fully expounds and conclusively establishes.

And now that we have learned that, as Kant so beautifully and truly expresses it, there are two forms of Causal Power which awaken our reverence, — the Causal Power which calls into existence the solid earth and the starry

¹ Vol. II. p. 28.

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heavens, and the Causal Power which reveals its presence in the Moral Law, — the question arises, Are these Powers separate and distinct or are they but the two modes of action of one Supreme Causality? In the *third* chapter Dr. Martineau, by weighty considerations, confirms the spontaneous judgment of the human mind that the true answer is assuredly the latter one, and that it cannot reasonably be doubted that it is one Self-Existent Personality who is disclosing his presence and his causality through the different faculties of the soul of man. That these two Causalities emanate from one metaphysical centre is shown by many marks, but especially from the fact that the Physical Universe “is so far from being foreign to the system of moral laws that to a considerable extent it administers their retribution and enforces discipline, as is conspicuously exemplified in the ruined health of the intemperate, and the repulsive stamp which selfishness and vice imprint upon the human countenance.”

But the chief value of this most impressive chapter consists in the effectual help which it furnishes towards the solution of that most difficult of problems, how to reconcile the presence of physical and moral evil in a universe, which, from the unmistakable deliverances of our rational and ethical consciousness, we have concluded to be the work of a Being not only of unlimited Intelligence and Power, but also of perfect Justice, Holiness, and Love.

An able and distinguished member of the University of Oxford, who found much to admire, and also something to criticise, both in the “Types of Ethical Theory” and in “A Study of Religion,” wrote a letter to Dr. Martineau, on the occasion of the publication of the latter work, in which occurs the following passage:—

“When you discuss the moral difficulties of the Universe, your attitude seems to me (very likely I misunderstand you) to be: given a morally perfect author, how are we best to

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account for the existence of evil? not—which is the real question—given the immoral features of the Universe, what are we to think of its author?”

Now, in reply to criticisms of this character, Dr. Martineau has repeatedly urged that there is a most adequate reason why we should assume the first of these two attitudes towards this formidable problem; for, having gained from the immanent Moral Ideal some insight into the essential character of that Eternal One, who is evidently also the author and governor of the world of nature, we cannot rationally enter upon the discussion of this question without bringing with us a strong presumption that in some way, though we may have but the faintest glimpse of what that way is, the existence of these painful features in animal and human life can be harmonised with the presence of perfect Wisdom and Perfect Love in the Supreme Cause of nature and humanity.

Of course, if the facts of nature and human experience gave no distinct indications of the existence of these attributes in their Author, then the problem would indeed be insoluble; or, at all events, would necessitate the assumed activity of Ahriman as well as of Ormazd in the constitution and evolution of the Universe. But when we see, as Dr. Martineau's exposition enables us to do, and as even Mr. J. S. Mill at length acknowledged to be the fact, that cases of pain and evil, when thoroughly examined, never seem to be the real object aimed at in the Universe, but to be only incidental and perhaps indispensable accompaniments of a design predominantly benevolent, it is obvious that there remains no insurmountable difficulty in the way of the presumption and the belief that the same immanent principle of Eternal Love, which claims *de jure* to dominate man's inner life, is also *de facto* the central animating spirit of the external universe. Nor must it be forgotten that, as Dr. Marti-

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neau so lucidly and forcibly reminds us, it is inconceivable that even the Eternal God could fashion a universe which should not be conditioned by mathematical necessities, or one in which the laws of nature, which must be uniform and constant if science and morality are to exist, should not, when enacted, form self-imposed limitations upon God's own possibilities.

The same consideration applies, of course, to the case of Moral Evil, which could not be eliminated without at the same time eliminating that inter-personal and moral relation between God and his rational offspring, which both Kant and Dr. Martineau and Prof. John Fiske have conclusively shown to constitute the ultimate and infinitely precious end for the sake of realising which the whole course of physical and psychical evolution has sprung into existence out of the causality and love of the Eternal.

Another most valuable feature in this chapter is the clear demonstration it furnishes that human nature is so constituted that the good principles in different men ever tend to support and strengthen one another, while the evil principles are ever conflicting and thus tending to mutual destruction. With special clearness does Dr. Martineau show that, as the Greek proverb, which Emerson so aptly quotes, well puts it, "The Dice of God are always loaded," and goodness must ever in the long run win the victory. It would be difficult, I think, to find in English literature a more perfect combination of depth of thought with beauty of expression than is presented in that section of this chapter in which Dr. Martineau illustrates "The Triumphs of Force in History," and shows how rude strength always gives way at length before intelligence; how intelligence, when it chiefly subserves the ends of pleasure or of gain, is sure to be worsted in the struggle with moral principle, and how in our present civilisation the unobtrusive elements of Christian faith and love are gradually over-

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mastering all lower and coarser forces and tending to become, in the course of centuries, the dominating influence in the social and political life of humanity.

After this all-important Book II., there follow two subsidiary but still very valuable ones. Book III. deals with the philosophical systems opposed to Ethical Theism. These are two in number, — Pantheism and Determinism, — but they are so closely allied in significance as to be little more than two aspects of one theory. As these subjects are closely related with that of Dr. Martineau's “Study of Spinoza,” I will treat of them in connection with that book in the following chapter.

The concluding section of this noble Theodicy sets forth the rational grounds which support the belief in “The Life to Come.” There is a basal distinction between this subject and that which forms the text of Book II., and it is thus vividly depicted by Mr. R. A. Armstrong in his masterly “Analysis and Appreciation of Martineau's Study of Religion”: —

“The philosophical demonstration of human Immortality can, perhaps, never be so completely wrought out as that of God. God *is*; the life to come, so far as each one of us is concerned, is only *to be*. A fact extending through the present and the past has innumerable points of contact with *experience*; a fact lying wholly in the future can have none.”

Absolute certainty is here, then, manifestly impossible, and Browning, in his profound philosophical poem “La Saisiaz,” contends that such certainty would be a disadvantage to the ethical and spiritual interests of the soul. But Hope may pass through various gradations up to confident assurance; and in this book Dr. Martineau has done excellent service to Religion, both by weakening through the force of his philosophical and scientific arguments those physiological and metaphysical obstacles which for many persons, in the present day, bar the way to faith, and also

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by voicing in most forcible and eloquent words that prophecy of Immortality which is implicit in the inexhaustible potentialities and yearnings alike of the Intellect, the Conscience, and the Heart. I will not venture to compress this book, so rich in thought and so glowing with spiritual warmth, into a poor and cold epitome; and in place of this I will insert one of those luminous and consoling letters by which Dr. Martineau rekindled faith and hope in friends stricken down by sad bereavement. This letter is also of high philosophical interest, and is especially appropriate at the close of this chapter; for it gathers up into a focus those self-revelations of God in man's intellectual and moral nature which are so effectively expounded in "A Study of Religion," and shows how unmistakably these revelations indicate, and require for their rational completion, the unending development of man's spiritual life: —

THE POLCHAR, AVIEMORE, Oct. 11, 1885.

MY DEAR SIR,—I had noticed, and followed with great interest, the published reports of your excellent father's last days, and the well-merited tributes to his rare private virtues and public services. It is natural for us, last lingerers on the stage of life, to watch with a sad adieu the exit of one after another of the friendly band of like-minded contemporaries; and though I had never the opportunity of intimately knowing your father, I always thought of him as continuing and expanding the admirable qualities of mind and character which I so much respected in your grandfather. It is, therefore, very grateful to me to know that, in the absence of living intercourse, he found something that was congenial to him in my written expression of thought and feeling. These silent friendships through the sincerest medium of communion between mind and mind are a priceless blessing to those of us who say little and read much.

It is only too easy to understand the blank and desolate feeling which is left with you by this near visitation of death. In one view, and *that* the most obtrusive, it is at all times the most startling shock to devout faith and love; and in our days the current drift of thought has swept us, by temporary deviation, away from the class of ideas which best

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interpret the meaning of Death in its relation to our nature and lot. If we are to believe in nothing but the objects of perception and the observed order of phænomena, *all* religious conceptions, in regard to either the Source or the issues of things, are non-suited by presupposition; and *that* is the blind assumption of the present age,—the root of all its agnosticism. Such a rule, however, is fatal to Science itself, on whose behalf it is set up; for the very *condition* of perceived objects is infinite *Space*, of observed phænomena, infinite *Time*, neither of which is known or believed through sensible experience; both are the given ground on which that experience is born. So it is with *Causation*, with *Substance*, with *Power*,—all of them essential to the Axioms of Science, and carried by it *ab initio* into its experience, not subsequently fetched out of it. Still more conspicuous are such necessary data of the Reason, when we come to the personal and moral Self-Consciousness, the whole language of which has germinated, ramified, and blossomed from the living root of an identical self-discriminating Subject, capable of alternative action, and responsible for it. *Unless* we may trust these primary conceptions, we must be agnostic of all else as well as of religion. *If* we may trust them, our beliefs may be as secure in regard to religion as in regard to any matter amenable to a balance of probabilities. In both instances we shall meet with many things which Reason must accept, though beyond the power of Imagination to represent. The Agnostic says, “I have no conception how the powers of Nature could come out of Mind.” May we not ask him whether he finds it any more conceivable how Mind should come out of no-Mind? Both sides of the alternative baffle imagination; the latter is in defiance of Reason too.

What place can be assigned to *Death* in a world under wise and righteous rule depends chiefly, as it seems to me, on the *Scope* of the living nature on which it falls. That it happens to the plant in its season, and to the simply animal tribes, occasions us no perplexity; we see in it the correlative of birth,—the indispensable concomitant of an economy of successive and progressive being. Not till we encounter it in human kind does it startle us with a mystery of surprise and sorrow. What is the secret of this difference? Does it lie in this,—that in the *Scale* of the nature which vanishes in death there is an *infinite difference*, whether it be a Christ or a sparrow that falls? In the mere animal creature the whole system of instincts and affections is in

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obvious subservience to the bodily organism, whose needs — of food, shelter, reproduction, and care of young, etc. — it supplies; the perfection of the physical structure is the *end*; the impulses and aptitudes of life are the *instruments* for securing it. When the end has been gained, and the body has fulfilled its term, it is a matter of course that the means should share its fate and lapse as well. We are, therefore, content to part with the whole creature — the visible form of the invisible life — at one stroke. In the case of man, this relation between the bodily organism and the animating intelligence and will is plainly inverted. His capacities and affections are not measured out by the exigencies of his corporeal structure, but immeasurably transcend these, and, assuming the headship of his nature, claim the right to subordinate and use the whole animal outfit in the service of their own higher ends. True *manhood* is first realised in one who wields all his physical energies and resources as tools of ideal achievements,—knowledge, right, and loving service of others, and growth towards Divine Perfection. These are the genuine ends in which we find the inspiration and development and fulfilment of our life. And because they are far reaching and indefinite in their demands of time, while the bodily term is spent ere they have well started on their way, we feel the incongruous combination of immense possibilities with fragile tools, and, at the grave of every noble man, mourn to part with the mere fragment of a life. This seems to me the reason why we can never be content with *human death*, so long as we take it to be the same phenomenon — of actual extinction — that it is with the shot bird. The *scale* on which we are made is conspicuously too vast for the short reckoning of our mortal years. The ripe and practised mind, the large and tender affections, the refined and steadfast conscience, which are the last attainments of a faithful soul, need nothing *but time* to realise the ulterior possibilities for which they sigh; their spiritual strength is not spent when their tools are broken; but was never greater than when the paralysed arm lay helpless at their side. Are we to believe, then, in such a disproportion between the inherent capabilities and inspirations of a self-directing nature and its material allowance of opportunity? Or, shall we not rather say, that we see at present only its first stage of opportunity, and are assured of the rest from the transcending range of its aims and powers? The profoundest feeling which possesses me at the end of life is, that I stand but little removed from its beginning, schooled only in the mere alphabet of its

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attainable lessons. And when once we realise what is meant by the *Moral* constitution of our nature, with probation continued to the end, we cannot fail to find in this alone a solemn augury of an accordant sequel. I admit that this would not hold if this world were itself perfectly retributory. But in a state where justice is but inchoate, Conscience plainly stands as sentinel in the fore-court of existence.

These are the considerations which, among many of similar tendency, most habitually sustain in me the immortal hope, and make me wonder at the weakened faith so evident and so pathetic in the present day. I have faith that a happy reaction is sure to come. Already, in America, the leading exponent of Spencer, Professor Fiske of Harvard, has avowed his return, in spite of Evolution, to his belief in personal immortality. Depend upon it, the nobler minds cannot live on the resources contained within the penfold of this life, and will reclaim their birthright.

Excuse this awkward scrawl, written from bed, to which I have been confined for some days, by an ailment now passing away.

With sincere sympathy,
Ever faithfully yours,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

THOMAS R. RUSSELL, Esq.

The following portion of a letter, which gives Dr. Martineau's estimate of the value of the *metaphysical* argument for personal immortality, forms an interesting pendant to the preceding:—

LIVERPOOL, Oct. 6, 1851.

MY DEAR SIR,— . . . On the Necessarian Theory I see no way of disengaging separate personalities from the Infinite One without making them phænomenal and perishable; and the only consistent resource seems to me that of Plato, viz., to make each soul in itself a little god,—an undervived and independent entity,—and to maintain that the number of them is a given quantity, unsusceptible of increase or diminution, and allowing only of transmigration. If our continued personality, amid ever-varying sensations, implies that we are essentially *ὄντα* and not *γενόμενα*, pre-existence is not less indicated by it than post-existence. Though I should feel no repugnance to accompanying you, if you were really to

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carry your doctrine to this extent, the strangeness of some of the conclusions involved would impair the effect of the argument on most readers. For this reason, among others, I am disposed to rest the proof of immortality much more upon *Moral* than on Metaphysical grounds; and I cannot but regret that you do not consider these more worthy of your regard, and are even precluded, by your necessarian convictions, from all reliance upon them. The sentiment of responsibility, — the experiences of conscience, — which are specially *human*, appear to me to be the living root of this great faith; and as these are certainly the highest phænomena of our nature, it seems only fit that they should furnish its highest truth. It seems to me an advantage that whatever argument they supply *goes no further than the human race*; while the metaphysical doctrine (except some modification of Plato's) cannot be hindered from taking in all organised beings. A few peculiarly constituted minds may be able to bear the doctrine of wider scope; but I confess to such an insuperable weakness or pride, that an argument proving so much, and available no less for my cat than for myself, would fill me only with indifference or scepticism towards the future. The whole stress of the proof rests with me on the *distinctive characteristics of man*. However, it is an excellent thing that the argument should be so carefully elaborated for those who take a different view on this point.

I venture to prophesy that, should these topics continue to engage your reflections for a few years more, the step you have taken out of James Mill's philosophy will be followed by others; that Space and Time will not always appear to you the mere attributes and relations of perceived things; and that Socrates's doctrine of primary ideas will make inroads upon the theory of Abstraction which you now approve. And yet what vanity it is in me to think that the course on which I have been urged myself must be taken by everyone starting from the same point!

Believe me ever, my dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

W. E. HICKSON, Esq.

Chapter VIII

"A STUDY OF SPINOZA." CRITICISM OF PANTHEISM AND DETERMINISM

ENGLISH students of Spinoza's writings are now aided in forming a true estimate of the merits of this eminent thinker by three accounts of his philosophy proceeding from very different, but all equally competent, writers. Sir Frederick Pollock's interest in Spinoza appears to be to a great degree due to his perception of the close affinity of Spinoza's fundamental doctrine with modern scientific theories, especially with that theory now popular with many scientists that matter and mind are but two aspects of one ultimate Reality. The motive which prompted Dr. John Caird's interesting treatise was evidently the conviction that notwithstanding Spinoza's erroneous conception of God as "Substance" rather than as thinking "Subject," and his distinction between the two basal attributes of Extension and Thought in God, he became in the working out of his system essentially an "idealist," and that, therefore, there was no essential difference between his theory and the Hegelian view of the Ultimate Reality. But while these two writers are drawn to Spinoza by some attraction of sympathy and affinity, Dr. Martineau, on the other hand, as appears from the following letter to his friend Prof. F. W. Newman, was actuated by a very different consideration: —

Nov. 1, 1882.

MY DEAR NEWMAN, — Your surprise at my taking Spinoza in hand is hardly greater than my own; nor can I quite divest myself of the feeling that the time spent upon him has not been

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put to the best use. I was moved to the task, partly by the pressing entreaty of my friend William Knight, partly by observing the great influence upon many minds of a mistaken conception of what Spinoza's philosophy really means. Having gained my own first impressions of him from Schleiermacher and Coleridge, I was myself misled, in my early study of his "Ethica," into an admiration of him resting upon wrong grounds. I credited his Theistic language with a meaning which, I now see, it did not contain. And the difference is so enormous between the imputed thoughts and the real ones, that I longed, if possible, to save others from repeating my illusions. On resuming my proper work, however, and seeing how much its designed remainder exceeds the measure of my shortening days, I half regret the Excursus, which has withdrawn me from the current text of life. If I have wasted my time in writing this book, all the more am I bound to warn you not to waste yours in reading it. Stop, at all events, with the biography. All the rest, I know, will only worry you with a just impatience, and yield no result except a confirmed distrust of the whole apparatus of Metaphysics.

• • • • •
Ever yours affectionately,

JAMES MARTINEAU.

But although Dr. Martineau thus depreciates Spinoza as a philosopher, he was evidently warmly interested in him as a man, and the charming biography which occupies the first hundred pages of "A Study of Spinoza" is, I believe, the best presentation we have of the life of this great representative of Pantheistic thought.

Of the high excellence and acumen of Dr. Martineau's description of Spinoza's philosophy there can only be one opinion. Sir Frederick Pollock, in reviewing the book in "Mind,"¹ says:—

"I must confess to a certain agreeable surprise in finding how much ground we have in common, and how much of substantial agreement is possible between critics who set out, if not from opposite, yet from considerably different points.

¹ Vol. VIII. p. 104.

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The agreement is enough to show that modern philosophical studies are not the chaos of hopelessly discordant conjecture which they are often assumed to be, and even to suggest that our existing divergences may turn out, in the view of successors capable of a larger comprehension than our own, to be less than they seem to us”; and “it is satisfactory to find that the attempts of one or two German critics to force upon Spinoza a doctrine of personal immortality in the popular sense meet with no favour at Dr. Martineau’s hands.”

It is interesting to compare with this last statement that made by Professor Sorley, in his review of Dr. John Caird’s *Spinoza*:—

“Dr. Caird,” says Professor Sorley, “shows how Spinoza passes from his view of the illusoriness of the individual to a conception of the individual mind as becoming free from the bondage of the passions and attaining immortality with the disappearance of the illusion of time.”¹

The fundamental difference between Dr. Martineau and Spinoza, and also, I may add, between Dr. Martineau and the Hegelians, lies in the different significance given by him and by them to the idea of Causation. It is quite essential to Dr. Martineau’s reasonings in “*A Study of Religion*” that the Supreme Being be regarded as the efficient Cause of the phenomena of the Universe. Spinoza, it is true, calls God the immanent “Cause” of the totality of finite things in the world, but gives to the word “Cause” here a meaning which it does not bear in any other philosophical writer, and which his admirers regard as a source of confusion in his exposition. The category of Cause and Effect and that of Substance and Attribute are used by him interchangeably, and explained by geometrical analogies which show that his use of the word neither agreed with that idea of “efficient Causation” which Dr. Martineau in “*A Study of Religion*” shows to be the appropriate signification of the word, nor with that view

¹ “Mind,” Vol. XIII. p. 604.

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of Cause as a relation among phenomena which is advanced by the followers both of Hume and Kant. His conception is that the relation which the *Natura Naturans*, or God, bears to the *Natura Naturata*, or the Universe, is analogous to that which the idea of a geometrical figure bears to the various inferences which can be drawn from it. But, as Dr. Martineau lucidly explains, the language of causality is wholly inapplicable to the reciprocal relations between the properties of a geometrical figure: —

“You may doubtless make some one characteristic of the circle, taken as its essence and put into its definition, yield others by inference; but it is not their *cause*; inasmuch as you can invert the order and deduce it from any one of them that may be substituted in the prior place. Their *ratio essendi* is a reciprocal one, by which they eternally co-exist; and not a successive one, like the *ratio fiendi*, which, in causality, determines the order of events.”¹

Dr. Martineau, accordingly, not only regards Spinoza's conception of the relation of God to the world as entirely erroneous, but he also maintains that the word “Cause” is quite unsuitable to express Spinoza's own idea of that relation. Spinoza's followers, on the other hand, as well as the Hegelian Idealists, assert that Spinoza's conception of the relation of God to the world is essentially correct, but they agree with Dr. Martineau that the word “Cause” is inapplicable to this relation. Thus Professor Land, of Leyden, in his striking lecture “In Memory of Spinoza,” says: —

“To Spinoza God and the world are correlates, as much as the equality of the angles and that of the sides, as much as the circle and the relations of magnitudes connected with it. It is possible in geometry to deduce the second from the first; but the first may equally well be deduced from the second. The word Cause is not a fit one in this part of the system; if it is to be used, the world may with equal correct-

¹ “A Study of Spinoza,” p. 116.

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ness be called the cause of God. If we let the word go, with the whole logical apparatus connected with it, and hold fast simply the mathematical analogy, the conception of Spinoza will appear in clear daylight."¹

Hence Professor Land would have the word as well as the idea "Cause" dropped out in thinking of God's relation to the phænomenal universe, and he would confine the word to the expression of the relations of one finite mode of being to another. If, however, Spinoza's view of God's relation to the world, as explained by Professor Land, is accepted, then the whole argument for Theism which occupies the first half of "A Study of Religion" is to a great extent invalidated. And, further, as Dr. Martineau clearly proves, Spinoza is not consistent in his use of words denoting Causality, for he speaks of "the *dynamic order* of physical nature whereby concrete objects and individual phænomena are successively produced, one out of another *in infinitum*."² Still there can be no doubt that Professor Land correctly describes the idea of the relation between God and the cosmos which pervades the "Ethica," when he says that in Spinoza's view God is no more the efficient cause of the world than the world is the efficient cause of God. From this it evidently follows that Spinozism is essentially pantheistic in its idea of God, and deterministic in its idea of man.

Having thus indicated this fundamental difference in the conception of Cause which completely separates Dr. Martineau's Theism from Spinoza's Pantheism, I must perforce leave the development of Spinoza's doctrine to be studied in Dr. Martineau's admirable monograph; and the rest of this chapter must be devoted to a brief account of Dr. Martineau's profound criticism of the Pantheism which undermines all causal interaction between the human

¹ "Four Essays on Spinoza," edited by Professor Knight, p. 21.

² "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. I. p. 392.

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soul and the "Cause of causes," and of the Determinism which is equally fatal to all moral relation between men and the "Soul of souls."

Dr. Martineau divides Pantheists into two general classes, one of which has little affinity with Theism, while the other is closely allied to it. The first class consists of those who found their theory of the universe on a study of particular cosmical phænomena, and reason from them to the principle which unifies the whole; the second class begin with an idea of the Absolute Reality, and in the light of this idea interpret all physical and psychical existences. The first class, again, subdivides into those thinkers who, starting with a mechanical or chemical conception, claim to have, in the assumed self-existence of atoms in motion, data adequate to the evolution of all things; and those, on the other hand, who find the origin of the cosmos in some *living* power pervading the universal frame of things, but conceive of that power as not possessing the attributes of self-consciousness and intending mind. Only the latter can be fitly called *pantheistic*; the former is evidently *atheistic*.

But the Pantheisms which really compete with Theism all fall into the higher class; they all base their theory of the cosmos on the assumed existence of an Absolute and Infinite Cause, out of whose central nature all the existences and phænomena of the material and spiritual universe proceed. This conception of the Supreme Being must at least include the functions of *mind* and *will*, even if it is not identified with these. Such Pantheisms may be predominantly of an intellectual character, as Hegelianism is, or they may be emotional as most forms of pantheistic Mysticism are. The Pantheisms which thus seek to interpret the universe from the idea of an Absolute Being, in whose essential nature all human ideals are already realised, must display, in spite of their ethical and

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religious defects, very attractive and noble features; and it is generally supposed that Spinoza's Pantheism is of this fascinating character. But Dr. Martineau gives cogent reasons for revising this estimate.

“Spinoza,” he says, “certainly took the right direction of movement for the nobler Pantheism. And if, in effecting it, he had started from a Real Being already charged with all divine predicates in their perfection, and carried this forward into the generated universe, to be the animating breath and actuating spring of the heavens and the earth, he would have fulfilled its promise, and planted us in a world ruled by thought and thrilled by love akin to ours, only unerring and supreme, and have left possible to us a sympathy between the mind of the part and the mind of the whole. But instead of this plenitude ready to flood all space with infused beauty and good, his ‘*Substance*,’ out of which all is to come, is kept studiously clear of all predicates; under the plea of not hurting its infinitude, you are forbidden to say anything of it but that ‘it exists’; the moment you affirm anything further you define it by a mark, and shut it out from what was open to it before; you limit it by exclusion, for ‘*omnis determinatio est negatio*.’ It has nothing, therefore, to share in common with derivative natures but this indefinite and sterile blank called ‘being’; all properties or functions that seem to us to fill up the worth of this blank — life, intellect, will, affection — belong first and only to creatures that are born and die, and must on no account be ascribed to the Absolute God.”¹

On this ground Dr. Martineau does not think the epithet “God-intoxicated” applied by Novalis to Spinoza was appropriate, nor does he share the enthusiasm which caused Schleiermacher to exclaim: “Join me in reverently offering a chaplet to the shade of the rejected yet saintly Spinoza! Penetrated as he was by the sublime spirit of Nature, the Infinite was his Alpha and Omega, the universe his only and eternal love.”²

So far was this from being the case, argues Dr. Martineau, “that the system of Spinoza was the product of

¹ “A Study of Religion,” Vol. II. p. 152.

² *Ib.*, p. 155.

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a strictly scientific mind, intent much more on correctly reading the *All* than on finding its *God*." In the celebrated Fifth Part of the "Ethica," indeed, Spinoza's pages seem to glow with spiritual warmth, and in his description of "the intellectual love of God," and of the tranquillity it brings, Dr. Martineau admits that the great Pantheist "speaks in tones forgetful of his 'geometrical' severity." But even here Spinoza expressly says that this *Amor Dei* is all on one side, without any answer from the object loved;

"the tranquillity is simply the absence of any jar between the order of thought and the order of things, — a coalescence between their pulsations in which the individual is lost. No nature so luminous as Spinoza's was ever filled with *drier light* than his. Pure, veracious, unselfish as he was, he understood nothing but understanding; his mind was a limpid thinking element, the vehicle only of the true, and dissolving away the beautiful and good; a perfect example of ἀπερὶ διανοητική; but fixed in a latitude too high and cold to feel the glow of even a temperate enthusiasm."¹

But even if Spinoza's system had been developed altogether on the nobler lines, it would not have escaped the defects which are inherent in all forms of real Pantheism. In his criticisms of Pantheism Dr. Martineau carefully discriminates between that *quasi*-Pantheism, so often found in great writers and poets, which is simply the expression in a somewhat extreme form of those mystical moods when the Over Soul so pervades and floods the inner life that the distinct consciousness of separate individuality seems for a time almost lost, and that genuine Pantheism which deliberately violates the ethical consciousness and denies to the soul the possession of any such delegated independence and causality as shall enable it to freely choose between a self-seeking life and a life with God.

¹ Vol. II. p. 157.

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It is, of course, only against this “crystallised” Pantheism that the powerful arguments in this section of Dr. Martineau’s great work are directed. And at the present time, when the inspiring doctrine of the Immanence of God in all nature and all souls is so deeply penetrating both religious and general literature, it behooves our leaders of thought to so interpret this grand doctrine that it may not degenerate into an unmoral Pantheism, and so illustrate, in its later developments, the well-known and true adage *corruptio optimi pessima est*. For nothing, I feel assured, will posterity be more grateful to Dr. Martineau than for the lucidity and force with which he has shown that the facts of our ethical and religious experience imply and demand that the voluntary nature of man must be saved from Pantheistic absorption, and be left standing as, within its sphere, a free cause other than the divine, yet homogeneous with it. And, as he well points out, there is no real difficulty in so saving it, for

“in fact it saves itself, since no one can exercise his own will and believe it to be another’s; and try as he may to merge his own causality in the Divine, it is still he, and not God, that makes the sublime renunciation. You cannot even declare yourself a Pantheist without self-contradiction; for in doing so you reserve your own personality as a thinking and assertive power, that deals with all else as objective.”¹

But it may be objected that this ascription to the human personality of a certain delegated independence of God’s causality excludes God’s direct action from just that region of being, viz., the moral life of man which is the sphere that is nearest to God, and would seem to be most congenial to him. The objector may say: “Are we, then, to find Him in the sunshine and in the rain and to miss Him in our thought, our duty, and our love?”

¹ Vol. II. p. 167.

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"Far from it," replies Dr. Martineau; "he is with us in both; only in the former it is his *immanent* life, in the latter his *transcendent*, with which we are in communion. It is not indeed *He* that, under the mask of our personality, does our thinking, and prays against our temptations, and weeps our tears; these are truly our own; but they are in presence of a sympathy free to answer, spirit to spirit; neither merging in the other, but both at one in the same inmost preferences and affections."¹

To this distinction between the *immanent* and the *transcendent* reality and causality of God exception has been taken by two eminent critics, who are, nevertheless, on the whole, admirers of Dr. Martineau's philosophy. In "Mind" for October, 1888, Professor Flint, in a highly appreciative review of "A Study of Religion," says the distinction between God's Immanency and Transcendancy is not a valid one, for "God, as infinite, cannot transcend his own immensity and eternity, His own being and perfection." But Dr. Martineau does not assert that God transcends himself; he simply maintains that God, in the infinite fulness of his being, transcends his own actual manifestations in the universe of finite physical and psychical entities which he has called into existence. In other words, the Perfect Personality of God is not exhausted in its cosmical expression, but retains an infinite reserve of unmanifested spiritual life, which renders possible personal relations between God and human beings. Dr. Schurman also, who once attended Dr. Martineau's Lectures and speaks with great respect of him, yet says, in his able book on "Belief in God," that "this feature of Dr. Martineau's teaching is an unconscious survival from the deistic conception of God's relation to the universe."² But in another passage he tells us "it is certainly possible that though nature and humanity are manifestations of God, they do not express his whole being any more than our

¹ Vol. II. p. 179.

² P. 176.

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words are an exhaustive expression of our personality. Yet it is equally conceivable that God has revealed his whole being, though man has read but part of the revelation.”¹

So far as I can see, no actual universe could possibly give exhaustive expression to that perfection which is progressively revealed in man's ideals, but which must be eternally real in God. And I believe that Dr. Martineau has conclusively shown that did there not exist in God's being something analogous to, but infinitely greater than, that distinction which we find in ourselves between our manifested life and our complete personality, it would be impossible to give any intelligible *rationale*, either of human free-will, or of prayer, or of felt communion with God, or, indeed, of any of those interpersonal relations between the finite soul and the Eternal which constitute the very essence of man's ethical and spiritual life.

No one interested in the fundamental religious question of the intercourse between God and mankind should omit a study of the very weighty considerations which Dr. Martineau adduces to prove that to deny to God the essential features of Personality, and the power to institute a real moral and spiritual relationship between himself and his rational offspring, is, in effect, to detract from God's perfection. What greater contradiction can there be than to say in one breath that a being is infinite and omnipotent, and yet is unable to so limit his own causality that he may give existence to spirits who can intelligently respond to and commune with the Father within them?

“For these reasons,” concludes Dr. Martineau, “the modern scruples that are felt with regard to the personality of God appear to me not less intellectually weak than they are morally deplorable. . . . As the parts of our nature which thus enter

¹ P. 175.

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into relation with God are precisely those which make us *Persons* and distinguish us from other 'living things,' it is difficult to see why the same term should not be given to the corresponding attributes of rational and moral Will in him; and where the idea is really present and craving expression, I believe that for the most part it will be glad enough of the word. At all events, its contents are just what we rescue from Pantheism. Here it is that the God, immanent through the universe besides, and operating by determinate methods alone, passes into transcendent existence still unpledged, and establishes moral relations with beings whom he has endowed with a certain scope of similar volitional causality. At this point, however, our conclusion, worked out from the causal intuition, encounters a difficulty raised from the moral side. It is said that the preferential power which we suppose ourselves to possess is illusory, and that, on close analysis of the process of volition, it turns out to be but an effect involving no alternative, so that we are the creatures of our past and not otherwise the causes of our future. We are thus obliged, for the protection of our position, to address ourselves to the most perplexing of all questions,—the problem, as it is called, of Determinism and Free-will.”¹

So far as I know there is not to be found in any other treatise such a clear statement of the real questions at issue, in this perennial controversy between Determinism and Libertarianism, as that which is presented in the long and elaborate chapter on the subject in “A Study of Religion.” The doctrine of the Freedom of the Will means that the human Self can in seasons of temptation make a free alternative choice between its conflicting motives, and select either the one or the other of them as its principle of action. This doctrine has been called in question in two ways. In earlier times it was more commonly assailed on *à priori* lines, by what was called the “Law of Causality.” It was asserted, first, truly enough, that it is a law of human thought that every phenomenon must have a cause, and this was followed by another assertion that every cause

¹ “A Study of Religion,” Vol. II. p. 183.

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can under given circumstances produce only one definite effect; the human will, accordingly, it was argued, must, in any particular case, take one definite direction. But this latter assertion Dr. Martineau shows to rest on no necessity of thought at all. The idea of Cause is, as we have seen, derived from our own experience of volition, and hence we have immediately, in the case of our own selves, or wills, instances of causes which, in seasons of temptation, are felt to be capable of producing either of two equally possible effects.

Recent determinists, however, prefer to attack the libertarian position from the empirical or psychological side, and it is more particularly against them that Dr. Martineau's powerful arguments are directed. Psychologists like Professor Bain attempt to explain voluntary action by saying that animals first make muscular movements largely at random, and that some of these being accompanied with pleasure increase the vitality of the creature, and so tend to prolong themselves, while the painful ones, by lowering the vitality, tend to grow weak and die away. The animal has not yet, however, reached the stage of “voluntary action.” But at length pleasure, having been experienced, becomes *desired as an end*. This desire tends to set in motion the muscular movements which have previously been associated with it; and when resistance is made to this by some of the other impulses, there arises what is called the “sense of effort.” The result of the conflict is determined, we are told, by the relative strength of the conflicting impulses.

Dr. Martineau's examination of this necessarian theory of volition is certainly one of the most striking of the many instances of keen psychological analysis contained in his writings. He shows clearly that “Life is *not* a mere wriggling into contact with something nice which thenceforth becomes its master, but contains within itself its own di-

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recting force." *Will* is not felt to be identical with the *strongest spontaneity*, but rather to be a principle which controls the spontaneities; and in our human consciousness, at all events, it takes the shape of *determining an alternative* between co-present and conflicting tendencies. It is very common now, both among empirical psychologists and idealists, to say that the selection is determined by the *character* at the time; that, in fact, the *Character* is identical with the *Self*. This is, as Dr. Martineau clearly shows, the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* which vitiates the modern deterministic reading of man's moral consciousness. If we examine our actual experience in the moral crises of our lives, we cannot, I think, fail to perceive that while it is the state of our character which determines the nature of our temptations, it is not to the character, but to the *Self which has the character* that the ultimate moral decision is due. As Dr. Martineau puts it:—

“Is there not a *Causal self*, over and above the *caused self*, or rather the *caused state and contents* of the self left as a deposit from previous behaviour? Is there not a *judging self*, that knows and weighs the competing motives, over and above the *agitated self that feels them*? The *impulses* are but phænomena of your experience; the *formed habits* are but a condition and attitude of your consciousness, in virtue of which you feel this more and that less; both are *predicates* of yourself as subject, but are not yourself, and cannot be identified with your personal agency. On the contrary, they are *objects of your contemplation*; they lie before you to be known, compared, estimated; they are your data, and you have not to let them alone to work together as they may, but to deal with them as arbiter among their tendencies. In all cases of self-consciousness and self-action there is necessarily this duplication of the Ego into the *objective*, that contains the felt and predicated phenomena at which we look or may look, and the *subjective*, that apprehends and uses them. It is with the latter that the preferential power and personal causality reside; it is this that we mean when we say that ‘it rests with us to decide,’ that ‘our impulses are not to be our masters,’

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that ‘guilty habit cannot be pleaded in excuse for guilty act.’”¹

Hence Dr. Martineau comes to substantially the same conclusion as that reached by another master in ethical analysis, his friend Dr. W. G. Ward, who, in his controversy with Professor Bain, successfully maintained that the Self, in cases of temptation, feels itself free to put forth “anti-impulsive effort,” that is to say, “to offer resistance to the strongest present desire in order to pursue an end indicated by reason.” And, as Dr. Martineau insists, it is in the freedom and causality of this Transcendental human Self, and in the felt personal relationship between this Self and the Transcendence of the Perfect Personality of God, that all that is most truly ethical and spiritual in the inner life of men both takes its origin and finds its explanation. It was this consideration which led Prof. F. W. Newman to say in a letter to Dr. Martineau: “You have rightly shown that Free-will and Ethical Theism stand or fall together.”

It is in vain that Hegelians and empirical determinists try to explain our all-important moral decisions in cases of temptation as the inevitable outcome of the character at the moment. The universal consciousness of mankind protests against such a perverse interpretation of man’s ethical experience. It is no slight confirmation, says Dr. Martineau, of the Free-will reading of human nature that even so cautious a thinker as Prof. H. Sidgwick, with his strong empirical and utilitarian bias, though unable to finally make up his mind between the formidable array of arguments for Determinism and the direct affirmation of consciousness on the side of Free-will, yet could not refrain from saying:—

¹ Vol. II. p. 214.

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"It is impossible for me to think, at each moment, that my volition is completely determined by my formed character and the motives acting upon it."¹

This statement is made in the first edition of the "Methods of Ethics"; the later editions rather soften the sharpness of the utterance, but still emphatically assert the essential principle:—

"Certainly, in the case of actions in which I have distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive is right and reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclination in the past."²

In like manner, as Dr. Martineau shows by a very elaborate exposition and criticism of "Kant's Interpretation of Free-will,"³ that the greatest of modern philosophers has preferred to introduce unintelligibility or inconsistency into his ethical system rather than to do violence to the deliverance of his moral nature. For when, in virtue of his mode of reading the "Category of Causation," he has concluded that it is wholly inconceivable that psychical phenomena should admit of the slightest intrusion of any real freedom of choice between equally possible alternatives, and has to face the question, What, then, becomes of moral responsibility? he does not take the easy Hegelian road and confidently assure his readers that Moral Freedom really involves no alternative choice, and is only another name for "self-determination." On the contrary, he distinguishes between a man's phenomenal self and his noumenal self, and argues that the true Self, which is out of Time, freely chooses its own character, and is therefore justly responsible for it, and for each particular act of

¹ "Methods of Ethics," first edition, p. 51.

² *Ib.*, third edition, p. 64.

³ Vol. II. p. 264-293.

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wrong-doing which that character involves. It is very interesting to compare the different ways in which students of Kant's philosophy have sought to abolish this unintelligible relation between the wholly necessitated phænomenal self and the perfectly free noumenal self; Lotze and Martineau preferring to deny the validity of the so-called Category of Phænomenal Causation, the Hegelians, on the other hand, denying the reality of the assumed Metaphysical Freedom of Choice. There can be little doubt, I venture to think, which of these two ways of making Kant's doctrine self-consistent is the more in accord with the ethical tone of Kant's philosophy.

Of the arguments urged against the doctrine of Free-will there are two which especially call for notice; one is based on the fact that human conduct can to a large extent be foreseen and calculated upon; the other is the theological argument that man's possession of free-will would involve the limitation of God's foreknowledge. The persuasive force of the former largely arises from an erroneous conception of the range within which this freedom of choice can be exercised. That range is really a very narrow one.

“The libertarian,” says Dr. Martineau, “in refusing to surrender a free personal power, does not dispute the influence of either the ‘immediate motives’ or the ‘formed character’ to which exclusively the necessarian attributes the action.”¹

In the innumerable cases, then, when we act in accordance with the prompting of our formed character, those who know us can reckon with almost complete certainty on the decision we shall make. It is only in cases of real moral ‘temptation’; cases, that is, in which our character is undergoing change for good or ill, that prediction becomes intrinsically impossible. But such decisions, though

¹ Vol. II. p. 243.
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they are of vital importance in the formation of our personal characters, form but a very small fraction of our daily acts; and indeed in some natures are of very rare occurrence. Hence it is by no means surprising that on a superficial view many thinkers fall into the fallacy of supposing that if we had psychological insight enough we could foresee all human conduct. So, too, in reference to the statistical argument; it is obvious that the moral characters of various members of a social organism under ordinary circumstances change but slowly, and hence it is to be expected that the statistics of human action should exhibit no great difference from year to year. But in reply to this determinist argument, which Mr. Buckle founded on the "law of averages," Dr. Martineau adduces, in addition to the explanation just given, another consideration based on the "theory of probabilities," and contends that when a very large number of acts of Free-will are taken into account there is a great probability that the numbers of the sinful and of the righteous decisions will approximate to equality.

As to the argument that human Free-will would limit God's foreknowledge, Dr. Martineau accepts the statement; but so far from admitting that this self-limitation of God's prescience at all detracts from his absolute Perfection, he maintains that the Divine Perfection would be manifestly incomplete did it not include those interpersonal relations between God and rational spirits which are only made possible by this voluntary limitation, to some small extent, both of God's causality and of God's omniscience.

And by a similar course of reasoning to that so effectively employed by Prof. W. James, in his striking paper on "The Dilemma of Determinism,"¹ Dr. Martineau shows

¹ See especially the analogy, there indicated, between God's relation to man's free-will and that of an expert chess-player to a novice. "The Will to Believe," p. 181.

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that the Supreme Being, who knows “all the open possibilities” which man’s possession of Free-will implies, and hence is able to provide for all events and combinations, can at length secure, notwithstanding man’s exercise of his Moral Freedom, the realisation of that eternal purpose of Righteousness and Love which is inherent in His essential life, and which is ever being more fully revealed in the progressive Moral Ideals of Society.

Thus does Dr. Martineau give further confirmation to the argument for Theism by showing that the Cosmos is so constituted, that while it contains enough of determinateness to meet all the needs of science and morality, there still is left a sphere of indeterminateness adequate for the existence of true moral responsibility, and of the highest and deepest spiritual communion between God and the Soul.

This long discussion is brought to a close by an admirable section on “The Ethics of Necessity and Free-will,” in which it is made abundantly clear that while the deterministic reading of Universe will, in thoughtful minds, lead to a course of personal conduct, and of social usage and law which does not in outward form differ greatly from that which the libertarian theory enjoins, yet in regard to the inmost sentiment and spirit of human action the results of the two theories are entirely unlike each other; for

“the language of Ethics, when translated into necessarian formulas, parts with all conceptions distinctly moral, and becomes simply descriptive of phenomena in natural history. It tells us what has been, what is, what probably will be; but not (unless in an altered sense) what *ought to be*. Responsibility, obligation, merit, guilt, remorse, forgiveness, justice, drop from its vocabulary, or remain there only to mislead.”¹

Nor can this fundamental divergence of belief concerning the origin of moral obligation and the nature of its

¹ Vol. II. p. 300.

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authority fail to lead to different practical results. Dr. Martineau illustrates this in the case of the sentiments which prompt to educational and other social reforms; and points out that it is especially conspicuous in the different views taken of Sin and Crime, and of the most effectual means of dealing with them. If all good and ill desert be denied to man, as by a consistent determinist it must be, and we agree with Professor Tyndall that the wickedness of men must be put in the same category with the devastations of nature, genuine moral condemnation becomes impossible, and punishment, being no longer able to appeal for its justification to the responsive conscience of the sinner or criminal, must inevitably lose much of its efficiency; for

“the motive force of Law and opinion is to be sought, not in its mere command over sentient pleasures and pains, but in its correspondence with the retributory awards of the common moral sense; and wherever, from disbelief in justice and the substitution of management, this correspondence is disregarded, it may be possible to organise some sort of a human menagerie, but not a civilised society great among historical States.”¹

¹ Vol. II. p. 299.

Chapter IX

APPRECIATIONS AND CRITICISMS

THE preceding chapters complete the general survey of Dr. Martineau's philosophical writings; for the four chapters which form the First Book of the "Seat of Authority in Religion," and which were previously published in "Old and New" in 1872-1873, simply present in a briefer and somewhat more popular form ideas which are more fully expounded in the two great philosophical works. Dr. Drummond, in the former part of this work, has included these four chapters in the outline which he has given of the whole of the "Seat of Authority."

In this final chapter I will briefly deal with the more important estimates and criticisms which Dr. Martineau's philosophical works have called forth; and in so doing I will attempt, though with no little diffidence, to explain the circumstance that in some of the many very high appreciations of Dr. Martineau's invaluable services to philosophy and religion there has mingled an undertone of partial dissatisfaction with certain features of his philosophical teaching.

At the beginning of the sixth chapter I divided religious philosophers into three classes, — Intellectualists, Ethicists, and Spiritualists or Mystics. In so doing I virtually followed the distinction drawn, in Dr. Martineau's admirable sermon on "The Three Stages in Unitarian Theology," between the Religion of *Causation*, the Religion of *Conscience*, and the Religion of the *Spirit*. I then stated the opinion that Dr. Martineau is pre-eminently

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the representative of the Religion of Conscience, but added that the spiritual or mystic side of religious experience also finds distinct and glowing expression in his works. For instance, in the sermon in which the above distinction is made, he says: —

“God is a Spirit, in so far as he is not locked up in the invariable order of the world; and there is a spirit in Man, in so far as he is not disposed of by his organism and his dwelling-place, but rises in thought and directs himself in affection to what is above them. Here, then, it is that there is room for true communion, — that Spirit may meet Spirit, and that the sacred silence may itself speak the exchange of love. . . . The life with God, then, of which saintly men in every age have testified, is no illusion of enthusiasm, but an ascent, through simple surrender, to the higher region of the soul, the very watch-tower whence there is the clearest and the largest view.”¹

This mystical side of Dr. Martineau's thought is thus emphasised in the memorial article in the “Spectator,”² which is probably from the pen of his old pupil Mr. R. H. Hutton: —

“We doubt whether the historian of the English thought of our time will credit Martineau with any distinct modification of the theological or philosophical opinions of this age. It was something that went below opinion; it was a revelation of spiritual character and power. That was the impressive thing in James Martineau. Holding this view, we should, perhaps, appraise differently from some the value of his writings. Important as are such of his later works as the ‘Types of Ethical Theory’ or the ‘Seat of Authority in Religion,’ we have no hesitation in saying that in his wonderful sermons known collectively as ‘Hours of Thought on Sacred Things,’ and in his ‘Endeavours after the Christian Life,’ the real Martineau, the spiritual teacher who will endure, has accomplished his greatest and finest work. . . . Spirit speaks to spirit in these pages, which are worthy of the finest mysticism of the Catholic Church at her best, while at the same time

¹ “Essays, Reviews, and Addresses,” Vol. IV. p. 579, 580.

² Jan. 27, 1900.

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manly, healthy, in harmony with human reason, and couched in a singularly noble and remarkable prose style."

And in a similar strain Dr. Forsyth writes:—

"Martineau's theology was of the Greek and not the Latin type. He was Greek in his subtlety, in his grace, in his lucidity, in his ideality. But he was a very Christian Greek; and he found the food of his soul among the great saints of Hebraism, Catholicism, and Evangelicalism. No man who so disowned the Catholic theology ever made so much use of the classics of Catholic and Evangelical devotion. He thought like a Socinian and prayed like a Pietist. His sermons, his prayers, his hymn-book are treasures of devotion, especially if we supplement them with a more adequate salvation and descend on them from a higher cross. He was a severe critic, but he was also a profound mystic."¹

With these two testimonies, however, must be compared that borne by the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, in his striking Memorial Address, at the Meeting of the National Conference at Leicester in 1900. In that Address the beneficent result of Dr. Martineau's great influence over the thought of his time is thus admirably depicted:—

"The victory which the ideas of God, and the Soul, and Immortality are now beginning to secure over their enemies is largely due to Martineau's stern and quiet leadership, under the banners of the intellect and the conscience, of the soldiers of religion. He taught, strictly within the realms of philosophy and criticism, that all science begins and ends in God; and all ethics begin and end in God; and that without the postulate of the soul in man akin to God and going to Him, science and ethic have no secure foundation. No other man has done this needful work so firmly or so clearly as he has done. Even the Church of England, with its cry 'Can any good thing come out of the Unitarian Village,' has been goaded into dim confessions of his use. On the whole, I have no doubt that the battle is practically won against the forces of godless science and godless ethics, and that Martineau has been the best builder, among many others, of a religion, bound

¹ "London Quarterly Review," April, 1900, p. 217.

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up with Jesus Christ, rooted in the confession of the Fatherhood of God, which is agreeable to reason, and in full accordance with the ethical progress of man in history."

But Mr. Brooke's estimate of the mystic insight of Dr. Martineau's mind is different from that given in the former quotations.

"I believe," he says, "that Dr. Martineau arrived at the close-fibred convictions he had concerning the predominance of the things of the spirit by passing first through the things of the intellect and the conscience in their relation to God; but that is not the path the man takes to whom the things of the spirit are natural, and therefore expressed with ease and passion. Such a man, like the writer of the Gospel of St. John, first lives in the spirit, and then, from the spirit, realises God in the conscience and the intellect. Martineau, on the other hand, was led to the spiritual life by discovering where the conscience and the intellect failed in finding the last and highest truths of God and man. It is for that reason, I think, that he had not, in his work, the spiritual world under his command as fully as he had the intellectual and moral worlds. In fact, he was not born with a large and piercing imagination, nor with the deep emotions of a mystic."

It is not difficult to understand the grounds on which Mr. Brooke has reached the conclusion that Mysticism was not naturally congenial to Dr. Martineau's soul, for there assuredly are, both on the intellectual and ethical sides of his philosophy, certain modes of conception which are in a high degree unfavourable to the recognition and adequate appreciation of the mystical element in man's religious experience; and if Dr. Martineau had allowed the spontaneous expression of his deepest religious feeling to be always restrained and moulded by the intellectual framework of his philosophy, the world would have lacked, I believe, some of his divinest utterances. But the impression which is left on my mind by the study of his writings, and by personal intercourse with him, is not that he was devoid of the mystical temperament, — for, I think, on the con-

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trary, he possessed it in abundance, — but that his peculiar epistemology on the one hand, and the exceptional intensity of his ethical consciousness on the other, rendered him unable to fully harmonise his warm and deep mystical emotions with his formulated philosophy.

I have already indicated, in the third and fifth chapters, features in Dr. Martineau's Epistemology (on that side of it, I mean, where it treats of man's knowledge of God) which appear open to question; and I will now describe more precisely where, I venture to think, his formal philosophy requires modification in order to bring it into full accord with the many profound passages in his writings, in which the deep spirituality of his nature found expression. The necessary limits of this closing chapter, however, will allow me only to touch the skirts of a deeply interesting subject, the full exploration of which would require the careful comparison of Dr. Martineau's views with those of the Rev. J. H. Thom, Dr. F. H. Hedge, Prof. C. C. Everett, and other competent expositors of man's religious experience. In the first place, then, I will endeavour to explain why the intensity of Dr. Martineau's *ethical* sentiments tends, at times, to obscure the complete recognition and interpretation of his *mystical* experiences. No one has shown more lucidly than he has that in all our Ideals there is revealed a Divine Presence which, though felt *in* us, is also felt to be not *of* us, so that we can clearly distinguish between this self-revelation of the immanent God, which carries with it the sense of an *objective* reality, and those *subjective* desires, affections, and sympathies which pertain to us as separate individuals. But though the Divine Ideal is ever more or less vividly present in our consciousness, and is that which gives to our life all its highest features, and all its truest charms and blessedness, yet it first distinctly reveals itself and its authority when it *resists* and *condemns* our per-

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sonal desires and aims. Now it is this aspect of the Ideal as opposing us, commanding us, obliging us which is the characteristic feature of our *ethical* consciousness; and it is this experience which is a continual warning to us against falling into the paralysing fallacy of supposing that our lives are nothing more than transient modes or phases of God's eternal life. Here it is we learn our true individuality, and learn also, what Kant so clearly saw, the quite infinite value of a "Good Will." It is evident, I think, that what mainly constitutes the incalculable worth of Dr. Martineau's writings, and renders them so seasonable and needful at the present time, is the emphasis with which he insists on, and the clearness with which he expounds, this essential truth in man's relationship with God. It is this which will make his philosophy live when the popular pantheisms which now captivate so many minds shall have had their day and ceased to be; for this truth rests on the daily deliverance of our moral consciousness; it is the truth to which Judaism, through the mouth of its great prophets and singers, has borne and will bear immortal testimony.

But while the Ideal at times resists us, it also ever abides with us, and its positive presence is a most real and influential factor in all the divinest experiences of life. God is not only revealed in the stern voice of Conscience, in the "Categorical Imperative," but also in the apprehension of the Beautiful and in the sentiments of spiritual Love, in which man most deeply feels his intimate communion with God, and his fundamental spiritual unity with all his fellow-men. It is these experiences which the Mystic profoundly realises and cherishes; and no earnest student of Dr. Martineau's writings can doubt that such experiences were very real and dear to him. This it was which prompted him to speak with enthusiasm of Tauler and the "*Theologia Germanica*," and to warmly appreciate the sacred songs

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of Charles Wesley and the evangelical piety of Hannah More.

Yet it must at the same time be admitted that he does not expressly give to this immediate apprehension of God its due place in his formulated philosophy. The *Æsthetic Ideal* is not sufficiently recognised as an important phase in the self-revelation of God; and in connection with this subject there occurs the statement (to which, I think, most poets and artists would demur) that the gradations of Beauty "remain upon the level of ideal facts, and do not rise into imperative Law subjecting us to a transcendent relation that asks the sacrifice of ourselves."¹ It is noteworthy, too, that though both in "A Study of Religion" and in the "Types of Ethical Theory" Dr. Martineau gives a most lucid and profound analysis of our moral consciousness, he does not recognise in that consciousness a direct apprehension of God's presence and character, but, on the contrary, by a *process of inference* reaches the idea of God as that of "another Person greater and higher and of deeper insight."²

The truth appears to be that Dr. Martineau's writings present two modes of conceiving God; one of which is Deistic or Hebraic, while the other is distinctly and intensely Christian. The first mode represents God as "another and higher Person"; the second represents Him as "the Soul of souls." The former conception rests upon an *inferential* knowledge of God, derived either from the experience of God's resistance to our will through the forces of Nature, or from God's felt restraint upon us in the voice of Conscience. In both cases the Supreme Being is regarded as completely separated from the human soul, and his existence and character are apprehended and dem-

¹ "A Study of Religion," Vol. II. p. 27.

² "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II. p. 104. Cf. Dr. Mellone's "Leaders of Religious Thought," p. 120.

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onstrated by a process of reasoning. A Theism of this stamp is correctly designated Rationalism; if it is reached by the argument from Causation it becomes "Intellectual Rationalism"; if by way of the Conscience, "Ethical Rationalism."

Now, as Dr. Caldecott¹ in his admirable exposition and criticism of Dr. Martineau's system points out, the first superficial impression which Dr. Martineau's philosophy of religion makes upon the reader is that it is a combination of Intellectual and Ethical Rationalism. And this impression is, I believe, supported by Dr. Martineau's account of the principle of "Relativity of Knowledge" as applied to God. He justly distinguishes between *Noümena* and *Phænomena*. "Noümena," he says, "are objects of the Understanding only, while Phænomena are objects of Sensible Perception."² The human self is a *noümenon*; so are the metaphysical substances and causes which underlie and effect the *phænomena* of nature. It is evident that such *noümena* are known, and can only be known, *inferentially*. The only *noümenon* we know directly is our own consciousness; and by this as our only clue we explain all other *noümena*. Thus we gain a knowledge of our fellow-men by interpreting their actions and their words after the analogy of our own immediately felt inner life; and what we know, or speculate about, in respect to the energies of nature, all rests on an assumed analogy between the substances and forces of nature and our personal self and its volitional efforts. Now the important matter is that in Dr. Martineau's formal Epistemology man's mode of knowing the self-existent and immanent *noümenon*, God, is not distinguished from his mode of knowing created *noümena*;

¹ "The Philosophy of Religion in England and America." By Alfred Caldecott, D.D., Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy in King's College, London, p. 343 *seq.*

² "A Study of Religion," Vol. I. p. 115.

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and it is distinctly stated that, like all other noumena, He can be known only "as He is revealed to our cognitive faculties."¹ Hence the knowledge of God as thus explained is an *inferential knowledge*; it is knowledge, therefore, which necessarily consists in our interpretation of God's nature in terms of our own consciousness; and consequently God can, in this way, be conceived of only as a magnified man, as "another and higher Person."

If this were a complete account of Dr. Martineau's view of man's knowledge of God, I have no hesitation in saying that both his philosophy and his sermons would lose much of their characteristic depth and beauty. The idea of God as thus conceived can neither explain the divine authority of conscience, nor the soul's sense of real communion with the Father within. It is this "rationalistic" or Deistic side of Dr. Martineau's philosophy which lends some justification to the criticism that his Theism is but "his individualism writ large," and which explains why there is a certain truth in the following remark made by one of Dr. Martineau's warmest admirers and most frequent correspondents, the Rev. A. H. Crawford, M.A.,² in a very thoughtful paper on "James Martineau as a Religious Teacher":—

"He dreaded all approaches to Pantheism, even though he habitually spoke of God as 'the Soul of all souls.' He never learnt to sympathise with that deep feeling of the meagreness of our present sharply individualised personality which urges some deep and reflective spirits to seek for some satisfying partnership; Solitude had no terrors for him. His was essentially a lonely and not a social religion, almost as lonely, as that of the ascetic Pascal."³

¹ "A Study of Religion," p. 117.

² Author of "Enigmas of the Spiritual Life" and "Christian Instincts and Modern Doubts."

³ With this view should be compared the following account of Dr. Martineau's "Ethical Individualism," by Dr. A. Caldecott: "Yet Martineau's view of the individual is not that man is a 'lonely' being who wakes all his

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But such criticism does not do justice to Dr. Martineau's philosophy as a whole. The *ethical* rationalist inevitably tends to become an "Intuitivist" or Mystic, just as Judaic Theism naturally developed into Christian Theism. It is impossible for the thinker whose moral consciousness is at all deep and intense to analyse that consciousness without becoming aware that in it we have a direct and immediate, and not merely an inferential, insight into God's nature. Hence, as Dr. Caldecott clearly shows, Dr. Martineau's Intellectual and Ethical Rationalism really rests on, and is illustrative and confirmative of, a fundamental "Intuitive" apprehension of God's being and character; although this basal "Intuition" finds no adequate recognition in the formal philosophy. Mr. Crawford truly says that Dr. Martineau habitually spoke of God as the "Soul of all souls"; and assuredly these words far more adequately express the central and vital principle of his philosophy of religion than does the description of God as "another and higher Person." Had he conceived of God in this latter way, he might indeed have held, with some of the Deists, that men are united in society by their possession in common of rationality and a moral sense, but he would not have reached the deeper and truer conception that "the social union is no mere forensic abstraction, but a concrete though spiritual form of life, penetrating and partly constituting all persons belonging to it, so that only as fractions of it do they become human integers themselves."¹

It is this idea of the spiritual life of God holding all

own echoes: society is the means of 'discovering us to ourselves'; but the inherent essence after all is a self-judgment made by every man as a type of human nature; we are all members of a kind, 'my fellow is myself over again'; and he thinks that by taking this view our experiences enable us to 'sweep into the widest generality,' yet 'without asking a question of our fellow-men,' the 'revelation of authority to one mind being valid for all' (p. 352). Cf. also Dr. Mellone's "Leaders of Religious Thought," pp. 135, 183.

¹ "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II. p. 403.

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nature and humanity in its embrace and gradually manifesting its essential character in and through them that inspires two of his greatest chapters,—that on “Conscience Developed into Social Consensus and Religion,” in the “Types of Ethical Theory,” and that on “Triumphs of Force in History,” in “A Study of Religion.”

Such an insight into the immanent presence of God as the unifying principle which makes evolution intelligible and combines present and past history into one continuous and unfolding drama, is only possible to thinkers who clearly conceive of God as the “Soul of souls.” Dr. Martineau further distinctly teaches that such a conception could not arise did not the Eternal directly reveal Himself in the human consciousness, and did not man possess a power of immediately apprehending this revelation.

“In the very constitution,” he says, “of the human soul there is provision for an immediate apprehension of God.”¹ Again, “All that we believe without us we must first feel within us; and it is the one sufficient proof of the grandeur and awfulness of our nature that we have faith in God; for no merely finite being can possibly believe the infinite.”²

In this apprehension, then, of God as the Infinite, including all finite existences, as the immanent Absolute on whom all Noümena, whether physical or psychical, depend, and who progressively manifests his character in the Ideals of Truth, Beauty, Righteousness, and Love, we have the inmost essence of Dr. Martineau’s religious philosophy; and this fundamental conception of God as the Soul of souls not only gives the *rationale* of all mystical experiences, but it also inspires and justifies that belief in substantiality and solidarity of the human race, which is the vital principle not only of Christianity but of all true sociological science. That Dr. Martineau really based his

¹ “Seat of Authority,” p. 651.

² “Endeavours after the Christian Life,” Vol. I. p. 2.

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religion and his philosophy on this immediate vision of the self-revealing God is clearly shown by the passages I have already quoted; but his writings abound in such evidences. Thus in one of his earliest works, the "Endeavours," he says:—

"I pretend not to draw the untraceable line that separates his being from ours. The decisions of the Will, doubtless, are our own, and constitute the proper sphere of our personal agency. But in a region higher than the Will—the realm of spontaneous thought and emotion—there is scope enough for his 'abode with us.' Whatever is most deep within us is the reflection of himself. All our better love, and higher aspirations, are the answering movements of our nature in harmonious obedience to his spirit. Whatever dawn of blessed sanctity, and wakening of purer perceptions, opens on our consciousness, are the sweet touch of his morning light within us. His inspiration is perennial; and he never ceases to work within us, if we consent to will and to do his good pleasure. . . . Finding a Holy of Holies within us, we need not curiously ask whether its secret voices are of ourselves or of the Father. Christ felt how, within the depths of our spiritual nature, the personalities of Heaven and earth might become entwined together and indissolubly blended: 'Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, and they also one in us.' And so the Holy spirit within us, the spirit of Christ, and the spirit of God are, after all, but one;—a blessed Trinity, our part in which gives to our souls a dignity most humbling yet august."¹

And in like manner, in his eightieth year, when speaking of God's self-revelation in the conscience:—

"I care not whether this be called an *immediate vision* of God in the experiences of conscience, or whether it be taken as an *inference* drawn from the data they supply. It is the truth contained in them; with one man it may be only implicitly felt in their solemn and mystic character; with another, explicitly and immediately seen emerging from them as they come, and making him the Seer of God rather than the reasoner about him. In any case, the constitution of our moral nature is unintelligible, except as living in response to

¹ "Endeavours after a Christian Life," Vol. II. p. 83, 84.

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an objective Perfection pervading the universe with Holy Law.”¹

But perhaps the most adequate expression of this central principle of both his faith and his philosophy was given to the world when, in his ninetieth year, he penned his searching criticism of Mr. Balfour’s “Foundations of Belief”:—

“A secret feeling of this overflow of the Divine essence into humanity contributed, I believe, not a little to the intensity, at first view so strange, of the Arian controversy. Was the ‘person’ of ‘the Son’ of essence *like* the Father’s? or of the very essence of the Father? According to the Arians, the former; for they ranked him as still among the ‘creatures’ of the Divine hand, though of a high order; according to the Athanasians, the latter; for He was *uncreated*, not an organised product brought into a certain grade, however eminent, of thinking and acting life on terminable lease, but *spirit itself*, with its creative and self-directing powers, commissioned freely to conduct the Divine administration of an appointed finite province of time and space. Is not this, then, a true conception that we see in the mind of Christ the very essence of the mind of God in what He loves and requires to see in us; not the passiveness of an instrument or the obedience of a creature, but the filial devotion, the self-renunciation, the enthusiasm of all righteous affections which must for ever constitute the ethics of all worlds? In opening to us this co-essentiality with God through His own personality, did He show us what is true of His own individuality alone? On the contrary, He stands, in virtue of it, as the spiritual head of mankind, and what you predicate of Him in actuality is predicable of all in possibility. This interpretation of His life on earth carries the Divine essence claimed for Him into our nature as His brethren. In Him as our representative, we learn our summons and receive our adoption as children of God. The ‘Incarnation,’ thus extended from the person of Christ to the nature of man, may fitly be called ‘the central mystery of revealed religion.’”²

In this doctrine of the co-essentiality of men with God and, therefore, with each other, when conjoined with the

¹ “A Study of Religion,” Vol. II. p. 28.

² “Nineteenth Century,” April, 1895, p. 564.

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doctrine of human Free-will which finds such complete expression in Dr. Martineau's writings, we have a philosophy which accords with the general moral and religious experience of mankind; and, therefore, for myself, I cannot but feel assured that it is in the direction to which the kindred metaphysical systems of Lotze and Martineau point that we must look for that much-needed interpretation of the cosmos in which the Universal Spiritual Principle is so conceived as not to cancel the true personality and responsibility of man.¹

The view taken in this chapter of Dr. Martineau's position in the realm of religious thought agrees in the main, I believe, with that expressed in Dr. Alfred Caldecott's elaborate analysis and estimate of Dr. Martineau's philosophy of religion; and I count myself fortunate that, in conclusion, I can present the result of this long survey of my revered teacher's philosophical work, not in the language, which might perhaps be thought too eulogistic, of a life-long and devoted disciple, but in the following well-weighed and wholly unbiassed words of a remarkably clear-sighted expositor and critic:—

“But when these deficiencies are noted and allowed for, the student of the philosophy of religion will still feel that in Martineau we have one of the great masters of the subject, one of the men who have made contributions of permanent value to its literature in Great Britain. His treatment of Causality made the intelligent interpretation of the cosmos *sauter aux yeux* once more in an age when mechanical theory was enveloping men with mist. His emphasis on the authority of conscience marks him as the truest successor of Butler in the history of English Ethics, making us, children of Utilitarianism as so many of us are, once more feel the ‘law over us which is not of our making,’ the obligation which is ‘undetermined from our will, independent of our idiosyncrasies,’ and impressing once more that sense of moral objectivity which

¹ Cf. Mr. W. L. Courtney's admirable essay on “Dr. Martineau's Theology,” in “Studies at Leisure,” p. 217.

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has to so many been the fulcrum of religious conviction. In his dealing with the objections and difficulties in the way of belief in a Perfect Ruler, Martineau draws on a rich store of moral and spiritual experience and gives us a result of enduring value. Lastly, his insistence on the personal nature of religious conviction, with the self-evidence and self-disclosure which are involved in it, and the necessity of substituting a *Religion of Consciousness for the Religion of Custom*, — to use an early phrase of his own, — though pressed to exaggeration and consequent defect in other directions, brings into relief one aspect of religious faith which can never for a moment be obscured without pernicious consequences to itself. If to these excellences we add the extraordinary profusion of delicate analyses of experience, of expressions of original thought and profound personal feeling, given to us in nervous, lucid, and most richly varied English, we can see that Martineau has secured one of the places of highest honour in the literature of our English Theism, and has given us many thoughts of the kind which raise the whole level of man's religious meditations.”¹

¹ “The Philosophy of Religion in England and America,” p. 352.

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
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